Handbook for Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency

Handbook

for

Armed Private Security

Contractors in Contingency

Operations

23 February 2010

UNITED STATES

JOINT FORCES

COMMAND

Joint Warfighting

Center

Joint Doctrine

Suffolk, Virginia

Joint Concept

Development and

Experimentation

Suffolk, Virginia

U.S. Joint Forces Command

JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER

116 LAKE VIEW PARKWAY

SUFFOLK, VA 23435-2697

DAN W. DAVENPORT

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Director, Joint Concept Development

& Experimentation, J9

STEPHEN R. LAYFIELD

Major General, U.S. Army

Director, J7/Joint Warfighting Center

MESSAGE TO THE JOINT WARFIGHTERS

As US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) continues to interact with the other combatant

commands and Services, we recognize there is no universal solution in dealing with the

complexity of issues associated with armed private security contractors (APSCs) in the joint

force commander’s operational area. Over the last several years, the United States Government

(USG) has done a great deal to address the policy, legal, and contracting issues for improved

oversight and accountability of all contractor services, specifically APSC operations.

Consequently, we developed this pre-doctrinal handbook based upon US Department of Defense

(DOD) instructions, joint doctrine, policies, and contracting language to support joint force

planning, management, and oversight of APSCs now and in future conflicts.

The US military plays an instrumental role in supporting and improving a collaborative

environment between USG agencies, host nation intergovernmental and international

organizations, and private sector companies employing APSCs. The US Office of Secretary of

Defense (OSD) established new polices on managing contractors in support of contingency

operations. New DOD Instructions expanded coverage over defense contractors, their employees,

and all sub-contractors to include US and non-US personnel working under contract with

DOD. In accordance with Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD

coordinated a memorandum of understanding with the US Department of State (DOS) and the

US Agency for International Development (USAID) to work together in controlling contracting

and contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The APSC project identified, correlated, and assessed relevant DOD trends for utilization

of APSCs. Key stakeholders from the OSD, Joint Staff, DOS, USAID, Department of Justice,

other combatant commands, and military academia worked in concert with USJFCOM to develop

an experimentation campaign. The baseline assessment included research on current practices,

current and proposed doctrine, lessons learned, peer reviewed journals, and other related materials.

Stakeholders validated and supported a limited objective experiment to test the utility of the

handbook in addressing scenarios encountered by the joint force in contingency operations.

The resulting handbook revision applies a whole-of-government effort and identifies solutions

to deconflict, integrate, and in some cases synchronize the joint force and APSC operations.

This handbook also provides examples of “best practices” for establishing and maintaining

coordination, cooperation, and understanding of APSC activities.

Understanding how APSC activities affect joint operations and the evolving effort for

improved communication, management, and coordination between DOD and APSC operations

is vital to the joint force commander. I encourage you to use the information contained within

this handbook and provide feedback to help us capture value-added ideas for incorporation in

emerging joint doctrine.

PREFACE

1. Scope

This handbook is a pre-doctrinal publication on planning, integrating, and managing

the employment of “Armed Private Security Contractors” (APSCs) by a joint force

commander (JFC) and staff for a contingency operation. It provides a single collection of

current (2009) work to address the policy, contract, and legal concerns of a joint force

commander and staff.

2. Content

This handbook examines joint doctrine and the current policies, techniques, and

procedures as practiced in the operational theaters. There is continual evolution on this

subject as requirements, procedures, agreements, and best practices adapt to the joint

and interagency community’s needs. This handbook helps bridge the gap between

current practices in the field and existing doctrine. It also offers some considerations for

the future development of APSC-related joint doctrine, training, materiel (logistics),

leadership, education, and facility planning.

3. Development

Development of this handbook was based on information from joint and Service

doctrine, conferences, trip reports, and experimentation. Additional research was

conducted through the wider body of knowledge in civilian and military academic products,

training, and lessons learned. US Government agencies contributed through the whole-

of-government approach to handbook development. Coordination with the leading experts

on policy formulation, understanding legal authorities, contracting, and interagency views

provided the most current direction in this field. Critical stakeholders validated the

experimentation plan, supported the experiment effort, and agreed with the findings.

4. Application

This handbook is not approved doctrine. It is a non-authoritative supplement to

currently limited doctrine to assist JFCs and their staffs in planning and executing activities

involving APSCs. The information herein can also assist the joint community in

developing doctrine and maturing concepts and methods.

5. Contact Information

Comments and suggestions on this important topic are welcome. The USJFCOM

Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate point of contact (POC) is

Maj Arnold Baldoza, USAF, at 757-203-3698 and email: [email protected]. The

Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group, POCs are Lieutenant Colonel

Jeffrey Martin, USAF, at 757-203-6871 and email: jeffrey[email protected]; and Mr. Ted

Dyke at 757-203-6137 and email: [email protected].

Preface

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Intentionally Blank

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... v

CHAPTER I

THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S CHALLENGES

• The Contractor Challenge ........................................................................................... I-1

• Management and Coordination of Armed Private Security Contractor Operations ....... I-2

• Issues Addressing Liability for Personnel Misconduct and Incident Management ...... I-3

• Contract Enforcement and Management of Contractors .......................................... I-6

CHAPTER II

LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY

CONTRACTORS

• Laws and Policies ..................................................................................................... II-1

• Statutory Requirements ............................................................................................ II-1

• Legal Jurisdiction over Armed Private Security Contractors ................................... II-4

• Combatant Commander Responsibilities .................................................................. II-4

• Area-specific Requirements ..................................................................................... II-6

CHAPTER III

ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR PLANNING,

INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SECTION A. PLANNING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED PRIVATE

SECURITY CONTRACTORS ............................................................... III-1

• Overview and Context ............................................................................................. III-1

• Planning for the Employment of Armed Private Security Contractors .................... III-2

• Establishing Planning Requirements for Armed Private Security

Contractor Support ................................................................................................. III-3

• Contract Support Integration Plan .......................................................................... III-5

• Contractor Management Plan ................................................................................. III-6

• Development of the Armed Private Security Support Contract .............................. III-7

• Department of Defense Operational Contract Support Enablers ............................ III-8

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION OF ARMED PRIVATE

SECURITY CONTRACTORS ............................................................... III-8

• General ..................................................................................................................... III-8

• Armed Private Security Contractor Integration Initiatives Developed

by United States Central Command ........................................................................ III-9

• Assessing and Balancing Risk to Forces Support................................................ III-11

• Balancing Contracting Best Business Practices with Operational Needs ............ III-11

Table of Contents

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

SECTION C. MANAGEMENT OF ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY

CONTRACTORS ............................................................................... III-12

• Overview ............................................................................................................... III-12

• Primary Responsibilities for Providing Military Management and Oversight ...... III-12

CHAPTER IV

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER COORDINATION WITH NON-DOD ARMED

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

• General ..................................................................................................................... IV-1

• Coordinating Mechanisms ...................................................................................... IV-1

APPENDIX

A Legal Framework for the Joint Force and Armed Private Security

Contractors ...........................................................................................................A-1

B Armed Private Security Contractor Compliance with Joint Force

Commander and Host Nation Requirements ........................................................ B-1

C United States Central Command Contractor Operations Cell

Coordination Procedures ...................................................................................... C-1

D Common Military Staff Tasks When Employing Armed Private

Security Contractors ............................................................................................. D-1

E Standard Contract Clauses That Apply to Armed Private

Security Contractors ............................................................................................. E-1

F Example Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Jurisdiction

Determination Checklist ....................................................................................... F-1

G References ............................................................................................................ G-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................... GL-5

FIGURES

I-1 Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Iraq by Nationality ................ I-2

I-2 Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan by Nationality .. I-2

II-1 Sample of USCENTCOM Rules for the Use of Force ....................................... II-5

IV-1 DOD Coordination with APSCs in an Operational Area .................................. IV-2

C-1 Contractor Operations Cell Task Organization ................................................. C-2

C-2 Mission Request Form Submission Process .................................................... C-5

C-3 Serious Incident Reporting Process Used in Iraq............................................. C-6

C-4 Serious Incident Report Format ........................................................................ C-7

F-1 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Jurisdiction

Determination Checklist ....................................................................................F-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

Overview

• Discusses the background, definitions, and status of Armed

Private Security Contractors (APSCs)

• Describes current Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives to

improve the management of APSCs in support of contingency

operations

• Identifies organizations, processes, and procedures for APSC

planning, management, and oversight

This handbook provides

joint force commanders

with needed guidance on

the planning,

employment,

management, and

oversight of armed

private security

contractors (APSCs)

Commanders at all levels

have experienced

challenges in

management,

accountability, incident

management, and

contract enforcement

regarding APSCs.

Recent enactment of laws

and DOD guidance has

established new policies

for managing APSCs in

support of contingency

operations.

This handbook provides the joint force commander (JFC)

and staff with an understanding of laws and policy related

to the planning, employment, management, and oversight

of Armed Private Security Contractors (APSCs) during

contingency operations. While the focus of this handbook

is on contingency operations, most of the limitations and

challenges presented concerning APSCs are applicable

universally.

APSCs are currently supporting US and coalition military

forces by performing critical security functions integral to

the success of US foreign policy objectives and military

operations. However, our ongoing experience with

employing APSCs has revealed a number of continuing

challenges for commanders at all echelons as follows:

• Management of APSC operations to include the

accountability of APSC personnel.

• Incident management procedures and liability for

personnel misconduct.

• Contract enforcement.

The National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) of 2007

and 2008 and implementing guidance promulgated in DOD

directives and instructions have revised and established

new policies on the management of contractors, to include

APSCs, in support of contingency operations.

Laws and Policies

JFC Challenges

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Executive Summary

DOD issuances provide

policy, assign

responsibilities, and

establish procedures for

selecting, training,

equipping, and

accounting for personnel

performing private

security functions.

The JFC and staff should

be familiar with

statutory, legal, and

command requirements

when employing APSCs.

APSCs must not only

comply with the terms of

their contract, but also

all applicable US and

international laws.

The JFC can employ

various management

tools to include

establishment of cross-

functional staff

organizations and the

Of specific interest and application, DODD 3020.41,

Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S.

Armed Forces, defines policy and assigning responsibilities

for program management, DODI 3020.50, Private Security

Contractors Operating in Contingency Operations,

establishes policy, responsibilities, and procedures for

selecting, training, equipping, and accountability of

personnel performing private security functions. DODI

3020.50 also provides procedures for incident reporting,

use and accountability of equipment, guidelines for the use

of force by armed contractors, and a process for

administrative action to punish misconduct by APSC

personnel. This latter Instruction also expands DOD

oversight to include all APSCs operating under United States

Government (USG)-funded contracts during contingency

operations in an area of combat operations, as designated

by the Secretary of Defense.

When employing APSCs, the JFC and the staff should have

a general familiarity with the statutory requirements

regarding the activities and conduct of APSCs, legal

jurisdiction over APSCs, and command-specific requirements

and responsibilities.

Dependent on the terms and conditions of the contract;

processes to plan, manage, and oversee APSCs are designed

to align tasks and performance with the performance work

statements. As contractors, APSCs must be prepared to

perform all tasks stipulated in the contract and comply with

all applicable US and/or international laws.

Combatant commanders regularly update plans to reflect

changes in the operational situation. For contract support

requirements, this process includes the need to recognize

and define the evolving requirements in contractors’

statements of work, awarding of contracts, and supervising

contract execution. In most cases, this will not be a single

service or single function. Rather, it impacts all of the

involved DOD, interagency, and multinational partners.

The JFC can employ various tools to establish organizations,

systems, and mechanisms to assist in various aspects of

managing the activities of APSCs. These management

options range from a joint contractor coordination board as

a policy making body, to a contractor operations cell to

manage daily operations. The roles and contributions of

Planning, Management, and Oversight

vii

Executive Summary

the joint force staff and contracting officers are also a

consideration for JFC management and oversight of APSCs

and their operations.

To improve coordination with non-DOD, USG contracted

APSCs, the JFC must seek the cooperation of a broad range

of parties. The Chief(s) of Mission (COMs) in an

operational area play a key role in organizing non-DOD,

USG participants and is often involved in the planning,

management, and oversight of non-DOD, USG contracted

APSCs. When it comes to non-DOD, USG contracted APSC,

the JFC must work with the COM and country team to

understand respective roles and limitations.

A civil-military operations center provides an option for the

JFC and staff to acquire visibility and situational awareness

of non-USG contracted APSCs present in the operational

area. It also permits the JFC and staff to initiate direct

coordination between controlling entities to plan and

manage mutual APSC support requirements.

This JFC handbook is designed to assist the JFC and staff

in establishing operational and functional relationships with

APSCs within a mutual security environment, and to the

extent possible, provide options to deconflict, synchronize,

and integrate activities for operational success.

detailed assignment of

staff member

responsibilities to

monitor and control the

activities of APSCs.

The JFC must coordinate

with the pertinent Chief

of Mission for the

management and

oversight of non-DOD,

USG APSCs.

The JFC and staff can

employ a civil-military

operations center to

obtain visibility and

situational awareness of

non-USG contracted

APSCs.

This handbook will assist

the JFC and staff in

establishing operational

and functional

relationships with

APSCs.

JFC Coordination with Non-DOD APSCs

Conclusion

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

viii

Executive Summary

Intentionally Blank

I-1

CHAPTER I

THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S CHALLENGES

1. The Contractor Challenge

a. While private contractors have accompanied US forces since the Revolutionary

War, in the past 20 years, there has been an exponential growth in the contractor force.

This change has been most significantly realized in US Central Command (USCENTCOM),

which by the end of the first quarter, fiscal year (FY) 2009, reported its employment of

approximately 259,000 DOD contractor personnel. Of these contractors, nearly 12,000

provided armed security services.

b. Private security contractors can provide significant operational benefits to the

US government (USG). Contractors can often be hired and deployed faster than a similarly

skilled and sized military force. Because security contractors can be employed as needed,

using contractors can allow federal agencies to adapt more easily to changing environments

around the world. In contrast, adapting the military force structure or training significant

numbers of Department of State (DOS) civilian personnel can take months or years.

Security contractors also serve as a force multiplier for the military, freeing up uniformed

personnel to perform combat missions or providing the DOS with the necessary security

capabilities when DOS civilian security forces are unable to cover all commitments. In

some cases, security contractors may possess unique skills that the government workforce

lacks. For example, local nationals hired by USG agencies working overseas may provide

critical knowledge of the terrain, culture, and language of the region. Contractors can be

hired when a particular security need arises and be let go when their services are no

longer needed. Hiring contractors only as needed can be cheaper in the long run than

maintaining a permanent in-house capability.

c. In the past, small numbers of armed private security contractors (APSC) operating

in combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) an area of responsibility (AOR) have not been a

problem. In recent years, however, new problems have arisen with the significant increase

in the number of APSCs. A September 2009 Congressional Research Study, “The

Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan:

Backgrounds, Analysis and Options for Congress,” summarized the current challenge.

According to DOD, as of June 2009, there were 15,279 private security contractors in Iraq

of which 13,232 were armed (87%). Nearly 88% were third country nationals (TCNs), 8%

were local nationals, the remainder were US citizens. These figures do not include the

thousands of APSCs working for non-DOD agencies, the host nation (HN),

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and other international organizations, and private-

sector organizations to include multinational corporations (MNCs). In Iraq there are

reportedly more than 50 private security companies (PSC) employing more than 30,000

armed employees (Figure I-1). In Afghanistan, there are reportedly about 40 licensed

private security companies employing over 20,000 personnel, with another 30 companies

applying for a license. Estimates of the total number of security contractors in Afghanistan

(Figure I-2), including those that are not licensed are as high as 70,000. According to

DOD, since September 2007, local nationals have made up 95% or more of all armed

security contractors in Afghanistan.

I-2

Chapter I

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

d. APSCs differ in significant ways from armed military forces. Military forces are

state employed and controlled by a chain of command and their home nation. APSCs are

privately employed and controlled by contracts. A commander’s ability to direct or

control APSC personnel is limited primarily by the terms of the contract. Only the

Figure I-1. Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Iraq by Nationality

Figure I-2. Trend of Armed Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan by

Nationality

I-3

The Joint Force Commander’s Challenges

contracting officer representative (COR) or contracting officer (KO) can direct the

contractor to take any specific action. HN, US federal, and international law also provide

some constraints and restraints, which the commander may leverage to regulate APSC

personnel conduct, but the principal vehicle for the commander to exercise control is the

contract. PSCs operate for capital gain and their employees work for a paycheck. Normally,

neither is guided by US foreign policy objectives.

e. As missions have grown in numbers and complexity, APSC operations have

expanded as well. In addition to providing training for foreign security forces, APSCs are

often engaged in the following security support activities and functions in unsecured

areas:

(1) Static security to protect military bases, housing areas, reconstruction

work sites, etc.

