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OECD Public Governance Reviews
Financing Democracy
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE
OECD Public Governance Reviews
Financing Democracy
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE
Contents
Part I. Funding of political parties and election campaigns, risks of policy capture and policy options
Chapter 1. Addressing the risks of policy capture
Chapter 2. Promoting a level playing field through balanced funding
Chapter 3. Increasing transparency and accountability through disclosure of political party
and election-campaign funding
Chapter 4. Fostering a culture of integrity among political parties, public officials and donors
Chapter 5. Ensuring compliance with political finance regulations
Part II. Country case studies
Chapter 6. Canada
Chapter 7. Chile
Chapter 8. Estonia
Chapter 9. France
Chapter 10. Korea
Chapter 11. Mexico
Chapter 12. United Kingdom
Chapter 13. Brazil
Chapter 14. India
ISBN 978-92-64-24944-8
42 2015 26 1 P
Financing DemocracyOECD Public Governance Reviews
OECD Public Governance Reviews
Financing Democracy
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES
AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE
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OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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FOREWORD – 3
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Foreword
Understanding and addressing the role of money and its influence in politics can no
longer be a taboo subject. When public policy making is captured by private interests, the
“rules of the game” for markets and opportunities may be bent to favour the few and
violate the interest of the many. The consequences include the erosion of democratic
governance, social cohesion, and equal opportunities for all, as well as the decline of trust
in democracy itself. The laborious recovery from the financial crisis, together with the
widening income gaps between rich and poor, heighten the risk of policy capture while
testing the ability of governments to develop and deliver policies and programmes that
benefit all citizens.
It is not enough to put in place policies to promote growth. Governments are expected
to ensure that the benefits of such growth are shared more evenly across society. The
design and implementation of structural reforms to create conditions for economic
recovery and sustain inclusive growth require a high-quality policy-making process that
citizens can trust.
This report takes a comparative approach to examining how the funding of political
parties and election campaigns has evolved, and how political finance regulations across
OECD member and partner countries have been established. In particular, the report
assesses the risks of policy capture through the funding of political parties and electoral
campaigns, identifies regulatory loopholes and implementation gaps in existing policies,
and suggests a comprehensive approach to integrity, including issues such as lobbying
and conflict of interest. One clear-cut lesson from this study is that ensuring the effective
implementation of political finance regulations still remains challenging in many
countries.
The Framework on Financing Democracy presented in this report is intended to
shape the global debate on risks and policy options, and provides tangible advice for the
funding of political parties and electoral campaigns. Efficient oversight and auditing,
meaningful sanctions, greater transparency and public scrutiny play a major role in
averting policy capture. In this regard, independent electoral management bodies are
becoming increasingly important. Such bodies currently exist in less than one-third of
OECD countries, and there is no one-size-fits-all model. But whatever the structure, the
institutions responsible for enforcing political finance regulations should have a clear
mandate, legal power and the capacity to conduct effective oversight and impose
sanctions.
4 – FOREWORD
This report is part of the policy toolkit being developed by the OECD Public
Governance Committee and contributes to the OECD agenda on inclusive growth and
trust. In democracies, public policy should never be for sale to the highest bidder. Better
policy making is a shared responsibility of governments, businesses and citizens. The
OECD brings together a wide range of stakeholders to make financing democracy a
subject of evidence, data, and good practices across countries.
Angel Gurría
OECD Secretary-General
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS – 5
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Acknowledgements
This report was prepared by the Public Sector Integrity Division of the Directorate for
Public Governance and Territorial Development.
Under the guidance of Janos Bertok, the co-ordination and drafting of this report was
led by Yukihiko Hamada. Invaluable input and guidance were provided by Julio Bacio
Terracino. The preliminary draft report was prepared by Emma Cantera and
Ulrika Bonnier. Data cleaning and follow-up were carried out by Chad Burbank. Editorial
and administrative assistance was provided by Thibaut Gigou, Julie Harris,
Anaísa Goncalves and Anastasia Slojneva.
Special thanks go to the experts who drafted the country chapters, namely: Stephane
Perrault, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Regulatory Affairs, Elections Canada;
Pamela Figueroa Rubio, Chief of the Studies Division and Francisco Espinoza Rabanales,
Advisor of the Studies Division, Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency of Chile;
Vello Pettai, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Tartu, Member of Estonian
Party Funding Supervision Committee; Yves-Marie Doublet, Expert on Political Finance
Legislation for the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), Deputy Director of the
National Assembly of France; Heeman Koo, International Cooperation Division, National
Election Commission of the Republic of Korea; Raphael Riva-Palacio, Director of
International Cooperation and Liaison, National Election Institute of Mexico;
Rupert Grist, Regulatory Lawyer and Nick Wright, Senior Project Officer, United
Kingdom Electoral Commission; José Antonio Dias Toffoli, President of the Superior
Electoral Court of Brazil, Justice of the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil;
Shahabuddin Yaqoob Quraishi, Former Chief Election Commissioner of India.
Particular appreciation goes to all the speakers and participants who actively engaged
in the debates and exchanged views during the OECD Forum on Financing Democracy
and Averting Policy Capture, organised in co-operation with the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Organization of American States on
3-4 December 2014 in Paris, and the OECD Policy Forum on Restoring Trust in
Government: Addressing Money and Influence in Public Decision Making on
14-15 November 2013 in Paris.
The Public Governance Committee and the Working Party of Senior Public Integrity
Officials reviewed and approved the report in the autumn of 2015.
