menon-en.PDF

President: Jacques DELORS

LEADING FROM BEHIND: BRITAIN

AND THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY

Anand MENON

Research and European Issues N°31

January 2004

STUDY AVAILABLE IN FRENCH AND ENGLISH

http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/Etud31-fr.pdf

This publication benefits from the financial support of the European Commission. Nevertheless its

content is the sole responsibility of the author. Neither the European Commission nor Notre Europe

are to be held responsible for the manner in which the information in this text may be used.

This may be reproducted if the source cited.

Anand MENON

Director of the European Research Institute at the University of Birmingham: Professor

Anand Menon came to Birmingham in the spring of 2001 from a post at Oxford University.

He has previously been on the staff of the West European Union for Security Studies in Paris

and at New York, Columbia, Massachusetts, and (Université Libre) Brussels Universities as

well as having been a consultant to the World Bank and a NATO Research Fellow. He is a

regular speaker for the US State Department on matters of European Politics.

The author would like to express his thanks to all those – over fifty in number – working in the

EU, Britain and other member states, who consented to be interviewed off the record as part

of this research. Several of them were also kind enough to comment on a draft version of this

text. He is also grateful to Ian Anderson for invaluable research assistance, and to David

Hine for his perceptive comments.

Notre Europe

Notre Europe is an independent research and policy unit whose objective is the study of

Europe – its history and civilisations, integration process and future prospects. The

association was founded by Jacques Delors in the autumn of 1996. It has a small team of in-

house researchers from various countries.

Notre Europe participates in public debate in two ways. First, publishing internal research

papers and second, collaborating with outside researchers and academics to contribute to the

debate on European issues. These documents are made available to a limited number of

decision-makers, politicians, socio-economists, academics and diplomats in the various EU

Member States, but are systematically put on our website.

The association also organises meetings, conferences and seminars in association with other

institutions or partners. Proceedings are written in order to disseminate the main arguments

raised during the event.

FOREWORD

This British – and critical – analysis of the "constitutional process" launched at the European

Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001, which went through a highly animated and

productive phase during the European Convention before reaching the current deadlock at the

European Council meeting in Brussels in December 2003, will no doubt be of interest to

many. As one might expect from a sharp, penetrating author such as Anand Menon, the

following account of this inconclusive and intense period of the Union's history is somewhat

less consensual than most of the grey literature on the topic.

But above all, it provides clear insights into a change of heart which astonished most

observers, from the pro-active, imaginative and positive attitude of the British delegation

during the first phase of the Convention to its much more customary back-footed behaviour at

the close of the negotiations. The pundits will certainly be interested by the assertion that the

British internal coordination machine, widely held to be the best in Europe, is perfectly

adapted to processing day-to-day business but ran into serious difficulties when it had to deal

with more strategic issues.

Even more significant, to my mind, is the author's analysis of the shift in British objectives.

The initial vision was very ambitious: to restore the Union's institutional balance from the top

down by strengthening all of its components, including the Commission (the emphasis is

mine, but the reader will find many quotes which are quite clear on this point). To be sure,

Britain will be Britain and this ambition was anything but federalist (the famous "F" word...),

in particular as regards the role allocated to the Commission: a super-administration with

acknowledged qualities, but certainly not a European executive. Even so, British policy

underwent a clear change of tack towards defiance for any institutional progress, frequently

expressed with Eurosceptic overtones. The author suggests two causes, probably

interconnected, for this state of affairs: the rift which the Iraq crisis opened up between the

main partners and the increasing pressure from the British media and public opinion. With an

ultimate paradox as the result: the United Kingdom secured a draft constitutional treaty which

took on board virtually all of its demands, but continued to fight the text nonetheless.

The author is tempted to consider that this attitude on the part of New Labour is tantamount to

shooting itself in the foot, since the party is neither benefiting from its negotiation successes

nor playing a key role in Europe. For my part, I fail to see who could be happy at the sight of

the United Kingdom giving up the sincere ambition it had at the start of the "negotiations" –

to enable the Union's institutions to cope with enlargement – for a timid attitude of general

distrust. Being an irrepressible optimist, I trust that this shall be only a temporary setback, and

that the United Kingdom will soon rejoin the "constitutional" debate – with its own views on

what the Union should be, of course, but also with the ambition of strengthening it in order to

make a success of enlargement.

Jacques Delors

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

I – BRITAIN, THE CONVENTION AND THE IGC 4

1. The run-up 4

2. The Convention 7

II – THE CONVENTION OUTCOME AND BEYOND 18

1. British reactions and the IGC 18

2. The Brussels Summit 22

II – EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME 25

1. The Convention 25

2. Britain 28

3. The Convention in Britain 30

IV – THE NEGOCIATIONS IN BROADER: CONTEXT 40

CONCLUSION 47

BIBLIOGRAPHY 50

ANNEX 51

Annex 1: Tax and Red lines: constitutional text 51

Annex 2: the European Constitutional Treaty: a chronology of key events 52

Annex 3: key interventions of British representatives 60

Annex 4: timetable of Convention meetings 62

‘We will not have influence if we only ever see Europe as in opposition to Britain and become

back-markers for further co-operation, always arguing thus far but no further’.

Tony Blair, speech to the European Research Institute, University of Birmingham, 23

November 2001

‘…it is important to recognise that we have our red lines and we are maintaining them’

Tony Blair, statement after the formal handing over of the draft constitutional treaty to the

European Council, 20 June 2003

INTRODUCTION

The dust has yet to settle fully on the Intergovernmental Conference that ended so

ignominiously in Brussels last December. And, of course, the debate over the European

Union’s constitutional future will now drag on – some are saying into 2005 – as the member

states attempt to agree on a new constitutional treaty.

This paper examines the role of Britain in the negotiations that commenced with the creation

of a Convention on the Future of Europe at the Laeken summit of December 2001. Its aims

are broadly fourfold. First, and most simply, to describe the approach to, and behaviour

within, the negotiations of the British representatives. Second, to consider the extent to which,

if at all, the constitutional text agreed on by the Convention and further amended by the IGC

reflected British concerns and preferences. Third, to explain how this outcome came about,

and finally, to place this analysis within the wider context of Prime Minister Blair’s ambitions

concerning the UK’s place within the European Union.

The argument presented below runs as follows. London approached the Convention with a

clear set of priorities focusing on the need to make the EU more effective. In specific terms,

this entailed ensuring the creation of a permanent chair for the European Council and the

provision of a role for national parliaments in the oversight of subsidiarity. It also implied the

strengthening of the European Commission, as an essential element of a well-functioning

Union. During the first half of the Convention, until around December 2002, Britain proved

remarkably successful in promoting its priorities, a success reflected in the notably positive

tone struck by all those involved with the negotiations.

Things changed, however, in the early part of 2003, as London’s upbeat tone was quickly

replaced by a more negative and critical approach to the negotiations. The change in tone was

accompanied by a shift in policy objectives, as British negotiators came to focus more on

blocking initiatives they opposed than on putting forward a proactive agenda of their own.

Insofar as an agenda survived, all references to a need to strengthen the Commission were

dropped in favour of rhetoric critical of the supranational institutions and apparently fearful of

the development of some kind of European superstate.

This was somewhat paradoxical if only because, in contrast to the increasing defensiveness of

London’s approach, the final draft of the constitutional treaty chimed remarkably well with

the stated preferences and priorities of its negotiators. That this was so was due in no small

part to the effectiveness of the British representatives within the Convention. Moreover, all

indications are that the final treaty drafts that were being negotiated at Brussels before the collapse of

the summit reflected these preferences and priorities still more faithfully.

The mismatch between the substance of what was achieved and the increasingly bitter rhetoric

that accompanied it is explicable to no small extent in terms of political developments within

Britain. As the Convention neared its endgame, it became an object of political debate at

home. The Government found itself faced with a hostile media and the carping of a

eurosceptic opposition in parliament which rallied opposition to the constitutional treaty –

including amongst Labour backbenchers - round the flag of the need for a referendum.

It was because of increasingly vociferous domestic political opposition to the constitutional

treaty that British rhetoric hardened and its priorities within the Convention shifted.

Consequently, while the Government managed to ensure its priorities were reflected in the

final outcome, these differed from the ones expressed when it was not running scared of a

hostile domestic political environment.

Consequently - and perhaps the ultimate irony of all this - Britain’s achievement in shaping

the constitutional treaty was a pyrrhic one when put in the context of the Government’s stated

ambitions for the country’s developing relationship with the Union. Not only did the final

text not reflect what had been a central concern of British officials only a year earlier –

notably a strengthened Commission – but the style in which that outcome was achieved

served to reinforce still further the negative stereotypes about ‘Europe’ that are all too

common in the UK. And this under a government which, on more than one occasion, had

stated its intention to tackle anti-European prejudice head on, and sell the positive case for

deeper British involvement in the Union. Political considerations, therefore, drove a strategy

aimed at short term political damage limitation rather than progress towards the longer term

ambition so frequently expressed by Tony Blair of a more confident Britain exercising

leadership and influence within the Union.

The following discussion is divided into four parts. Part One examines British involvement in

the Convention on the Future of Europe; the following part analyses Britain’s performance in

the succeeding intergovernmental conference, and compares the constitutional treaty that

emerged from the negotiations with stated British preferences. Section three attempts to

explain this outcome, pointing in particular to the importance of the increasingly bitter

domestic dispute about the constitutional treaty which played a crucial role in shaping the

attitude of the government towards the negotiations. Section four, finally, considers the

implications of the negotiations for Britain’s place in the EU more generally.

I - BRITAIN, THE CONVENTION AND THE IGC

The run-up

Towards Laeken

Prior to the Laeken summit, which was formally to enshrine the idea of a Convention, the

British attitude towards proposals to create such a body was distinctly unenthusiastic. For one

thing, London’s experience with EU Conventions was hardly positive. That which had drafted

the Charter of Fundamental Rights had taken many in the UK by surprise with the way in

which it had achieved consensus and produced a text that many in Whitehall and Westminster

considered deeply flawed. For another, British officials were not in favour of launching a

process over which governments could not exercise complete control.

Initial concerns were voiced in dramatic fashion in a Cabinet meeting in early 2002. As

reported some months later by Blair’s cabinet colleague Peter Hain, the Prime Minister:

“… quite startled people at an informal Cabinet committee with officials by saying that the

outcome of the Convention is absolutely fundamental. It will define the relationship between

Britain and the rest of Europe, the prospects for the euro, and it would last for

generations…..He said it was more important than Iraq, which rather startled people round

the table, in the sense that the European issue would be with us for generations

(The Times 9 September 2003).

Whilst one can question Mr Hain’s judgement in bringing this up in this way at this time (see

below), the message the Prime Minister was conveying to colleagues was clear: Britain was

playing for high stakes in the Convention and would have to live with its consequences for a

long time. The unease felt in Whitehall was summed up by a senior Foreign Office official:

for him, the Convention was a matter of ‘damage control’.

The Summit

British hesitancy about a Convention to discuss the future of the Union was mollified

significantly by the text of the Laeken declaration. Appended as an annex to the Presidency

conclusions of the Laeken summit of December 2001, this formally announced the creation,

and spelled out the terms of reference of, the forthcoming Convention (Presidency 2001).

This section is based heavily on Menon (2003)

Reading the Laeken declaration, one cannot but be struck by the degree to which it reflected

British anxieties about both the Convention itself, and European integration more generally.

The former was explicitly limited in scope, with the prospect of an EU constitution (to which

Blair himself (2002) had voiced his hostility) consigned to a long term future. The

Convention, moreover, was restricted to the task of producing a document which ‘may

comprise different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or

recommendations if consensus is achieved’. Regardless of what it was to produce, its findings

were in no sense to be binding. Thus the final document would provide merely a starting point

for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which would take the ultimate decisions

(Presidency 2001: 24-5).

The language used about European integration addressed British

concerns still more clearly. What citizens expect, the declaration asserts, ‘is more results,

better responses to practical issues and not a European superstate or European institutions

inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life’ (Presidency 2001: 21).

At the European Council meeting, British officials recovered quickly from their

embarrassment when the Prime Minister refused to pose with his euro starter pack. Robin

Cook emphasised delightedly that it had been his predecessor, Douglas Hurd, who had first

demanded that the Union be kept out of the ‘nooks and crannies’ of national life. Meanwhile

the Prime Minister confidently asserted that the document chimed with his view that

European countries should cooperate more closely, but ‘as a group of nations together, not on

the basis of a federal superstate’ (The Herald 16 December 2001).

From Laeken to the Convention

Once the idea of a Convention had been formally accepted, it remained to select the British

representatives on that body. When, in January, the Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, was

announced as the British representative, this was widely seen as a signal of the UK’s serious

intent (The Independent 25 January 2002). London was also handed a couple of unanticipated

and unplanned fillips. Despite facing severe opposition, Labour loyalist Gisela Stuart was

elected to the Presidium of the Convention as one of the representatives of national

parliamentarians. Less public though more significant was the selection of Sir John Kerr,

former Ambassador in Washington and to the EU, to serve as Secretary General of the

Convention. One senior official beamed that the appointment ‘means Britain will be in the

driving seat’ (Financial Times 25 January 2002).

London was also quick off the blocks in attempting to seize the initiative in the early rounds

of the battle of ideas. Peter Hain insisted repeatedly that independent nation states ‘must

remain the bedrock’ of the European Union. In a speech to the European Policy Centre, he

declared that what he wanted from the Convention was a list of principles stressing that ‘the

EU is primarily a union of the member states’ (Financial Times 30 January 2002). And in an

interview with The Guardian (28 February 2002), he spelled out what would be the central

British message: the ‘Council of Ministers has got to take over the political leadership of the

EU so that elected governments are the key driving force strategically, which has not been the

case up until now. That is crucial.’

It also quickly became clear that the Government had no intention, if this could possibly be

avoided, of fighting its battles alone. In February, the Prime Minister, accompanied by Hain,

made a trip to Rome to discuss the forthcoming constitutional discussions. Just days before

the official launch of the Convention, Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, in a

joint letter to the Spanish presidency, emphasised the need for the Council of Ministers to be

reformed in order that it work more effectively and transparently (The Guardian 26 February

2002). And, in a move that foreshadowed a strategy he was to adopt throughout the

Convention, Hain began to cultivate links with the accession states. On the day of the formal

launch of the Convention proceedings, he held a breakfast for the representatives of the then

applicant countries (The Independent, 28 February 2002).

The search for allies was accompanied by an effort to avoid antagonising opponents, as

London adopted a markedly conciliatory tone over even the most sensitive dossiers. Thus,

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, in a major speech immediately before the launch of the

Convention, appeared far more relaxed about the prospect of an EU constitution than had the

Prime Minister less than a year and a half earlier (Straw 2002). Meanwhile Peter Hain told

BBC’s On The Record programme that he was not opposed in principle to the Charter of

Fundamental Rights being included in the new text as long as it were not enforceable by

British Courts (Financial Times 18 February 2002).