(2) Personal security and protection.

(3) Convoy security.

(4) Provide security for internment operations.

f. With the initiation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), challenges associated

with the management of APSCs have been on the rise. One turning point in particular was

the historically important 2007 incident that involved the APSC organization “Blackwater

Private Security Detail in Iraq

I-4

Chapter I

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Security” in Nisoor Square in Baghdad, Iraq. An APSC personal security detail that was

escorting a convoy of DOS vehicles, perceived a threatening situation. Confusion led to

escalating the use of force and ended with seventeen Iraqi civilians killed. Local nationals

blamed the Coalition for the shooting. This echoed in the international press coverage

condemning the US for excessive and reckless use of deadly force. This incident illustrates

how the actions of a non-DOD APSC can impact and adversely affect joint force operations.

The “Blackwater” incident further illustrates the lack of oversight the USG has had over

APSCs operating in a JTF commander’s joint operating area and the negative effects that

contractor conduct can have on friendly operations. As a result, the USG undertook a

major effort to create a system to manage APSCs and their conduct, ensure APSCs are

responsive to the needs of their USG sponsors, and ensure the USG has jurisdiction to

prosecute APSCs when necessary.

g. Continuing APSC challenges for commanders at all echelons include:

(1) Management and coordination of APSC operations, including APSC

personnel accountability.

(2) Incident management procedures and liability for personnel misconduct.

(3) Contract oversight.

h. In Iraq, two agencies are responsible for the security of USG employees and

contractors: (1) the US military, which has responsibility for the security of all personnel

under direct control of the CCDR and (2) the DOS, which is responsible for all USG and

nongovernment personnel under Chief of Mission’s (COM’s) authority. With regard to

DOS responsibility, authority is delegated to Embassy Baghdad’s Regional Security Office,

which establishes security policies and procedures. Together, the military and DOS

share responsibility for providing general oversight and coordination of their respective

APSCs, regardless of whether the APSCs perform their services through direct contracts

with the USG or subcontracts with its implementing partners.

2. Management and Coordination of Armed Private Security

Contractor Operations

The JFC must have visibility over all friendly forces operating in the operational

area, including USG and non-USG sponsored APSCs. While the joint force commander

(JFC) can coordinate with the COM to establish common procedures for the registration

of APSC personnel and the management of APSC movements, the JFC has no authority

over non-USG APSCs and only limited authority over non-DOD contracted APSCs. For

establishing visibility over USG-affiliated APSCs, the JFC can establish a contractors

operations cell (CONOC). Described in Chapter III, “Armed Private Security Contractor

Planning, Integration, and Management,” a CONOC functions as a coordinating body,

which identifies and addresses operational concerns regarding movement coordination,

identification procedures, and fratricide avoidance. The CONOC also can work with a

civil military operations center (CMOC) to facilitate establishing visibility over non-USG

APSCs activities.

I-5

The Joint Force Commander’s Challenges

3. Issues Addressing Liability for Personnel Misconduct and Incident

Management

Recently introduced Federal statutes and implementing DOD policy guidance have

significantly expanded the JFC’s investigatory and criminal prosecution authority over

misconduct by individual employees of DOD affiliated APSCs. When combined with

specific contract language addressing general standards of conduct for APSC employees,

the JFC has a far broader range of measures that can be employed to enforce individual

behavioral standards and even penalize the contractor for individual misdeeds. As

described in Chapter II, “Laws and Policies Governing Armed Private Security

Contractors,” these initiatives have provided JFCs with leverage to punish specified

contractor misconduct. However, these statutes and policies only apply to DOD

contractors. For non-DOD APSCs, the JFC must rely on the laws of the respective

contracting nation and the HN to punish misconduct. At a minimum, the JFC should

establish incident management and reporting procedures for the command, which under

the terms of DOD contracts, apply to the APSCs.

4. Contract Enforcement and Management of Contractors

a. A commander’s ability to direct or control APSC personnel is limited by the terms

of the contract. At a minimum, an APSC contract will advise the contractors on the laws

and regulations governing the import of their weapons into the country. It will specify

the contractor’s responsibilities to instructions from the chain of command (usually

published in the form of fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs)), require APSC employees to

understand and accept terms for carrying weapons when on- and off-duty, describe the

types of weapons that can be carried, stipulate how an APSC is allowed to carry their

weapons, provide guidance on the use of force, and remind contractors that MEJA and/

or the UCMJ apply to specified acts of misconduct. Ideally the JFC should obtain the

contracts of all the DOD-affiliated contractors in the operational area through the theater

contracting organization structure. Familiarity with the terms of an APSC’s contract will

facilitate the management of DOD affiliated contractors by the command’s KOs and

CORs. For non-DOD, USG affiliated APSCs, specific information on the contract provisions

can usually be obtained by coordination with the American Embassy (AMEMB),

specifically the regional security officer (RSO).

b. The goal of a well-written contract and its supporting enforcement/coordination

mechanism is to ensure the activities of DOD contracted APSCs are integrated in and

synchronized with joint operations and there are established standards for the training

and conduct of APSCs. At a minimum, when dealing with APSCs employed by non-USG

entities, the JFC can seek to use the US model as a suggested standard for adoption by

those third parties.

I-6

Chapter I

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Intentionally Blank

II-1

CHAPTER II

LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING ARMED PRIVATE

SECURITY CONTRACTORS

“Armed Private Security Contractors are first and foremost contractors who must

comply with all Department of Defense requirements concerning visibility,

deployment, and redeployment requirements; they must adhere to theater

management procedures; and must abide by applicable laws, regulations, policies,

and international agreements.”

Report of the Special Inspector General for the Reconstruction of Iraq

August 2008

1. Laws and Policies

A number of federal laws and implementing DOD Directives (DODD) and Instructions

(DODI) provide specific guidance on the employment of contingency contractors and

APSCs. (Note: Additional detail is provided in Appendix A, “Legal Framework for the

Joint Force and Armed Private Security Contractors.”) While the staff judge advocate

and contracting organizations have expertise in dealing with specific issues relating to

the contract and the application of US federal law to individual APSC employees, the JFC

and staff should have a general familiarity with the following: statutory requirements

regarding the activities and conduct of APSCs; the extent of their legal jurisdiction over

individual APSC’s conduct; theater-specific requirements and command responsibilities

that have been established by the CCDR; and AOR-specific requirements and command

responsibilities established by the CCDR and supplemented, as required, by the

subordinate JFC.

2. Statutory Requirements

The following federal laws and DODD/DODI provide the JFC with guidance to plan

and manage APSC contracts.

a. FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 861. The Act

requires DOD, DOS, and USAID, the leading agencies that employ APSC abroad, to

establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) addressing contracting procedures

and contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. In July 2008, DOD, DOS, and USAID agreed

and signed the required MOU specifying each agency’s roles and responsibilities

concerning contracts in the two countries; established responsibilities, procedures, and

coordination for movements of APSCs in the two countries; and agreed to a common

database for contract information. DOD developed the Synchronized Pre-deployment

and Operational Tracker (SPOT) and designated it as the contractor management and

accountability system to provide a central source of contingency contractor information

to fulfill this last requirement.

b. FY 2008 NDAA, Section 862. This section requires DOD and DOS to develop

regulations for the “selection, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing

II-2

Chapter II

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

private security functions under a covered contract in an area of combat operations.”

These regulations are normally incorporated as specific requirements in the APSC’s

contract and include:

(1) A process for registering, processing, accounting for, and keeping

appropriate records of personnel performing APSC function in an area of combat

operations.

(2) A process for authorizing and accounting for weapons carried by personnel

providing private security functions.

(3) A process for registration and identification of armored vehicles, helicopters,

and other vehicles used by APSCs.

(4) An incident reporting procedure.

(5) A process for independent review of incidents.

(6) Requirements for qualification, training, and screening, including

background checks.

(7) Knowledge of the rules for the use of force (RUF).

(8) Development of specific contract clauses to require compliance with these

goals and objectives.

c. DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed

Forces, October 3, 2005 (under revision). This DODI provides the overarching policy

for DOD to:

(1) Implement appropriate contractor planning, visibility, deployment, and

redeployment requirements; adhere to theater management procedures; abide by

applicable laws, regulations, policies, and international agreements; and use contractor

support only in appropriate situations consistent with the Defense Federal Acquisition

Regulation Supplement (DFARS).

(2) Implement DODI 3020.41 in operations plans (OPLAN) and operations

orders (OPORD) and coordinate any proposed contractor logistic support arrangements

that may affect the OPLAN/OPORD with the affected geographic combatant commanders

(GCCs).

(3) Ensure contracts clearly and accurately specify the terms and conditions

under which the contractor is to perform, describe the specific support relationship between

the contractor and DOD, and contain standardized clauses to ensure efficient deployment,

visibility, protection, authorized levels of health service and other support, sustainment,

and redeployment of contingency contractor personnel.

(4) Develop a security plan for protection of contingency contractor personnel

in locations where there is not sufficient or legitimate civil authority and the commander

II-3

Laws and Poicies Governing Armed Private Security Contractors

decides it is in the interests of the USG to provide security, because the contractor cannot

obtain effective security services, such services are unavailable at a reasonable cost, or

threat conditions necessitate security through military means.

(5) Ensure that contracts for security services shall be used cautiously in

contingency operations where combat operations are ongoing or imminent. Authority

and armament of contractors providing private security services will be set forth in their

contracts.

(6) Maintain by-name accountability of all APSC personnel and contract

capability information in a joint database. This database shall provide a central source of

personnel information and a summary of services or capabilities provided by all external

support and systems support contracts. This information shall be used to assist planning

for the provision of force protection, medical support, personnel recovery, and other

support. It should also provide planners an awareness of the nature, extent, and potential

risks and capabilities associated with contracted support in the operational area. Note:

In January 2007, SPOT was designated as the DOD database to serve as the central

repository for all information for contractors deploying with forces and contractor

capability information.

d. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency

Operations, July 22, 2009. This is the latest guidance that directly applies to APSCs

employed in contingency operations outside the United States. DOD policy:

(1) Requires the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of APSC personnel

including the establishment of appropriate processes to be coordinated between the

DOD and DOS.

(2) Requires GCCs to provide APSC guidance and procedures tailored to the

operational environment in their (AOR. Specifically, they must establish the criteria for

selection, training, accountability, and equipping of such APSC personnel; establish

standards of conduct for APSCs and APSC personnel within their AOR; and establish

individual training and qualification standards that shall meet, at a minimum, one of the

Services’ established standards. Additionally, through the contracting officer, ensure

that APSC personnel acknowledge, through the APSC’s management, their understanding

and obligation to comply with the terms and conditions of their covered contracts.

Furthermore, issue written authorization to the APSC identifying individual APSC

personnel who are authorized to be armed. RUF, developed in accordance with Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B shall be included with the written

authorization.

(3) Recognizes that the relevant COM is responsible for developing and

issuing implementing instructions for non-DOD APSCs and their personnel consistent

with the standards set forth by the GCC. The COM has the option to instruct non-DOD

APSCs and their personnel to follow the guidance and procedures developed by the GCC

and/or subordinate JFC. Note: Interagency coordination for investigation, administrative

penalties, or removal from the theater of non-DOD affiliated APSCs for failure to fulfill

their contract requirements may be included in these instructions.

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Chapter II

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

(4) Additionally, DODI 3020.50 requires GCCs to develop and issue

implementing procedures for the selection, training, accountability, and equipping of

such APSC personnel and the conduct of APSCs and APSC personnel within their AOR.

In consultation with the COM in designated areas of combat operations, these requirements

also are shaped by considerations for the situation, operation, and environment.

3. Legal Jurisdiction over Armed Private Security Contractors

There are four ways that an individual contractor can be prosecuted for misconduct:

a. Where the HN has a functioning legal infrastructure in place and in the absence

of a SOFA that includes protections for DOD affiliated APSCs, the civil and criminal laws

of the HN take precedence. If the HN waives jurisdiction, then US laws regarding criminal/

civil liability will have precedence.

b. With the passage of Section 552, “Clarification of Application of Uniform Code of

Military Justice During a Time of War,” of the John Warner National Defense Authorization

Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007, commanders are authorized court martial jurisdiction

over certain offenses committed outside of the Continental United States by contractors

employed by or accompanying US forces in a declared war or contingency operation.

c. If an APSC employee has not been prosecuted under the HN’s legal system or

under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), that person, after being brought to

the US, can be tried in US Federal Court under the “Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

Act” (MEJA), 18 United States Code, Section 3261. MEJA allows a JFC to bring criminal

charges against US contractors working for DOD or in support of a DOD mission; however,

it only applies to felonies - offenses punishable by at least one year in prison.

d. Certain US federal statutes have extraterritorial application regardless of the

application of MEJA or the UCMJ. For example, certain acts of war profiteering, torture,

certain false statements by a US citizen, theft of federal property by US citizens abroad,

and certain fraud, human trafficking, counterfeiting, and forgery offenses can subject the

alleged offender to the jurisdiction of the US courts regardless of the seriousness of the

offense.

4. Combatant Commander Responsibilities

a. CCDRs have responsibility for geographic areas or specific worldwide functions.

While DOD has published DODIs and DODDs establishing general requirements, the

CCDRs must tailor their implementing regulations, orders, directives, and instructions to

fit their unique requirements for contingency operations and the employment of APSCs.

b. CCDR Responsibilities

(1) Registering and Accounting for Personnel. When the CCDR considers

using APSCs, there is a requirement to register and account for personnel assigned to the

various contracts implemented within the AOR. The current SPOT system allows the

command to register and track personnel as they in-process through a centrally controlled

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Laws and Poicies Governing Armed Private Security Contractors

deployment center, and issue documentation that will establish that individual’s status

and authorize government support for each individual associated with the GCC’s forces

in a theater. SPOT provides a web-based database tool to track all types of contractor

personnel and contractor expertise and capabilities within a theater. This system also

tracks contractor operated armored vehicles, helicopters, and other vehicles. Contracting

officers (KOs) must keep track of, and account for, contractor personnel while deployed

in support of the force.

(2) Verifying Eligibility and Granting Permission to Arm Contractors. When

there is a requirement to arm contractor personnel, a review by the staff judge advocate

(SJA) ensures the agreement follows US and HN law and DOD policies. At a minimum

contractors will be required to be trained on specifically authorized weapons to Service

established standards before they are granted authorization to carry weapons. Contractor

weapons training will include the command’s established procedures for reporting of

suspected incidents.

(3) Establishing RUF. Established at the combatant command level, RUF

require a certain amount of restraint. As a result, APSC personnel must be thoroughly

familiar with the application of RUF in various scenarios. RUF need to be developed and

implemented in the contract and are usually modified as the situation changes. The JFC,

through the KOs, will certify that APSCs are following the RUF. Figure II-1 is an example

of USCENTCOM RUF for APSCs in Iraq.

Figure II-1. Sample of USCENTCOM Rules for the Use of Force.

SAMPLE OF USCENTCOM RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE

USCENTCOM

RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE BY CONTRACTED

SECURITY IN IRAQ

NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR INHERENT

RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO DEFEND

YOURSELF

1. CONTRACTORS: A re nonc om batan ts, you may n ot e ngage in offe nsi ve

operat ions with Co al ition Forces. You alwa ys retain y our ab ility to exerc ise sel f-

defense against hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent.

2. CONTRACTED SECURITY FORCES: Cooperate with Coalition

an d Ir aqi Pol ic e/Secu rity Forc es and comp ly wit h th eater forc e p rot ecti on pol ic ie s.

Do not av oi d or ru n Co al it ion or Iraqi Po li ce/S ecu ri ty Forc e che ckpoi nts. If

authorized to carry weapons, do not aim them at Coalition or Iraqi Police/Security

Forces.

3. USE OF DEADLY FORCE: Deadly force is that force, which one

reasonably believes will cause death or serious bodily harm. You may use

NECESSARY FORCE, up to and including deadly force against persons in the

fo ll owi ng c irc um st ance s:

a. In self-defense,

b. In defense of facilities and persons as specified in your contract,

c. To prevent life threatening offenses against civilians,

d. In defe ns e o f C oal itio n- appr ove d p rope rty spec ified i n y ou r cont ract

4. GRADUATED FORCE: You will use the reasonable amount of force

ne cessa ry. The f ollo win g are som e tec hn iqu es you ca n u se, if t he ir u se wil l no t

unnecessarily endanger you or others.

a. S HOUT : v erbal wa rn ings to HA LT in na tiv e lan guag e

b. S HOW: yo ur wea p on an d d em onstrat e inten t t o us e i t.

c. SHOOT: to remove threat only when necessary

USCENTCOM

RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE BY CONTRACTED

SECURITY IN IRAQ

NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR INHERENT

RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO DEFEND

YOURSELF

5. IF YOU MUST FIRE YOUR WEAPON:

a. Fi re o nly aime d s ho ts,

b. Fire with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders,

c. Immediately report the incident and request assistance.