TABLE OF CONTENTS – 7
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Table of contents
Executive summary .............................................................................................................. 15
Regulating political finance to minimise risks .................................................................. 15
Loopholes and implementation gaps ................................................................................. 15
Political finance regulation as part of an overall integrity framework .............................. 16
The way forward ............................................................................................................... 17
Part I. Funding of political parties and election campaigns, risks of policy
capture and policy options ........................................................................................ 19
Chapter 1. Addressing the risks of policy capture .............................................................. 21
Money and influence are necessary components of democratic representation ................ 22
Risk of policy capture through political finance is still prevalent in OECD countries ..... 23
Assisting inclusive growth though averting policy capture ............................................... 24
Captured policies lead to low levels of trust in government, and the fairness of
decision making is being questioned ................................................................................. 25
Trust in public institutions is driven not only by the substance and outcomes of
policies, but also by the policy-making process ................................................................ 26
OECD Framework on Financing Democracy ................................................................... 27
Third-party campaigners and transnational private interests present risks to
levelling the playing field .................................................................................................. 27
Institutionalising an enabling environment for better transparency and public scrutiny ... 28
Promoting a holistic approach to avert policy capture by connecting surrounding
integrity measures with political finance ........................................................................... 28
Increasing importance of independent electoral management body for effective
oversight ............................................................................................................................ 29
Country case studies provide in-depth analysis of political finance regulation
and its challenges in different institutional settings ........................................................... 29
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 32
Chapter 2. Promoting a level playing field through balanced funding ............................. 35
Finding the right combination of policy measures is key to ensuring a level
playing field ....................................................................................................................... 36
The financing of political parties and election campaigns: Private or public funding? .... 37
Framing private funding to level the playing field ............................................................ 46
Spending limits for election campaigns: Promoting integrity and fairness or a
limitation of political expression? ..................................................................................... 53
Abuse of state resources presents a risk to the level playing field, but most
OECD countries limit privileged access to state resources by the incumbents ................. 59
Notes .................................................................................................................................. 62
References ......................................................................................................................... 63
8 – TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 3. Increasing transparency and accountability through disclosure of
political party and election-campaign funding ................................................ 65
Reporting requirements as a tool for ensuring accountability in the decision-making
process ............................................................................................................................... 66
Comprehensive disclosure of both public and private funding is crucial .......................... 66
Thorough auditing of political finance reports ensures transparency and
accountability .................................................................................................................... 67
Public availability of disclosures to enable public scrutiny .............................................. 70
References ......................................................................................................................... 76
Chapter 4. Fostering a culture of integrity among political parties, public officials
and donors ........................................................................................................... 79
Embedding political finance regulations in the overall integrity framework
addresses the risk of money in politics more effectively ................................................... 80
Codes of conduct can be seen as a commitment to integrity by political parties
and politicians, but the adoption of an enforceable code is still relatively limited
in OECD countries ............................................................................................................ 81
Mitigating risks such as conflict of interest and lobbying in relation to political
finance through proactive disclosure of related information is crucial ............................. 83
Over 60% of lobbyists support the disclosure of their contributions to political
campaigns .......................................................................................................................... 86
Whistleblower protection can strengthen a culture of integrity in relation to
political finance; countries are expected to consider introducing or strengthening
protection through dedicated legislation ........................................................................... 88
In addition to whistleblower protection, citizen complaint mechanisms can also
facilitate reporting of wrongdoing in political finance and safeguard public interest ....... 88
Private donors are also expected to share the responsibility of strengthening integrity .... 88
Self-regulation of lobbying is an encouraging sign, although its enforcement remains
challenging ........................................................................................................................ 91
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 93
Chapter 5. Ensuring compliance with political finance regulations ................................. 95
Countries should assure independent and efficient oversight over political finance ......... 96
How to ensure independence of oversight bodies poses a problem .................................. 97
Sufficient capacity and resources ensure the ability of electoral management bodies
to perform their tasks ......................................................................................................... 98
Clear mandate and sufficient power should be given to the electoral management
bodies............................................................................................................................... 100
Dissuasive and enforceable sanctions can deter breaches and promote compliance ....... 102
Education and training for political parties as a tool to promote compliance ................. 106
Appraising the system: Identifying evolving risks of policy capture and involving
stakeholders ..................................................................................................................... 107
References ....................................................................................................................... 108
TABLE OF CONTENTS – 9
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Part II. Country case studies .............................................................................................. 113
Chapter 6. Canada ............................................................................................................... 115
Overview of the mandate and political finance legislation
......................................... 116
Political finance rules
.................................................................................................... 117
Transparency and accountability
.................................................................................. 118
Compliance
..................................................................................................................... 119
Integrity
......................................................................................................................... 120
Challenges and risks ........................................................................................................ 121
Notes ................................................................................................................................ 122
Chapter 7. Chile ................................................................................................................... 123
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 124
Promoting a level playing field: Equity in political competition .................................... 127
Ensuring more transparency ............................................................................................ 128
Integrity ........................................................................................................................... 128
Control, enforcement and supervision ............................................................................. 129
Penalties as mechanisms to ensure effective compliance ................................................ 130
Concrete measures to respond to citizens and adopt international standards on
money and politics ........................................................................................................... 130
Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 131
Note ................................................................................................................................. 132
Chapter 8. Estonia ............................................................................................................... 135
Overall description .......................................................................................................... 136
Practical implementation of political finance regulations ............................................... 137
Challenges and risks ........................................................................................................ 144