This conciliatory approach, however, had its limits. Certainly, there were protestations

concerning Britain’s centrality within the Union and its desire to be a constructive partner,

coupled with efforts to disown London’s past negotiating style. Hain declared (The

Independent 31 January 2003), that ‘the idea that you could just go into the Convention like

Margaret Thatcher waving a handbag and splatting everyone is just fantasy’. Such rhetoric

was on occasion, however, succeeded by outbursts reminiscent of the Iron Lady herself. Thus,

confronted with rumours about possible plans for an elected EU president in January 2002,

Hain brusquely rejected them as ‘barmy’ and insisted that Britain would use its veto at the

IGC if necessary (AFX Europe (Focus); 9 Jan, 2002). British politicians, moreover, remained

keen to emphasise that the ultimate task of deciding on the future structures of the Union

would fall to the forthcoming IGC. In his otherwise positive speech in the Hague in February

2002, Jack Straw portrayed the Convention as little more than a discussion forum which

would precede the taking of the real decisions by the IGC (Straw 2002).

Yet, in the early stages at least, such defensiveness was the exception rather than the rule.

Indeed, the British tone became, if anything, increasingly confident and assertive. Newspaper

reports stressed the positive mood in the Foreign Office, based on a belief that the tide was

turning in Britain’s favour (The Independent 21 February 2002). Hain insisted that Britain ‘is

going into this with confidence and a constructive frame of mind….We are now at the centre

of gravity of European debate and our arguments get a wide resonance’ (The Guardian 28

February 2002).

The Convention

The work of the Convention itself was formally divided into three phases: a listening phase,

which lasted from March to July 2002, a discussion phase, spanning the period between

August and December of that year, and a drafting phase which ran until the following July. In

terms of Britain’s involvement, however, it is perhaps more useful to think in terms of two

distinct periods. The first lasted from the beginning of the Convention until the end of 2002;

the second from January 2003 until the following July, when the draft constitutional treaty

was formally handed over to the European Council.

The First Phase: February-December 2002

Two features of the British approach to the Convention during its first nine months stand out.

First, the emphasis placed on the need to maintain the ‘institutional balance’ of the Union

which accompanied substantive British proposals. Second, the remorselessly positive tone

about both the Convention process and British influence within it.

National control and ‘institutional balance’

The Convention itself was formally launched with a plenary session on 28 February, and

finally got down to serious business at the meeting of 25 March. Predictably enough, British

representatives spent much time responding to proposals they found unacceptable. Thus

Hain’s alternate, Baroness Scotland, was quick to reject the notion of any move towards a

single EU judicial system, whilst assiduously explaining British reservations about the clear

consensus which emerged in favour of incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights

into the constitution during the plenary of 3-4 October.

Similarly, during his lengthy intervention in July on the Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP), Hain declared that its credibility relied entirely on consensus among national

governments to pool their diplomatic, financial and military resources. Consequently, all that

the introduction of the greater use of qualified majority voting (QMV) would achieve was a

starker illustration of the divisions among the Member States. Moreover, although Britain

favoured the idea of a single ‘face’ to represent the Union in external affairs, its opinion of

such an innovation would be conditional at best. As Blair (2002) put it during his Cardiff

speech that November, double hatting ‘cannot be a way, through the back door, of

communitising the CFSP. The High Representative's accountability to the Member States, and

their responsibility for foreign policy, must remain clear cut’.

More positive British thinking crystallised around two key issues. First, the idea that the

European Council should have a permanent chair. In May 2002, Hain explained this proposal

on the grounds that the ‘current system causes a lack of strategic grip and doesn't give Europe

political leadership and clout’. Under his scheme, the chair would take on much of the work

done by Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy representative, and be the first point of call for

a US Secretary of State hoping to speak to ‘Europe’ (Financial Times, 16 May 2002).

Britain’s other practical proposal related to subsidiarity. Blair had argued in a speech in

Warsaw in 2000 that there was a need for a second chamber of national parliamentarians to

oversee the application of the principle (Blair 2000). Such thinking, however, received short

shrift from the other member states and by the time of the Convention, the British were

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had called for a single President of the Council and the Commission.

Europe Minister Denis MacShane caused something of a stir when he bluntly rejected the idea of such a

‘European Kaiser’ (Financial Times 2 January 2003).

arguing for something far less ambitious. In a joint letter sent in June 2002 to the Convention

and co-signed with Peter Glotz (Germany), Pierre Moscovici (France), Ray McSharry

(Ireland) and Danuta Hübner (Poland), Hain proposed a watchdog body which would

represent a check and balance on Commission legislative proposals and help to improve

democratic legitimacy. This was to be a political body, made up of MPs from national

parliaments or some body mandated by the European Council, which would advise whether

proposals should be carried out at EU level (Financial Times 14 June). The following month,

Hain clarified British thinking. The problem, he declared, was that the Union had ‘no means

of enforcing subsidiarity. It's like passing a law and having no police force to enforce it’. He

proposed a ‘subsidiarity watchdog’ made up of one MP from the 15 EU member states. His

officials had great fun with the idea, dubbing it ‘Of Brussels’ (The Independent 22 July 2002).

By the end of the year, London had made significant progress in gaining acceptance for its

ideas. The open hostility of federalists towards the first draft texts focused on the inclusion of

provisions for the institutionalisation of the European Council which, although they had failed

to garner widespread approval during plenary debates, clearly represented a step in the

direction of British proposals. On the subsidiarity proposals, although the two working

groups which dealt with the issue shied away from the idea of a ‘red card’ system, the

subsidiarity group did recommend a watered down version of the Hain plan. Under this,

national parliaments would have the right to examine Commission legislative proposals, and

produce reasoned opinions as to whether or not these breached the principle of subsidiarity. If

a significant number of concerns were voiced, the Commission would be required to reassess

the original proposal (CONV 286/02).

Partly as a consequence of the fact that both its substantive proposals were intended to

enhance national control over the Union, London insisted - increasingly so towards the end of

2002 – that this was not enough in and of itself. Jack Straw argued in The Economist (11

October 2002) that enlargement would require the strengthening of all the EU institutions, and

not merely the intergovernmental ones. The following month, in an interview with the

Financial Times, Peter Hain asserted that ‘a strong Commission matters to us. Without a

strong Commission driving through change, none of the Council's decisions would come to

anything’.

Hain went on to propose several areas where the role of the Commission could and should be

maintained or even strengthened – when setting out the Union’s strategic agenda, in policy

initiation, and over policy enforcement – whilst underlining the Government’s opposition to

the election of the Commission president by the European Parliament, because of the

deleterious consequences of such a step for the institution’s ability to act in the general

interest (Financial Times 15 November 2002). Later the same month, the Prime Minister

himself, in a striking speech delivered in Cardiff, hammered home the same message in

perhaps the strongest defence of the European Commission ever launched by a British Prime

Minister (Blair 2002).

It would be naïve to deny that an element of tactical manoeuvring lay behind this series of

interventions. There were concerns in Whitehall, clearly expressed in a Financial Times

article by Peter Mandelson (11 November 2002) - itself, according to some, part of his own

campaign to become Britain’s next Commissioner – that Britain’s stance in the Convention,

and particularly its focus on enhancing national control over the Union, was alienating the

smaller member states. Yet the Prime Minister’s’ interest in ensuring a strong Commission

pre-dated the Convention. Speaking in Warsaw in 2000 he had prefigured the tone of his

Cardiff speech:

Neither do I see any profit in pitting the European institutions against intergovernmental co-

operation. We need a strong Commission able to act independently, with its power of

initiative: first because that protects smaller states; and also because it allows Europe to

overcome purely sectional interests. All governments from time to time, Britain included,

find the Commission’s power inconvenient but, for example, the single market could never

be completed without it.

(Blair 2000)

The commencement in earnest early in the New Year of debates about the Union’s

institutional future would reveal how firmly held such beliefs were.

Upbeat Britain

The other noteworthy aspect of Britain’s early involvement in Convention discussions was the

positive nature of its contributions. In his opening statements in the plenary, Hain was

notably upbeat about the European Union, and reinforced his conciliatory message by

claiming that he had ‘come to listen… there is no British blueprint’.

Hain made it clear that he intended to take his participation very seriously. He attended

regularly, was an active participant in debates, and a tireless networker, bending the ears of

colleagues incessantly in an attempt to put over the British position. At the plenary session of

11-12 July, which debated the Common Foreign and Security Policy, he played the leading

role. At one stage, the session took on the appearance of a Peter Hain question and answer

show as he spelled out the strict limits Britain placed on developments in this policy sector.

When confronted with potentially major setbacks, the British reacted by redoubling their

efforts at persuasion. When strong support was voiced for inclusion of the Charter in the

constitutional text, Baroness Scotland in particular undertook a period of frantic behind the

scenes lobbying and cajoling. Largely as a consequence of her work, the Commission

suggested that the Charter apply only to States when they were implementing EU law.

Equally, during the debate of 29 October there was widespread acceptance of the need for

‘explanatory notes’ to be produced to help courts ‘interpret’ the Rights, and/or ‘horizontal

clauses’ to the Charter, laying down exactly how far these would affect the laws of the

member states. Peter Hain graciously welcomed this compromise, and indeed applauded the

Working Group for accommodating British concerns.

Certainly, there was the odd crack in the positive mask. When the first draft text appeared at

the end of October, the British were typically forthright in their condemnation of those

elements they found unsatisfactory. Peter Hain did not pull his punches in reaction to the

proposal that the Union could henceforth be called United States of Europe, sniping that

‘Europe United’ sounded more like a football team. A senior official asserted bluntly that

there ‘is not a cat in hell's chance of it being called the United States of Europe’ (The

Guardian 29 October 2002; 30 October 2002). The spat over nomenclature notwithstanding

however, the clear sense from this plenary was that it was the federalist camp, rather than

their opponents, who had the most cause for concern. By October, Peter Hain was asserting

once again that ‘we are winning the battle of ideas over the future of Europe’ (Financial

Times 16 October 2002).

The Second Phase: Jan-July 2003

Despite certain setbacks – notably over the charter of fundamental rights - the British thus

finished the year 2002 on a high. However, the dynamics of the Convention were to change

significantly as from the early part of 2003.

The Franco-German Contribution and the end of ‘balance’

As the New Year dawned, attention in London began to focus on the forthcoming fortieth

anniversary celebrations of the signing of the Élysée Treaty, which the French and Germans

had signalled would produce a high profile joint contribution to the Future of Europe debate.

Neither Paris nor Berlin had hitherto appeared to take particularly seriously a Convention

whose proceedings had, if anything, been dominated by the figure of Peter Hain. The first

signs of a change in attitudes over the Channel occurred in the autumn of 2002 when first the

Germans and then the French decided to send their Foreign Ministers as government

representatives to the Convention. This apparent change in attitude, together with the

escalating crisis over Iraq which was beginning to drive a wedge between EU member states,

meant that all attention was focused on Paris by mid January, as observers waited to see if the

Franco-German motor of European integration could be jump started.

There were real concerns in London prior to the publication of the Franco-German proposals

that the pro-integrationist stance of the Germans, and especially of their Foreign Minister,

Joschka Fisher, would push France away from its traditional intergovernmentalist stance. A

particular worry was that the French would be persuaded to accept the idea of a single EU

President that Minister for Europe Denis Mac Shane had derided as representing a European

‘Kaiser’ the previous December.

Traditional German proclivities to strengthen the

Commission and Parliament stood in stark contrast to the British proposals which centred on

ensuring effective national control. As one senior foreign office official put it in early

January, ‘this could all go pear shaped at Versailles’.

The thirtieth anniversary of British accession to the EC occurred in the same month as the fortieth anniversary

of the Élysée Treaty. The contrast between the ways in which these were celebrated in one case, and virtually

forgotten in the other, could hardly have been more marked.

See footnote 2, above. MacShane had been elevated to the post of Minister for Europe in October, when Peter

Hain was made Secretary of State for Wales. Hain continued to act as Government representative on the

Convention, however. For a discussion of the effects of this reshuffle, see below.

In the event, however, such fears proved to be largely unfounded in that the proposals

published by Paris and Berlin were not the direct challenge to British views that many in

London had anticipated and feared. The ‘common contribution to the Convention’ agreed by

Schroeder and Chirac on January 15, 2003 steered clear of the ‘Kaiser’ idea, proposing,

rather, the creation of a dual EU presidency consisting of a permanent European Council chair

and a European Commission President directly elected by MEPs.

Initial British reactions to the proposals were broadly positive. Peter Hain, for instance,

welcomed the continuity implied by a long-term chairman for the European Council (BBC

News, 20 January 2003). The mood in the Foreign Office was immensely upbeat as earlier

fears about the plans being hatched in Paris and Berlin proved groundless.

Confronted with the Franco-German initiative, British officials quickly came to reveal the true

weight they gave to the goal of maintaining institutional balance. In November of the previous

year as we have seen, London was insisting on the need to ensure the continued independence

of a strengthened European Commission. Yet it became evident, in the days following the

Franco-German announcement, that such ideas were tradable in return for what was perceived

as the far more important objective of securing a permanent chair for the European Council.

Thus Ministers declared that a directly elected Commission President - for all that this

contradicted British thinking about what was best for that institution - would be a small price

to pay to ensure a permanent chair of the European Council (The Independent 16 January

2003; The Guardian 21 January 2003).

As for assertions concerning the need to strengthen the Commission, the aftermath of the

Versailles celebrations quickly underlined the strict limits to such thinking. Substantive

British concerns about the Franco-German initiative focused largely on the third institutional

innovation it proposed – the creation of an EU ‘Foreign Minister’ elected by the Council but

also a member of the Commission. Peter Hain argued forcefully in a paper circulated to

Convention members in January that there was no need for a merger between the posts of

Commissioner for External Relations and High Representative for Foreign policy in order to

achieve consistency. Indeed, in his Economist article of the previous October (11 October

2002), Jack Straw had argued that EU foreign policy could be made more effective simply via

See, Franco-German Plan (15.2.2003) (http://www.bundeskanzler.de/www.bundeskanzler.de-

.7698.459668/Deutsch-franzoesischer-Beitrag-zur-institutionel...htm).

the reinforcement of the High Representative’s position, and improvement of coordination

between him and the Commissioner for external relations.

Hain’s paper also emphasised, in contrast to the Franco-German proposals that ultimate

authority over foreign policy should rest with the President of the European Council, while

the Foreign Minister would play a more operational role on the ground in the Balkans and

Middle East (The Guardian 30 January 2003, The Independent 24 January 2003).

Differences between the British and Franco-German views crystallised in a joint paper by

Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio and Peter Hain submitted to the Convention on

February 28, 2003 (CONV 591/03). Under these proposals, the EU Foreign Minister was to

be a strengthened High Representative, who enjoyed the right to attend Commission meetings

when foreign affairs were discussed, while the President of the European Council was to

reinforce the Union’s external representation. London was hence signalling, if only implicitly,

its willingness to see both the coherence and independence of the Commission undermined if

this were necessary in order to limit its remit over foreign policy (Menon 2004).

The focus on balance, along with Britain’s previously upbeat tone, were both to be forgotten

as the Convention moved towards its final stages.

The closing stages: increasing defensiveness

Following the publication of the Franco-German proposals, events moved fast. On 30

January, Tony Blair met with Giscard d’Estaing and signalled his flexibility – even to the

point of accepting some degree of QMV on foreign policy, as long as this was agreed to by

unanimity. The Prime Minister also displayed a willingness to make significant concessions

on a host of other issues ranging from the idea of an elected Commission President to the

adoption of the EU's charter of fundamental rights to the creation of an embryonic EU

diplomatic service. London was obviously happy to offer trade offs in order to secure the

creation of a permanent chair for the European Council (Financial Times 30 January 2003).