6. CIVILIANS: Treat Civilians with Dignity and Respect

a. Make every effort to avoid civilian casualties,

b. You m ay s top, d etain , se arc h, and d is arm c ivi li an perso ns if req uire d fo r

your safety or if specified in your contract,

c. Civilians will be treated humanely,

d. Detained civilians will be turned over the Iraqi Police/Security or Coalition

Forces as soon as possible.

7. WEAPONS POSSESSION AND USE: Possession and use of

weapons must be authorized by USCENTCOM and must be specified in your

contract.

a. You must carry proof of weapons authorization,

b. You wi ll mai nta in a cu rre nt wea pon s tr ai ni ng rec or d,

c. You may possess and use only those weapons and ammunition for which

you are qualified and approved,

d. You m ay not j oi n C o al ition Forces in co mbat op erat ion s,

e. You must follow Coalition weapons condition rules for loading and cleaning.

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Chapter II

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

(4) ROE and RUF should not be used interchangeably. Generally, ROE refers

to rules of force during military combat operations while RUF usually refers to the use of

force required while conducting security or noncombat operations.

(a) ROE is the authority to use up to lethal force to engage an enemy of

the State, and the source of authority is a State’s inherent right to defend itself and

provide national security. For the US military, ROE must be approved by the chain of

command, commencing with the President and Secretary of Defense. Subordinate

commanders may further limit the rules, but may not expand them, and in no case can the

rules deprive military personnel of their inherent right of self defense.

(b) RUF is the term applied to personnel who are authorized to use force

to accomplish their mission to enforce laws, maintain peace and security, and protect the

civilian population. The source of this authority is the duty of the State to protect its

citizens.

SecDef through the chain of command. RUF apply to security type operations; therefore,

if the APSC is performing law enforcement operations, then the RUF would apply. Under

a typical RUF the right of self-defense is inherent and may be resorted to for protection

from a hostile act or the display of a hostile intent indicating an imminent attack.

Additionally, absent a hostile act or intent, the right of self-defense does not authorize

the use of force to protect government property, and the assistance of security forces

should be sought. Furthermore, the use of force must be proportional to the threat in

intensity, duration, and magnitude based on facts known, with due care for third parties

in the vicinity.

(d) Contractors may be used for a variety of missions, many of which do

not involve the likely use of force to accomplish a mission but are nonetheless high risk.

These activities include supporting field operations, conducting surveillance programs,

providing police training and mentoring, and providing corrections/border patrol training.

In high risk situations, these contractor personnel may be authorized to carry arms for

self-defense.

(e) Contractors should not be asked or offer to assume inherently military

missions just because they may be armed or because they have particular knowledge or

skills outside those called for in the scope of their contracts, as it is not a proper delegation

of such duties. For example, a security team with the mission to protect a contractor,

should not ask the contractor to lead a convoy or man one of the weapons other than for

the purpose of self-defense.

5. Area-specific Requirements

a. In contingency operations, JFCs are responsible for ensuring, through contract

management teams, that contractors comply with orders, directives, and instructions

issued by the CCDR and the JFC especially those relating to force protection, security,

health, safety, and relations and interaction with local nationals. In circumstances where

DOD contractor personnel are authorized to be armed, commanders and contracting

II-7

Laws and Poicies Governing Armed Private Security Contractors

officials are responsible for ensuring they comply with specific CCDR and subordinate

JFC guidance for the operational area, including ROE and RUF, use of weapons in self-

defense, and local license requirements. Additional information is included in Appendix

B, “Armed Private Security Contract Compliance with Joint Force Commander and Host

Nation Requirements.”

b. While most AOR-specific contract requirements will have been identified early in

the planning process for inclusion in the base contract, the contract also should provide

a vehicle for updating/modifying requirements as the situation dictates. The JFC should

coordinate procedures with the respective KOs to develop and promulgate these changes

to the affected contractors. For example in the USCENTCOM AOR, the command uses

FRAGORDs to effect changes. As discussed in the following chapter, JFCs should

ensure promulgation of appropriate requirements for arming contract security personnel

and investigate use of force incidents.

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Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Intentionally Blank

III-1

CHAPTER III

ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR PLANNING,

INTEGRATION, AND MANAGEMENT

SECTION A. PLANNING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF

ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

1. Overview and Context

a. The 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress, Private

Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, 25 August

2008, identified the following key issues and concerns influencing APSC planning,

integration, and management:

(1) The United States is relying heavily on private firms to supply a wide

variety of services…including security. From publicly available information, this is

apparently the first time that the United States has depended so extensively on contractors

to provide security in a hostile environment.

(2) Private contractors contribute an essential service to US and international

efforts to bring peace. Nonetheless, the use of armed contractors raises several concerns,

including transparency and accountability.

(3) The lack of public information on the terms of the contracts, including their

costs and the standards governing hiring and performance, make evaluating their efficiency

difficult. The apparent lack of a practical means to hold contractors accountable under

US law for abuses and other transgressions, and the possibility that they could be

prosecuted by foreign courts, is also a source of concern.

b. This CRS report further explains that questions often arise when a federal agency

hires private persons to perform “inherently governmental functions,” which Congress

in 1998 defined as “so intimately related to the public interest as to require the performance

by Federal government employees (FAIR Act of 1998). DOD implementation of DFARS

does not prohibit the use of contractors for security, but limits the extent to which contract

personnel may be hired to guard military institutions and provide personnel and convoy

security. DOD subsequently clarified and amended DFARS to authorize APSCs to use

deadly force “only when necessary to execute their security mission to protect assets /

persons, consistent with the mission statement contained in their contract.” This rule

establishes that:

“It is the responsibility of the combatant commander to ensure that the private

security contract mission statements do not authorize the performance of any

inherently Governmental military functions, such as preemptive attacks, or any

other types of attacks. Otherwise, civilians who accompany the US Armed Forces

lose their law of war protections from direct attack if and for such time as they take

a direct part in hostilities.”

c. Acknowledging, “without private contractors, the US military would not have

sufficient capabilities to carry out operations,” the CRS Report recognizes “potential

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Chapter III

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

downsides to (this) force multiplier argument.” Citing important concerns, it questions

whether the use of private security contractors may adversely affect:

(1) Military force structure suggesting that a competing private sector could

deplete the military of highly trained security personnel.

(2) US military missions when APSCs disregard the sensitivities of and

consequences for the people of the HN.

(3) Military flexibility as commanders do not exercise command and control of

APSCs.

(4) Reliability and quality of APSCs as the demand for security services

increases.

d. The following considerations are integral to the basic relationship between the

commander and the APSCs, and provide general guidance when drafting the overall

terms of a contract:

(1) APSCs are required to perform all tasks identified within the performance

work statements and all provisions defined in the contract. As contractors, APSCs must

be prepared to perform all tasks stipulated in the contract and comply with all applicable

US and/or international laws.

(2) APSC employees may be subject to court-martial jurisdiction in time of war

or while participating in a contingency operation.

(3) Even though APSCs are armed, when deployed, the JFC has a continuing

obligation to provide or make available force protection and support services

commensurate with those authorized by law.

(4) APSCs accompanying the US Armed Forces may be subject to hostile

actions. If captured, an APSC’s status will depend upon the APSC’s precise activity at

the time of capture, the applicability of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment

of Prisoners of War (GC III), the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War (GC IV), the type of conflict, applicability of other bodies of

international law and any relevant international agreements, and the nature of the hostile

force (state-based armed force, irregular force, paramilitary force, terrorist group, etc.).

2. Planning for the Employment of Armed Private Security

Contractors

a. For each APSC mission area, effective planning and integration significantly

improves the potential to successfully manage and implement APSC operations. APSCs

typically support four mission areas:

(1) Static security to protect military bases, housing areas, reconstruction

work sites, etc.

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Armed Private Security Contractor Planning, Integration, and Management

(2) Personal security and protection.

(3) Convoy security.

(4) Security for internment operations.

b. It is worth noting that the fourth mission area is a relatively recent and expanding

role for APSCs. These contracts for custodial security, support for detention operations,

riot control, and related missions, significantly impact associated APSC performance

work statements and RUF.

c. Qualified and well-trained CORs and KOs need to be involved from the beginning

of the JFC planning processes to identify the requirements for APSC support. Involvement

of the joint force SJA or legal counsel is crucial and fundamental to effective planning for

APSC support. Early participation in JFC mission analysis yields a clearer understanding

of contract requirements and more efficient allocation of JFC and APSC personnel and

resources.

d. In accordance with DODI 3020.50, CORs need to be identified for US government

private security contractors operating in a designated area of combat operations. This

DODI prescribes the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of

personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract in a designated

area of combat operations for both DOD and DOS APSCs. It also prescribes incident

reporting, use of and accountability for equipment, RUF, and a process for the discipline

or removal, as appropriate, of USG private security contractor personnel. The DODI

responds to requirements of section 862 of the FY 2008 NDAA.

3. Establishing Planning Requirements for Armed Private Security

Contractor Support

a. The CCDR provides specific guidance on arming contractor personnel and private

security contractors in the AOR through DOD and theater-specific policies, FRAGORDS,

and other authoritative guidance.

b. During the mission analysis, the following general conditions and requirements

regarding contracts and contractor personnel should be considered:

(1) Private security contractor personnel are not authorized to participate in

offensive operations and must comply with specific RUF. Under these RUF, private

security contractor personnel are authorized to use deadly force only when necessary in:

self-defense, defense of facilities/persons as specified in their contract; prevention of

life-threatening acts directed against civilians; or defense of JFC-approved property

specified within their contract. The JFC will issue, to approved private security contractor

personnel, a weapons card authorizing them to carry a weapon. This weapons card also

contains the guidance for the RUF and the contractor personnel’s signature acknowledging

the difference between the RUF and ROE.

(2) Private security contractor personnel must be properly licensed to carry

arms in accordance with HN law and must receive JFC approval of their operations.

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Chapter III

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

(3) In addition to properly authorized Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs),

the status of Stationing Agreements (SA) can be discussed between the United States

and a HN. A stationing agreement can establish joint committees to review existing APSC

policies and to develop new policies and procedures. Committee members include

representatives from the HN Ministry of Interior and the AMEMB. These committees can

discuss and implement the following:

(a) Licensing of contractors.

(b) Registration of firearms and personal security weaponry.

(d) Licensing of pilots and aircraft related to personnel and security

operations.

(e) Customs, duties, tariffs, taxation and inspections.

(f) Entry, exit procedures and use of DOD assets to transport members of

the US Forces, DOD civilian component, US contractors, AMEMB personnel, and other

members of the Coalition.

(g) DOD contractor personnel armed by DOD authorities must report

any use of force, including the firing of a weapon. This requirement and the required

information to be submitted, or references imposing the specific requirements, are identified

within the terms of the contract.

Note: By incorporating these requirements in the contract’s basic provisions (or subsequent

amplifying directives), the JFC can minimize the opportunities for problems related to contractor

performance and/or misconduct.

c. APSC requirements also shape specific measures of performance and resulting

performance work statements (PWS) to include the duration of support, and the USG’s

requirements to provide subsistence and care for APSCs. Ultimately, the result of this

process yields an actual cost-benefit analysis of proposed APSC support, which serves

to appropriately scope and determine the worth of APSC costs/effort to continue with the

contract.

d. Contracting for APSC support incurs higher-than-average levels of risk given the

potentially profound consequences of their actions. Other considerations include: the

appearance or perception of APSCs as mercenaries; RUF and the escalation of force

issues; back-up plans for corrective action should a contractor default; questions of

human trafficking; and how to synchronize, integrate, essential services, and manage the

APSCs (as described in JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, Chapter IV).

e. During mission analysis, establishment of a working group is recommended to

consider the employment of APSCs. This working group should include the following

joint force staff representatives or members:

III-5

Armed Private Security Contractor Planning, Integration, and Management

(1) J-1, Personnel Directorate;

(2) J-2, Intelligence Directorate;

(3) J-3, Operations Directorate;

(4) J-4, Logistics Directorate;

(5) J-5, Plans and Policy Directorate;

(6) J-6, Command, Control, and Communications Directorate;

(7) SJA;

(8) Provost Marshal Office (PMO);

(9) Civil Affairs (CA);

(10) PA;

(11) Security Manager;

(12) Staff Surgeon;

(13) Applicable contracting authorities; and

(14) Resource Manager or Comptroller.

f. With known contract support requirements and the subsequent development of

each PWS, the contract planning process needs to recognize and define evolving

requirements that may affect a contractor’s PWS along with the procedures to award the

contract and supervise its execution.

Note: Planning considerations for APSC support explained in JP 4-10 includes the development

of the contract support integration plan (CSIP).

4. Contract Support Integration Plan

a. In all operations where there will be a significant use of contracted support, the

supported GCCs and their subordinate commanders and staffs must ensure that this

support is properly addressed in the appropriate OPLAN/OPORD. Accordingly, a CSIP is

developed by the logistics staff contracting personnel, assisted by the lead Service (if a

lead Service is designated). Additionally, each Service component should publish its

own CSIP seeking integration and unity of effort within the supported GCC’s CSIP. The

CSIP defines key contract support integration capabilities to include command and control

(C2) relationships, cross functional staff organization (e.g., board, center, cell) requirements,

theater business clearance policies, etc., necessary to execute subordinate JFC contract

support integration requirements. Using the guidance provided in the CSIP, requiring

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Chapter III

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

activities have the basis for defining, vetting and prioritizing joint force requirements, to

include the need for APSC support.

b. Normally, the CSIP is developed by the J-4 contracting personnel, but this effort

may be assisted by the lead Service (if a lead Service is designated). Additionally, each

Service component should publish its own CSIP seeking integration and unity of effort

within the supported GCC’s CSIP. Close coordination with J-3, J-5, CA, financial

management, and legal support is essential to the development of the CSIP. JP 4-10

provides a detailed discussion of the CSIP development process and a contracting support

planning checklist can be found in its Appendix E.

5. Contractor Management Plan

a. While the CSIP is focused on how we will acquire and manage contracted support,

contractor management planning is focused on the government obligations under the

terms and conditions of the contract to provide support (e.g., accountability, force

protection, government furnished equipment (GFE)) to contractor personnel. This

includes developing policies and procedures required to ensure proper integration of

contractor personnel into the military operations.

b. IAW DOD policy, the supported GCC and subordinate JFC must identify operation

specific contractor management policies and requirements for inclusion in the OPLAN/

OPORD. These requirements include, but are not limited to:

(1) Compliance with operationally specific contracting polices to include

Service, multinational, and HN requirements and guidance;

(2) Contractor-related deployment, theater reception, accountability, and

strength reporting;

(3) Operations security plans and restrictions, force protection, and personnel

recovery;

(4) Contractor personnel services support;

(5) Medical support; and

(6) Redeployment requirements.

c. For each operation, the GCC should publish a contractor management plan

(CMP). The CMP identifies the theater’s specific contractor personnel and equipment

requirements for the JFC(s), Service components, joint theater support contracting

command (if established), special operations forces, and Defense Logistics Agency to

incorporate into applicable contracts as required. Supporting the GCC’s CMP, the JFC(s)

and Service components should prepare CMPs that provide added, specific details.

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Armed Private Security Contractor Planning, Integration, and Management

d. While the subordinate JFC-level CSIP is coordinated and written by the J-4 or

designated lead Service contracting staff, there is no single primary or special staff officer

responsible to lead the contractor management planning effort. By its very nature,

contractor management integration-related planning responsibilities cross all primary

and special staff functional lanes. To address this situation, the JFC should consider

establishing a contractor management integration working group to ensure the various

contractor management challenges are addressed and synchronized across all primary

and special staff lines.

6. Development of the Armed Private Security Support Contract

a. The culmination of the requirements process leads to the development of the

terms of the contract. While each AOR will develop a contract tailored to their particular

circumstances, the tasks will generally include supplementing internal operations at entry

control points, manning perimeter towers, securing selected facilities, providing convoy

security, providing personal protection for select individuals, providing armed escorts

for local national laborers, maintaining a liaison cell at selected headquarters sites, and

any other internal security services as determined by the command. It will always contain

a specific prohibition against engaging in offensive operations. A current example of an

APSC contract is USCENTCOM’s “Theater Wide Internal Security Services” (TWISS).

b. The USCENTCOM TWISS contains detailed requirements for the training and

qualifications of APSC individual employees. For example, it specifies that:

(1) The security contract companies will be expected to supply guards,

explosive ordnance detection dog handlers (and working dogs), screeners, interpreters,

supervisors, medical officer, and other managerial personnel.