Notes ................................................................................................................................ 145
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 146
Chapter 9. France ................................................................................................................ 147
Level playing field ........................................................................................................... 148
Transparency and accountability ..................................................................................... 150
Compliance and supervision............................................................................................ 152
Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 153
Notes ................................................................................................................................ 154
Chapter 10. Korea ............................................................................................................... 155
Definition and basic principle of political funds ............................................................. 156
Restrictions on political fundraising and contributions ................................................... 157
Restrictions and reimbursements of campaign fund expenses ........................................ 158
Contributions of political funds through the National Election Commission ................. 159
Public subsidies to political parties ................................................................................. 159
Tax benefits for political funds ........................................................................................ 160
Income and expenditure of political funds available to the public through
financial reports ............................................................................................................... 161
Investigation and enforcement of control over political funds ........................................ 161
10 – TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 11. Mexico .............................................................................................................. 163
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 164
Finance for political parties and candidates .................................................................... 164
Limits and restrictions ..................................................................................................... 168
Accountability and transparency ..................................................................................... 169
Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 171
Note ................................................................................................................................. 171
Chapter 12. United Kingdom .............................................................................................. 173
Legislative framework ..................................................................................................... 174
Practical implementation of political finance law ........................................................... 174
Challenges and risks ........................................................................................................ 181
Notes ................................................................................................................................ 182
Chapter 13. Brazil ................................................................................................................ 183
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 184
Applicable legislation – the main competencies and attributions of Brazilian
Electoral Courts in place to inspect, regulate and control party and electoral
funding mechanisms ........................................................................................................ 185
Transparency of parties’ and candidates’ accounts: On the requirement to render
accounts and sanctions in the event of failing to meet said requirement ......................... 192
Integrity in the political funding process; the support rendered to parties and
candidates, enabling them to comply with legal standards; and the bills drafted
to promote the reform of political funding ...................................................................... 192
Notes ................................................................................................................................ 195
Chapter 14. India ................................................................................................................. 197
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 198
Political finance and disclosure norms in India ............................................................... 198
Transparency and accountability ..................................................................................... 201
Integrity ........................................................................................................................... 204
Compliance and oversight ............................................................................................... 205
Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 206
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 207
Note ................................................................................................................................. 207
TABLE OF CONTENTS – 11
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Tables
Table 1.1. Framework on Financing Democracy: Supporting Better Public Policies
and Averting Policy Capture ...................................................................................... 30
Table 2.1. The balance between public and private funding to political parties in
selected OECD countries, 2012 .................................................................................. 38
Table 2.2. Eligibility criteria for direct public funding to political parties in
OECD countries .......................................................................................................... 40
Table 2.3. Allocation calculation of direct public funding to political parties in
OECD countries .......................................................................................................... 42
Table 2.4. Maximum donation ceilings for individuals in selected OECD countries ................. 47
Table 2.5. Bans on foreign donations to political parties in OECD countries ............................. 51
Table 2.6. Top 20 US campaign donations from foreign-owned firms in 2012 .......................... 53
Table 2.7. Spending limits for political parties and candidates in OECD countries .................... 56
Table 2.8. Examples of third-party campaigning regulations in selected OECD
countries ..................................................................................................................... 58
Table 3.1. Public disclosure of information in reports from political parties and/or
candidates in OECD countries .................................................................................... 71
Table 3.2. Examples of online availability of political finance information in
selected OECD countries ............................................................................................ 73
Table 4.1. Promoting a culture of integrity in the public sector: Key elements .......................... 81
Table 4.2. Actions taken after collecting the private information for public officials
in the executive branch in OECD countries .............................................................. 86
Table 5.1. The institutional capacity of electoral management bodies in selected
OECD countries .......................................................................................................... 99
Table 5.2. Variation of sanctions across selected OECD countries ........................................... 104
Table 8.1. Personal campaign expenses incurred by candidates on party lists and by
independent candidates, 2015 Riigikogu elections, Estonia ..................................... 139
Table 8.2. Expenditures on political activities by the four parliamentary parties in
Estonia, 2014-15 ....................................................................................................... 140
Table 8.3. Categories of information to be provided within party finance reports,
Estonia ...................................................................................................................... 140
Table 11.1. Public finance at federal level for Mexican political parties in 2015 ....................... 166
Table 13.1. Percentage share of donations made in Brazilian municipal elections,
2004-12 .................................................................................................................... 188
Table 13.2. Percentage share of donations made in Brazillian general elections,
2006-14 ..................................................................................................................... 188
Table 13.3. Political party spending during the Brazilian presidential elections,
2002-14 ..................................................................................................................... 190
Table 14.1. Electoral expenditures, by category and party, in the 2014 Indian
general elections ....................................................................................................... 200
Table 14.2. Donations received in excess of EUR 280 by political parties in India,
2010-14 ..................................................................................................................... 200
12 – TABLE OF CONTENTS
Figures
Figure 1.1. Trust in government and political parties in 23 European OECD
countries, 2014 ........................................................................................................... 26
Figure 2.1. Expenditures during the 2010 parliamentary general election in the
United Kingdom ......................................................................................................... 36
Figure 2.2. Expenditures during the 2013 Upper House election in Japan ................................... 37
Figure 2.3. Direct public funding to political parties in OECD countries ..................................... 39
Figure 2.4. Most common types of indirect public funding in OECD countries .......................... 44
Figure 2.5. Free or subsidised access to media for political parties and for candidates
in OECD countries ..................................................................................................... 45
Figure 2.6. Types of banned private contributions in OECD countries ........................................ 46
Figure 2.7. Ban on anonymous donations to political parties in OECD countries ........................ 48
Figure 2.8. Spending limits for candidates and political parties in OECD countries .................... 55