The idea of a permanent chair for the European Council had first been openly mooted in a speech by Jacques

Chirac in Strasbourg in 2002. The French President had in fact portrayed the proposal largely as a way of

ensuring effective external representation for the Union.

The conciliatory tone quickly disappeared, however, when the rewritten draft treaty articles

were published in early February. These drew an immediate and uncompromisingly hostile

reaction from Peter Hain, who commented acidly that it:

“Didn’t seem to reflect the consensus….I am wondering whether the people who drew up

this document have been going to a different Convention. It's a bit odd. The presidium has a

lot of explaining to do. We'll be making clear that a lot of the material in the draft has got to

change”.

(The Guardian 7 February 2003).

Specific issues criticised by London included the proposed role for the Union in coordinating

the economic policies of member states, the phrasing of the definition of common defence

policy and the text on foreign policy. As Hain commented, it ‘seems to put the EU in charge

of economic and foreign policy, when that was not what was agreed’. He also objected to the

reference to the EU's charter of fundamental rights as ‘an integral part of the constitution’

(The Guardian 7 February 2003). Indeed, the British stance on the Charter appeared to have

hardened significantly, as Hain demanded further reassurances.

In the ensuing plenary discussions, London raised objections and proposed amendments to 15

of the 16 articles, and Hain became the only government representative to use the phrase ‘my

government will not accept this’ (European Voice 6 March 2003). Perhaps most worryingly

from a British point of view, he appeared isolated. Neither Paris nor Berlin expressed any real

concerns about the draft, whilst Denmark, traditionally a sceptical member state, said the

articles were ‘a rather good basis’ for setting out the division of labour between member states

and the EU (Financial Times 7 February 2003). The sense of British isolation increased as a

flood of amendments to the initial text – some 1500 of them – came in. Depressingly for

London, however, few of these went in the direction of British objections, ranging, rather,

from calls to reinstate the notion of ever closer union – dropped at UK insistence - to demands

for a reference to the ‘European social model’ (Financial Times 20 February 2003).

To compound London’s problems still further, plans were unveiled in March for the creation

of an EU public prosecutor. He or she would investigate serious crimes committed across EU

borders as well as cases of fraud against the European taxpayer, pursuing them in the courts of

the member states. Once again, Britain reacted angrily. Whilst London had been in the

forefront of attempts to strengthen the EU in the area of asylum and immigration, EU

In an interview in International Affairs in October, Hain (2003) acknowledged that the publication of the first

draft marked the low point of the Convention for him, and that he was ‘a bit bad tempered’ about it.

intrusion into the area of criminal law represented a ‘red line’ issue. One British official

argued that the ‘job of pursuing cases through British courts is one that has to remain within,

and accountable to, the British system. We will not support the idea of a European public

prosecutor as proposed’ (The Independent 18 March 2003). Fortunately, such concerns were

shared. In May 2003, Britain, along with six other member states (Austria, Sweden, Ireland,

Denmark and Estonia), signed a letter attacking the plan (FT.com 21 May 2003).

Indicative of the new defensiveness in the British attitude was the puzzling and ultimately

fruitless outburst by Hain at the plenary session of 5 March 2003, when he demanded that the

proposed treaty article on the primacy of EU law be deleted from the text. It was only after a

sharp reminder from Vice-President Giuliano Amato and Commissioner Antonio Vitorino

that the principle of EU law primacy had served as the basis of legal functioning in the Union

for fifty years that Hain modified his position and instead advocated a rewording of the text

(EU Observer, 6 March 2003).

Meanwhile, London continued its rearguard action against Franco-German proposals relating

to CFSP. During the plenary debates on the institutional architecture on 15 May, and despite

almost unanimous support for the idea of a single EU Foreign Minister based in both the

Council and the Commission, Hain, backed by Sweden, argued that the post should come

under control of governments, and that its links to the Commission be limited. Moreover,

whilst France, the Netherlands and Belgium argued for more majority voting on foreign

policy matters, Hain voiced strong opposition – ‘[the] freedom to act is at the heart of our

sovereignty’ (EU Observer 16 May 2003).

From around April, the British tone within the Convention hardened still further. In a sharply

worded letter to the Convention chairman, Hain warned him against claiming that Britain had

agreed to the charter of fundamental rights being included in the new treaty (The Guardian 15

May 2003). When, on 19 May, Giscard visited Downing Street and held talks with Hain,

Foreign Minister Jack Straw and the Prime Minister, Blair threatened to use his veto at the

The doctrine of supremacy had been established in the 1964 Costa/ENEL case, (case 6/64) in which ECJ ruled

that ‘the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and

original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions…without being deprived of its character as

Community law and without the basis of the Community itself being called in to question The transfer by the

states from their domestic legal systems to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising

under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation on their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent

unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail’

IGC if certain elements of the constitution were not dropped or amended (The Independent 20

May 2003). In particular, he insisted that if the word ‘federal’ and references to QMV on tax

fraud and social security rights were not removed, then the veto would indeed be wielded

(The Guardian 20 May 2003). Reports indicated that, during the course of this meeting,

Giscard agreed to remove references to ‘federal’ from the draft and to amend article 13 which,

in its original form, referred to the Union coordinating the economic policies of the member

states (Financial Times 22 May).

London also increasingly came to speak out against what some senior figures labelled the

danger of a ‘backdoor communitarisation’ of CFSP via the proposed Foreign Minister’s links

to the Commission. Indeed, officials also objected to use of the term Foreign Minister at all.

The FCO’s ten point guide to the new constitution termed it the ‘European foreign affairs

representative’ (FCO 7 June 2003).

While criticism of the proposed Foreign Minister focused on the danger of strengthening the

Commission, concerns regarding the new Chair of the European Council related to the post’s

potential weakness. London mounted a rearguard action against smaller member states keen

to water down the powers of the proposed chair. Thus Hain commented on the ‘smalls’ that, if

‘they think the full-time post can be purely decorative . . . then a deal won't be made’ (The

Guardian 12 June 2003). He insisted that it was essential that the chair have the power to set

the agenda in the EU's decision-making councils, such as those dealing with the internal

market (The Independent 7 June 2003).

Final debates in the Convention took place between the end of May and mid-June. During a

frantic fortnight of drafting and redrafting, certain key changes were made to the text,

including the insertion of a new ‘passerelle’ clause to allow for the extension of the scope of

QMV by unanimity in the European Council. In addition, it was decided that the European

Parliament’s role in the appointment of the Commission President would be limited to the

confirmation of the candidate selected by the Council. Finally, a last minute compromise on

the explaNATOry notes for the Charter of Fundamental Rights secured UK support for its

inclusion in the constitution.

The final plenary session on the published draft of Parts I and II, held on 13 June, saw broad

support, in the end, for the text to be presented to the Council at Thessaloniki. The European

Council accepted the final draft, and instructed the Convention to make no more than

technical amendments to Part III. On 4 and 9-10 July, plenary sessions took place to discuss

Part III, and on 18 July, the final text was presented to the Council in Rome.

II - THE CONVENTION OUTCOME AND BEYOND

British reactions and the ICG

British reactions to the draft constitutional treaty were positive without betraying anything

amounting to enthusiasm. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw declared it to be ‘a good starting

point for the lengthy negotiations in the IGC’ (The Independent 12 June 2003). The

Government, Peter Hain declared, was broadly satisfied with the outcome, and happy with

‘eighty or ninety per cent’ of the draft constitutional treaty (Hain 2003). Importantly in terms

of what was to follow, the official line from Whitehall was that the text was both better than

could have been hoped for at the start of the Convention process, and necessary in order that

enlargement proceed smoothly and the Union enhance its effectiveness.

Unsurprisingly, Ministers were keen to underline what they saw as British gains from the

Convention process, emphasising the benefits of both the ‘yellow card’ system of national

parliamentary oversight of the subsidiarity principle, and the creation of a permanent chair of

the European Council (Hain 2003). The Government’s White Paper on the IGC (Secretary of

State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 2003: para 42), released on 9 September, also

notes approvingly the fact that the new treaty text not only consolidates existing treaties into a

single, logical text, but also provides a definition of EU competencies and made it clear that

‘the national governments of Member States remain in control’.

Finally, the White Paper spells out the thinking behind the Government’s somewhat grudging

acceptance of the incorporation of the text of the charter of fundamental rights into the

constitutional text:

The Convention text makes clear, in Article II-51, that the Charter “does not extend the field

of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or

task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined in the other parts of the

Constitution.” It therefore does not give any new powers to the EU. The Member States are

affected only when they are implementing Union law. So where Member States are dealing

with non-EU matters the Charter has no legal application.’

It went on to make clear, however (para 103) that this acceptance was provisional and

ultimately dependent on developments within the IGC.

As the IGC approached, attention focused on the need to maintain the gains secured while

amending those sections which gave cause for concern. As one senior Whitehall source put it,

there ‘is no reason why we cannot keep the good bits and get rid of the bad bits’ (The

Telegraph, 31 July 2003). In terms of improving on the ‘good bits’, Britain negotiated hard to

try to secure greater authority for the chair of the European Council – notably by arguing that

he or she chair the General Affairs Council.

At the same time, several ‘bad bits’ preoccupied London and continued to do so during the

IGC skirmishes.

The EU ‘Foreign Minister’

As noted above, the UK had initially not favoured the merging of the posts of Commissioner

for External Relations and High Representative for foreign policy as proposed in the

constitutional text. The White Paper (para 52) acknowledges that there may be advantages to

merger, including ‘better coordination of external policy at EU level’. However, officials

voiced several concerns. First, that under the double hatting arrangement he or she be subject

to Commission collegiality. Once again, fear of a Commission ‘grab for power’ underpinned

such concerns:

“You could find the Commission through the back door, in a kind of gradual process,

exerting more and more influence, so that the centre of gravity moves away from

governments keeping a tight hold on the common foreign and security policy, to the

Commission”.

(Hain 2003)

As the IGC got underway, Jack Straw underlined at a meeting of Foreign Ministers on 16

October his unhappiness both with the term Foreign Minister and the post’s links to the

Commission. At the preparatory meeting in Luxembourg three days earlier he had proposed a

solution whereby the Foreign Minister would have the right to attend Commission meetings,

but would not be a member of the institution. (EU Observer 16 October 2003).

The situation was made worse for London with the publication on 26th November of a revised

draft which strengthened the provisions for qualified majority voting by allowing for such

votes on proposals from the Foreign Minister. ‘We are surprised to see this proposal’ declared

a government spokesman, adding that it was ‘totally unacceptable in any shape or form’

(Financial Times 26 November 2003).

QMV

The second major area of concern for London related to provisions for moves towards

qualified majority voting on certain of Britain’s ‘red line’ issues, notably cross border social

security payments, and cross border tax fraud. The arguments deployed against such

initiatives were fundamentally similar to those utilised to oppose the Foreign Minister being a

full member of the Commission: the fear that any concession in a sensitive area might be the

thin end of the wedge, seized upon by the Commission to increase its powers still further. As

Hain put it, discussing the issue of tax fraud, ‘once you establish that principle, then do the

Commission and the Parliament start encroaching elsewhere in your tax system?’ (Hain 2003)

A particular concern when it came to moves away from unanimity as the basis for decision

making was the so-called passerelle clause (Article I-24), which would have allowed Heads

of State and Government, meeting in the European Council, to alter the basis of decision

making in a particular area from unanimity to QMV. British concerns were broadly twofold.

First, that decisions amounting to treaty changes could be decided on without national

parliaments being consulted (Hain 2003). Second, that the passerelle could represent a means

of achieving virtually continual reform. As one British official put it, ‘[w]e want this to be a

long-term settlement, not permanent revolution’ (The Independent 14 June 2003).

Defence

The final issue that dominated British thinking during the IGC was defence policy. Two

aspects of the draft treaty in particular spawned British opposition: provision for the creation

of a mutual defence pact within the Union, and the possibility of ‘structured cooperation’

allowing some member states to collaborate more closely on defence issues.

The British government has long stressed its opposition to any moves within the Union that

might be seen to challenge, or unnecessarily duplicate, NATO. Talk of a mutual defence pact

clearly fell into this category, given the Article Five commitment existing under the NATO

Treaty. British officials were clear that their preference on this score was to remove the

mutual defence clause altogether, leaving only a more vague commitment to ‘solidarity’

among EU countries (The Daily Telegraph, 31 July 2003).

As for the notion of ‘structured cooperation’, British wariness stemmed to a significant extent

from its origins in the summit that occurred between the Heads of State and Government of

Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg on April 29, 2003. Involving the four member

states most openly hostile to the military action about to commence in Iraq, the meeting –

inopportune in its timing if nothing else – provoked fears in London and elsewhere that

certain member states were intending to use the forthcoming IGC as a means of enabling the

Union to compete with NATO. Stipulations in the communiqué produced by the summit to

the effect that the four states intended to create between them a more effective autonomous

planning capacity for the Union based in Tervuren outside Brussels did little to dispel such

anxieties. As Peter Hain, put it in an interview with The Times (September 9, 2003): ‘we have

to get rid of the nonsense that France, Germany and Luxembourg, with all due respect, and

Belgium can go off and launch a defence initiative in Europe’s name on their own by

bypassing NATO’

During the IGC London made it clear that it remained fundamentally opposed to measures

that could undermine NATO or set the Union up as a rival to it. Bilateral and trilateral

negotiations between London, Paris and Berlin attempted to secure consensus, or at least

agreement, on this point. At an informal trilateral summit of Heads of State and Government

in Berlin in September, progress was made in this direction, with Blair agreeing on the need

for the creation of an EU Headquarters and acceding to the notion of structured cooperation,

following French and German agreement to drop plans to set up a separate EU operational

planning facility. Simultaneously, Blair insisted that all member states must enjoy a veto over

EU military operations (Financial Times 22 September 2003; EU Observer 16 October 2003).

Discussions in early November made further advances, with consensus emerging between

Paris and London that the definition of any ‘vanguard’ for EU defence be based not upon

simply desire – as had been the case with the so-called ‘chocolate summit’ – but, rather, upon

capabilities (Financial Times 12 November 2003)

Final agreement came a step closer at a further meeting between Blair Chirac and Schroeder

in late November which agreed on the need for the creation of at lest an embryonic EU

military planning capability (Financial Times 26 November 2003, 28 November 2003), and

provided the basis for broad agreement between Foreign Ministers meting in Naples later that

week.

The Brussels Summit

For all the progress made in such discussions, as the summit itself approached, London raised

the stakes significantly. In late November, the British quality press was full of reports that a

senior ‘government source’ or ‘foreign office official’ had declared that the new treaty fell

into ‘the category of highly desirable, but it's not in the category of absolutely necessary. If

there were no agreement it would complicate all sorts of things. But plainly life will go on

under existing treaties’ (Financial Times 24 November 2003; The Independent 25 November

2003; The Telegraph 25 November 2003).

Whether a negotiating tactic or a serious threat to wield the veto, the immediate effect of such

language was limited, as the Italian Presidency proceeded, in early December, to produce a

further draft text which contained provisions for QMV on both cross-border tax fraud and

proposals from the Foreign Minister (Presidency 2003). Indeed in early December it seemed

that the number of British objections to the draft text had multiplied as the government added

the provisions on energy to its list of red lines, fearing for the effect on its control over North

Sea oil (The Telegraph, 26 November 2003). Blair in fact scheduled a meeting with Jacques

Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder immediately before the opening of the December summit in an

attempt to resolve the outstanding issues.