(2) The security guards must be at least 21 years old and speak English well

enough to give and receive situational reports. They may be expatriates or local nationals.

They must be qualified on 9mm, 5.56 and 7.62 caliber weapons, and be able to fulfill work-

weeks of not more than 72 hours.

(3) Employees will be expected to fully understand the differences between

the law of war (a.k.a, law of armed conflict (LOAC)), RUF, and ROE.

(4) Contractors will obtain a signed written acknowledgement from each of

their employees authorized to bear weapons that they have been briefed on the law of

war, RUF, and the differences between ROE and RUF. The TWISS also makes it clear that

RUF controls the use of weapons by contractors employed the USG and that the

contractor may NOT use ROE at any time for use of force decisions.

c. The TWISS is a very detailed document that covers all aspects of the APSC’s

relationships with the USG. The terms of the TWISS are used by the KO and the COR

when determining the contractor’s compliance with the terms of the contract – non-

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Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

compliance usually results in a range of penalties. Example of the TWISS’s contract

language can be found in Appendix E, “Standard Contract Clauses that Apply to Armed

Private Security Contractors.”

7. Department of Defense Operational Contract Support Enablers

a. The NDAAs of 2007 and 2008, mandated that DOD develop joint policies

addressing the definition of contract requirements and establishing coherent contingency

management programs. Implementing actions by DOD included establishing the Joint

Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), and co-locating fourteen joint

operational contract support planner (JOCSP) positions with select combatant commands

to improve operational contract support. The JCASO and JOSCP could also be leveraged

to assist in planning, integrating, and managing APSCs. These enablers should be

utilized by JFCs and joint force staff planners early, often, and throughout the planning

process.

b. JCASO

(1) The JCASO, assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency, facilitates

orchestrating, synchronizing, and integrating program management of contingency

acquisition support across combatant commands and USG agencies, during combat,

post-conflict, and contingency operations. Once the JCASO attains full operational

capability at the end of FY 2010, its deployable teams can augment a CCDR’s staff to

assist in providing oversight and program management at the operational-level over the

array of contracts and contractors throughout the AOR.

(2) The deployable teams are multifunctional with expertise in engineering,

logistics planning, contracting, and acquisition. The forward team will have reachback to

other JCASO team members at Fort Belvoir, VA, for legal, financial, and other support

capabilities; including a liaison to interagency partners to assist with the whole-of-

government approach to shaping and managing a contingency operation.

c. JOCSPs are assigned to the geographic combatant commands, USSOCOM and

USJFCOM. The JOCSPs assist CCDR and their staffs in identifying the requirements for

contractor services, as well as the performance standards. The requirements will

incorporate DOD and the CCDR’s policies and standards regarding contractor performance

and the provision of life support and other services for military personnel and contractor

personnel in forward areas. The JOCSPs work with operations, logistics, and contracting

planners to develop contracting support annexes and contractor management annexes.

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION OF ARMED

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

8. General

a. The CSIP prepared for APSC support is designed to enable the supported GCC

and subordinate JFCs to properly synchronize and coordinate all the different contracting

III-9

Armed Private Security Contractor Planning, Integration, and Management

support actions planned for and executed in an operational area. While joint doctrine and

DOD guidance for the employment of contractors and specifically armed contractors

contains detailed guidance on the employment of contractors, in the absence of governing

federal law, the language of the contract rules. Commanders do not command contractors,

nor can they direct actions outside the work stipulated in the contract itself.

b. Factored into planning and integration for APSC support is the DOD-wide use of

SPOT. Combatant commands are continuing to transition from manual accounting of

contractor personnel to a this web-based, database tool to track contractor personnel

and contractor capability in theater. SPOT has a number of features that facilitate individual

contractor management. For example, USCENTCOM is using SPOT to generate Letters

of Authorization that are required for contractors receiving government furnished support

in the AOR. Additionally, SPOT allows for the scanning of identification cards to track

the movements of contractor personnel and equipment through key life-support and

movement nodes.

9. Armed Private Security Contractor Integration Initiatives

Developed by United States Central Command

a. The following organizations, systems, and mechanisms are initiatives that have

supported the command in its employment of APSC’s in Iraq and Afghanistan. These

mechanisms serve as a model to assist JFCs in planning for and managing APSC activities:

(1) Joint Contractor Coordination Board (JCCB)

(a) A JCCB can be established by a JFC and convened on an as needed

basis to review and coordinate policies and contracting actions within the operational

area to include APSC issues. The JCCB reviews contract requirements and makes

recommendations on which specific contracting organizations/contract venues are best

suited to fulfill the requirements.

(b) Potentially, JCCB membership would include the JFC, the joint force

staff directorates, MSCs (as required), senior KO, SJA, PMO, and involved USG authorities

from the COM and a representative from the CMOC.

(2) Armed Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD)

(a) In order to maintain oversight and visibility over APSC operations,

the JCCB can establish an ACOD or armed contractor oversight branch (ACOB) . The

ACOD, normally chaired by the J-3 or designee, is designed to establish a link between

the military and the various APSCs in the operational area. The ACOD can also be

employed as the central office for policy, oversight, and military support for APSC related

issues. In addition to publishing guidance, the ACOD is responsible for reviewing and

tracking all reported APSC incidents as well as facilitating coordination on PSC matters

among DOD, DOS, the GoI, and the APSC community.

(b) ACOD tasks include:

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Chapter III

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

1. Process, log, disseminate and monitor APSC activity.

2. Assist military staff in conducting inspections of APSC

documentation of training and incident reporting.

3. Coordinate with the brigade support battalions (BSB) and the

joint operations center (JOC) to ensure that all reportable incidents involving APSCs are

reported.

4. Track the status of all ongoing investigations involving APSC

weapons discharges.

5. In coordination with the USCENTCOM: maintain regular contact

with HN Ministry of Interior (MOI) or the equivalent representative to identify issues

concerning DOD contracted APSC’s actions, incidents and procedures; work with MOI

counterpart in investigations concerning APSC escalation of force (EOF) incidents; and

perform duties as liaison officer with HN government entities.

6. Possess a good understanding of HN government law and the

legal system.

7. Accumulate data as reported from various sources and performs

analysis to identify trends concerning APSC activities and incidents.

8. Develop and support HN administrative requirements such as

rosters, POC phone lists, contract POC lists, etc.

(3) Contractors Operations Cell (CONOC). A USCENTCOM initiative for

the day-to-day management of contractor movements is the CONOC, which allows the

JFC to establish a central point of contact to gain awareness of, track, and coordinate the

day-to-day movements of APSCs. To reduce the potential for fratricide, the CONOC was

developed to coordinate the movement of the large numbers of APSCs frequently moving

in the uncertain or hostile operational environment of Iraq. CONOC deconfliction permits

both the joint force and APSCs to accomplish their tasks within a reasonable time, increase

their safety in a hostile environment and reduce the potential for fratricide. It also serves

as a central point of coordination with the AMEMB and its USG APSCs. While non-DOD

APSC participation in the coordination of convoy movements is not mandatory, they can

benefit in conforming to JFC movement request requirements to acquire access to

intelligence about the area, deconflict with military operations, and if needed, receive

medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) or quick reaction force (QRF) support. For details, see

Appendix C, “United States Central Command Contractor Operations Cell Coordination

Procedures.”

(4) Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). Finally,

USCENTCOM established a JCC-I/A to facilitate theater oversight of its theater-support

contracts. This command provides a central management office for clearing all contracts

and task orders for those two countries. An advantage is the faster response time to

III-11

Armed Private Security Contractor Planning, Integration, and Management

support operational contracting needs by the units. This command approves PWS terms

and conditions for supplies and services in either country. By this system, trained

personnel handle the contracts to ensure that they contain required clauses, are consistent

with the priorities and operations of the in-country JFC’s plans, and contracted work has

been completed prior to delivery.

10. Assessing and Balancing Risk to Forces Support

a. Another major challenge in planning for and integrating APSC support is balancing

the risk to required support and the potential impact on the civil-military aspects of the

supported commander’s objectives. In many cases, hiring local companies and local

personnel to provide security services will provide substantial economic benefit to the

populace and further the goals of the civil-military aspects of the joint operation. However,

this option is not without risks.

b. Transitioning to local vendor support can be accomplished by moving the

requirements of a Civil Augmentation Program (CAP) task order to a theater support

contract or by setting subcontracting goals within a CAP task order to move from a TCN

and/or expatriate work force to a local national work force. In either case, both the

increased security risks and contract management requirements must be closely analyzed

prior to making any formal decisions. When contemplating transferring an APSC contract

to local sources, the lead Service or joint theater support contracting command must

work closely with the supported GCC, the subordinate JFC, and the Services to assess

these risks and make determinations on which APSC actions can be effectively and safely

transferred to local sources and which ones cannot.

11. Balancing Contracting Best Business Practices with Operational

Needs

a. The JFC planners must work closely with the lead Service or joint theater support

contracting command personnel to balance acceptable contracting business practices

and operational needs. In some cases, a tradeoff process may be appropriate when it may

be in the best interests of the USG to award to other than the lowest priced offer or other

than the highest technically rated offer or in order to achieve best value for the government

considering other factors such as overall civil-military strategic objectives, schedule, and

performance. Examples of such contracting actions include:

(1) Awarding to a vendor based on civil-military considerations (i.e., the

company is owned by or substantially employs local nationals) versus lowest cost.

(2) Developing a PWS that may require the use of manual labor, in lieu of

mechanized equipment, in order to employ more local nationals even though this may

drive the cost up and increase the delivery schedule.

(3) Awarding a contract to a local national vendor versus a lower costing

foreign vendor in order to maintain a viable local vendor base.

III-12

Chapter III

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

SECTION C. MANAGEMENT OF ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY

CONTRACTORS

12. Overview

a. Contractor management planning is related to, but not the same as, contracting

support integration planning. While the CSIP is focused on how we will acquire and

manage contracted support, contractor management planning and the CMP are focused

on the government obligations under the terms and conditions of the contract to provide

support (e.g., accountability, FP, GFE) to contractor personnel. This includes developing

policies and procedures required to ensure proper integration of contractor personnel

into the military operations.

b. The JFC-level CSIP is typically coordinated and written by the J-4 or designated

lead Service contracting staff for the CMP. There is no single primary or special staff

officer responsible to lead the contractor management planning effort. By its very nature,

contractor management integration-related planning responsibilities cross all primary

and special staff functional lanes. To address this situation, the JFC should consider

establishing a contractor management integration working group with a designated office

of primary responsibility, to ensure the various contractor management challenges are

addressed and synchronized across all primary and special staff lines.

c. The JFC’s lead Service contracting staff, responsible for contracting and/or joint

theater support contracting command personnel, acts as advisors to the subordinate JFC

and/or working group on how the contracting process affects in-theater contractor

personnel management. The lead Service contracting staff should not be designated as

the lead for contractor management planning or execution oversight since their role is to

assist the appropriate GCC and subordinate JFC staff section as necessary to ensure that

the overall contract support effort is properly integrated with the contractor management

planning effort.

13. Primary Responsibilities for Providing Military Management and

Oversight

a. KOs and CORs

(1) The military system of KOs and CORs has specially designated government

personnel vested with responsibility and authority to monitor contract compliance. The

primary responsibility for supervising the day to day compliance with the contract rests

with the KO and COR. Only the KO is able to approve contract modifications and accept a

completion of requirements. This makes the KO and their representatives the main legally

invested interface with the companies, which provide APSC services. JFC personnel should

coordinate all input and comments regarding the performance of contractors with the KO

and COR. Only the KO and COR are authorized to officially review and comment on such

performance (e.g., any inclination to praise performance of a contractor should be forwarded

to the KO to ensure that successful performance in one area is not used by the government

as a defense against poor performance in another area).

III-13

Armed Private Security Contractor Planning, Integration, and Management

(2) CORs are critical for oversight. They provide day-to-day oversight of the

contractors’ performance and compliance with contract requirements. They are “the

eyes and ears of the contracting officer”. They have significant responsibilities. They

must monitor the contractor’s performance and compliance with contractual requirements,

including compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, orders, and directives.

Furthermore, the COR is responsible for validating invoices for payment submitted by

the contractor. In USCENTCOM, the TWISS CORs are also responsible for ensuring that

APSCs adhere to arming requirements, personnel reporting systems, serious incident

reporting systems, badging (identification tasks), and compliance with the command’s

FRAGORDs.

(3) In some cases, the KO and COR have responsibility for a large number of

contracts and may not be located in the country where the contracts or grants are being

performed. If they are not co-located with the APSC, the COR may encounter significant

difficulty providing sufficient monitoring and oversight of execution of the contract’s

performance measures.

(4) Standard DOD contract language requires the APSC to provide the following

office records/reports:

(a) Daily Reports. The contractor should provide a daily report to the

COR on any ongoing issues with regard to personnel, APSC incidents, or other items that

affect the contractor’s ability to perform its mission.

(b) Monthly Report. The contractor should provide summary reports

that meet criteria specified in each contract, i.e., for the discharge of weapons, detention

of individuals, convoys attacked.

COR, at the same time as the monthly report, to be processed for payment.

(5) Finally, an appropriately trained, authorized (by warrant) and experienced

COR appointed in accordance with joint contracting command guidelines shall hold a

grade commensurate with the contract’s oversight responsibilities. Ideally, the contract

oversight function should be the COR’s primary duty; however, the reality is that COR

duties are normally considered as additional duties. The COR will normally:

(a) Review and approve contractor requisitions and expenditures in

order to stay within the annual budget.

(b) Submit funding request, as required, to joint force finance office to

maintain the contractors and their system(s), if used.

contractor performance to contract specialist representative responsible for the contract/

task order at the JCCB.

III-14

Chapter III

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

b. Joint Force Staff Responsibilities For Contract Management and Oversight

(1) In addition to contributing to the planning of APSCs, the joint force staff

actively participates in the management of the supporting APSCs. Additional detail on

staff responsibilities is contained in Appendix D, “Common Military Staff Tasks When

Employing Armed Private Security Contractors.” The following joint force staff sections

have specific responsibilities in dealing with APSCs supporting a joint force:

(a) The J-1 coordinates personnel accountability and casualty reporting

processes and therefore, requires timely, complete, and accurate information on the

disposition and status of APSCs to fulfill contractual obligations.

(b) The J-2 coordinates intelligence support, including warning of enemy

activity along the route, for contractor movements in coordination with US or multinational

forces. Requests for support will be submitted and processed through normal channels.

deconfliction of daily operations involving APSCs. While this is normally a movement

control issue worked through the respective movement control centers, the J-3 must

maintain visibility over APSC activities to minimize the risk of fratricide and provide

armed support to APSC convoys under attack. The J-3 should also ensure that end-of-

mission spot reports and post-mission information for each APSC-escorted convoy are

filed with the JFC CONOC – this is normally required in the contract or FRAGORD

governing convoy movements.

(d) The J-4 coordinates APSC support for logistic and convoy movements

in the operational area. To support combatant command and JFC management of APSCs,

the J-4 monitors current and evolving theater logistic capabilities and advises the JFC/J-

3 of the supportability of proposed operations or courses of action.

(e) The J-5 coordinates the preparation JFC plans that require APSC

support.

(f) The J-6 will coordinate with operations centers for integration of

required communications support between the APSCs and the operations centers.

(g) The SJA is an essential participant in APSC management. The SJA

plays a key role in developing and updating the command’s RUF training packages that

are used to orient APSC personnel and for providing advice to the operations center

during incident investigations.

(h) The PMO can assist the contracting officer in conducting inspections

of APSC operations and recommending modifications to the employment of APSCs.

(i) Representatives from the CA, PA, security management, and medical

support offices need, at a minimum, adequate situational awareness, contact information,

and capabilities to satisfy contractual requirements for APSC support. CA and PA have

III-15

Armed Private Security Contractor Planning, Integration, and Management

specific responsibilities with regard to the management of APSCs and occasional response

to repercussions of serious incidents. For instance, should an APSC mistakenly injure a

civilian, the PA office has the media lead for the command. The security manager needs

to address clearances/access for APSCs and the staff surgeon conducts planning for

required medical support for treatment of APSCs.

(j) The contracting staff/office provides the requisite contracting expertise

and contracting authorities to coordinate contracting support requirements among Service

components to procure supplies or services to obtain effective utilization and

advantageous prices through consolidation of joint force requirements and to preclude

inter-Service competition. Only contracting officers can enter into negotiations with the

APSC and make subsequent modification to the terms.