Figure 2.9. OECD countries that ban state resources being unevenly given to, or
received by, political parties or candidates (excluding regulated
public funding) ........................................................................................................... 60
Figure 2.10. OECD countries that ban donations from corporations with government
contracts or partial ownership to political parties ...................................................... 61
Figure 3.1. Separate reporting of information on election campaigns by political
parties and/or candidates in OECD countries ............................................................. 67
Figure 3.2. Requirement to include the identity of donors in reports from political
parties and/or candidates in OECD countries ............................................................. 69
Figure 4.1. OECD countries with a central function responsible for the development
and maintenance of conflict-of-interest policies ......................................................... 84
Figure 4.2. Specific conflict-of-interest policy for particular categories of public
officials in OECD countries ....................................................................................... 84
Figure 4.3. Level of disclosure of private interests and public availability of
information in the three branches of government in OECD countries ....................... 85
Figure 4.4. Types of information that legislators and lobbyists believe should be
made publicly available in OECD countries .............................................................. 87
Figure 5.1. OECD country institution(s) receiving financial reports from political
parties and/or candidates ............................................................................................ 96
Figure 5.2. Sanctions for political finance infractions in OECD countries ................................. 102
Figure 5.3. Compliance rates in the United Kingdom, 2010-13 ................................................. 103
Figure 8.1. Sources of political party income in Estonia, 2014 .................................................. 138
Figure 12.1. Public funds and donations to political parties in the United Kingdom,
1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010 .................................................................................... 176
Figure 12.2. Candidate spending at the UK Parliamentary General Election 2010,
by political party in the long campaign and short campaign .................................. 177
Figure 12.3. Campaign expenditure, by category, at the UK Parliamentary general
election 2010 .......................................................................................................... 178
Figure 12.4. Campaign expenditure (non-party campaigners) at the UK
Parliamentary general election 2010 ...................................................................... 179
Figure 12.5. Compliance rate (statement of accounts) in the United Kingdom,
2010-13 ................................................................................................................... 180
Figure 12.6. Compliance rate (quarterly returns) in the United Kingdom, 2010-12 ................... 181
Figure 13.1. Percentage share of party fund money and private resources with
regard to campaign donations, Brazilian general elections, 2014 .......................... 188
Figure 13.2. Percentage share of individuals and legal entities with regard to
campaign donations, Brazilian general elections, 2014 ......................................... 189
Figure 13.3. Total spending of Brazil’s presidential candidates, 2002-14 .................................. 190
TABLE OF CONTENTS – 13
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Boxes
Box 1.1. Risks of policy capture in high-spending areas ............................................................. 23
Box 2.1. Eligibility criteria for receiving public funds in Austria, Belgium,
Chile and Turkey ........................................................................................................... 41
Box 2.2. Allocation criteria for public funds in Australia, Estonia and the
United States ................................................................................................................. 43
Box 2.3. Regulation of membership fees as a source of political party funding in
selected OECD countries .............................................................................................. 49
Box 2.4. Third-party campaigning during the 2015 parliamentary elections in Estonia ............. 59
Box 3.1. Verification of financial records sheds light on suspicious use of
political funding in Japan .............................................................................................. 68
Box 3.2.
Donor anonymity in small donations in Japan ........................................................... 69
Box 3.3. Transparency and accessible information in the United States ..................................... 74
Box 3.4. The monitoring role of CSOs in political finance in the Slovak Republic
and the United States ..................................................................................................... 75
Box 4.1. Various channels through which powerful special interests exert influence
over public policies: An example from the United States ............................................. 80
Box 4.2. UK Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords ........................................... 82
Box 4.3. The World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative
(PACI) Principles for Countering Bribery .................................................................... 90
Box 4.4. BNP Paribas’ charter for responsible representation with respect to
public authorities ........................................................................................................... 92
Box 5.1. Composition of the Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee ........................... 98
Box 5.2. Supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning aspects of the electoral
management body’s regulatory role in the United Kingdom and Korea ..................... 100
Box 5.3. India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management ....................... 106
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 15
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Executive summary
This report addresses three key questions: What are the risks associated with the
funding of political parties and election campaigns? Why are existing regulatory models
still insufficient and not fully implemented to tackle those risks? What are the links
between money in politics and broader frameworks for integrity in the public sector? The
resulting analysis has produced a Framework on Financing Democracy for shaping the
global debate, providing policy options and a mapping of risks. The report also features
detailed country case studies of Canada, Chile, Estonia, France, Korea, Mexico, United
Kingdom, Brazil and India, providing in-depth analysis of their political finance
mechanisms and challenges in different institutional settings. The findings of these nine
case studies also confirm the relevance of the Framework and provide good practices that
can be applied to other countries.
Regulating political finance to minimise risks
Money in politics is a double-edged sword. It is a necessary component of the
democratic process, enabling the expression of political support as well as competition in
elections. Yet, the increasing concentration of economic resources in the hands of fewer
people presents a significant threat to political and economic systems. If the financing of
political parties and election campaigns is not adequately regulated, money may also be a
means for powerful special interests to exercise undue influence, and “capture” the policy
process.
For example, access to public procurement has been used by elected officials to
“return the favour” to corporations that made significant contributions to their campaigns
or to exclude those that supported their opponents. While high-spending areas such as
infrastructure and urban planning are particularly vulnerable to the risk of policy capture,
any policy-making process can be a target of powerful special interests. The consequence
may be the adoption of inadequate policies or policies that go against the public interest,
preventing inclusive growth and decreasing trust in government.
Loopholes and implementation gaps
Countries’ experiences have revealed that several shortcomings still exist and are
vulnerable to exploitation by powerful special interests. The allocation of public funding
and the rules for private funding continue to require special attention to ensure a level
playing field for all democratic actors. At the same time, loans, membership fees and
third-party funding can be used to circumvent existing regulations such as spending
limits. Many countries struggle to define and regulate third-party campaigning in
particular, to prevent the re-channelling of election spending through supposedly
independent committees and interest groups. At the moment, only a few countries, such
as Canada, Ireland, the Slovak Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States have
regulations for third-party campaigning.
16 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Furthermore, countries have increasingly experienced that globalisation further
complicates the regulation of private funding. Many foreign companies and wealthy
individuals are deeply integrated with domestic business interests, blurring national
boundaries. Where limits and bans on foreign and corporate funding exist in many
countries, disclosure of donor identity has become important, serving as a deterrent to
undue influence. In this regard, 50% of OECD member countries such as France, Korea
and Mexico currently ban all anonymous donations to political parties, and 38% of
countries ban anonymous donations to parties above certain thresholds.
However, the information disclosed needs to be organised in an intelligible and user-
friendly way to facilitate effective public scrutiny. Civil society organisations and the
media can only be effective watchdogs if substantive political finance information is
publicly available for their analysis. Many countries have increasingly adopted online
technologies to enable comprehensive proactive disclosure; however, only a few
countries such as Estonia have so far managed to ensure that all reports are submitted and
published in a standardised, machine-readable format and are thus comparable, clear and
accessible for public scrutiny.
While most countries already have laws and regulations on party and election
financing, if oversight institutions lack the independence and/or legal authority to
meaningfully regulate potential violators, existing regulations cannot be fully enforced.
Only 29% of OECD countries have an independent electoral management body.