In the event, of course, the summit, or at least its outcome, proved to be something of an anti-

climax. From London’s point of view, there was no little consolation in the fact that it was not

Britain that stymied agreement on a new Treaty. In the absence of an agreed text it is

impossible to judge to what extent British red lines had been respected during the

negotiations, though early indications from participants indicate that, to a significant extent,

they were.

A Very British Treaty?

It would be all too easy, given the heated political debates taking place within the country, to

assume that the constitutional treaty in some sense represented a defeat for Britain. The

language used by the Government about its ‘red lines’, along with the tone of opposition

statements (see part three) conspired to provide a somewhat negative impression. Moreover,

the Government, it seems, took a decision to downplay its successes in favour of exaggerating

potential problems.

On tax and social security, the provisions for a possible move towards QMV were very weak

– certainly far more so than the reactions of Ministers implied. An even clearer illustration of

this mismatch between rhetoric and reality was provided by the passages in the text relating to

the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Article 41). In his interview with The Times of 9

September, Peter Hain flagged up criminal law issues as one of the five ‘red line’ issues

confronting the Government:

“We have enthusiastically accepted proposed majority voting on the whole justice and home

affairs area because it stops back markers from passing the buck over illegal migration, or

combating terrorism, or border control, or fighting international crime. But its extension into

the operation of our judicial system is not acceptable”.

Yet it is difficult to conceive of a final outcome to the Convention negotiations in this area

which could better have reflected British sensibilities. The document stressed the principle of

mutual recognition of Member States’ systems, which was always a key principle for the

government. The big shift was to abolish the Third Pillar and move over to QMV on the

majority of JHA issues, as Britain had hoped. Moreover, Article 41 referred most of the

substantive decisions to Part III, where the crucial exceptions to the QMV rule tend to be in

areas of concern to London. In particular, the text of Part III preserved unanimity on the

creation of a Public Prosecutor (III-175), on operational police cooperation or police action on

other states’ territory (III-176 & 178), or on establishing further common definitions of

criminal offences or sanctions (III-172) beyond the list of cross-border crimes which had,

with British support, already been drawn up. There was no mention of a common border

guard even as an ultimate objective, despite the fact that the issue was raised in several

plenary sessions as one on which action should be taken.

Overall, it is hard to avoid the impression that the constitutional Treaty is a document which is

strikingly congruent with expressed British preferences. Progress in negotiations with France

and Germany over defence, along with the fact that the provisions for moving towards QMV

on tax or social security issues are very weak meant that London’s red lines were unlikely to

be crossed by the time of the Brussels summit. More positively, the final text represented

something of a triumph in that the two British proposals put forward at the Convention were

adopted. Certainly, neither was included in precisely the form that London had wished. The

Chair of the European Council was not to enjoy the wide ranging powers to chair the General

Affairs Council, and be in charge of strategic planning. And the red card idea was shelved in

favour of a yellow card scheme. For all this, however, and particularly in light of the concerns

that had been voiced about the convention process, the Treaty, British rhetoric

notwithstanding, suited London far better than many had feared it would. As one French

commentator put it:

“Chateaubriand ironically termed the (French) Constitution of 1814 « la Benjamine », a

reference to Benjamin Constant. It would be appropriate to call the draft Constitution for a

25 member states Europe “la Britannique” ... For the Constitution’s work bears the mark of

British pragmatism more than it does of French Constitutional law”.

(Le Nouvel Observateur 19 June 2003)

How, then, did this situation arise. And, perhaps more interestingly, why did the portrayal of

the Treaty in Britain diverge so strikingly from such positive analyses?

III - EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME

The Convention

The true measure of the achievement of securing a treaty that chimed so well with stated

British objectives becomes clearer in light of the nature of the Convention within which it was

negotiated. Despite British satisfaction with the substance of the Laeken declaration, its

stipulations concerning the composition of the Convention provided grounds for unease from

the beginning. These were neatly summed up by the Economist (27 May 2003): ‘Mr Giscard’s

Convention is packed with enthusiastic Euro-centralisers and harmonisers’. One fifth of the

members of the Convention and nearly half of the Presidium were either Convention staff

(President and Vice Presidents) or representatives of the EU institutions. As from the first

plenary sessions, London was to become aware of the veracity of this statement as speaker

after speaker came out in favour of, amongst other things, a European social model, EU

involvement in crime, border control, and the environment; the promotion of EU values

abroad through a coherent CFSP, more economic coordination for the EU and the possibility

of EU taxes.

In contrast to the tendency within the plenary sessions, the Convention President, Giscard

d’Estaing, was in many ways a more sympathetic figure from a British perspective. Despite

the vitriol heaped upon him by sections of the British press (the Sun, in a carefully considered

pen portrait, described him as an ‘arrogant condescending French snob’ who ‘was planning to

end Britain’s freedom’) his perspective was a largely intergovernmentalist one. Thus he was

the driving force behind the decision to include the reference to a permanent chair of the

European Council in the initial treaty texts, despite overwhelming opposition to the idea on

the floor of the Convention. As for an early proposal to vote by QMV on foreign policy

proposals from the High Representative agreed on by the Commission, that Tony Blair

succeeded in having this dropped from the texts during a meeting with Giscard d’Estaing in

London in April 2003 was in part due to the fact that the Convention President himself was

not a supporter of the idea. As Peter Hain (2003) himself put it once the Convention had

drawn to a close, ‘Giscard is keener on the British agenda than he is on the federalist agenda’.

Giscard d’Estaing notwithstanding, the Convention became a more challenging environment

for British negotiators as the New Year dawned. Partly this was due to the increased attention

paid to events in Brussels by Berlin and Paris. Partly, too, the Iraq crisis impacted upon the

negotiations. For one thing, it led to an unprecedented bitterness in the tone adopted in

London towards Paris. With France threatening to use its veto, whatever the circumstances,

to block a second UN Security Council resolution on Iraq, Britain accused president Chirac of

ending any chance of a diplomatic settlement. At the March European Council in Brussels,

Blair and Chirac maintained a frosty distance.

The Iraq crisis impinged in particular on discussions of CFSP and ESDP. French Foreign

Minister Dominique de Villepin encapsulated the feelings of many –if not the British – when

he stated in front of the Convention that in ‘a world where war and peace are now at stake,’

Europe ‘has to play its full role because the world needs Europe’ (The Guardian 30 January

2003). The undue haste and – it should be said – lack of adequate reflection that preceded the

Brussels mini-summit bore eloquent testimony to the role of events in the Middle East as

driving forces for developments within Europe. Arguably this haste was eventually to come to

London’s aid, making it easier for British officials to argue that the initiative was based more

on knee-jerk anti-Americanism than on a genuine desire to make Europe a more effective

actor in international affairs.

On the other hand, the bitterness generated by the crisis made it difficult for British officials

to work effectively with their French counterparts on Convention business. French officials

and political leaders share to large extent British reservations about basing the EU Foreign

Minister too firmly within the Commission. It is reasonable to assume that, had it not been for

events in the Gulf, London and Paris would have worked together more effectively to secure

an alternative specification for the post. Some Foreign Office officials have even gone so far

as to claim that Britain suffered a backlash as a result of its staunch support for the United

States, with ambitious proposals being forwarded – such as for an EU Security Council seat

during the plenary of 21 May – purely in an effort to embarrass London and force it into

wielding the threat of a veto.

In Search of Friends

Britain is often portrayed as – indeed has often found itself – isolated in discussions over the

future of European integration. During the Convention and subsequent IGC, however, this

has not proved to be the case. From the first, Peter Hain was anxious to emphasise the

closeness of his links with the accession states.

“We are seen as the best friend of the candidate countries; we are the champion of

enlargement….Most of them have only won independent nationhood in the last 10 years;

they are not about to subvert it into the nightmare of a federal superstate ... Enlargement will

help build our kind of Europe rather than a superstate”.

(The Independent 23 April 2002).

A further consequence of the Gulf crisis was to solidify relations with many of these

countries, not least because their distrust of the Franco-German tandem was reinforced by

President Chirac’s ill advised outburst criticising them as ‘badly brought up’.

The Government in fact proved highly adept at seeking out tactical alliances to further its case

within the negotiations. It found itself with allies on most of its red line issues, ranging from

the Irish on taxation, to Spain, Italy and several of the accession states on defence policy.

Such was the degree of unease concerning the creation of a ‘single legislative council’ that the

Italian Presidency postponed discussions of sensitive matters relating to the chairing of

councils to a European Council meeting after the IGC (EU Observer 27 October 2003).

As the Brussels summit approached, London unexpectedly offered support for the Poles in

their quest to retain the voting weight they had acquired at Nice. Jack Straw and his Polish

counterpart Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz met on 17 November 2003. The following day, as the

former stressed that any constitutional settlement should be acceptable to all, the latter

stressed the points where Warsaw and London were in complete agreement – notably defence

and the extension of qualified majority voting (EU Observer 19 November 2003).

Indeed, such was the obvious desire on the part of British negotiators to secure whatever

support was forthcoming that it is difficult not to be cynical when considering the acerbic

comments made in November 2003 by Denis MacShane about Commission President

Romano Prodi (The Guardian 5 December 2003). The timing, if not the content of his

remarks - that Prodi should either resign his position or cease to act as an Italian ‘leader of the

opposition in exile’ - could, by one reading, have been intended to curry favour with Prodi’s

sworn enemy from Italian politics Silvio Berlusconi, who was about to chair, in his own

unique style, the European Council meeting.

Britain

‘Hain the Pain’ and the British Convention ‘team’

The success of British efforts to shape developments within the Convention were also a

function of the role played by the various British representatives to it. Foremost amongst the

British ‘team’ was Peter Hain. From the first, he benefited from his position in the

government, as a Minister known to have the ear of the Prime Minister (even if his relations

with his Secretary of State were not always too cordial). Equally important was the way he

went about his job. He was a virtually always present, not only attending the majority of

sessions, but staying around, arranging meetings, and collaring people in corridors. His

permanence contrasted starkly with the attitude of other senior Convention members. Joschka

Fischer, for instance, turned up for the plenary session of 28 October, made a brief

intervention, spoke to the members of the French team – then left. As Giscard d’Estaing

commented ruefully following this: ‘participating in the Convention means living with the

others.’

Hain also, moreover, took full advantage of the system in place within Convention plenary

sessions, and to good effect. These operated according to simple rules of procedure whereby

participants indicated with a green card their desire to respond directly to a preceding speaker,

and registered with a blue card a request to react generally to the foregoing debate. Hain used

the blue card system very effectively to react to previous interventions and make general

points spelling out the British position – a far more effective strategy than use of the green

card, the use of which was seldom recognised by the chair. His interventions were generally

felt by Convention participants to be clear and to the point.

Hain was more than ably supported by his alternate, Baroness Scotland. Not only did she

perform well in plenary sessions – she received a standing ovation the first time Justice and

Home Affairs issues were discussed in the plenary – but she played a crucial role in

persuading and cajoling colleagues over the question of inclusion of the Charter of

Fundamental Rights in the draft treaty text, and was instrumental in obtaining the caveats

which limited its applicability to the field of EU actions.

One Foreign Office official attributed British success in watering down the applicability of the

Charter to ‘sheer bloody-mindedness in bending the ears of Convention members’. This was

not atypical of the British approach. Both Hain and Baroness Scotland were regarded by their

colleagues as talented negotiators and debaters, who were very well briefed on the relevant

dossiers. Both invested large amounts of time and effort in developing contacts and lobbying.

Moreover, throughout the first phase of British involvement, they managed to at least appear

open minded and willing to both listen to others and to make concessions –as they did over

the Charter and the post of EU Foreign Minister.

More generally, they were willing to spell out British positions openly and frankly, in contrast

to many other participants who were happy to hide behind British positions rather than

voicing their own concerns about proposals. Nor, finally, did the British give up easily. One

Presidium member remarked that they were 'very similar to Yasser Arafat in their way of

negotiating in that they do not give in or stop until the very end’. From this came the epithet –

part admiring, part pejorative – of Hain the pain.

Alongside the UK government representatives, London was also represented by two MPs -

Gisela Stuart (Labour) and David Heathcot-Amory (Conservative). Whilst the latter’s

profound and unflinching euroscepticism won him few friends and little influence, Ms

Stuart’s role was more complex. Her appointment to the Presidium as a representative of

national parliaments was seen by many in London as something of a coup. While on the

surface a parliamentary representative with the same role as Heathcot-Amory, her close links

with the Labour leadership (and her aspirations to a ministerial position within the Labour

Government) meant that she was far better briefed on, and loyal to, the Government’s

‘message’, although she herself was careful to play down such links. Thus, she never travelled

to sessions with the British delegation.

However, assessments of Ms Stuart’s role within the Convention from other members of it

reflect the ambivalence of her formal and informal roles. Many were keen to point out that

she was, on occasion ‘more British than the UK representatives’, and acted as little more than

a British Government ‘plant’ within the Presidium. The general consensus amongst those

interviewed was that her influence within both the group of national parliamentarians and the

Presidium suffered as a result of her determination to pursue a Blairite agenda over the

involvement of national parliaments in EU decision-making processes – an agenda which did

not chime with that of the majority of national parliamentarians whom she was chosen to

represent on the Presidium. Particular annoyance was voiced by several Convention

participants about the fact that, whilst she sat on the Working Group on subsidiarity and

prepared its report, she was later to disown it in discussions within both the plenary and the

presidium, in favour of lobbying again – in January 2003 - for London’s preferred ‘red card’

approach.

In contrast to Ms Stuart’s increasingly high profile opinions was the role of those who had

worked within the machinery of the Convention itself. British officials had, as we have seen,

reacted with delight when Sir John Kerr was appointed as Secretary General of the

Convention. Sir John’s role, and particularly his role as an ally of London, is immensely hard

to pin down due to lack of anything other than anecdotal evidence. Convention and Presidium

insiders have insisted that London was kept abreast of everything that was happening in the

Convention by him, and that he acted as a highly effective – and very discreet – conduit

between Giscard d’Estaing and Downing Street. Whilst it is impossible accurately to know

the full extent of his role, it seems clear that London benefited from his presence at the heart

of the Convention, not least because contacts between him and his former Whitehall

colleagues were both easy and frequent.

The Convention in Britain

The Blair Factor

A crucial factor determining British behaviour, and performance, within both the Convention

and the IGC was the nature and style of leadership exercised from 10 Downing Street by

Prime Minister Tony Blair. It is dangerous to indulge in too much of the kind of

Kremlinology that has characterised much academic and most press reporting of the Prime

Minister’s role both in the recent Gulf crisis, and in matters European, particularly as they

pertain to his relationship with his neighbour Gordon Brown. However interviews with senior

Whitehall officials do reveal certain of his key characteristics and preferences.

For one thing, the Prime Minister is a keen networker who dislikes being isolated or

unpopular. This, as much as tactical reasons to do with the negotiations, or strategic ones

related to a desire to hold a euro referendum, lay behind the periodic calls from Downing

Street to British negotiators to be positive in their dealings with partners. On the other hand,

the lack of consistency revealed by officials and Ministers – generally in terms of the tone

they adopted, and more specifically over the issue of a possible referendum – was indicative

of a lack of firm day to day management of the Convention process from Downing Street.