(k) The resource manager or comptroller advises the JFC and staff on the

funding sources and guidance on the appropriate use of funds, to include APSC operations.

c. Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)

(1) The DCMA is the combat support agency responsible for ensuring major

DOD acquisition programs (systems, supplies, and services) are delivered on time, within

projected cost or price, and meet performance requirements. In contingency operations

DCMA provides contingency contract administration services (CCAS) to LOGCAP when

CCAS is delegated by the principle KO. Because of numerous APSC incidents negatively

impacting US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DCMA was called upon to improve

APSC CCAS efforts. This resulted in the following initiatives:

(a) Incorporation of “trafficking in persons” instructions into FRAGORDs

and contract-specific training requirements.

(b) Establishment of quality assurance surveillance plans (QASP) and

specific audit checklists for APSC contracts.

(d) Completion of property control systems analyses

(e) Use of APSC audit checklists to initiate independent quality assurance

representative (QAR) audits.

(f) Institution of dynamic and on-going monitoring and training

assessments of COR performance through scheduled and unscheduled monthly audits.

(2) DCMA continues to actively administer APSC contracts and task orders in

Iraq and Afghanistan and remains responsive to the contract oversight needs of DOD.

Specifically, DCMA works to:

(a) Enhance QAR and COR checklists.

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Chapter III

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

(b) Forward position additional QARs to better support CORs.

the understanding of contractual requirements.

(d) Develop methods to track COR re-deployments and replacements

which is critical to promoting continuity of service and facilitating personnel transitions.

(e) Pursue geographic delegations of contracts/task orders.

(f) Track force re-posturing and the closure of forwarding operating

bases.

(g) Monitor periods of performance (PoPs) of existing contracts to foster

the timely closure of contracts and increase the efficient delegation of new contracts.

IV-1

CHAPTER IV

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER COORDINATION WITH

NON-DOD ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

1. General

DOD’s interests in sharing information and increasing coordination to improve USG

APSC support in an operational area continue to expand. This is especially true when it

comes to APSC employed by non-USG entities present in the GCC’s AOR (coalition, HN,

international, and private sector).

2. Coordination Mechanisms

a. In a country with an established COM, the country team will coordinate the

planning, management, and oversight of non-DOD APSCs contracted by the USG agencies

operating in the AOR. In a country without a COM, and where DOD has the lead, all USG,

non-DOD APSC support should be coordinated with appropriate DOD planners prior to

their deployment.

b. For the many other non-USG APSCs operating in an operational area over which

a JFC has no authority, a CMOC provides a viable option to acquire visibility and situational

awareness of these non-USG activities. Described in JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations,

a CMOC as depicted in Figure IV-1, can share information with participating non-USG

organizations employing APSCs and establish direct relationships that would enable

supporting coordination authorities and operations centers, i.e. non-USG and USG/JFC

CONOCs, to collaborate and deconflict APSC planning and activities.

(1) A CMOC is an established coordination mechanism that can serve as the

primary coordination interface between the JFC and other entities operating in the

operational area. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces,

non-DOD USG agencies, IGOs and other international organizations, NGOs, coalition

military forces, and private-sector organizations that have contracted APSCs.

(2) The CMOC functions as a forum where participants can coordinate and

deconflict non-USG APSC activities in an operational area. For political and philosophical

reasons, many non-USG organizations will reject the opportunity to participate in the

CMOC in order to maintain the perception of their neutrality. Therefore, informal, indirect

coordination between the CMOC and individual non-USG APSCs, may be required to

exchange information to support security requirements for convoy movements, etc.

(3) A JFC could use the CMOC to coordinate with the following non-USG

APSCs:

(a) TCNs/third countries;

(b) Multinational participants; and

IV-2

Chapter IV

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

(4) The CMOC, with appropriate host nation representation, could be used to

sensitize the HN to the need to establish standardized rules for the operations of APSCs

in its territory with a goal of having the HN adopt rules for APSC conduct that will reduce

adverse effects on local civilians and minimize the potential for fratricide between security

forces. When it comes to the activities and movements of non-USG sponsored APSCs,

the CMOC can act as an information conduit to the JFC CONOC to provide situational

awareness and minimize potential opportunities for fratricide.

Figure IV-1. DOD Coordination with APSCs in an Operational Area

APSC armed private security contractor

COM Chief of Mission

CMOC civil-military operations center

DOD Department of Defense

DOD COORDINATION WITH APSCs IN AN OPERATIONAL AREA

DOD requirements to share information and increase coordination with

USG APSCs (working for COM) and non-USG APSCs

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

Non-USG, HN

International (i.e. UN),

Military Coalition,

and Private-sector

APSCs

DOD

APSCs

USG

APSCs

COM

CMOC

HN host nation

UN United Nations

USG US Government

A-1

APPENDIX A

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE JOINT FORCE AND ARMED

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

1. General

DOD affiliated APSCs are currently subject to three types or systems of legal

authority.

a. International law and usage of war, and resolutions of the United Nations Security

Council, along with other treaties or agreements to which the US is a party to and applies

to a particular operation;

b. United States law, including military and civilian laws and other regulatory

authorities or requirements issued by the Executive Branch. This list of authorities

includes, but is not limited to:

(1) UCMJ in certain circumstances (time of war or contingency operation);

(2) MEJA;

(3) Certain other federal criminal statutes with extraterritorial application; and

(4) Civil law, which provides another legal option to hold APSCs accountable.

c. Host nation law, depending on the functioning of the system, rule of law within

the nation, and the existence of international agreements on the status of US forces,

including the civilian component, may have jurisdiction to prosecute non-citizen civilians,

including APSCs, without the permission of the United States. Proceeding under HN

civil law is also possible (for example, civil actions in HN courts for wrongful detention or

battery).

2. Laws and Regulatory Guidance that Apply to Armed Private

Security Contractors

The following subparagraphs summarize the body of law, regulations, and directives

that applies to APSC contracting.

a. International Law and Agreements

(1) The Third Geneva Convention (GC III) provides legal standards pertaining

to the classification and treatment of prisoners of war. The Fourth Geneva Convention

(GC IV) relates to the protection of civilians during times of declared war, armed conflicts

and undeclared wars, when civilians are “in the hands” of an enemy and under military

occupation by a foreign power. It also defines “protected persons,” and more

controversially, “unlawful combatants.” APSCs providing services during times of armed

conflict are subject to rules found in international humanitarian law. GC IV and the two

A-2

Appendix A

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

“Additional Protocols” outlaw certain acts, whether committed by state or non-state

participants. For example, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions prohibits certain

acts and Additional Protocol II applies to armed conflicts. International tribunals and

national courts have found non-state participants criminally and civilly accountable for

war crimes, so APSCs may remain subject to prosecution. The application of international

human rights law to APSCs is more complicated than international humanitarian law

because much of international human rights law contains “state action” requirements

limiting liability for violations to state participants.

(2) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Montreux Document

of 17 September 2008, provides a model of international obligations, standards, and

practices for nations who have APSCs present in a theater of conflict. The Montreux

Document is the first international document to describe international law as it applies to

the activities of APSCs when they are present in an armed conflict. It also contains:

(a) A compilation of potential APSC practices;

(b) A model selection process for contracting an APSC;

(d) Compliance and accountability monitoring; and

(e) Proper authorizations to operate.

(3) The ICRC describes the document and the process, which produced the

document, i.e., A meeting in the Swiss town of Montreux has reaffirmed States’ obligations

regarding private military and security companies in war zones. Two key points contained

in the document agreed upon by 17 nations are that delegating tasks to a contractor does

not relieve a State of its responsibilities, and that governments should not let contractors

take part in combat operations.

b. Law of War. The law of war governs international conflict between nations. In

the view of the United States, these laws are binding on the nation and each citizen,

including treaties and agreements to which the United States is a party. When DOD

forces deploy for operations, each component and their contractors are responsible for

observing and enforcing the laws. Each Service secretary develops internal policies and

procedures for carrying out those responsibilities and obligations.

c. Customary Law and Usage. The body of law governing armed conflict also has

unwritten portions. Civilian status and the treatment of civilians encountered on the

battlefield require particular attention since there are several other categories of non-

military-but-hostile, into which they may fall. The APSC contract should require training

on the status of individual contractors and provide them with an understanding of their

US and international legal rights.

d. United States Law. Prior to 2000, if a civilian accompanying the force abroad

committed a felony, the military was often unable to prosecute the civilian under the US

A-3

Legal Framework for the Joint Force and Armed Private Security Contractors

legal system. Subsequent action by Congress extended the legal authority of the United

States to cover citizens accompanying US armed forces as civilians, contractors, and

family members. Moreover, the 2007 NDAA modified Article 2 of the UCMJ to prescribe

court-martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the force abroad in time of war or

for contingency operations, regardless of the level of the offense.

e. Contractor’s Legal Status. Contractors may support military contingency

operations in a noncombat role if they have designation as contractors authorized to

accompany the force (CAAF) by the military force they accompany. They require an

appropriate identification card under the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and DODD 4500.54. If captured on the

battlefield, only contractors with CAAF status are entitled to treatment as prisoners of

war. The 1949 Geneva Convention covers all contractors. Contractors may support

contingency operations through indirect participation such as providing communications

support; transport of logistic supplies; performing maintenance on equipment; providing

security services; and providing logistic services. Each service performed by contractors

in a contingency operation requires individual review and discussion with personnel and

legal offices for compliance with applicable laws and international agreements.

f. UCMJ

(1) Historically, private contractors have not been subject to criminal

prosecution under the US military justice system. However, in 2006, Congress enacted

legislation that would place APSCs under the authority of the UCMJ in some

circumstances.

(2) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “UCMJ Jurisdiction over DOD Civilian

Employees, DOD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving With or Accompanying

the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations,” March

10, 2008, addresses concurrent authority and defines the authorities and policies for the

implementation of UCMJ authority over DOD civilians and DOD contractor personnel.

The Memorandum reaffirms the commander’s traditional authority to investigate violations

of the UCMJ and apprehend suspects. It also reaffirms DOD policy of offering the

Department of Justice (DOJ) the opportunity to prosecute violators in federal courts. If

DOJ declines jurisdiction, the DOD can proceed with appropriate legal action. In late

September 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum to commanders

emphasizing the importance of accelerating the implementation of UCMJ authority over

DOD contractors, as authorized under Section 552, “Clarification of Application of Uniform

Code of Military Justice During a Time of War,” of the NDAA for FY 2007. The current

laws or policies apply to all operations.

(3) A notable shortfall in this legislation is that it does not apply to non-DOD

contractors accompanying and supporting non-DOD USG departments and agencies

outside the US but operating in the JFC’s operational area. These contractors are subject

to other provisions of federal criminal law but questions of investigation and enforcement

remain. DOS and DOJ believe additional action to strengthen legal accountability of non-

DOD contractors deploying with non-DOD USG departments and agencies will eventually

occur.

A-4

Appendix A

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

g. MEJA

(1) APSCs are subject to federal criminal prosecution under MEJA, which

allows felony criminal charges to be brought against US contractors working for DOD or

in support of a DOD mission. Federal authorities have not strongly enforced the statute

for a variety of reasons, including the fact that many contractors are not under contract

with the DOD, but instead are employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DOS,

or other agencies to which MEJA does not apply. Moreover, DOJ also has unreviewable

discretion over whether to bring cases under MEJA. MEJA prosecutions can be expensive

and require a US Attorney’s Office (USAO) to expend valuable resources to prosecute

cases which did not occur in the USAO district and which may not have any nexus to the

district at all.

(2) This law extends legal jurisdiction over people employed by, a member of,

or accompanying US forces outside the US. The MEJA does not apply to all crimes and

offenses but only to those offenses punishable by at least one year in prison based on

US law. The authority of this Act covers offenses which are felonies and under the

jurisdiction of a federal district court. Arrest authority rests with any member of DOD

serving in law enforcement, with swift delivery to law enforcement officials within the

United States.

(3) The MEJA statute has been used rarely. From its enactment in 2000

through March 2008, DOD referred 58 cases involving APSCs and other contractors to

DOJ. Federal prosecutors brought charges in 12 of those cases, and state prosecutors

brought charges in one other case. Of those, eight resulted in a conviction and five await

trial.

h. USA PATRIOT Act. The USA PATRIOT Act addresses APSC issues to some

extent by expanding the United States’ Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction (SMTJ)

to include US-operated facilities overseas. For example, a federal prosecutor might bring

charges against employees of APSCs that mistreat detainees if the abuse constitutes a

crime within the SMTJ and was committed within a US facility. A federal district court

convicted one private contractor who worked for the CIA for detainee abuse at a US

facility in Afghanistan.

i. Other Federal Statutes. Several other federal statutes have extraterritorial

applicability, vesting jurisdiction in US federal courts over offenses, which occur outside

the United States and outside the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United

States. For example, torture, certain frauds against the US, and war profiteering can be

prosecuted regardless of the site of the offense.

j. Civil Law Liability. Tort and contract claims may be another way to hold APSCs

accountable, either individually or corporately. The use of domestic tort and contract

claims in international humanitarian law is a relatively new concept. In the US, plaintiffs

could bring claims against APSCs under the Alien Tort Claims Act (Title 28 USC § 1350),

which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to consider “torts in violation of the law

of nations” brought by non-citizens.

A-5

Legal Framework for the Joint Force and Armed Private Security Contractors

k. SOFA

(1) A SOFA clarifies terms for US military operations within a HN. The SOFA

addresses legal issues regarding foreign military members, family members, property, and

their dealings with local citizens. SOFAs generally address issues pertaining to border

entry and exit; customs, duties, and taxes; and employment of family members, HN and

third country nationals by the foreign military. Over time, the most difficult issue has

been of civil and criminal jurisdiction and adjudication over incidents on the bases or in

the country by foreign military members. has been the most difficult. In civil cases, a

SOFA normally provides a procedure for the settlement of civil damages caused by the

forces. Jurisdiction over criminal issues varies and is usually the subject of intense

negotiation, and will vary by country. Typical positions taken by the US in a SOFA are

that US courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed either by a Service member against

another Service member, or by a Service member as part of his or her military duty, but the

HN retains jurisdiction over other crimes. In a typical SOFA, the US will seek to introduce

terms extending legal jurisdiction over family members, CAAF workers, and non-CAAF

US citizens working for other USG agencies.

(2) During pre-operational deployment phases, planners, including contracting

representatives and the SJA, should review applicable SOFAs and other agreements

affecting contracting operations and the status of individual contractors within the

contingency area.

l. HN and TCN Laws

(1) Laws of the HN country may apply directly to the APSCs. Joint force staff

members charged with operational planning and contracting functions must consider not

only international and US laws, but also the laws of the HN and other countries with

citizens under contract to the USG. Generally, the SJA provides advice and monitoring of

applicable laws, codes, or regulations limiting contracting and hiring of contractor support.

In some cases, these limitations may delay timely contracting for needed capabilities, and

in others may prohibit it completely.

(2) Within the HN, two basic conditions may exist: either the governmental

systems remain functional and capable, or they do not. In the former case, the JFC

coordinates with the COM to identify the HN laws and regulations that may impact on the

conduct of contractor operations, especially APSCs. In the absence of a HN government,

where a provisional governmental authority may be temporarily in charge, the provisional

authority will establish a SOFA like document governing the military, government civilian,

and contractors while performing their duties. The terms of the SOFA for legal jurisdiction

of APSCs needs to be examined and communicated to all pertinent parties.

(3) The hiring of contingency contractor personnel must also comply with

applicable local and/or third country laws. Contractor personnel may be hired from US,

HN, or TCN sources and their legal status may change (e.g., from non-CAAF to CAAF)

depending on where they work or the provisions of the contract. CCDRs, their

subordinate commanders, Defense agencies, and DOD field activities, need to be cognizant

of limiting factors regarding the employment of HN and TCN personnel. Limiting factors

A-6

Appendix A

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

include imported labor permits; workforce and hour restrictions; insurance coverage;

taxes, customs, and duties; cost of living allowances; hardship differentials; access to

classified information; and hazardous duty pay.

(4) Third country national laws may contain additional requirements or

limitations on their citizens performing work for the USG or in a contingency operations

area. Primarily these requirements are the responsibility of the hiring company; however,

the JFC must be knowledgeable about these areas as well. Directly concerning the JFC is

the ability of the TCN government to assist in vetting their citizens sufficiently and

quickly. Long term, any TCN changes to law or business regulations affecting the hiring

and use of their citizens need monitoring and legal compliance. The joint force legal

office will provide expertise concerning interpretation and specific points of law.

m. Provisions of the Contract and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The

contract and the FAR have specific requirements with regard to contractor activities and

individual contractor conduct. Penalties for violation of those requirements can be imposed

for shortfalls in contractor performance and for non-felonious misconduct by individual

contractors.