Moreover, the institutions responsible for enforcing political finance regulations
sometimes have rather limited human and financial capacity to effectively deal with large
volumes of oversight work. Data clearly show that sanctions have deterrent effects and
promote higher compliance. For instance, since the UK Electoral Commission was given
its civil sanction powers, compliance rates have increased by 9%. Yet, many countries
still struggle to ensure the right balance in defining sanctions that are both proportionate
and dissuasive.
Political finance regulation as part of an overall integrity framework
Political finance regulations are likely to be ineffective if they exist in isolation. They
need to be part of an overall integrity framework that includes the management of conflict
of interest and lobbying. On their own, political finance regulations are likely to result
merely in the re-channelling of money spent to obtain political influence through
lobbying and other activities. Therefore, integrity measures such as increasing
transparency in lobbying, better management of conflict of interest strengthen the
political finance regulations. However, incorporating various integrity policies into a
wider framework to effectively address the risks of party and election funding remains
challenging. Fewer than half of OECD countries have so far acted to set or tighten
lobbying standards. While disclosure of private interests by decision makers is widely
adopted by countries to manage conflict-of-interest situations and identify suspicious
financial flows in public decision making, verification and auditing of disclosure forms
are not strictly practiced. According to the OECD survey, only 32% of respondent
countries carry out audits or review the accuracy of the information reported by public
officials in the executive branch through disclosure forms, while 63% verify receipt of the
forms.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 17
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
The way forward
Most countries still struggle to monitor the performance of policy measures in place
and there is an empirical deficit in assessing and comparing the practices of political
finance regulations in different country contexts. The OECD is committed to further
expanding comparative data and developing benchmarks and indicators relative to
financing democracy, integrity in the public policy-making process, and averting policy
capture in order to monitor and improve performance of existing measures. Addressing
concerns related to the funding of political parties and election campaigns is a key lever
for restoring trust in government and forming the foundation for inclusive growth.
Countries would benefit from highlighting and sharing good practices so as to identify the
conditions for policies and practices that effectively safeguard the integrity of the policy-
making process and curb the risks of policy capture by powerful special interests.
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Part I
Funding of political parties and election campaigns,
risks of policy capture and policy options
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Chapter 1
Addressing the risks of policy capture
Money is a necessary component of the democratic processes, enabling the expression of
political support as well as competition in elections. Yet, the increasing concentration of
economic resources in the hands of fewer people presents a significant threat to political
and economic systems. This chapter highlights the risks of policy capture through
political finance and presents a Framework on Financing Democracy: Supporting Better
Public Policies and Averting Policy Capture, which provides policy options and a
mapping of risks.
22 – I.1. ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF POLICY CAPTURE
Money and influence are necessary components of democratic representation
Money plays a role both as a channel for citizens to support their candidates or
political parties, and as a means for candidates and political parties to reach out to their
constituencies, shaping the public debate with policy options. Access to resources for
political parties and candidates also shapes political competition. There is a correlation
between campaign spending and performance in elections, suggesting that well-funded
candidates are likely to defeat opponents with fewer resources (Silver, 2013; Speck and
Mancuso, 2013). However, whether the candidate is elected because he/she had more
resources than the opponent, or because he/she was able to mobilise more funds as a
result of a greater support from the electorate, is still unclear.
The legitimacy of financing the democratic process is tainted by risks that threaten to
undermine its very purpose. Although money is necessary for political parties and
candidates to operate and reach out to their voters, experience has shown that there is a
real and present risk that some parties and candidates, once in office, will be more
responsive to the interests of a particular group of donors rather than to the wider public
interest. Donors may also expect a sort of “reimbursement” for donations made during an
election campaign and to benefit in future dealings with the respective public
administration, for instance through public procurement or policies and regulations.
A basic distinction can be made between influencing where politicians make
decisions based on their discretionary power, and intermediation of favours granted by
public administration, which typically includes transgression of laws and regulations. In
the first case, lawmakers and governments shape laws and regulations of economic
activities taking into account demands and interests from campaign donors, but also from
lobbyists, public opinion, guidelines from political parties and their own convictions. In
the second case, elected officeholders use their influence on civil service to arrange for
donors to earn contracts, get access to public loans or earn other benefits. This involves
undue political influence on public service and unlawful behaviour of public servants
involved in policy making, public procurement, licensing, permissions or other areas
where companies expect illegal favours in return for campaign donations.
Public opinion might accept a representative speaking for the interest of a specific
economic segment, yet it may launch a public debate on the influence of donations. For
example, German political parties regularly receive donations from the German
automotive industry. Despite the fact that those donations are transparent, do not
contravene any law and Germany is one of the main sites for the car industry, it still can
lead to public debate on the influence of political donations in the policy-making process.
Globalisation shifts this debate as well. Where bans on foreign and corporate funding
exist in many countries, many multinational corporations have become part of the
economy of hosting countries, creating a large number of local jobs. The question of
whose money, and thus whose political preferences, should influence a country’s
elections and political parties is becoming more complex.
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Risk of policy capture through political finance is still prevalent in OECD countries
The other type of buying of economic favours by means of campaign donations
evokes a different response. For elected officeholders to be able to grant or intermediate
favours to individual companies, they need to have influence over parts of the public
administration responsible for public contracting, public loans, tax inspection or any other
state activity that is in contact with the private sector. While the term of the corrupting
influence of private donations on politics is often used metaphorically, it is in these cases
that campaign donations come closest to bribery in its original sense.
Policy capture occurs when the interests of a narrow group dominate those of other
stakeholders to the benefit of that narrow group. In a democratic context, this involves the
exclusion of parties and opinions, and violates basic democratic norms (Warren, 2003).
When policy making is captured by a handful of powerful interests, rules may be bent to
favour only the few in society. The consequences are likely to be the adoption of policies
that counter public interest. At the centre of policy capture, there are exchanges of
flavours between private and public actors, which can be set up for one exchange or
established and maintained on a regular, even highly institutionalised basis. In the latter
case, policy capture is best characterised as a stable flow of mutual favours among the
captor network.