Indeed, insofar as there was a coherent or consistent thread to British actions during the

negotiations, this has been the unwavering insistence on the need for there to be a permanent

chair of the European Council. This again can be attributed to the Prime Minister himself.

Tony Blair has never been a Minister. Consequently, his experience of the European Union is

limited to his dealings within the European Council. He has no direct experience of the

workings of the European Parliament, or the Council of Ministers, or of the day to day

functions and functioning of the European Commission. Certainly, the European Council is

an institution that has not always functioned as effectively or as consistently as is desirable –

witness the recent Italian Presidency. However what has been striking about London’s

negotiating tactics has been the way in which its position on institutional reform has focused,

virtually to the exclusion of all else, on this one institution. Thus Britain signalled its

willingness to accept election of the Commission President as a quid pro quo for the Council

chair. British negotiators also dropped their insistence on the need for a smaller Commission -

a demand grounded in a desire to see that institution be made more effective and more

independent - as a trade off with the ‘smalls’, who, egged on (curiously enough) by Romano

Prodi, argued in favour of representativeness at the level of Commissioners in return for

accepting the idea of a permanent European Council chair. As the final section will illustrate,

this focus on the European Council, to the virtual exclusion of all other institutional questions,

may well be one that spawns negative consequences for the UK.

A Rolls Royce in Overdrive

The British administrative system has long been hailed as one of the most effective when it

comes to dealing with the European Union. A coherent and cohesive administration, operating

in an information rich environment, has permitted London to cope successfully with the

taxing demands of EU membership and made Britain known as the member state which

manages most effectively to coordinate its responses to, and present the most united and

coherent negotiating positions within, the Union.

The Foreign Office was the central player in London during the Treaty negotiations, with

policy thrashed out at Friday meetings involving Peter Hain and the relevant FCO officials.

During the course of the Treaty negotiations the FCO gained a reputation for a greater degree

of Euroscepticism than was to be found in Downing Street. A senior member of the

Presidium recalled having heard, on more than one occasion, the phrase 'this is the position of

the PM, but the FCO…' Partly, the different positions sprang from the fact that the Foreign

Minister, if not a eurosceptic, certainly did not share the pro-European enthusiasm of his

predecessor, Robin Cook, or the Prime Minister.

Disputes between Downing Street and the Foreign Office arose primarily over legal issues.

Thus, they clashed over the question of the charter of fundamental rights. From the

perspective of the PM, it would have been politically very difficult to oppose the defence of

rights. Moreover, the legal arguments against the charter were not of a kind to interest public

opinion. The FCO, on the other hand, advocated a more rigid position on the advice of its

legal experts. Baroness Scotland, according to some, had to negotiate as hard in London as in

Brussels to secure an acceptable deal on the charter. Similarly, the surprising and ill-judged

intervention of Peter Hain on the issue of the supremacy of EU law reflected the position

adopted by the Foreign Office lawyers who had also been reluctant to concede on the question

of an EU legal personality. Once again one can see evidence of a lack of firm leadership from

the centre in deciding which battles to fight, and which to pass by. This left British negotiators

in the worst of all worlds - losing negotiating capital as a consequence of their negative

attitude whilst not being committed enough to fight to the bitter end on issues such as

supremacy.

Such tensions certainly had an impact on Britain’s performance during the negotiations. For

one thing, there was the lack of coherence and consistency. London oscillated between

producing lists of amendments to almost every treaty article, as individual departments

struggled to defend their own turf, and periodic outbursts of conciliatory behaviour, as

pressure from Number 10 in particular limited the negative tactics. To a certain extent, this

was counterproductive. For instance, given the increasingly negative tone that London

adopted as the Convention wore on, it was perhaps unwise to concede ground on issues such

as the label ‘constitution’ so early in the process. It would presumably have been more

rational to use the debate about nomenclature as a bargaining chip later in the process.

Clearly, treaty negotiations involve a number of ministries. When it comes to coordinating

their various positions, the very features of the British system that make for effectiveness in

dealing with routine EU business represent something of a handicap in treaty negotiations

For one thing, unlike routine legislative matters treaty negotiations deal directly with issues of

power and competence, rather than matters of policy substance. This necessarily affects the

attitude of individuals and ministries towards them. As one Foreign Office official put it,

‘even broadly pro-European ministries are not when it comes to defending their own turf

against “Brussels”’.

Second, treaty negotiations are far more public than legislative negotiations within the

Council. As a consequence, they provide an incentive for posturing on the part of Ministers

anxious to play the patriotic card to a somewhat sceptical public. Because of the visibility of

the negotiations, Ministers themselves became involved in the discussions, making it

impossible, unlike in the case of ‘normal’ EU business, for the senior mandarins at the heart

of the EU coordination system to overrule recalcitrant line ministries. Ministers are all too

aware of the need to maintain their political standing within the country, and ‘standing up to

Brussels’ is, unfortunately, as good a way of doing this as any. They are therefore all too

willing to fight their own corners and let the Prime Minister take the rap for any concessions

that are made. It is, partly at least, in this light that Gordon Brown’s outburst against tax

harmonisation should probably be viewed (Daily Telegraph 5 November 2003).

A clear example of the influence of line ministries was provided by domestic debates over the

proposal to create a single legislative council. Both the Prime Minister and especially his

adviser Roger Liddle were enthusiastic supporters of an idea which, for them, promised more

transparency and less bureaucracy. It was the opposition of line ministries - anxious to guard

legislative prerogatives in their own areas of competence – that led London to drop its initial

support for the idea (The Times 15 May 2003)

The large number of British amendments and objections to the draft treaty texts was further

evidence of the negative impact of the highly tuned British coordination system. Because

consultation was the norm, texts were circulated to all departments, each of which promptly

inserted its own reservations. The absence of direct and persistent Prime Ministerial

involvement in the process created a leadership vacuum, spawning an inability to define an

overall strategic vision whereby certain reservations were dropped in order to focus on more

pressing issues.

Two ministries in particular were forthright in their interventions during the negotiations. The

White Paper on the IGC was published only hours before the commencement of the

parliamentary debate because of the need for detailed negotiations on the text over the

preceding weekend between Foreign and Home office officials. Downing Street was happy

with the unanimity lock on the idea of a European public prosecutor, but this did not satisfy

Home Office officials, who insisted on the need to water down the text still further. One

Foreign Office official exclaimed, with uncharacteristic forthrightness, that the ‘Home Office

were a complete pain in the arse’.

The other Ministry which flexed its muscles was Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT). Because it

enjoyed a large degree of autonomy over domestic policy, and because of the political weight

of the Chancellor, HMT enjoyed significant influence within the domestic processes that lay

behind the Treaty negotiations. As one Foreign Office official put it, ‘some departmental red

lines are redder than others, and the Treasury’s are the reddest of all’.

There was a palpable sense of frustration amongst certain officials in the Foreign Office about

the attitude of the Treasury to EU negotiations. At a general level, officials accuse their

Treasury colleagues of ‘not playing the game’, of clearing initiatives late if at all. In

particular, as far as the Treaty negotiations were concerned, the Treasury has adopted a

hawkish tone about the (highly remote) possibility of tax harmonisation. As one Foreign

Office official remarked, ‘they would oppose any treaty article with the letters T, A and QMV

in the same sentence’.

Treasury officials, for their part, are wont to criticise their colleagues on King Charles Street

for their unhealthy emphasis on ‘relationship management’. The Foreign Office has thus

found itself on more than one occasion trapped uncomfortably between more hawkish

members of the Treasury team such as the Chancellor’s adviser Ed Balls, and more Europhile

members of the Prime Minster’s staff such as Roger Liddle, who have criticised the FCO’s

negative attitude towards the on going negotiations (The Times 15 May 2003).

Divisions were not overcome by the failure to secure agreement at Brussels. In the wake of

the failed summit, senior Cabinet ministers privately dissociated themselves from the Prime

Minister’s ‘evangelism’ about the new constitution. The Foreign Secretary himself was

reported to have been urging the Prime Minister to adopt a more conciliatory approach

towards the notion of a referendum (Sunday Telegraph 14 December 2003, Sunday Times, 41

December 2003).

Even within the Foreign Office itself, effective coordination was, on occasion, problematic.

Partly, as already alluded to, this stemmed from differences of opinion between key

ministerial players about Britain’s relationship with the Union. Partly, too, the difficulties

encountered by the FCO stemmed from a series of reshuffles which had the effect of moving

the British representative on the Convention, Peter Hain, from King Charles Street. In

October 2002, the then Minister for Europe was promoted to the post of Secretary of State for

Wales (the Welsh portfolio, naturally enough, representing a promotion from the European

one). The move created uncertainty about coordination procedures, not least because of

incipient tensions between Hain and the Foreign Secretary, as acknowledged by one Foreign

Office official, who confided to the FT’s Observer column that the ‘lines of responsibility’

implying, one presumes, the question as to whether Hain was to report to the FCO or Number

10, ‘have yet to be decided’ (28 October 2002). It seems fair to assume, at the very least, that

Hain’s move to another department made it harder than ever for FCO officials to control his

tendency to ‘shoot from the hip’, with obvious consequences for his behaviour in the

Convention.

Bureaucratic in-fighting was also responsible for the failure of an abortive initiative aimed at

imposing greater coherence and leadership on domestic actors. When planning the Cabinet

reshuffle in June 2003, the Prime Minister had strongly considered creating a cabinet level

post of Minister for Europe. Certainly, there is no guarantee that such an initiative would

have been effective at imposing greater coherence and discipline on the various competing

ministries in London: it is hard to imagine even a European Minister of Cabinet rank

imposing discipline on the Treasury. However, it is conceivable that a senior and high profile

appointment (the PM apparently was considering both Peter Hain and Alan Milburn for the

position) might have succeeded in imposing greater discipline on the line ministries and

having a clearer strategic vision of the overall British position. The proposal, however, was

opposed and finally killed by Jack Straw, who did not want to see a rival centre of power on

the Europe issue. (The Independent 12 June 2003 21 June 2003).

Party Politics and the Press

If the world of Whitehall was where the detailed discussions of Britain’s negotiating stance

took place, it was over the road in Westminster that the grandes lignes of policy were most

profoundly shaped. A clear illustration of the state of British party politics when it came to

discussions of the EU was provided by the political reaction on the PM’s return from the

Laeken summit. As pointed out above, short of having the Laeken declaration drafted in the

FCO, it is hard to conceive of a document more sensitive to British concerns. Nonetheless, the

Prime Minister’s report to the House of Commons prompted allegations from Conservative

leader Iain Duncan Smith that the government was leading Britain towards deeper political

integration with Europe (Financial Times 18 December 2001).

However, during the early stages of the treaty negotiations, the Government must have been

pleasantly surprised by the almost total lack of reaction to events in Brussels in Westminster.

The press was quiet on the issue of the Convention, and Iain Duncan Smith failed to raise it

even once at Prime Minister’s Questions. This brief period of calm, however was rudely

shattered in April 2003, as the Iraq crisis neared its climax and the first draft texts appeared.

The Sun (17 April 2003) was quick to link the two issues in its own inimitable style: ‘Mr

Blair has just fought a war that France and Germany bitterly opposed. The split between the

axis of weasel and allies like Britain, Spain and Italy runs deep. The shabby dealings of the

surrender monkeys have shown that much of the EU is not to be trusted’.

The picture for British negotiators was complicated immensely in May as the press – in

anticipation of the publication of the full draft at the end of the month - launched a furious

assault against the government and the Convention. Opposition to the constitutional treaty

was closely linked to growing calls for a referendum. In May of 2003, the issue gained public

prominence when the Right Wing newspaper the Daily Mail launched a campaign for a

referendum on the constitutional treaty because of which, apparently, British ‘independence,

sovereignty, indeed our very soul is under threat’ (19 May). On the same day, Conrad Black,

owner of the Telegraph newspapers, announced that these latter would campaign for a

referendum on the constitution (The Guardian 20 May 2003). Equally if not more unsettling

for the Government were reports that some Labour backbench MPs favoured the calls for a

referendum (The Scotsman 20 May 2003).

Rather than adopting a coherent position on the referendum issue, Government Ministers

seemed ill-briefed and out of step with each other. Peter Hain stated confidently that the

Treaty represented little more than a ‘tidying up exercise’ in contrast to the Single European

Act and the Maastricht Treaty, neither of which had resulted in a referendum (Financial

Times 13 May 2003). Yet later the same month, in an interview on the Radio Four Today

Programme of 27 May, he declared, apparently without prior consultation with Cabinet

colleagues, that ‘I would be quite happy to fight the next European elections on a Labour

platform endorsing this treaty, and the conservatives can oppose it, and then the people will

decide’. Two months later, despite frantic denials from Downing Street that either the EP

elections could be used as a surrogate referendum, or that the Government planned to call a

referendum, Minister for Europe Dennis MacShane, in an interview on 17 July 2003, with

EU Observer, stated simply, if ambiguously, that it ‘is simply too early to call for a

referendum’.

As the row simmered on, the Conservative opposition seized upon it, with Iain Duncan Smith

calling for a referendum on the constitutional treaty – a call taken up immediately after his

inauguration as Duncan Smith’s successor by new Conservative Party leader Michael

Howard. Meanwhile, the Government continued to create rods for its own back. In an

interview with The Times in early September, Peter Hain, no doubt honestly, yet nevertheless

ill-advisedly, made his comments about the Prime Minister describing the Convention to the

cabinet as potentially more important than the Iraq crisis. This was hardly calculated to chime

with repeated Government assertions to the effect that the Constitution did not seriously

redefine Britain’s relationship with the European Union.

The assault was redoubled in September as the Government prepared to release its White

Paper on the IGC. The Sun printed a photo of Blair in an undertaker’s hat on the front page of

its 10 September issue - the day after the White Paper’s publication - under the headline ‘Last

Rites: Blundertaker Blair is set to Bury our Nation’. In October the Telegraph (16 October

2003) was trumpeting on its front page the fact that the Queen herself was becoming

increasingly concerned that the assertion, in article 10 of the draft treaty, of the primacy of EC

law would undermine her role as Head of State.

The point of all this lay not in the journalistic sophistication of the British tabloid press but,

rather, in the effect that domestic opposition to what the Government was doing had on

British policy. It is certainly no coincidence that it was during the phase of media and

opposition quiescence that the British stance was most positive, conciliatory and upbeat.

Similarly, the more negative tone adopted by the press and the opposition from around April

2003 coincided with a distinct hardening of the tone adopted by British negotiators.

The government’s mishandling of the issue has certainly exacerbated the pressure it now finds

itself under. Confused and confusing messages, alongside often injudicious language

emanating from Whitehall and Westminster have done nothing to dampen the ardour of the

pro-referendum right, whilst helping to reinforce an image of a government running scared.

Pressure on the Prime Minister to call a referendum intensified when his official spokesman

told journalists in London that it was a ‘reasonable representation’ of the UK's position that if

certain ‘red lines’ are breached, a referendum might be held (EU Observer 16 October 2003).

Political pressure linked to calls for a referendum had a particular weight in the UK context.