B-1

APPENDIX B

ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR COMPLIANCE

WITH JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND HOST NATION

REQUIREMENTS

1. Joint Force Commander Requirements

a. A JFC has a variety of tools to control the actions of APSCs within an operational

area, including: establishing operational area entry requirements, drafting contractual

language specifically detailing APSC conduct and activities connected with APSC

operations; and, by exercising operational control per the terms of the APSC’s contract

once in the operational area.

b. The JFC establishes requirements for APSC individual training, selection,

accountability, and vetting of individual contractors before they begin work. Once in the

operational area, the APSC and their employees must also comply with HN licensing

requirements.

c. The JFC is concerned with legal requirements affecting APSCs to include

contractually and HN imposed compliance with insurance, arms, vehicles, coordination,

licensing, legal jurisdiction, and other obligations. Ideally, the JFC, COM and HN will

agree to a standardized set of requirements for the employment of contractors supporting

USG activities.

d. While contract requirements may set a high degree of professionalism, training,

and preparation for actual conditions in the operational area; legal issues regarding the

responsibility for actions by HN or TCN APSCs hired by US companies may be unclear.

For commanders dealing with US contracted APSCs, the best tool is a detailed contract

with specific requirements for preparation, training, operating, and coordination with the

joint force.

e. While the JFC seeks military style command and control over APSC activities in

the operational area, the various types of APSCs, and the specific legal relationships

among USG and non-USG agencies, their contractors and grantees make this impossible.

Control through contracted requirements, tasks, and obligations specified when hired

are much more direct and practical but is limited to contractors hired by the USG. The

ability to control APSCs from non-DOD organizations and agencies or other governments,

organizations, or commercial entities may not be possible. The JFC can try to establish a

level of cooperation for mutual advantage through the assurance of shared intelligence

and emergency aid in the form of a quick reaction force (QRF) to provide rescue or

security, logistical support, maintenance recovery, or medical evacuation. Establishing

an informal relationship with APSCs at the individual level remains an effective method of

gaining some measure of cooperation and coordination.

2. Host Nation Requirements

a. HN Governmental Agencies and the Joint Force. In cases where the HN

government retains significant governmental functions and capabilities, the joint force

B-2

Appendix B

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

coordinates operations with counterpart HN authorities. For some situations where the

HN is not currently functional, the joint force may be forced to assume certain quasi-

governmental functions, or assist in maintaining general order and security at some level.

While countries differ, the JFC must ensure DOD contracted APSCs conform to local laws

for legal contracts and proper documents for operating in the operational area. If the JFC

has control or significant influence on a HN counterpart, establishing favorable,

coordinated requirements for movement coordination and control of APSCs is the goal.

b. HN Licensing Requirements. Client organizations within a HN need to ensure

there is proper documentation from the government for the APSCs to operate. This may

include licensing from the MOI and other HN government agencies for weapons, vehicle,

tax, and import/export permits. Going through the procedure offers clients some measure

of assurance they actually hired a legitimately licensed company. Licensing also provides

the JFC with a method for reporting crimes or other misconduct to the appropriate

authorities. Within the JFC’s operational area, there should be an awareness of the

capability of the HN government to process requests quickly and fairly for operations.

An additional challenge that cannot be overlooked are visas and work permits for the

APSC’s individual employees. If a company provides documentation issued by the

proper authorities, there is some level of confidence in the APSC’s abilities to meet

contractual requirements.

c. Professional Standards and Behaviors

(1) Both the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and the

Montreux Document signatories have recommended a set of professional standards and

behaviors for APSCs. These recommendations are in reality goals for APSCs to meet,

there are no real enforcement mechanisms. Potential clients provide the means to enforce

an industry-wide set of standards or requirements by either incorporating the IPOA and

Montreux standards into their contracts and hiring companies who sign on; or by using

companies contracted by other organizations with high standards.

(2) For an APSC, or any other contract service company, the terms of the

contract establishes the requirements for complying with military orders, standards of

behavior, and any specific additional requirements imposed by directives, regulations,

and laws governing the operational area. The APSC has a professional and contractually

required duty to establish and maintain standards of conduct for their employees.

Standards of training, established by the JFC and included in the contract, must be

adhered to not only to comply with the contract but also to ensure the safety of the

individual contractors and joint force personnel. This includes a certain level of assurance

that individuals are qualified to carry weapons, understand the RUF, and are trained in

applicable laws or other agreements in the nation they operate in. The JFC has a continuous

requirement to monitor APSC activities and ensure that they are not counterproductive

to the USG mission.

d. Certification

(1) By adhering to standards of practice and training, clients of APSCs gain a

level of assurance about contract performance. Certification by an outside agency that

B-3

Armed Private Security Contractor Compliance With JFC and HN Requirements

represents the industry as a whole permits a client to have some minimal expectations of

the contractor’s professional standards. Adherence to outside high standards imposed

by other or previous clients also provides prior knowledge about the APSC and their

employees. Self-certification to a published standard, internal or external, remains an

option that may be all that is available. The DOS diplomatic security standards are as an

example of a high standard that the joint force can use to measure the performance of

particular companies and evaluate their relative reliability.

(2) In the opening stages of an operation, the JFC may be required to certify

companies for non-DOD agencies since access into the operational area will be limited.

As the situation matures, these agencies will contract for their own needs and use their

own standards. As the HN operates, or begins to operate again, their requirements for

employment and use of APSCs needs consideration. In some cases, the joint force will

work closely with its counterparts to guide the development and implementation of these

requirements, standards, and legal obligations.

e. Vetting

(1) Vetting armed security personnel remains difficult for APSCs and for USG

employers. Within the US, certain criminal convictions prevent citizens from possessing

weapons. These statutory limitations on employment apply to persons hired as APSCs;

even when those US citizens are employed to work outside US territory. Processing

individuals for hire requires screening individuals to meet these requirements. Assumed

names or counterfeit documents are also a problem, particularly when the individual

comes from a country with lax identity rules. Querying a common name through national

or international criminal databases, assuming the country has a criminal tracking system,

may not produce usable returns.

(2) In countries without central registries or capabilities to accomplish

background checks, other methods must be used to produce required results. As an

example, establishing a required level of surety for particular job assignments may be

necessary to allow contracting through multiple layers of TCN or HN companies and

employees. Assisting companies with background checks in the operational area may

become necessary for the JFC to have some assurance of trustworthy personnel in

certain jobs. A risk assessment for particular positions, duties, or with physical proximity

to vital personnel or assets should guide the JFC and staff for the amount and type of

assistance offered or provided. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary to

preclude hiring TCNs from countries unable to perform an adequate background check.

B-4

Appendix B

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Intentionally Blank

C-1

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND CONTRACTOR

OPERATIONS CELL COORDINATION PROCEDURES

1. Contractor Operations Cell Tasks

a. CONOCs (Figure C-1) are established at the joint task force level and at the major

subordinate commands (usually division headquarters). They are embedded with the

JOCs and have access to the full range of US military communications systems.

b. When sufficiently manned and equipped, a CONOC can coordinate APSC activities

and perform the following tasks:

(1) Receive movement requests from APSCs and disseminate to subordinate

battlespace owners for approval/disapproval. Provide positive confirmation of mission

approval/disapproval to the higher headquarters and the APSC.

(2) Maintain situational awareness of APSCs operating and moving within the

operational area, including tracking APSCs entering, transiting, and departing the assigned

area.

(3) Facilitate QRF/MEDEVAC support upon request by APSC TOC, logistics

movement coordination center (LMCC) or Commercial Movement Division (CMD), or

AMEMB, or other TOC. After receiving an incident alert from an APSC, confirm the alert

is real and not false with appropriate subordinate unit or APSC involved. In Iraq, the

LMCC is now called the Commercial Movement Division (CMD).

(4) Report APSC SIRs and all other activities in accordance with current

reporting standards.

(5) Collect and develop reports and products pertaining to APSC operations

as required in orders or SOPs.

(6) Coordinate with staff to maintain awareness of threat information and

military activities affecting APSCs and convoys within the area of operations. When

appropriate, disseminate information or direct mission cancellation to APSCs, USG agency’s

TOC, and LMCC in order to prevent incidents.

(7) Serve as the local SME for military units on capabilities; limitations;

requirements; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for APSCs.

(8) Monitor and provide ground QRF and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)

support to all APSCs, as available or required, during an incident requiring military support.

(9) Be prepared to coordinate directly with the AMEMB TOC on DOS armed

private security detachment (APSD) movements and provide recommendations regarding

movement adjustments or cancellation based on the threat levels along selected routes

C-2

Appendix C

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

or disposition of friendly forces. Per the MOA between DOD and DOS: the RSO LNO is

responsible for the real-time monitoring of all AMEMB Baghdad and USF-I PSD

movements throughout Iraq using shared electronic systems data and linked Command

Post of the Future (CPOF) terminals.

(10) Be prepared to coordinate directly with the AMEMB TOC to provide

QRF; MEDEVAC; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support for approved

AMEMB movements transiting or operating within the operational area.

(11) Be prepared to assist in coordinating investigations and visits to the

scene of a serious incident in order to facilitate a proper investigation.

2. J-3 Management Responsibilities

a. Coordinate military support as available with the appropriate division after

receiving an incident alert and required information from the AMEMB or non-DOD agency

TOC, LMCC, or APSC element involved in the incident.

Figure C-1. Contractor Operations Cell Task Organization

EMBASSY

RSO LNO

JTF JOC

CHOPS

JTF CONOC

Directorate

Director

Deputy Director

CONTRACTING

OFFICER's

REPRESENTATIVE

DIVISION

CHOPS

DIVISION

CHOPS

DIVISION

CHOPS

CONTRACTOR OPERATIONS CELL TASK ORGANIZATION

JTF JOC

CONOC

DIVI SION

CONOC

DIVISION

CONOC

Cell Chief

Asst Cell Chief

3 x Ops Offrs

3 x Asst Ops Offrs

Cell Chief

Asst Cell Chief

3 x Ops Offrs

4 x Asst Ops Offrs

Cell Chief

Asst Cell Chief

3 x Ops Offrs

3 x Asst Ops Offrs

Cell Chief

Asst Cell Chief

3 x Ops Offrs

4 x As st O ps O ffrs

Asst assistant

CHOPS chief, operations

CONOC contractor operations cell

JOC joint operations center

JTF joint task force

LNO liaison officer

OPS operations

OFFRS officers

RSO regional security office

DIVISION

CONOC

C-3

USCENTCOM Contractor Operations Cell Coordination Procedures

b. In accordance with SOPs, collect and forward reports and products pertaining to

APSC operations to the multinational force office dealing with armed contractors. Maintain

a process for collecting statistics on APSC operations and incident types.

c. Coordinate and assist AMEMB representative personnel to revisit the scene of

a serious incident in order for them to conduct an investigation and interview witnesses.

d. Limit distribution of COM personnel movements, or other movements as

designated by AMEMB, to only US personnel with a need to know, and coordinate with

AMEMB TOC to ensure such information is compartmentalized.

e. Review all DOS PSD movements and provide recommendations to the RSO TOC

regarding movement alterations or cancellations based on the threat levels along selected

routes or disposition of coalition forces.

f. Review all DOD PSD movements and direct cancellation or alteration based on

the threat levels along selected routes or disposition of coalition forces.

g. Coordinate with LMCC to receive their logistics movement notifications in order

to process through the appropriate operational area owner.

h. Provide necessary support for liaison officers from agencies or units in the JOC.

i. Identify reporting requirements during battle drills and shift change briefs.

APSC Team Secures the Immediate Area while Transporting USAID Staff

C-4

Appendix C

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

j. Provide a representative to attend the joint incident review board (JIRB) to provide

input regarding APSC incidents.

k. Ensure the necessary automation and communications equipment (excluding

equipment that must be supplied by the contractors, if they are present) is available and

operational. Note: The communications array deployed by APSC’s is usually dictated by

the contract. At a minimum, each APSC convoy should have:

(1) Two satellite transponders on separate vehicles with a refresh rate of four

minutes or less;

(2) Two commercial satellite phones;

(3) Two very high frequency (VHF) radios per convoy with a minimum range

of 3000m, compatible with single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS);

and

(4) Commercial cellular phones.

3. Armed Private Security Contractor Convoy Operations

a. A CONOC coordinates and submits, as appropriate, APSC convoy movement

requests through the designated operations center and cells within specified time limits

prior to movement. APSCs associated with non-DOD USG agencies or the LMCC should

utilize existing movement request procedures for those organizations. In Iraq, the AMEMB

requires all APSCs conducting personal security missions to coordinate their movements

with either the RSO’s TOC or the CONOC In all cases, APSC’s must have a movement

plan that is approved by the RSO. Non-USG APSCs are encouraged to coordinate convoys

with the CONOC. The CONOC can establish a web page that can be used to submit

movement requests, FRAGORDS, and spot reports. Figure C-2 provides an overview of

CONOC-managed processes and procedures for movement requests.

b. Listed below are specific CONOC functions and processes involved in convoy

management:

(1) With the submission of a movement request form to an operations center,

an APSC (DOD or non-DOD-contracted) implicitly agrees to abide by the rules and

guidance established in policies, directives, or orders issued by the JFC. This includes

providing all required reports and SIRs. Subordinate units will provide QRF and MEDEVAC

support, as available, to participating APSCs.

(2) APSCs will contact their respective operations center(s) at requested

movement start time for final coordination and at movement end time. Other APSCs

should report to their controlling organization.

(3) For reportable incidents, i.e. the discharge of weapons, etc., contact the

operations center with responsibility for the area in which operating and submit the

report in accordance with established procedure, format, detail, and timelines. Reportable

C-5

USCENTCOM Contractor Operations Cell Coordination Procedures

incidents during convoy operations should be reported to the LMCC. For example, initial

reports should be submitted within four hours with interim reports, as required, and final

reports within 96 hours. Figure C-3 summarizes the SIR process in Iraq. Figure C-4

provides a format for a SIR.

(Note: In May 2008, AMEMB Baghdad issued a set of policy directives that provided guidelines

applicable to all APSCs operating in Iraq under either a contract or subcontract with any

federal agency under COM authority. Although these new policy directives were considered

to be aligned for the most part with the guidance contained in the US Forces-Iraq operational

orders, they contained a few key differences. One, specified in the policy directives, required

APSCs to start reporting serious incidents directly to both CONOC and RSO/TOC, rather

than only to CONOC as previously required under the US Force’s reporting procedures.

However, subsequent audits of these procedures discovered that they were not being

adequately supervised by the responsible USG agencies and incidents were not being reported.)

(4) APSC movement itineraries should adhere to the established request format

and indicate the route for each movement leg. Convoy movement itineraries will adhere

to the LMCC request format. Multi-day movement requests must indicate the individual

daily movement leg(s) and overnight location(s). When stating routes, use the joint

force convention such as the route name only.

Figure C-2. Mission Request Form Submission Process

PSC submits movement

request form (MRF) on

CONOC Web site

JTF JOC CONOC confirms

receipt of movement request

JTF JOC CONOC reviews

request and forwards to

respective Division CONOC

Division CONOC coordinates

with Division Operations

Center to obtain battlespace

approval / disapproval

Division CONOC informs JTF

JOC CONOC of request

status

Response

Division CONOC notifies

PSC, with approval /

disapprova l.

Reques t

Recommended Disapproval Criteria

1. Conflicts with mi litary operations

2. Requested route is closed.

3. Current intelligence and trend analysis

makes movement unsafe

MISSION REQUEST FORM SUBMISSION PROCESS

CPOF

GDMS

BCS3

NIPR SIPRSKYPE

CONOC Communications Systems

Submit Approve ConfirmNoti f y

-72 hrs -48 hrs -24 hrs 0 hrs

1 4

BCS3 battle command sustainment support system

CONOC contractor operations cell

CPOF command post of the future

GDMS gl obal dist ribut ion ma nage ment sys tem

JOC joint operations center

JTF joint task force

NIPR Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router

PSC private secur ity company

SIPR Secure Internet Protocol Router

C-6

Appendix C

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Figure C-3. Serious Incident Reporting Process Used in Iraq

Immediate notification (verbal

or via e-mail) made at earliest

opportunity after incident.

Personal Security Company

(PSC) sends initial written

incident report within 4 hours

after incident.

PSC sends final incident report

within 96 hours following

incident.