Access to public procurement, for instance, has been used by elected officials to
“return the favour” to corporations that made important contributions to their campaigns
or to exclude corporations that supported the opponent as a means of retaliation.
Campaign donors can get access to overpriced public contracts; receive favourable
conditions in public loans or receive other forms of illegal benefits from public
administration (Box 1.1). Private companies depending on government contracts can also
be forced to make donations to the ruling party or be prevented from supporting
opposition parties.
Box 1.1. Risks of policy capture in high-spending areas
Research in Italy highlights that mayors who stayed in office for one extra term were
associated with deteriorated procurement outcomes, such as lower numbers of bidders, higher
prices, biased concentration of the local procurement market, and higher probability that the
winning firm was local. This quantitative evidence indirectly points at how the local heads of
administration could use their time in power to build a collusive network with bidding
companies capturing local public procurement spending (Coviello and Gagliarducci, 2010).
Another study indicates that large companies’ success on federal public procurement tenders
in the United States is highly dependent on their political connections. The strongest predictor of
these companies’ value of contracts won was whether they had a former politician on their
boards of directors associated with the political camp holding the power at the time (Goldman,
Rocholl and So, 2013).
A recent study also shows that firms specialising in public works projects in Brazil can
expect a substantial boost in contracts - at least 14 times the value of their contributions - when
they donate to a federal deputy (lower house) candidate from the ruling Workers’ Party and that
candidate wins office (Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson, 2013).
24 – I.1. ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF POLICY CAPTURE
Box 1.1. Risks of policy capture in high-spending areas (continued)
Similarly, if government favouritism is rampant, the change of government and the
corresponding turnover of political leadership are likely to affect the winning chances of firms in
the public procurement market in some countries. Research in Hungary highlights top managers
of large construction, information technology (IT), and healthcare companies supplying public
organisations expressed the view in which the swings in market shares of companies reflect the
changing preferences of the political leadership for particularly well-connected companies
(Fazekas, King and Tóth, 2013). According to this interpretation, success in the public
procurement market may depend much more on political connections than on the
competitiveness of companies, implying a preferential allocation of public resources. In the same
research (Fazekas, King and Tóth, 2013), such claims are demonstrated by tracking the changes
in market shares of the largest companies before and after the new government entered office. It
highlights that the companies with the largest market share throughout the one and a half years
leading up to the elections in the first half of the 2010 lost about 25-30% of their combined
market share. This change was accompanied by a comparable increase in the total market share
of companies dominating the post-election market between the second half of 2011 and 2012.
Source: OECD (forthcoming), Policy Making in the Public Interest: Curbing the Risks of Policy Capture,
OECD Publishing, Paris.
In addition to the awarding of public procurement contracts, other favours may
include granting tax breaks or state subsidies, preferential access to public loans, and
selling public assets below market prices. While high-spending areas, such as
infrastructure and urban planning, are particularly vulnerable to the risk of capture, any
policy-making process can be a target of powerful special interests. Policy capture
involves varieties of actors and means, but one of the most effective remedies to avert
policy capture in policy making is to adequately regulate the funding of political parties
and election campaigns.
Though much of the attention regarding political finance regulation focuses on
national parties and election campaigns, the risks of undue influence and corruption are
also present at the local or regional level as well. Local-level studies have pointed out the
most revealing experiences when it comes to vote buying, the exchange of public
contracts for political donations, and the role of illicit financial flows and organised
crime. It is also at local or regional level that capture of public authorities may occur
(Pinto-Duschinsky , 2013). For example, research argues that political party financing has
been the major corruption driver in France: a process that has been further accelerated by
administrative decentralisation and regionalisation in recent decades. Public contracts in
large cities like Paris have been granted to companies that have provided support to
political parties (Lalam, 2012).
Assisting inclusive growth though averting policy capture
Over the past three decades, income inequality has risen in most OECD countries,
reaching in some cases historical highs. The increasing concentration of economic
resources in the hands of fewer people presents a significant threat to increase the risks of
policy capture. When government policy making is captured by a handful of powerful
special interests, the rules may be bent to favour the rich. The consequences of a
widespread feeling that governments are not working in the wider public interest are
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grave, leading to the erosion of democratic governance, the pulling apart of social
cohesion, and the undermining of crucial concepts that underlie democracy such as equal
opportunities for all.
The challenges of the 21
st
century continue to test the ability of governments to
develop and deliver policies and programmes that benefit all citizens. In this regard, the
pursuit of inclusive growth has become one of the priorities for OECD countries. The
OECD Initiative on Inclusive Growth highlights that it is not enough to put in place
policies that harness growth, countries are also expected to ensure that the benefits of
growth are shared by everyone. The design and implementation of effective reforms to
create conditions for economic recovery and to sustain inclusive growth require a top-
quality, policy-making process that citizens can trust.
Embedding the policy-making process with mechanisms that safeguard the public
interest and curb the undue influence of money and power is essential to inclusive
growth. The relationship between inequality and undue influence in politics through
political financing is often overlooked. Socio-economic inequality is only the tip of an
iceberg of inequalities of different dimensions, including differences in influence, power
and voice. Consequently, governments are expected to proactively address high-risk areas
at the intersection of the public and private sectors, including lobbying, conflict of interest
in public decision making, and the influence of vested interests exercised through
political financing. In-depth analysis of facts and comparative evidence on political
finance and its associated risks to the fairness of policy making is needed to understand
the risks and opportunities in different institutional settings and to move away from an
ideological discussion.
Captured policies lead to low levels of trust in government, and the fairness of
decision making is being questioned
In a number of countries money is perceived as having undermined the government
decision-making process, which has led to low levels of trust in government. The 2013
Edelman Trust Barometer found that 52% of respondents surveyed in 26 countries
distrusted government. Among the key factors they cited to explain the prevailing distrust
were “wrong incentives driving policies” and “corruption/fraud”. Together, the two
factors accounted for half of all reasons for trusting government less. The figure stood at
the same level in the 2015 survey as well. In addition, the 2014 Eurobarometer shows that
while levels of trust in government are low, trust in political parties is even lower
(Figure 1.1).