Regular scrutiny of the negotiations by parliamentary committees – most notably the House of

Lords EU Select Committee – coupled with the need to report regularly to the House on

progress meant that the Government could not simply sweep the whole difficult issue of the

constitutional treaty under the carpet. As one senior Foreign Office official commented wryly

‘on issues like the supremacy of EU law we could not, as some other member states did,

recognise the potential for a clash with domestic constitutional norms and ignore it. We had to

respond to challenges from parliament about them.’

Domestic unrest, moreover, was grist to the mill of Ministers anxious to prove their patriotic

credentials, and merely increased the incentives for them to guard their turf and leave it to the

Prime Minister to take the responsibility – and the rap – for concessions. It is hardly

surprising therefore that even a strongly worded memo from the Prime Minister’s adviser to

key Foreign Office officials urging the need for a less aggressive and negative tone towards

the Convention failed to have the required effect (The Times 15 May 2003).

By the time of the Brussels summit, political pressure increased still further as British

parliamentary representative on the Convention, Gisela Stuart, appeared to disown its

outcome. In December, she launched an unexpected and furious assault against both the treaty

and the process by which the Convention had come to negotiate it, declaring that the

government ‘does not have to accept it’ (EU Observer 8 December 2003; Financial Times 8

December 2003). Her outburst had the effect of ratcheting up the pressure on the Government

to call a referendum, leading former Europe Minister Keith Vaz to speculate publicly at the

weekend of the summit itself that a referendum had perhaps become a necessity. The same

weekend thirty one MP’s signed a public letter demanding a referendum, whilst there were

mutterings (if unconvincing ones) on the Labour backbenches that the Prime Minister could

face the equivalent of his own Maastricht if he attempted to deny a popular vote. The Prime

Minister himself appeared to soften his tone in the immediate aftermath of the summit, when,

asked directly if he was willing to countenance a referendum, he stated ‘Let’s wait and see

what we get as to the European constitution’ (The Sunday Times 14 December 2003).

Nor is there any indication that the political pressure will abate following the Brussels

summit. The debate has certainly been complicated by the intervention of Gisela Stuart who,

her reputation for being pro-European notwithstanding, has set herself up as an unlikely

intellectual leader of the eurosceptic cause. The real fear for British negotiators now must be

that, faced with a continuation of the IGC in a political climate that will be marked by the fall

out from the Hutton report, and with the prospect of a 2005 general election reducing still

further the Government’s room for manoeuvre, making the new round of negotiations far

more difficult than those of the last two years.

As a consequence the Government will doubtless be less inclined than ever to attempt to stand

up to the eurosceptic attacks on the draft treaty. This, as the final section will argue, may be

politically expedient, but it will also help undermine progress towards the achievement of one

of the central objectives of Prime Minister Blair’s EU policy. .

IV - THE NEGOCIATIONS IN BROADER CONTEXT

Selling Europe

Any assessment of Britain’s role within the Convention and the IGC must be placed in the

wider context both of the country’s relationship with the EU in general, and the ongoing

debate about the UK’s relationship with the Union in the country itself. A curious paradox

emerges when these are juxtaposed. The negativity that characterises public perceptions of

Britain’s place in Europe stands in stark contrast to a reality in which Britain is generally

viewed as a generally effective member of the EU which has done more than most member

states to shape its recent development (Menon and Wright 1998).

One of the defining features of the Blair government has been an apparent commitment to

reconciling these conflicting perspectives by persuading the British public of the UK’s central

role and influence in the Union. Since his accession to power in 1997, Tony Blair has

periodically given the impression that his intention was to challenge prevailing popular

misconceptions:

“The blunt truth is that British policy towards the rest of Europe over half a century has been

marked by gross misjudgements, mistaking what we wanted to be the case with what was the

case; hesitation, alienation, incomprehension, with the occasional burst of enlightened

brilliance which only served to underline the frustration of our partners with what was the

norm”.

(Blair 2000)

He repeated his criticism the following year in a speech to the European Research Institute at

the University of Birmingham: ‘Britain's future is inextricably linked with Europe;…to get the

best out of it, we must make the most of our strength and influence within it; and…to do so,

we must be whole-hearted, not half-hearted, partners in Europe (Blair 2001)

The Convention was seen by many in the Government as an ideal opportunity to alter

prevailing ideas about Britain’s relationship with the Union. Partly, this was so in its own

right, with the Convention serving as a means to challenge head on some of the

misconceptions that pervade British discourse about the Union. Partly, too, the Government –

and the Prime Minister in particular - had a more instrumentalist purpose, notably to use the

Convention as a means of easing a positive vote in any euro referendum. Simply put, the

Prime Minister was of the opinion that, given his attempts to sell the euro to an

overwhelmingly sceptical population, the Convention could serve to separate political

discussions about the European Union from what he was keen to portray as the purely

economic question of the euro. Peter Hain made this point after the Convention had finished

its work. The ‘outcome . . . as Tony Blair has always wanted, has put us in a good position to

win the euro argument and creates the context for making the case for the euro’ (Financial

Times 29 July 2003)

Consequently, according to officials at the Foreign Office, a Prime Ministerial ‘edict’ in early

2002 had urged those involved with the Convention to adopt a positive tone. As preparations

for the Convention got underway - in early 2002 – there was still a feeling that the

Government might call a referendum on the euro as early as the autumn of 2003. This being

the case it was felt that the adoption of an excessively hostile or negative tone towards the on-

going negotiations would serve to confirm, rather than reduce, the euro scepticism of the

British public.

The positive tone, as we have seen, took two forms. First, an upbeat assessment, maintained

by all officials during 2002, of the work of the Convention and Britain’s role and

effectiveness within it. Second, the emphasis on institutional balance maintained until the end

of the year was partly based on a desire to explain to a wider audience that traditional British

phobias – about the Commission in particular - were misplaced. Take, for example, the

following passage from the Prime Minister’s November 2002 speech in Cardiff:

“It is easy to knock the Commission. By definition, because it is based in Brussels, it is a

remote bureaucracy - but smaller in size than many single Whitehall Departments. It takes

unpopular decisions - because it is responsible for keeping Member States to the

commitments they have agreed. This role as enforcer is unenviable, but essential.

Governments rarely give it credit for its achievements, but are always quick to criticise its

shortcomings. And it has at times in the past not managed its internal affairs well….But we

should stand up for the Commission. It plays an essential role. Along with the Court of

Justice, it is the best guarantee of equality in the Union, ensuring that small countries or new

Member States are not treated as second class members. And on enlargement, economic

modernisation and CAP reform, the Commission has been a strong progressive force”.

Such positive rhetoric was, not, however, to be sustained. During the course of 2003, partly

due to increased defensiveness within the Convention itself, but mainly because of the

political backlash that was brewing at home, the government increasingly seemed to come to

believe that it was both easier and more profitable to pander to eurosceptic myths than to

question them.

Thus, as relations between Britain and the Convention moved into their second phase, the

traditional themes of Britain’s public diplomacy with the Union resurfaced. Rather than

exuding confidence about their ability to shape the Union’s future, British officials resorted to

raising fears concerning the Commission’s desire and ability to steal power from nation states

if it were given the merest opportunity to do so. Opposition to the ‘Foreign Minister’s’ links

with the Commission and to the possible use of Qualified Majority Voting on social security

and cross border tax fraud were explicitly justified in these terms. As Peter Hain put it in

reference to the latter:

You might say it was sensible to have the Brussels Commission able to stop cross-border tax

fraud. Say a member state, perhaps a newer member state, doesn’t have quite the standards

of anti-fraud measures in place that a country like ours does. That sounds very plausible but

actually it would allow the Commission and the European Parliament a back door into our

tax system’

(Times 9 September 2003)

Clamping down on tax evasion across frontiers, then, certainly made sense – not least for a

British Exchequer that was losing significant sums because of it. However, it was simply too

dangerous a step to take. This, it should be remembered, was the same Peter Hain who, upon

his appointment to the post of UK Government representative on the Convention, had stressed

that he was ‘focused on delivery, not process’ (The Independent 25 January 2002). It is

striking to what extent the shadow of the future stalked the corridors of a Whitehall that

previously had been anxious to trumpet its ability to shape that future.

In early June, a further aspect of that future was clarified – to an extent – when the Treasury

published eighteen volumes of evidence to support the 246-page assessment of the tests on the

single currency. The Chancellor duly announced that the Treasury's massive assessment had

concluded that only one of the five economic tests for joining the single currency had been

Such a lack of confidence was not confined to the Government. A senior CBI official told me that, whilst he

appreciated that there was no problem per se in voting by QMV on cross border tax fraud, or on incorporating

the Charter with explicit safeguards limiting its applicability, his organisation was voicing opposition to both

because it simply did not trust Ministers to defend these positions adequately in the future.

met, and that changes to the housing market, Britain's inflation target, and reforms in the rules

governing the European Central Bank were required to allow the UK to safely enter the

existing eurozone of twelve.

In the face of the profound disappointment that the announcement spawned amongst the pro-

European lobby, Gordon Brown and Tony Blair used the occasion of a joint press conference

following the Chancellor’s statement to announce a decision to send out Ministers

aggressively to promote a ‘positive pro-European consensus’. Brown announced a series of

events around the country to counter ‘anti-European prejudice’.

For all the fine rhetoric, however, the promised pro-European road show never materialised.

One Minister stated, of the promised campaign to tackle ‘anti-European prejudice’ that there

‘was no follow through. It looks like another five-minute wonder’ (The Independent 21 June

2003). On 9 September, Simon Buckby announced his resignation as Director of the Britain

in Europe Campaign. His parting shot was illuminating, as he complained that the government

had suffered a loss of confidence over the euro and failed to follow a consistent strategy:

‘When I came here, I was told Tony Blair would attack anti-European prejudice. One speech

every six months does not a campaign make. Stop-go is not good enough.’

Indeed, freed from the prospect of an imminent euro-referendum, and hence of the need to

strike a positive tone to convince doubtful voters that the European Union represented an

opportunity rather than a threat for Britain, Ministers responded with a more euro-sceptic

tone. Following the presentation of the Convention text, and immediately before the

commencement of the IGC, Peter Hain pulled no punches in an interview for International

Affairs with Martha Kearney:

MK: ….You talk in terms of constantly fighting back the tide and the power of the

European Commission, you talk about them encroaching, that they want to do this, they

want to do that—

PH: That’s the language in which the debate with them is conducted.

MK: Well, it’s the language in which you’re conducting the debate.

PH: Well, I have to.

MK: But it’s your sense, the sense of your party, that you are fighting it. And that

accounts for a lot of people’s suspicion about the European Union, doesn’t it? The

feeling that it is some kind of conveyor belt, that we’re the whole time having to draw

lines in the sand.

PH: Well, the point is, there are—it is a terrible caricature of a term, but there are the

federalists, who are well represented in the Commission and in the Parliament, because

they enjoy exercising more and more power, and that is their ambition;

The supranational institutions were thus increasingly portrayed as the enemy, in stark contrast

to the language used by both the Prime Minister and Hain himself in November of the

previous year. And the degree to which concern for institutional balance had been shelved

became abundantly clear in the Government’s White Paper on the IGC. Seemingly unaware

of the irony, that document (page 16., para 5) quoted verbatim a passage from the Prime

Minister’s Cardiff speech which referred to the need to strengthen all the EU institutions and

criticised those who saw the EU as a battle between the intergovernmental and the

supranational. Some pages later, a text box (p. 31) trumpeted the fact that the ‘House of Lords

European Union Committee concluded in its twenty-first Report on 15 May that “it is clear

that the balance of power in the European Union is going to shift from the Commission in

favour of the Member States if the [Convention’s] proposals… are adopted”’.

Indeed, so pleased was the Foreign Secretary with this idea, that he not only quoted the same

passage again during his presentation of the White Paper to the House, but also (against the

advice of at least some Foreign Office officials) hammered home the point by proclaiming

delightedly that the creation of a permanent chair for the European Council ‘will too, in

practice, shift authority from the Commission to national Governments’ (House of Commons,

Hansard, 9 September 2003 column 173).

Two months later, the same Chancellor who had promised to counter anti-European prejudice

penned an article that was as astonishing for its placement in the eurosceptic Daily Telegraph

(5 November 2003) and the title under which it was reported (‘Brown the sceptic blasts EU

federalism’) as it was for its content. In a tone all too reminiscent of the hectoring of Margaret

Thatcher, Brown lectured the rest of Europe on the theme of how they should follow the

British economic example. Whatever the rights or wrongs of his economic case, the way in

which it was put, with the now all too familiar dismissals of the idea of a European superstate,

and its arrogant, even condescending tone illustrated all too clearly that the period of listening

and of compromising was over.

The dangers inherent in this steady rhetorical drift were neatly summed up by a Blair aide: ‘If

we attack the Convention's proposals all the time, we are sending more negative messages

about the EU….We need to present a more balanced picture, or we will just reinforce people's

prejudices about Europe.’ (The Independent 20 June 2003).

Shaping Europe

So much for the Government’s abortive efforts to win round a sceptical British public to the

positive aspects of EU membership. In and of itself, the failure of the ‘hearts and minds’

strategy was of only limited significance, given the Government’s refusal to countenance a

referendum on the constitutional treaty, and the Chancellor’s veto on a euro referendum in the

foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, however, the implications of this retreat into timid pandering to the

eurosceptics were not confined to its consequences for British popular opinion or the

possibility of a referendum on euro entry. Equally importantly, the turn taken by British

policy was one which threatened to undermine the very British effectiveness within the

European Union that the Blair government was, sporadically, keen to underline to the

population.

In retreating from its earlier emphasis on institutional balance, the government was turning

away from policy preferences which suited its own interests in the Union. There were genuine

concerns amongst senior officials in Whitehall as to the implications of enlargement for the

effective functioning of the Union. In making his speech at Cardiff, the Prime Minister was

not simply engaged in a struggle to win over British public opinion, but also underlining the

degree to which these benefits depended on the presence of effective supranational

institutions. In so doing, he provided one of the most honest assessments of the role of the

~Commission ever provided by a serving British Minister:

Its role is two-fold: the initiation of detailed proposals within the strategic priorities set by the

European Council and the implementation of political decisions. I want to see both those roles

strengthened. I do believe it is time to communitise much of the Justice and Home Affairs

Pillar. This will not, of course, affect the agreement Britain secured at Amsterdam in 1997 on

our border controls. But it will mean integrated and effective action on issues to do with

organised crime, drug dealing, asylum and immigration that affect all of Europe, cause huge

distress and difficulty and cannot seriously be tackled by nations alone….The Commission is

rightly responsible for ensuring that there is a level playing field across the Member States; and

that the detailed legal rules can be changed rapidly where that is sensible: for example through

the…procedures to keep our financial services industry competitive in the new global market.

We should improve the way the Commission consults on future framework legislation. In

addition I favour strengthening the Commission's authority in making sure Europe's rules are

obeyed and redress is available quickly in circumstances of a breach of the law.

(Blair 2002)

There is hardly need for additional explanation. As the state which has played a leading role

in creating, and has benefited as much as, if not more that any of its partners from the Single

Market, Britain has more reason than most to desire a Commission able effectively to perform

these tasks, particularly given the recent decline in authority suffered by that institution

(Kassim and Menon 2003). Faced with public hostility and ignorance forged via years of

misleading rhetoric, however, it proved impossible for the Government to stick to its line

concerning institutional balance. The need to strengthen the European Commission was

forgotten and, as we have seen, Peter Hain even suggested removing the legal foundations of

the whole integration project.