Report via the RSO

Liaison Officer assigned

to CONOC HQ

Others

Needed

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTING PROCESS USED IN IRAQ

Serious

Incident

Notification

RSO/TOC

(U.S. Embassy

Regional Security

Office’s Tactical

Operations Center)

CONOC

(Contractor

Operations Cell)

ACOD

(Armed Contractor

Oversight Division)

C-7

USCENTCOM Contractor Operations Cell Coordination Procedures

FROM:

TO:

DATE TIME GROUP (DTG):

REPORT NUMBER:

SUBJECT: (U) (PSC Company Name)(Type of Incident) REPORT

Highlight/Bold APPROPRIATE REPORT DESIGNATION: FIRST – INTERIM -

FINAL

1. WHO (was involved)? Include PSC Name, Movement Notification Form #, and

any coalition forces involved. Also, include name of USG Agency, contractor for

which the PSC provides security.

2. WHAT HAPPENED? Include small arms fire, IED, indirect fire, PSC weapons

discharges, traffic accidents, RUF and graduated force response incidents.

3. WHERE IT HAPPENED? (Grids, place, description)

4. WHEN DID IT HAPPEN? (Date Time Group)

5. IMPACT ON OPERATIONS? Route closures, infrastructure damage and

casualties.

6. OTHER (Information relevant to incident or considered valuable during mission)

7. ACTIONS REQUIRED (List any actions that are required, who should take the

action, and what you are doing about it).

8. NAME OF PERSON TAKING REPORT.

9. SPONSORING AGENCY, CONTRACT NUMBER, NAME OF COR.

10. CONTACT INFORMATION OF PERSON TAKING REPORT

(Email and phone #).

Figure C-4. Serious Incident Report Format

C-8

Appendix C

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Intentionally Blank

D-1

APPENDIX D

COMMON MILITARY STAFF TASKS WHEN EMPLOYING

ARMED PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

1. Common Requirements Concerning APSC Monitoring

a. The JFC will maintain a designated cell, watch duty officer, or other structure at

its operations center and designated subordinate units to monitor APSC operations and

movements. The designated cell may use contracted personnel to coordinate and control

APSCs in the operational are. The designated cell will report directly to the JOC CHOPS.

DOD-contracted APSCs will be required to request permission to conduct operations

within the operational area. Mission requests will be approved at subordinate units or

multinational forces (referred to as “Divisions”) by the appropriate area commander.

APSC incident management will be controlled by a designated officer and coordinated

through the appropriate division and by CONOC, AMEMB or USG agency, and APSC

(company TOC), as required.

b. Designated subordinate unit headquarters retain authority to approve/disapprove

APSC movements. APSC missions should be disapproved according to criteria such as:

(1) APSC mission or timing would directly interfere with a military operation.

(2) Intelligence and trend analysis indicates APSC mission, area, or objectives

make the movement risky or otherwise unsafe.

(3) Route closure has or will occur before/during the APSC mission.

c. Following approval/disapproval, the subordinate headquarters will inform the

higher headquarters, APSC concerned, and CONOC of the final decision on the mission(s).

d. All changes to operations prior to APSC mission execution causing a disapproval

of a previously approved movement must be coordinated through the approval system in

order to alert the APSC(s) to reschedule the movement. All changes to APSC movements

inside the required time window must be coordinated through the system in order to alert

subordinate operations centers via their representatives.

e. All division level cells will be supervised by a military officer (or equivalent

civilian security specialist), who will provide contract performance input to the joint force

COR for contract management purposes. The officer will integrate the operations and

tracking processes in order to accomplish the tasks listed below. Divisions will provide

the military oversight officer’s name and contact information to the joint force COR when

required and upon change.

f. All MSCs initiating future contracts for APSCs will include mandatory contract

language required by law, DOD regulations, and the pertinent joint force directives.

D-2

Appendix D

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

2. Joint Staff Section Tasks

a. Intelligence Staff

(1) Be prepared to coordinate intelligence support for AMEMB movements in

coordination with divisions or multinational forces. Requests for support will be submitted

and processed through normal channels.

(2) Coordinate with the JOC officer for contractor operations in order to maintain

a process to receive spot reports and post-mission information from USG contracted

APSCs.

b. Operations Staff. Serves as overall lead agency for establishing military control

over APSCs operating in the operational area.

(1) Operations Integration Office. Provides military oversight for JOC officer

for contractor operations. Ensures it remains capable of controlling APSC movements

within the operational area. Coordinates military oversight at the divisions and

multinational forces.

(2) Current Operations Office

(a) Supervise operational performance of contractor oversight tasks.

(b) Screen for accuracy and disseminate movement requests to divisions

for APSC movement and operations approvals at the appropriate level.

(d) Be prepared to coordinate military support as available with

appropriate division after receiving an incident alert and required information from the

AMEMB or other USG agency TOC, CONOC, or APSC element involved in the incident.

(e) Receive and disseminate intelligence and threat information from

divisions to APSCs, AMEMB and other USG agency TOC(s), and CONOC as appropriate

in order to prevent incidents.

(f) Provide coordination of APSC movements via secure and non-secure

military and commercial voice, data, and chat communications systems. A commercial

chat system with both audio and text may be required in order to maintain communications

with APSC TOCs.

(g) In accordance with SOPs, collect and forward reports and products

pertaining to APSC operations to the multinational force office dealing with armed

contractors. Maintain a process for collecting statistics on PSC operations and incident

types.

D-3

Common Military Staff Tasks When Employing Armed Private Security Contractors

(h) Be prepared to coordinate and assist AMEMB representative

personnel to revisit the scene of a serious incident in order for them to conduct an

investigation and interview witnesses.

1. Submit initial or final “Shots Fired” SIR to appropriate AT/FP

office(s).

2. Limit distribution of COM personnel movements, or other

movements as designated by AMEMB, to only US personnel with a need to know, and

coordinate with AMEMB TOC to ensure such information is compartmentalized.

3. Review all DOS PSD movements and provide recommendations

to the RSO TOC regarding movement alterations or cancellations based on the threat

levels along selected routes or disposition of coalition forces.

4. Review all DOD PSD movements and direct cancellation or

alteration based on the threat levels along selected routes or disposition of coalition

forces.

5. Coordinate with CONOC to receive their logistics movement

notifications in order to process through the appropriate area commander.

6. Provide necessary support for liaison officers from agencies or

units in the JOC.

7. Continue to provide a liaison to the AMEMB TOC for

coordination concerning movements; QRF, MEDEVAC, or ISR support; and for convoy

reports.

8. Maintain two seats in the JOC for APSC watch officer personnel.

Identify reporting requirements for the joint force during battle drills and shift change

briefs.

9. Provide a representative to attend the quarterly JIRB in order to

provide the joint force’s input regarding PSC incidents.

10. Ensure the necessary automation and communications

equipment (excluding equipment that must be supplied by the contractors, if they are

present) is available and operational.

(i) Perform duties as the operations COR for assigned contractor

oversight.

1. In accordance with appropriate joint contracting command

guidelines, current operations office will appoint an officer to perform duties as the COR

for the contract/task order if contractor movement cell is a contracted function in the JOC.

The appointed COR shall hold a grade commensurate with the contract’s oversight

responsibilities and have the contract oversight function as a primary duty.

D-4

Appendix D

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

2. The COR will complete a training course found online at the

Defense Acquisition University website and provide the successful completion certificate

to the JCC representative. See appendix H, “References,” for the links to these course

materials.

3. Review and approve contractor requisitions and expenditures in

order to stay within the annual budget.

4. Submit funding request to the joint force finance office to maintain

the contractors and their system(s), if used.

5. Coordinate with division CORs and joint force CHOPS in order

to provide reports on contractor performance to the contract specialist representative

responsible for the contract/task order at the JCC.

6. Coordinate with contracted leadership to ensure either the

contractor director or deputy is present at all times.

(3) Operations AT/FP Office. Execute civilian arming program in accordance

with appropriate references, orders, or agreements.

(4) Operations Knowledge Management Office

(a) Maintain a capability to record DOS transponder alerts via repeat

function maintained by the GCCS server team in JOC.

(b) Maintain the division system integration in respective operations

centers.

c. Logistics Staff. For APSC operations, the logistics staff coordinates security

requirements for convoy movements. To support JFC management of APSCs, the logistics

staff monitors current and evolving theater logistic capabilities and advises the JFC/J-3

of the supportability of proposed operations or courses of action. It also acts as the

JFC’s agent and advocate to non-theater logistic organizations.

d. Communications and Computers Staff

(1) Coordinate with divisions to ensure continued operation of the commercial

Internet line into their respective operations centers for chat system text and audio

capability.

(2) Coordinate with operations centers for integration of required

communications requirement for APSCs.

e. SJA

(1) Identify legal issues that impact military operations.

D-5

Common Military Staff Tasks When Employing Armed Private Security Contractors

(2) Continue to identify a range of legal options intended to increase

accountability for PSC actions.

(3) As necessary, update RUF and law of war training packages for use in

required training of armed contractors, armed DOD civilians, and APSCs. These training

packages should include, at a minimum, the current RUF and the current graduated force

response procedures employed throughout the operational area. When updated,

disseminate these training packages to subordinate units.

(4) Coordinate with AT/FP for dissemination of the packages to APSCs.

(5) Coordinate with and support operations center as required during APSC

incident investigations.

(6) Be prepared to coordinate and assist AMEMB and other USG entities with

their distribution of timely and appropriate condolence payments.

(7) Maintain visibility on existing laws, policies, and FRAGORDs regarding

contractor operations in the operational area.

(8) In accordance with appropriate references, receive arming request packets

from AT/FP and provide a legal review of each packet within 48 hours. A preliminary legal

review may be provided if there are concerns or errors that require correction.

f. PMO. In accordance with appropriate references, ensure that all individuals

applying for arming authorization are not on the barred list for any base or installation in

the operational area.

D-6

Appendix D

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Intentionally Blank

E-1

APPENDIX E

STANDARD CONTRACT CLAUSES THAT APPLY TO ARMED

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

This appendix is an extract from the USCENTCOM TWISS II contract that specifically

addresses the arming of private security contractors, reporting of serious incidents, and

training in RUF/LOAC. While these provisions have been written for the Iraq Theater of

Operations, they serve as a good example of what might be found in a typical contract for

the employment of APSC personnel. The TWISS format presented below does not

conform to the format of appendices contained in this handbook.

Arming Requirements and Procedures for Private Security Company (PSC)

Contracts, Personal Security Detachment (PSD) Contracts, and for Requests for

Personal Protection in Iraq and Afghanistan (July 2008)

a. General. Contractor and its subcontractors at all tiers that require arming under

this contract agree to obey all laws, regulations, orders, and directives applicable to the

use of private security personnel in Iraq. US Forces-Iraq (USF-I) orders, instructions and

directives. Contractors will ensure that all employees, including employees at any tier of

subcontracting relationships, armed under the provisions of this contract, comply with

the contents of this clause and with the requirements set forth in the following:

(1) DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US

Armed Forces;

(2) DFARS 252.225-7040, Contractor Personnel Supporting a Force Deployed

Outside the United States, (MAR 2008);

(3) Class Deviation 2007-O0010, Contractor Personnel in the United States

Central Command Area of Responsibility;

(4) CPA Order #17, Registration Requirements for Private Security Companies,

dated 27 Jun 04; and

(5) USCENTCOM Policy Letter, Mod 1, Personal Protection and Contract

Security Service Arming, dated 7 Nov 2006.

b. Required Government Documentation. The unit requesting the contractor security

shall provide a description of the following to the arming approval authority and to the

contracting officer:

(1) The specific location where the PSC will operate;

(2) The persons and/or property that require protection;

(3) The anticipated threat;

(4) The required weapon types; and,

E-2

Appendix E

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

(5) The reason current security/police forces are inadequate.

c. Required Contractor Documentation. Contractors and their subcontractors at all

tiers that require arming approval shall provide the following to the contracting officer

representative (COR):

(1) Documentation that each employee who will be armed under the contract

received the following training:

(a) Weapons Qualification/Familiarization. All employees must meet the

qualification requirements established by any DOD or other US government agency.

(b) Law of armed conflict (LOAC);

Policy, dated 23 December 2005; and

(d) Distinction between the above-prescribed RUF and the rules of

engagement (ROE), which are applicable only to military forces.

(2) Completed DD Form 2760 (or equivalent documentation) for each armed

employee, indicating that the employee is not otherwise prohibited under US law from

possessing the required weapon or ammunition.

(3) One (1) copy of a business license from the Iraqi or Ministry of Trade or

Interior;

(4) One (1) copy of an operating license (or a temporary operating license)

from the Ministry of Interior.

(5) A communications plan that, at a minimum, sets forth the following:

(a) The contractor’s method of notifying military forces and requesting

assistance where hostilities arise or combat action is needed;

(b) How relevant threat information will be shared between contractor

security personnel and US military forces; and

military authorities.

(6) An acceptable plan for accomplishing background checks on all contractor

and subcontractor employees who will be armed under the contract. The contractor

shall, at a minimum, perform the following (which will be specifically addressed in its plan

and which will be documented and furnished to the COR upon completion):

(a) Use one or more of the following sources when conducting the

background checks: International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Federal

E-3

Standard Contract Clauses That Apply to Armed Private Security Contractors

Bureau of Investigation, country of origin criminal records, country of origin US Embassy

information request, and/or any other records available;

(b) Verify with USF-I or that no employee has been barred by any

commander within Iraq; and,

contract are not prohibited under US law from possessing a weapon or ammunition.

d. Required Contractor Acknowledgements. Contractors and their subcontractors

at all tiers that require arming approval will provide written acknowledgement of the

following to the COR:

(1) Penalties for Non-Compliance. Failure of contractor or subcontractor

employee(s) to comply with the laws, regulations, orders, and rules (including those

specified herein) governing the use of force may result in the revocation of weapons

authorization for such employee(s). Where appropriate, such failure may also result in

the total revocation of weapons authorization for the contractor (or subcontractor) and

sanctions under the contract, including termination.

(2) Criminal and Civil Liability. Arming of contractor or subcontractor

employees under this contract may subject the contractor, its subcontractors, and persons

employed by the same, to US and Host Nation prosecution and civil liability. “Host

Nation” refers to the nation or nations where services under this contract are performed.

(3) Lapses in Training. Failure to successfully retrain an employee who is

armed under this contract within twelve (12) months of the last training date will constitute

a lapse in the employee’s authorization to possess and carry the weapon. All unauthorized

employees will immediately surrender their weapon to the contractor and will remain

unarmed until such time as they are retrained and the COR determines that the retraining

is sufficient.

e. Authorized Weapon & Ammunition Types. Unless the DCDR [Deputy Commander]

USCENTCOM (or a designee) provides otherwise, all arming requests and authorizations

for contractor or subcontractor employees under this contract shall be limited to US

Government-approved weapons and ammunition. This restriction applies to all weapons

in the possession of contractor employees, even if such weapons are required for personal

protection. The following weapons and ammunition is currently authorized by the US

Government for use in Iraq and Afghanistan:

(1) The M9, M4, M16, or equivalent (e.g., .45 CAL, AK-47, PKM with 7.62

ammunition).

(2) The M9 or equivalent sidearm will be the standard personal protection

weapon unless other weapons are specifically requested and approved.

(3) US government Ball ammunition is the standard approved ammunition.

E-4

Appendix E

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

f. Requirements for Individual Weapons Possession. All employees of the contractor

and its subcontractors at all tiers who are armed under this contract must:

(1) Possess only those US Government-approved weapons and ammunition

for which they are qualified under the training requirements of section (c);

(2) Carry weapons only when on duty or at a specific post;

(3) Not conceal any weapons, unless specifically authorized;

(4) Carry proof of authorization to be armed. Employees not possessing such

proof will be deemed unauthorized and must surrender their weapon to their employer;

and

(5) IAW USCENTCOM General Order #1, consumption of alcohol in Iraq is

prohibited. In the event of a suspension or/and exception to G.O. #1, employees shall not

consume any alcoholic beverage while armed or within eight (8) hours of the next work

period where they will be armed.

g. Weapons/Equipment Restrictions and Responsibilities. Unless otherwise

provided, the US Government will not provide any weapons or ammunition to contractors,

their subcontractors, or any employees of the same. The contractor will provide all

weapons and ammunition to those employees that will be armed under the contract. The

contractor and its subcontractors at all tiers will also provide interceptor body armor,

ballistic helmets, and the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective masks to

those employees that require such equipment in the performance of their duties.

h. Rules for the Use of Force (RUF). In addition to the RUF and ROE training

referenced in paragraph (c), the contractor and its subcontractors at all tiers will monitor

and report all activities of its armed employees that may violate the RUF. Prompt reporting

demonstrates a desire by the contractor and its subcontractors to minimize the impact of

any violations and, therefore, will be given favorable consideration. Violations of the

RUF include, though are not limited to:

(1) Taking a direct part in hostilities or combat actions, other than to exercise

self-defense;

(2) Failing to cooperate with Coalition and host nation forces;

(3) Using deadly force, other than in self-defense where there is a reasonable

belief of imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm;

(4) Failing to use a graduated force approach;

(5) Failing to treat the local civilians with humanity or respect; and

(6) Detaining local civilians, other than in self-defense or as reflected in the

contract terms.