26 – I.1. ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF POLICY CAPTURE
Figure 1.1. Trust in government and political parties in 23 European OECD countries, 2014
Note: Trust in national government and political parties: % of “tend to trust” answers to the question: I would like to ask you a
question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend
to trust it or tend not to trust it; national government and political parties.
Source: European Commission (2014), “Standard Eurobarometer”, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
Trust in public institutions is driven not only by the substance and outcomes of
policies, but also by the policy-making process
A solid foundation of trust for effective policy making is of particular importance in
the current economic situation, where structural reform involves difficult, unpopular
choices and requires the confidence of citizens and markets to reignite growth.
Accordingly, the OECD has put the building of trust in institutions and government at the
heart of its New Approaches to Economic Challenge (NAEC) Initiative and its forward-
looking Trust Agenda.
The OECD has identified five key policy dimensions for action by governments
seeking to invest in trust:
1. Integrity: The alignment of government and public institutions with broader principles
and standards of conduct that contribute to safeguarding the public interest while
mitigating the risk of corruption.
2. The fairness of public policy making: The ability to propose policy-making processes
and decisions that are perceived as fair and meet locally accepted standards.
3. Openness and inclusiveness: A systematic, comprehensive approach to
institutionalising two-way communication with stakeholders, whereby relevant, usable
information is provided and interaction fostered as a means to improve transparency,
accountability and engagement.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Trust in national government Trust in political parties
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4. Reliability: The ability of governments to minimise uncertainty in the economic, social,
and political environment of their citizens and act in a consistent and predictable
manner.
5. Responsiveness: The provision of accessible, efficient, and citizen-oriented public
services that effectively address the needs and expectations of taxpayers.
The first three policy dimensions - integrity, fairness, openness and inclusiveness -
are especially relevant to financing democracy, where it is essential to ensure fairness and
a level playing field for stakeholders who seek to influence the decision-making process.
All stakeholders are entitled to participate effectively in that process and the information
enabling their participation needs to be available. Furthermore, the integrity of decision
makers also needs to be ensured so that the wider public interest - and not only vested
interests that can afford to make large political contributions - forms the basis of policy
making.
In this context, trust in public institutions is driven not only by the substance and
outcomes of policies, but also by the process of policy making. The way policies are
designed and implemented, and the compliance that policy makers show with broader
principles and standards of behaviour, matters to trust.
OECD Framework on Financing Democracy
Recognising that adequately regulated political finance forms the foundation for
restoring trust in government and inclusive growth, this report builds on the discussions
and findings of the 2013 OECD Forum on Restoring Trust in Government: Addressing
Risks of Influence in Public Decision Making and the 2014 OECD Forum on Financing
Democracy and Averting Policy Capture, and presents a Framework on Financing
Democracy: Supporting Better Public Polices and Averting Policy Capture that maps a
range of risk areas and provides policy options to adequately regulate the financing of
political parties and electoral campaigns, thus strengthening the integrity and credibility
of the government decision-making process (see Table 1.1 at the end of this chapter).
The Framework has four main pillars: promoting a level playing field; ensuring
transparency and accountability; fostering a culture of integrity; and ensuring compliance
and review. The following four chapters look at each of the pillars with comparative data
to highlight the trend of political finance regulations and remaining areas for
improvement in OECD countries.
Third-party campaigners and transnational private interests present risks to
levelling the playing field
Chapter 2 reviews various policy options to promote a level playing field in financing
democracy. Allocation of public funding and the rules for private funding continue to
need special attention to ensure a level playing field for all stakeholders. To be effective,
a comprehensive regulation of political finance should focus on the whole cycle including
the pre-campaign phase, the campaigning period itself, and the period once the elected
official take office. Additionally, applying spending limits also contributes to stopping the
spending race and framing the impact of private funding. Privileged access to state
resources also needs to be understood through an analysis of the incumbency factor - the
advantage which entails that ruling political parties may have privileged access to public
resources.
28 – I.1. ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF POLICY CAPTURE
It also highlights that certain shortcomings in the regulations are particularly
vulnerable to exploitation by powerful special interests. Loans, membership fees and
third-party funding can be used to circumvent the regulations of private funding. Many
countries struggle to clearly define and regulate third-party funding to prevent re-
channelling of election spending through supposedly independent committees and interest
groups. Third-party campaigners are sometimes referred as non-party campaigners and
may include charities, faith groups, individuals or private firms that campaign in the run
up to elections, but do not stand as political parties or candidates. Increasing globalisation
also further complicates the regulation of private funding as many foreign companies and
wealthy individuals are deeply integrated with domestic business interests, blurring the
national boundaries. In addition to bans and regulations on foreign and corporate funding,
regulation of anonymous donation and disclosure of the donor identity serve as
complementary measures to minimise the impact of undue influence.
Institutionalising an enabling environment for better transparency and public
scrutiny
Chapter 3 focuses on measures to ensure transparency and accountability in financing
democracy. Keeping records of election campaigns expenditure as well as keeping books
and accounts of political parties and their affiliated entities forms a basis for greater
transparency and accountability. Comprehensive disclosure of income sources of political
parties and candidates contributes to greater transparency, serving as a deterrent measure
to limit undue influence. No oversight mechanism is complete without the participation of
civil society and media. In this regard, civil society organisations (CSOs) can be effective
watchdogs and have proven instrumental in advancing transparency and anti-corruption
efforts in the field of political finance.
For disclosure of information to make sense and inform the citizen, information needs
be organised in an intelligible and user-friendly way. In this regard, online technologies
facilitate countries developing more comprehensive proactive disclosure. Ideally, all
reports are submitted and published in a standardised, machine-readable format so as to
ensure their comparability, clarity and digestibility. CSOs and media can only be
effective watchdogs if substantive political finance information is publicly available for
their analysis. In order to mobilise CSO support in advocacy, political finance
information must be reliable and accessible, creating an enabling environment in which
CSOs, media and private citizens can conduct effective public scrutiny.