The Blair government is not the first to try to have its cake and eat it in this way. The Tories,

too, when in power benefited from British engagement in the Union, and especially from the

Single Market, whilst castigating the very institutions on which its continued effectiveness

depended. The situation now however is very different, given the prospect of the accession of

ten new member states in May 2004. Not only will a market of twenty five require more

effective policing and law enforcement than ever, but it is hard to rate as encouraging the

prospects for carrying out the necessary reforms in future IGC’s when twenty five vetoes are

there to be wielded. The potential implications of the British stance, therefore, are far from

positive.

CONCLUSION

Any judgement about Britain’s role and performance in the negotiations over the draft

constitutional treaty must necessarily be nuanced. On the one hand, British negotiators

proved strikingly successful in achieving their stated objectives. This was all the more

remarkable given not only the composition of the Convention and the objectives of a majority

of its members, but also Britain’s increasing isolation as 2003 dawned, and the steadily more

acerbic tone of negotiations as the Iraq crisis intensified. Despite the overwhelmingly

negative press comment, the Treaty was, as we have seen, a better one from a British

perspective than most in Whitehall could have hoped for at the start of the Convention

process.

On the other hand and largely as a result of steadily increasing domestic political interest in

and unrest about the negotiations, British negotiators steadily shifted their priorities in 2003.

This involved a downplaying of their earlier emphasis on institutional balance in favour of a

defensive stance focussed on measures intended to promote and enhance national control over

‘Brussels’. The early confidence that marked British attitudes soon dissipated in favour of a

more familiar negative, carping and defensive tone.

Certainly this shift of emphasis did nothing to diminish the ability of British negotiators to

achieve what they said they wanted. On the contrary, it is arguable that the Whitehall machine

proved most adept at defending essentially negative positions as illustrated by the gusto with

which individual departments added their own red lines to the growing list. The British,

moreover, are hardly inexperienced when it comes to arguing against proposals, or securing

limited tactical alliances to stymie the initiatives of others.

However, this negative approach, born out of a desire to peddle to short term political

pressures, did have potentially deleterious wider implications. For one thing, the way in which

London approached the negotiations, particularly during 2003, did little to facilitate the

Government’s quest to place Britain at the heart of the Union. Certainly, the Iraq crisis in and

of itself seriously damaged relations with both the French and the Germans. Whatever little

chance remained of rapprochement was further eroded by London’s attitude to the IGC

negotiations. Veto threats sat uneasily beside the broadly supportive attitudes of Paris and

Berlin. More importantly, the apparently purely instrumentalist way in which Britain appeared

to offer its support to Spanish and Polish demands that the Nice voting weights be maintained

angered German and French officials. Some reports following the Brussels meeting claimed

that President Chirac held Tony Blair responsible for the breakdown of the summit.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the positions that British negotiators ultimately

defended were not necessarily those most suited to the creation of a Union whose nature

meshes neatly with British interests. As argued above, Britain has as much as any member

state to gain from an effective Union with a well functioning internal market. As several high

profile British Ministers including the Prime Minister himself openly acknowledged towards

the end of 2002, this involves a reinforced and independent European Commission with the

authority and resources effectively to police that market. The political pressure that was

brought to bear upon the Government, however, militated against the continuation of the kind

of rhetoric that marked the autumn and winter of 2002. Commission bashing, which became

the norm (at least from Peter Hain) was politically far easier than putting forward a reasoned

case for institutional balance. After all, the costs of a treaty which is not congruent with

British interests would take time to emerge and would be far from obvious.

Finally, the style and tone of British participation - so reasoned and positive during the first

months of the Convention – served to work against another objective of a Government which,

on more than one occasion, has stated its intention to explain the benefits of EU membership

clearly, and combat the prejudices of euroscepticism in Britain. Rather than doing so

however, the Government opted instead to pander to these prejudices as from the early part of

2003. In so doing, it not only played down its own achievement in negotiating a text which

suited it relatively well but also helped to reinforce the negative stereotypes about the

European Union that it had been its stated intention to challenge.

The key reason behind the change of attitude to which most of these negative consequences

can be attributed was, of course, domestic politics. More than one of those interviewed in

Westminster and Whitehall referred to domestic political pressures to account for the apparent

timidity of the Government’s efforts to ‘sell’ a more positive image of the Union to its

citizens.

Yet perhaps the ultimate indictment of Government policy in this regard is that greater

political courage could conceivably have yielded significant fruit in terms of shifting the

terms of political debate in the UK. Far from the federalist nightmare bemoaned by much of

the British press, the draft treaty suggests a European Union modelled firmly on

intergovernmentalist lines. The spectre of a superstate, in retreat anyway for much of the last

decade, has finally, it would seem, been banished. If ever there were an opportunity to

challenge prevailing stereotypes about the EU, it existed for this pro-European government,

during these negotiations, armed with this draft text and an overwhelming majority in the

House of Commons. The opportunity, however, like so many others in the history of British

membership of the EC/EU, has been squandered.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blair, T. (2002). ‘A Clear course for Europe’, Cardiff, 28 November.

(2001). 'Britain's role in Europe' Prime Minister's speech to the European Research Institute,

University of Birmingham 21 November.

(2000). Prime Minister's Speech to the Polish Stock Exchange, Warsaw, 6 October.

Hain, P (2003) ‘Europe: a vision for the World, Peter Hain talks to Martha Kearney’,

International Affairs 79, 5, October

Kassim, H. and Menon, A (2003) ‘Les Etats Membres de l’UE et la Commission Prodi’,

Revue Française de Science Politique, 53, 4, August 2003, p. 491-511.

Menon. A. (2004) ‘Foreign and Security Policy’ in H. Kassim, G. Peters And A. Menon (eds.)

Co-ordinating the EU: constructing policy co-ordination and coherent action in a multi-level

system (forthcoming)

(2003). ‘Britain and the Convention on the Future of Europe’ International Affairs, 79, 5, 963-

978.

Menon, A. and Wright, V (1998) `The Paradoxes of “Failure”: British EU Policy Making in

Comparative Perspective’ Public Administration and Public Policy 13. 4.

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2003) ‘The British Approach to

the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 2003’ Presented to Parliament by the

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, September

Straw, J. (2002) ‘Reforming Europe: new era, new questions’, The Hague, 21 February.

Presidency (2003) Addendum to the Presidency note,

http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/B6D8B2AC-707C-4FC8-AA34-

12FD3C396EC8/0/1209Cig60Add1_en.pdf

Presidency (2001) Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting In Laeken 14 And 15

December 2001 Sn 300/1/01 Rev 1, Annex I, Laeken Declaration On The Future Of The

European Union

Annex 1

Tax and Red lines: constitutional texts

Article III-62

1. A European law or framework law of the

Council of Ministers shall lay down

measures for the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties

and other forms of indirect taxation provided that such harmonisation is necessary for

the functioning of the internal market and to

avoid distortion of competition. The

Council of Ministers shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament

and the Economic and Social Committee.

2. Where the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the

Commission, finds

that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 relate to administrative

cooperation or to combating tax fraud and tax evasion, it shall act, notwithstanding

paragraph 1, by a qualified majority when adopting the European law or framework law

adopting these measures.

Article III-63

Where the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the

Commission, finds that measures on company taxation relate to administrative

cooperation or combating tax fraud and tax evasion, it shall adopt, by a q

ualified

majority, a European law or framework law laying down these measures, provided

that they are necessary for the functioning of the internal market and to avoid

distortion of competition.

That law or framework law shall be adopted after consultation

of the European

Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.

Annex 2

The European Constitutional treaty – a chronology of Key Events

23 November 2001

Tony Blair’s first major speech on Britain’s place in the future of European debate, to the

European Research Institute: “Britain's role in Europe”

http://www.pmo.gov.uk/output/Page1673.asp

14-15 December 2001

Laeken European Council agrees to establish a Convention to debate the Future of

Europe

http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf for the Laeken Declaration on the Future

of Europe

http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID=76&DID=68827&LANG=2&File=

/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf&Picture=0 for the Presidency Conclusions

21 February 2002

Jack Straw makes his first keynote speech on the Convention process: “Reforming

Europe: New Era, New Questions”

The most provocative element in the speech – at this stage in the process – is his support for

the concept of a written European Constitution.

http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&

cid=1007029393411&a=KArticle&aid=1014918160874 for the full text of the speech

February 2002

The Convention’s first plenary session

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1845695.stm for BBC analysis

24-25 June 2002

Convention “Civil Society” consultation Plenary Session.

http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00167en2.pdf for a summary of the session

27 August, 2002

Jack Straw makes a keynote speech in Edinburgh, “Strength in Europe begins at home”. He

points out how Scotland manages to combine several levels of identity and sovereignty, and

repeats his support for a written constitution.

http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&

cid=1007029393411&a=KArticle&aid=1030405878065 for the full text of the speech

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/world_at_one/2219046.stm and

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_ politics/2218136.stm for BBC coverage and comment

10 October 2002

Jack Straw’s article in the Economist, “A constitution for Europe”, sets out his vision of a

Constitution for Europe as simple, inspiring and transparent as that of the US.

http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1378559

28 October, 2002

The first draft of the Constitution is unveiled by Giscard d’Estaing

The skeleton text suggests only chapter headings for a new constitution, but in principle

envisages merging all the treaties which currently underpin the EU into a single, much

simpler document

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2367237.stm

8 November, 2002

Giscard d’Estaing tells Le Monde newspaper that people who backed Turkey’s accession are

“adversaries of the European Union”; in his view, Turkey’s entry into the EU would be “the

end of Europe”.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2420697.stm

28 November 2002

Tony Blair makes a keynote speech in Cardiff: “A clear course for Europe”.

He calls for a new constitution to clarify the division of powers; more powers for European

institutions and a new long-term presidency; a stronger European better able to enforce its

laws.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2522931.stm for the BBC’s coverage and summary

http://www.pmo.gov.uk/output/Page1739.asp for the full text of the speech

15 January, 2003

After talks in Paris with Schroeder, Jacques Chirac announces suggested Franco-German

reforms of EU presidency: one of the co-presidents would be elected by the European

Parliament, and the other by ministers

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2659445.stm

24 February, 2003

The controversial Franco-German plan to revolutionise the way the European Union is run

gets its first real test in the Convention Plenary. Opposition from the Commission and the

small states is clear.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2676379.stm

6 February, 2003

GISCARD D’ESTAING ANNOUNCES THE FIRST 15 DRAFT ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2735205.stm

25 April, 2003

AN EXIT CLAUSE ALLOWING MEMBER STATES TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION IF THEY CHOOSE

IS AGREED ON.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2977143.stm

13 May, 2003

Hain rules out a British referendum, in response to Tory demands

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3023493.stm

16 May, 2003

A letter signed by representatives of the 16 small member and future member states to

Giscard d'Estaing, arguing for the retention of the current rotating presidency and for a

commissioner in Brussels representing each member state

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3035231.stm

27 May, 2003

Publication of the penultimate version of the draft constitution

From the British point of view, a charter of fundamental rights for EU citizens, tax

harmonisation and a plans for a European public prosecutor's office are key inclusions;

smaller countries (and the Commission) object to the proposed powers offered to a

“President” and “Foreign Minister”. Another set of symbolic British ‘triumphs’ are the

removal of “federal” from the text, and the retention of the name EU in preference to “United

Europe” or “United States of Europe”.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2939646.stm

28 May, 2003

Anders Fogh Rasmussen announces that Denmark will hold a referendum on whether to adopt

the European Union's new constitution. The same day, Blair dismisses calls for a referendum

in the UK.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2944034.stm for Blair

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2943418.stm for Fogh Rasmussen

28 May, 2003

Publication of the European Union's draft constitution hardly makes the headlines in some

countries, and the BBC comments on the apathy with which the news is received across the

continent. Prodi is unimpressed.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2944384.stm

6 June, 2003

Valery Giscard d'Estaing claims that a ‘basis for consensus’ has been reached on reforms to

EU institutions at the Convention’s penultimate plenary session

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2967684.stm

7 June 2003

At the Seminar on the Convention on the Future of Europe, Jack Straw defends the

government’s performance at the Convention and its successful defence of British interests

http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&

cid=1007029393411&a=KArticle&aid=1055784241918 for the full text of the speech

13 June, 2003

Final plenary session of the Convention; a final version of the draft constitution agreed

after tough last-minute negotiations.

“This will be a good foundation for final negotiations… The outcome is a good foundation for

a modern, democratic Europe better anchored to its nation states and more accountable to its

citizens” Peter Hain

http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00814en03.pdf for the Convention’s

summary of the proceedings

17 June, 2003

Mr Straw told BBC Radio 4’s Today program the government did not believe there was a

case for a referendum http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2996322.stm

19-20 June 2003

Summit at Thessaloniki, dominated by debate over the Constitution. European Union

leaders give a reserved welcome to draft proposals for an EU constitution.

The official Presidency Conclusions stated:

“The European Council welcomes the Draft Constitutional Treaty presented by

the President of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. This presentation

marks a historic step in the direction of furthering the objectives of European

integration… The European Council decided that the text of the Draft

Constitutional Treaty is a good basis for starting in the Intergovernmental

Conference. It requests the future Italian Presidency to initiate, at the Council

meeting in July, the procedure laid down in Article 48 of the Treaty in order to

allow this Conference to be convened in October 2003. The Conference should

complete its work and agree the Constitutional Treaty as soon as possible and

in time for it to become known to European citizens before the June 2004

elections for the European Parliament…”

http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth200603_en.pdf

29 June, 2003

Pope John Paul II urges the European Union to include in the constitution recognition of

Europe's Christian heritage

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3029456.stm

10 July, 2003

Last meeting of the Convention

Giscard d’Estaing’s closing speech at

http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/fr/conveur/76615.pdf

18 July, 2003

EU receives draft constitution. Valery Giscard d'Estaing formally hands the document

over to the current EU President, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, at a

ceremony in Rome.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3076641.stm

1 September, 2003

A group of smaller European Union members and candidate countries meeting in Prague calls

for parts of the draft EU constitution to be revisited.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3197635.stm

9 September, 2003

Publication of UK White Paper on the IGC.

http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FoE_IGC_Paper_cm5934_sm,0.pdf for the Command

Paper

16 September 2003

Commons debate on Michael Ancram’s call for a referendum for the Constitutional Treaty

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm030916/debtext/30916-

20.htm#30916-20_head0

20 September, 2003

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac meet with Germany's

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in Berlin, aimed at finding common ground on Iraq. The

leaders also discussed the controversial draft EU constitution, with the German leader

reiterating that he and President Chirac wanted the constitution passed in full.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3112860.stm

16-17 October, 2003

European Council meeting in Brussels. Speaking during a break in talks with fellow EU

leaders in Brussels, the prime minister again insists he would not accede to demands for a

referendum on the draft constitution. Earlier Foreign Secretary Jack Straw insisted there was

“no case” for a vote on the issue.