E-5

Standard Contract Clauses That Apply to Armed Private Security Contractors

i. Retention and Review of Records. The contractor and all subcontractors at all

tiers shall maintain records on weapons training, LOAC, RUF and the screening of

employees for at least six (6) months following the expiration (or termination) of the

contract. The contractor and its subcontractors at all tiers shall make these records

available to the contracting officer or designated representative, at no additional cost to

the government, within 72 hours of a request.

j. Contractor Vehicles. Vehicles used by contractor and subcontractor personnel

in the course of their security duties shall not be painted or marked to resemble US/

Coalition or host nation military and police force vehicles.

k. Quarterly Reporting. The prime contractor will report quarterly (i.e., NLT 1

January, 1 April, 1 July and 1 October for each quarter of the calendar year) to the contracting

officer responsible for this contract, and any other organization designated by the

contracting officer, the following information under this contract:

(1) The total number of armed civilians and contractors;

(2) The names and contact information of its subcontractors at all tiers; and

(3) A general assessment of the threat conditions, adequacy of force numbers,

and any problems that might require a change to force levels. Note: this information is in

addition to the information the contractor promises to immediately provide under the

communications plan referenced at paragraph (c)(5).

l. Armed Personnel – Incident Reports. All Contractors and subcontractors in the

USF-I theater of operations shall comply with and shall ensure that their personnel

supporting USF-I forces are familiar with and comply with all applicable orders, directives,

and instructions issued by the USF-I Commander relating to force protection and safety.

(1) Contractors shall provide an initial report of all weapons firing incidents to

the CONOC as soon as practical based upon the situation and shall submit a written

report to a CONOC within 48 hours. The initial report will include the name of the

company, where the incident occurred, time when the incident occurred, a brief description

of the events leading up to the incident, and a point of contact for the company. A follow-

up, comprehensive written report of events surrounding the firing of weapons will be

provided to the CONOC within 96 hours. Reports shall be submitted to the CONOC (or as

otherwise directed).

(2) Contractors will also provide first aid and request MEDEVAC of injured

persons, and remain available for Coalition response forces based upon the situation. In

the event contractor personnel are detained by US or Coalition Forces, prolonged

detention due to lack of proper identification can be alleviated by contractor personnel

possessing on their person information that includes the contractors name, the contract

number, a POC in the contractor’s management team, and the phone number of the CONOC

operations desk.

m. LOAC and RUF. The contractor’s personnel will be trained regarding LOAC and

RUF as specified by the contracting officer representative or designated representative

E-6

Appendix E

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

for Iraq in accordance with country specific guidelines and/or laws. The contractor will

obtain a signed written acknowledgement from each of their employees authorized to

bear weapons that they have been briefed on LOAC, RUF and the differences between

ROE and RUF, namely that RUF controls the use of weapons by contractors employed by

the United States Government and that the contractor may NOT use ROE at any time for

use of force decisions. LOAC and RUF training will be documented as specified by the

Contracting Officer or designated representative. The contractor shall brief RUF to all

shift employees at every shift and shall provide refresher LOAC training to its employees

every six months. In particular, LOAC training will include restrictions on firing on

persons who have surrendered or are out of combat due to wounds/injuries. It also will

discuss the requirement to render first aid to the best of the contractor’s ability and

contact medical response units to obtain medical care for wounded, safety permitting.

The contractor shall train contractor employees on the requirement to report all escalation

of force incidents pursuant to current USF-I orders, presently MNF-I FRAGORD M08-

641. The contractor shall train all employees under this contract that they must comply

with the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

War, August 12, 1949. A copy of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of

Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949 must be given to all employees authorized to carry

weapons on this contract at any tier.

F-1

APPENDIX F

EXAMPLE MILITARY EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

ACT JURISDICTION DETERMINATION CHECKLIST

Figure F-1 below provides the “Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Determination

Checklist” used by USCENTCOM.

Figure F-1. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Jurisdiction

Determination Checklist

F-2

Appendix F

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Figure F-1. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Jurisdiction

Determination Checklist (Cont.)

G-1

APPENDIX G

REFERENCES

1. US Government Documents

a. John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, 109th Congress, 2d Session. S.2766, 22

June 2006, Section 552, “Clarification of Application of Uniform Code of Military Justice

During a Time of War.” Paragraph (10) of section 802(a) of title 10, United States Code

(article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended by striking ‘war’ and

inserting ‘declared war or a contingency operation.’

b. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Congress, 28 January 2008:

(1) Section 862: Contractors performing private security functions in areas of

combat operations. Directs the Secretaries of Defense and State to write regulations to

vehicles. It includes methods for reporting and investigating incidents, personnel

qualifications, and other guidance for combatant commanders.

(2) Section 862(a)(2): Establishes the process for authorizing and accounting

the weapons carried by, or available to, APSCs in an area of combat operations.

(3) Section 862(a)(2)(E)(ii): Outlines the process for an independent review

and investigation of incidents of alleged misconduct by APSCs in an area of combat

operations.

(4) Section 862(b): Directs revision of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41

USC. 421) with specific contract clauses concerning selection, training, equipping, and

conduct of APSC under contract to the USG.

c. Duncan Hunter NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law 110-417, 14 October 2008.

Section 832 directs the military to retain functions and missions where combat would

occur and US forces would be fired on first. This section requires that sufficient trained

personnel from the military perform these tasks. In Section 854, the Congress directs all

USG organizations employing contractors to add language to contracts concerning the

reporting of offenses and providing protection to witnesses and victims.

d. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Public Law 106-523, 106th

Congress, 22 November 2000.

e. Title 18, USC, Section 3261, “Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000,”

Washington, DC, 2008. This document describes the US law and jurisdictional authority

for prosecuting US citizens who perform illegal acts in a foreign country that would have

a sentence of at least one year, if convicted in the United States.

f. Uniform Code of Military Justice as expanded by the National Defense

Authorization Act of 2007, Washington, DC, 2007.

G-2

Appendix G

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

g. Congressional Research Service, “Report to Congress, Private Security

Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues,” 25 August 2008.

h. Congressional Research Service, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private

Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis and Options for

Congress,” 29 September 2009.

2. Department of Defense Issuances

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of

Force for US Forces, 15 January 2009.

b. DOD and DOS “Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Between the Department of

Defense and the Department of State on USG Private Security Contractors,” Washington,

DC, 5 December 2007. This memorandum of agreement defines the mutual relationship

between DOD and DOS on the development of accountability and operations of US

employed APSCs operating in Iraq. Exact procedures are to be developed in the theater

for management, coordination, legal authority and investigation of PSC actions.

c. DODI 1100.22, Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix, with Change 1, 6 April

2007. This instruction provides guidance for determining the correct mix of military and

civilian personnel to private sector personnel to support the required mission. Laws,

policies, and other regulations of the US government are to be taken into consideration in

the calculation, however, this applies only to DOD forces.

d. DODI 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards, 2 October 2006. This

instruction updates and defines the standards in the areas of risk management, planning,

training exercises, resourcing, and program review for an AT program in DOD. The

standards are set to provide protection for all DOD personnel, their families, DOD

information, and facilities from acts of terrorism.

e. DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed

Forces, USD(AT&L),Washington, DC, 30 October 2005.

f. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency

Operations, 2009.

g. DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or

Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members,

and Former Service Members, 3 March 2005. This document is a prime source of

instructions and responsibilities for US commanders concerning civilians with their forces

outside the United States. The jurisdiction over civilians is expressly given since legal

jurisdiction of the nation ends at the national borders. DODI 5525.11 provides a means of

legally prosecuting crimes outside the borders by citizens who are not covered by another

nation’s laws or takes place on a US installation in another country.

h. “Business Rules for the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker,”

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics & Material Readiness, Washington, DC,

2009, 2Q.

G-3

References

i. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS 225.7401), “Contracts

Requiring Performance or Delivery in a Foreign Country,” Washington, DC, 15 January

2009. This regulatory supplement provides additional instructions to the military

concerning contractors authorized to accompany US military forces outside the US on

various missions. The amount and level of support, along with required training of the

contractors for a theater, is detailed for the military services. Included in every security

contract, is the clause: “The process for arming contractors is regulated by the Defense

Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), specifically DFARS 252.225.7040,

and DODI 3020.41.”

3. Joint Publications

a. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 8 July 2008.

b. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, 17 October 2008.

4. Other

a. Dickinson, L.A., “Accountability of Private Security Contractors under

International and Domestic Law,” The American Society of International Law, Washington,

DC, 2007, retrieved 10 July 2009.

b. “The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and

Training of Mercenaries,” UN General Assembly Resolution 34, 44th Session, Supp. No.

43 at 590, UN Doc. A/44/43, 29 I.L.M. 91, New York, NY, 4 December 1989, retrieved 26

March 2009.

c. Montreux Document (Montreux). The Montreux document provides pertinent

international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of

private military and security companies during armed conflict. United Nations; Geneva,

Switzerland, A/6 467-S/2008/636.

d. “Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate Performance Work Statement,”

Combined Joint Task Force-Afghanistan, 22 November 2008.

e. COR training courses:

(1) Defense Acquisition University: http://icatalog.dau.mil/

icatalog_home.aspx.

(2) Army Logistics Management College: http://www.almc.army.mil/HSV/

hsv.htm.

G-4

Appendix G

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Intentionally Blank

GL-1

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACOB armed contractor oversight branch

ACOD armed contractor oversight division

AMEMB American Embassy

AOR area of responsibility

APSC armed private security contractor

AT/FP anti-terrorism/force protection

BCS3 battle command sustainment support system

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs

CAAF contractors authorized to accompany the force

CCDR combatant commander

CHOPS chief of operations

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CMP contractor management plan

COM Chief of Mission

CONOC contractor operations center

CONOPS concept of operations

COR contracting officer representative

CMOC civil military operations center

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CPOF command post of the future

CSIP contractor support integration plan

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Register Supplement

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense Directive

DODI Department of Defense Instruction

DOJ Department of Justice

DOS Department of State

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulations

FP force protection

FRAGORD fragmentary order

FY fiscal year

GCC geographic combatant commander

GCCS Global Command and Control System

GDMS global distribution management system

GFE government furnished equipment

GoI Government of Iraq

GL-2

Glossary

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

HN host nation

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IGO intergovernmental organization

INTERPOL international criminal police organization

IPOA International Peace Operations Association

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JCASO joint contingency acquisition support office

JCC joint contracting command

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan

JFC joint force commander

JIRB joint incident review board

JOC joint operations center

JOCSP joint operational contract support planner

JP joint publication

KO contracting officer

LOA letter of authorization

LOAC law of armed conflict

LMCC logistics movement control center

LNO liaison officer

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

MNC multinational corporation

MNC-I Multi-National Corps – Iraq

MND multinational division

MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq

MOA memorandum of agreement

MOI ministry of the interior

MEJA Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act

MOU memorandum of understanding

MSC major subordinate command

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NGO nongovernmental organization

NIPR Non-secure Internet Protocol Router

OCS operational contract support

OFFRS officers

OGA other government agency

PA public affairs

POC point of contact

PoP period of performance

PMC private military company

PMO provost marshal office

GL-3

Glossary

PSC private security company

PSD personal security detachment

PWS performance work statement

QAR quality assurance representative

QASP quality assurance surveillance plans

QRF quick reaction force

ROE rules of engagement

RSOI reception, staging, onward-movement, and

integration

RSO regional security office

RUF rules for the use of force

SA stationing agreements

SIPR Secure Internet Protocol Router

SIR serious incident report

SJA staff judge advocate

SME subject matter expert

SMTJ Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction

SOFA status of forces agreement

SOP standing operating procedure

SPOT Synchronized Predeployment and Operational

Tracker

TCN third country national

TOC tactical operations center

TWISS Theater Wide Internal Security Services

(USCENTCOM)

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

UN United Nations

USAO US Attorney’s Office

USG United States Government

GL-4

Glossary

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

Intentionally Blank

GL-5

Glossary

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

armed contractor oversight branch (ACOB). An office created in Iraq, and subsequently

Afghanistan, to assist the military in policy, tracking the movements, and other issues

concerning APSCs. Oversees the contractor operations cell (CONOC) and acts as the

link to the military chain of command for policy, problem solving, and support. Formerly

known as the Armed Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD).

armed private security contractor (APSC). Same as private security company (PSC)

personnel (DOD). Any individual performing private security functions under a covered

contract.

contracting officer. The Service member or Department of Defense civilian with the legal

authority to enter into, administer, modify, and/or terminate contracts.

contracting officer representative (COR). A Service member or Department of Defense

civilian appointed in writing and trained by a contracting officer, responsible for

monitoring contract performance and performing other duties specified by their

appointment letter.

contractor operations cell (CONOC). The staff located within the overall structure of

the joint operations center(s) in Iraq, and subsequently Afghanistan, to receive APSC

movement requests, coordinate them with subordinate military units, relay approval or

disapproval, track the movement when it occurs, take reports on incidents, coordinate

assistance if there is an incident, and close out the movement on completion.

covered contract. A DOD contract for performance of services in an area of contingency

operations or a contract of a non-DOD Federal agency for performance of services in

an area of combat operations, as designated by the Secretary of Defense; a subcontract

at any tier under such a contract; or a task order or delivery order issued under such a

contract or subcontract. Also includes a grant (including a contract under a grant, or a

sub-grant or subcontract at any tier) from a federal agency for performance in an area

of combat operations as designated by the Secretary of Defense.

fragmentary order (FRAGORD). A military set of instructions that provide partial

information as updates to past instructions, changes to past instructions, or as

preparation for a future full set of instructions. Sometimes pertinent information that

has not changed from previous orders is included. Generally these are brief and of

immediate concern to the receivers.

letter of authorization (LOA). A document issued by the procuring contracting officer or

designee that authorizes contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force to

travel to, from, and within the operational area; and outlines Government-furnished

support authorizations within the operational area, as agreed to under the terms and

conditions of the contract.

private security company (PSC). During contingency operations, “PSC” means a company

employed by the Department of Defense, performing private security functions under

GL-6

Glossary

Armed Private Security Contractors in Contingency Operations

a covered contract. In a designated area of combat operations, the term “PSC” expands

to include all companies employed by US Government agencies performing private

security functions under a covered contract (DOD). [In common usage, the terms PSC,

Private Military Company (PMC), and Private Military and Security Company (PMSC)

are used interchangeably even though they are different.] A private commercial business

which has been registered, licensed, and authorized to operate in a country seeking

commercial success through providing various armed security services to individuals,

businesses, and other organizations. In the broadest sense, these companies may also

provide training, advising, or operational forces to clients.

private security company personnel. Same as an armed private security contractor

personnel. Any individual performing private security functions under a covered

contract.

rules of engagement (ROE). A set of orders for military units and/or individual soldiers

for initiating, concluding, or ending a combat engagement with other forces or individuals

encountered. They cover general and specific situations; how, when, and where force

may be used to accomplish a task, and permissions concerning individual actions.

Restrictions to the inherent right of self-defense are also detailed.

rules for the use of force (RUF). A set of instructions to non-military security forces or

civilians accompanying military forces concerning the use of force for self-defense,

defense of other persons, or to defend specific locations. Generally there are a set of

rules concerning a graduated response to hostile actions, but also concerns interactions

with civilians, possession and use of weapons, and any legal concerns for detaining

those engaged in illegal actions.

serious incident report (SIR). A formatted message containing immediate, critical

information on a designated event a higher headquarters has marked as important to

decision makers. There may be several of these sent as a notification followed by

additional information as it becomes known.

State Department Directives. A similar method to the FRAGORD of instructions to

contractors and others used by the DOS. Provides instructions for current or future

requirements for DOS employees and contractors.

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Authority. The body of law governing military

criminal offenses. Specific to APSCs, only commanding officers and, in certain cases,

commissioned officers have authority to order the arrest or confinement of members of

the US Armed Forces or civilians accompanying armed forces in the field during a

declared war who have violated the UCMJ.

Developed Jointly

by the

Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate

and

Doctrine and Education Group, Joint Warfighting Center

United States Joint Forces Command

UNITED STATES

JOINT FORCES

COMMAND