Amid reports of US concerns, the prime minister reiterated his commitment to NATO the UK

will not allow the new European constitution to diminish British sovereignty over the “red

lines” of tax, defence and foreign policy.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3195016.stm

20 October, 2003

House of Commons Statement: Claims that the new European constitution would undermine

the UK's independence are “frankly absurd”, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw tells MPs while

standing in for the prime minister in the House of Commons. Mr Straw also insisted European

Union defence operations would not undermine NATO.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3208168.stm

23 October, 2003

The Conservatives step up their campaign for Tony Blair to hold a referendum on the

proposed EU constitution, Michael Ancram going to Downing Street to hand over a letter

warning the government to hold a vote or face a nationwide petition over the issue.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3210354.stm

17 November, 2003

CBI Conference statement: Prime Minister Tony Blair tells business leaders that Britain will

keep control over taxation, despite the new European constitution, adding that many European

countries needed to press ahead with economic reforms, and that Britain should “keep the

option open” of joining the euro.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3277107.stm

24 November, 2003

In their first bilateral summit since their splits over the Iraq war, Tony Blair and Jacques

Chirac insist plans for Europe to have its own military capability will not undermine NATO.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3231820.stm

26 November, 2003

Eight EU countries vote to overrule the European Commission and allow France and

Germany to escape penalties for breaching the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3037672.stm

27 November, 2003

Naples: On the eve of the foreign ministers’ negotiations in Naples, the Italian presidency puts

forward new that decisions on proposals from the new EU foreign minister should be decided

by qualified majority. Mr Straw appeared in the House of Commons and declared: "There are

changes we require to the draft treaty in order for Britain to agree.”

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3244676.stm

28 November, 2003

Naples: Speaking the Naples conference, Jack Straw has said ‘life would go on’ if Europe's

leaders failed to agree on an EU constitution. If ‘it happened that the convention process ran

into the ground and one country or another did not ratify it then I said to put it bluntly that

would not be the end of the world’.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3245704.stm

28 November, 2003

Jack Straw says the UK would reject the draft if it meant states would lose their veto over

foreign policy. Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio, meanwhile, has said provisions in the

text which dilute the voting power Spain and Poland won at the Nice summit three years ago

are “unacceptable”.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3247826.stm

28 November, 2003

Trilateral Defence summit: Britain, France and Germany reach an informal agreement on a

joint defence arrangement for Europe. Correspondents say the United States is likely to baulk

at the accord, and is said to be particularly upset at calls for a European defence headquarters.

Speaking in Naples during a break in a meeting of the EU’s members, French Foreign

Minister Dominique de Villepin said it was crucial Europe forged ahead with plans for a

common defence. But a British official said that “any EU operations planning capability has

to be compatible with NATO”.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3247826.stm

29 November, 2003

Naples: Members and future members of the European Union “broadly agree” to enlarge the

body's executive arm so all 25 states will have a Commissioner. Italy's Foreign Minister

Franco Frattini announced the agreement as two days of talks on a future European

constitution ended in Naples. Progress has also been made on efforts to strengthen EU

military co-operation. But major constitutional disagreements remain on voting systems and

the role given to Europe's Christian heritage.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3249236.stm

30 November, 2003

Mr Straw tells Radio 4's The World This Weekend that EU members now thought the talks

should not "drift" beyond the end of the year. The UK foreign secretary says he hopes a deal

can be done by the end of the year over Europe's new constitutional treaty, adding that the

previous week's talks between foreign ministers in Naples had been more positive than

expected.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3251042.stm

6 December, 2003

The Scottish National Party begins a campaign against the proposed new EU Constitutional

treaty. Leader John Swinney announced the move in a keynote speech to the party's national

council in Glasgow on Saturday, saying his party cannot support the plans because they will

“entrench” EU control of fishing policy.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3295883.stm

7 December, 2003

Speaking in Berlin, German and Italian leaders warn that the forthcoming summit might not

agree a new EU constitutional treaty. Silvio Berlusconi said he was “55% optimistic” a deal

would be reached. His host Gerhard Schroeder said both men did not rule out failure in

Brussels on Friday.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3298441.stm

8 December, 2003

Gisela Stuart tells BBC Radio 4’s today programme that if ‘the constitution were to be

accepted the way we handed it over to heads of governments, I would not find it acceptable.’

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3299905.stm

8 December, 2003

Italy hurries to make last-minute changes to the draft EU constitution in an attempt to

persuade heads of state to endorse it. Officials want to find a form of words to set up a mutual

defence pact without upsetting the four neutral member states.

There was a furious reaction from the president of the European parliament, Pat Cox, to the

rejection by the foreign ministers of plans to give parliament the final say over the EU budget.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3301567.stm

11 December, 2003

Talks between Poland and Germany in Berlin to resolve a row over European Union voting

rights ahead of this weekend’s EU summit fail to reach agreement, leaving Poland threatening

a veto. Mr Kwasniewski - after meeting Mr Schroeder in Berlin on Thursday - said no

progress had been made in the run-up to the summit. President Aleksander Kwasniewski has

said Poland could veto a new European constitution if its votes are reduced when it joins the

EU next year.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3308917.stm

12 December, 2003

Britain, France and Germany agreed on a European Union defence policy, an issue which had

caused concern and controversy in the US. NATO chief George Robertson welcomed the new

deal, which means making NATO planning staff the first port of call before consulting EU

staff. The new proposal met NATO and US concerns that a separate European defence policy

would undermine the NATO alliance, as it is explicit that they will first be expected to use

planning staff at NATO. Only if that cannot be done would they use existing British and

French headquarters, and then in the last resort the European Union's own military planning

staff, who would liaise closely with NATO.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3312265.stm

12 - 13 December, 2003

Brussels summit

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3315447.stm

14 December, 2003

UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said he was sorry that EU leaders failed to hammer out a

deal over the proposed European Constitution. Mr Straw told the BBC’s Breakfast with Frost

programme: “What we need and what we now have is a period to reflect.”

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3317473.stm

16 December 2003

Six of the EU’s richest states have called for the capping of the bloc's future budget, which

could lead to a cut in aid to its poorer nations. Germany, Austria, Britain, France, the

Netherlands and Sweden said the budget should not exceed 1% of the EU's gross national

product from 2007 onwards. Their letter came just days after Spain and Poland blocked a deal

on the EU's future constitution at Brussels talks.

http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/story.jsp?story=473762

Annex 3

KEY INTERVENTIONS BY BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES

21 March 2002

Intervention by Peter Hain on the purpose and aims of the convention

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/412.pdf

23 May 2002

Intervention by Peter Hain on the Efficiency and Legitimacy of the EU carrying out its

Missions

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/682.pdf

6 June 2002

Intervention by Baroness Scotland on Justice and Home Affairs

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/892.pdf

24 June 2002

Intervention by Peter Hain at the Civil Society Plenary

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/1138.pdf

24 June 2002

Intervention by Baroness Scotland at the Civil Society Plenary

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/1149.pdf

11 July 2002

Intervention by Peter Hain on EU External Action

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/1480.pdf

12 July 2002

Intervention by Baroness Scotland on Common Foreign and Defence Policy

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/1491.pdf

12 September 2002

Intervention by Peter Hain on Simplification of Instruments and Procedures

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/3233.pdf

20 December 2002

Intervention by Peter Hain on External Action

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/6598.pdf

20 December 2002

Intervention by Peter Hain on Defence

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/6609.pdf

6 February 2003

Intervention by Peter Hain on Social Europe

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/7039.pdf

7 February 2003

Intervention by Peter Hain on the role of the Regions

http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/7050.pdf

ANNEX 4

TIMETABLE OF CONVENTION MEETINGS

From the Convention website’s schedule of plenary and Praesidium sessions,

http://european-convention.eu.int/calendrier.asp?lang=EN

Summaries of Plenary debate focus taken from the same website’s full listing of all sessions,

their focus and their key documents,

http://european-convention.eu.int/sessplen_all.asp?lang=en

INITIAL “LISTENING” PHASE – TO JULY 2002

February

28 Inaugural meeting of the CONVENTION

March

21-22 Plenary meeting – “What do you expect from the European Union?”

April

15-16 Plenary meeting – “The missions of the European Union”

May

23-24 Plenary meeting – “The European Union carrying out its missions: efficiency and

legitimacy”

June

6-7 Plenary meeting – “The role of national parliaments in the European architecture” and a

discussion of the proposed Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: “The

role of the Union and of Member States”

[21/22 EUROPEAN COUNCIL – Seville]

24-25 Plenary meeting – Hearing the views of civil society

July

11-12 Plenary meeting – “EU external action” and the Report by the Youth Convention

September

12-13 Plenary meeting – Simplification of instruments and procedures

REPORTS FROM THE WORKING GROUPS FORM THE START OF THE SECOND, MORE

SUBSTANTIVE PHASE OF DISCUSSIONS

October

3-4 plenary meeting – Subsidiarity: debate on the report of Working Group I

Legal personality of the Union: debate on the report of Working Group

III

[24/25 EUROPEAN COUNCIL – Brussels]

28-29 plenary meeting – Charter of Fundamental Rights: debate on the Working Group II

report

The role of national parliaments: debate on the report by Working

Group IV on National Parliaments

Preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty

November

7-8 plenary meeting – Complementary competence: debate on the report by Working

Group V

Coordination of economic policies: (a) debate on the report by Working

Group VI chaired by Mr Hänsch; (b) debate on a Social Europe

December

5-6 Plenary meeting – Simplification of instruments and procedures: debate on the

report by Group IX

Formation of Working Group XI on Social Europe

Security and Justice: debate on the report by Group X

[12/13 EUROPEAN COUNCIL – Copenhagen]

20 Plenary meeting – External action: debate on the report by Working Group VII

Defence: debate on the report by Working Group VIII

January

20-21 Plenary meeting – The functioning of the Institutions

February

6-7 Plenary meeting – Presentation by the Praesidium of an initial draft set of articles of

Part I of the Constitutional Treaty

Presentation by Mr Katiforis of the report by Working Group XI on

Social Europe

The regional and local dimension

27-28 Plenary meeting – Presentation of draft articles 24 et seq on instruments

Debate on draft articles 1 to 16

March

5 Plenary meeting – Debate on draft articles 8 to 16

17-18 Plenary meeting – Presentation of draft Articles on: Union's finances; freedom,

security and justice

Debate on draft Articles 24 et seq

Debate on: draft protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality, draft

protocol on role of national parliaments

[21/22 (Friday-Saturday) EUROPEAN COUNCIL]

April

3-4 Plenary meeting – Debate on draft articles on the Area of freedom, security and

justice

Presentation of draft Articles on: Title VI : The democratic life of

the Union; Title IX : The Union and its immediate environment;

Title X : Union membership of Part I of the Constitutional

Treaty; Part Three : General and final provisions

Debate on draft articles on Finances

24-25 Plenary meeting – Presentation of new draft Articles

Debate on draft Articles on: a) Title VI: The democratic life of the

Union; b) Title IX: The Union and its immediate environment of Part I

of the Constitutional Treaty

Debate on draft Articles on: a) Title X: Union membership of Part I of

the Constitutional Treaty; b) Part Three: General and final provisions

May

15-16 Plenary meeting – Working method of the Convention during its last phase and

consensus building process

Debate on draft articles on Institutions (Part I - Title IV)

Debate on draft articles on External Action and Defence

30-31 Plenary meeting – Debate on draft texts on enhanced cooperation

Debate on draft texts on: 1- Economic governance and 2- Own

resources and budgetary procedure

Debate on draft Part II and Part III of the Constitution

June

5-6 Plenary meeting – Debate on: Part I (Titles I to III and V to IX); Protocols on the role of

national parliaments and on the application of the principles of

subsidiarity and proportionality; Part IV (General and final provisions)

11-13 Plenary meeting – Presentation of the revised text of the whole Part I, preceded by

the preamble, and accompanied by the Protocol on the role of

national parliaments and the Protocol on the application of the

subsidiarity and proportionality principles

[20/21 Friday-Saturday) EUROPEAN COUNCIL]

July

4 Plenary meeting – Oral report by the President on the European Council meeting of 20

June

Debate on reactions to doc. CONV 802/03 (CONV 821/03) and revised

version in

9-10 Plenary meeting – Closing session

PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED “EUROPEAN ISSUES”

(The more recent are available on the website of Notre Europe:

http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/Publications.htm#Etudes)

• US attitudes towards Europe: a shift of paradigms? (Timo Behr)

Available in French and English (November 2003).

• Giving euro-Mediterranean cooperation a breath of fresh air (Bénédicte Suzan)

Available in French (October 2003).

• Italy and Europe 2003 presidency (Roberto Di Quirico)

Available in French, English and Italian (July 2003).

• European attitudes towards transatlantic relations 2000-2003: an analytical survey (Anand

Menon and Jonathan Lipkin)

Available in French and English (june 2003).

• Large and small member states in the European Union: reinventing the balance (Paul

Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaïdis)

Available in French and English (May 2003).

• Enlargement and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe (Bérénice Picciotto)

Available in French and English (May 2003)

• The institutional architecture of the European Union: a third Franco-German way? (Renaud

Dehousse, Andreas Maurer, Jean Nestor, Jean-Louis Quermonne and Joachim Schild)

Available in French and English (April 2003).

• A new mechanism of enhanced co-operation for the Enlarged Union (Eric Philippart)

Available in French and English (March 2003).

• Greece, the European Union and 2003 Presidency (George Pagoulatos)

Available in French and English (December 2002).

• The question of the European government (Jean-Louis Quermonne)

Available in French and English (November 2002).

• The European Council (Philippe de Schoutheete and Helen Wallace)

Available in French and English (September 2002).

• Multilevel government in three Eastern and Central European candidates countries:

Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic (1990-2001) (Michal Illner)

Available in French and English (June 2002).

• The Domestic basis of Spanish European Policy and the 2002 Presidency (Carlos Closa)

Available in French, English and Spanish (December 2001)

• The Convention of a Charter of Fundamental Rights: a method for the future?

(Florence Deloche-Gaudez).

Available in French and English (December 2001).

• The federal approach to the European Union or the quest for an unprecedente European

federalism (Dusan Sidjanski).

Available in French, English and German (July 2001).

• The Belgian Presidency 2001 (Lieven de Winter and Huri Türsan).

Available in French and English (June 2001).

• The European debate in Sweden (Olof Petersson).

Available in French, English and Swedish (December 2000).

• An enlargement unlike the others ... Study of the specific features of the candidate countries

of Central and Eastern Europe (Franciszek Draus).

Available in French, English and German (November 2000).

• The French and Europe: the state of the European debate at the beginning of the French

presidency (Jean-Louis Arnaud).

Available in French, English and German (July 2000).

• Portugal 2000: the European way (Alvaro de Vasconcelos)

Available in French, English and Portuguese (January 2000).

• The Finnish debate on the European Union (Esa Stenberg)

Available in French, English and Finnish (August1999).

• The American Federal Reserve System: functioning and accountability (Axel Krause)

Available in French, English and German (April 1999).

• Making EMU work (partnership Notre Europe and Centro European Ricerche).

Available in French, English, Italian and German (March 1999).

• The intellectual debate in Britain on the European Union (Stephen George).

Available in French, English and German (October 1998).

• Britain and the new European agenda (Centre for European Reform, Lionel Barber)

Available in French, English and German (April 1998).

• Social Europe, history and current state of play (Jean-Louis Arnaud)

Available in French and English (July 1997).

• Reinforced cooperation: placebo rather than panacea (Françoise de la Serre and Helen

Wallace)

Available in French, English and German (September 1997).

• The growth deficit and unemployment: the cost of non-cooperation (Pierre-Alain Muet).

Available in French, English and German (April 1997).