Promoting a holistic approach to avert policy capture by connecting surrounding
integrity measures with political finance
Chapter 4 looks at the importance of fostering a culture of integrity to effectively
promote a holistic approach to connect surrounding integrity issues, such as lobbying and
conflict of interest, to better understand the impact of money in politics on the quality of
policies. Matters such as conflict of interest, asset disclosure and lobbying cannot
realistically be considered without taking into account the role of political finance in
many countries. Conversely, controls of party and election funding are likely to be
ineffective if they exist in isolation. On their own, they are likely to result merely in the
re-channelling of money spent to obtain political influence through lobbying, and through
third-party financing. Any consideration of political funding needs to be part of an overall
strategy to assure public integrity and good governance. However, less than half of
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OECD member countries have so far acted to set or tighten lobbying standards. While
disclosure of private interests by decision makers is also essential for managing conflict-
of-interest situations and spotting any suspicious financial flows in public decision
making, the level of disclosure of private interests (assets, liabilities, income source and
amount, paid and un-paid outside positions, gifts and previous employment) and the
public availability of the disclosed information varies considerably among and within
countries in the different branches of government.
Increasing importance of independent electoral management body for effective
oversight
Chapter 5 focuses on policy measures and institutional mechanisms to ensure the
compliance and review of political finance regulations. Regulating income and spending
are not sufficient if there is no proper and efficient oversight and enforcement. In many
cases, the responsibilities of monitoring and supervising breaches to political financing
regulations are rather diluted among various institutions. This raises concerns over
effective co-ordination, information sharing, and responsiveness. An independent
electoral management body (EMB) is desirable although there is no one-size-fits-all
model. In 29% of OECD countries, the EMB receives financial reports from political
parties and/or candidates for oversight. Institutions responsible for enforcing political
finance regulations should also have a clear mandate and power, not just the capacity, but
the legal power to conduct investigations, refer cases for prosecution, and impose
sanctions. Development of such powers is critical for the effective enforcement of a
transparent and equitable campaign finance regime. Well-staffed and well-funded
supervisory bodies that lack the independence and/or legal authority to meaningfully
regulate potential violators limit the extent to which existing regulation can be enforced.
Besides, sound political finance regulations need sanctions, serving as deterrents for
breaches and indirectly promoting compliance. However, countries still struggle to ensure
the right balance in penalising infringements to political finance regulations and define
sanctions that are proportionate and dissuasive.
Country case studies provide in-depth analysis of political finance regulation and its
challenges in different institutional settings
In order to examine practices and lessons learned in various country contexts, this
report features country case studies from Canada, Chile, Estonia, France, Korea, Mexico,
the United Kingdom, Brazil and India. Countries selected for case studies include both
OECD member countries and key partner countries in Europe, North America, South
America and Asia, providing detailed practices of political finance regulations and
challenges that are of particular importance in each country. Findings from these country
case studies also confirm the trend and emerging concerns in regulating political finance
as well. Further elucidating the risks of money in the government decision-making
process as well as identifying practical solutions based on evidence and good practices
will contribute to refining the framework and develop an associated toolbox that may be
useful in different country contexts.
30 – I.1. ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF POLICY CAPTURE
Table 1.1. Framework on Financing Democracy:
Supporting Better Public Policies and Averting Policy Capture
Overall
objective
Policy options and specific risks to mitigate
Promoting a level playing field
Balancing funding
through direct and
indirect public
contributions
Direct funding which entails a monetary transfe
r
to parties, candidates:
- clear and equitable criteria such as equal access and proportionality
- provision to promote gender equality.
Indirect funding, including tax exemptions, subsidised access to media, meeting rooms, etc.
Unintended consequences may include:
Risk of unbalanced playing field for the challengers and smaller parties if, for example, the criteria
of allocation is based on past electoral performance.
Framing private funding
Banning certain types of private contributions, in particular:
- foreign interest
- corporations with government contracts or partial government ownership
- corporate donations, trade unions, etc.
Limiting anonymous donations.
Unintended consequences may include:
Risks of avoidance through third-party funding and other legislative loopholes.
Applying spending limits
Clear limits based on absolute amount, percentage of total public funding, certain amount per
citizen in the electoral district, etc.
Unintended consequences may include:
Risk of avoidance through third-party funding
Risk of an uneven playing field for the challengers if there is abuse of state resources by the
incumbent.
Limiting privileged access
to state resources
Controlling abuse of state resources:
- ban the use of state resources for political purposes
- ban state resources being given to, or received by, political parties or candidates (except
regulated public funding)
- ban disproportionate government spending on advertising before or during campaigns, hiring new
public servants and signing large public contracts.
Unintended consequences may include;
Risk of avoidance if the incumbents use the public resources to campaign for their votes in the
name of “carrying out their legislative duties”.
Ensuring
transparency and
accountability
Requiring disclosures
Requiring comprehensive reporting, including:
- timely provision of information.
Not limiting reporting to only how public funds have been spent, but also include private donations.
Enabling scrutiny
Timely, reliable, accessible and intelligible public disclosure of reports.
Promote media and civil society scrutiny.
Fostering a culture of
integrity
Applying the integrity
framework in the public
sector
Code of conduct.
Conflict of interest and asset disclosure provisions.
Disclosure on lobbying.
Risk mapping.
Whistleblower protection.
Promoting standards of
professionalism, integrity
and transparency in
private donors
Sel
f
-regulation of financing of political parties and electoral campaigns:
- appropriate accounting practices
- private sector codes of conduct
- responsible lobbying.
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Table 1.1. Framework on Financing Democracy:
Supporting Better Public Policies and Averting Policy Capture (continued)
Overall
objective
Policy options and specific risks to mitigate
Ensuring compliance and review
Assuring independent
and efficient oversight
Strengthen independence of monitoring body and process:
- independent appointment of members
- ensure security of tenure to members
- independent budget for the body to conduct monitoring.
Provide capacity:
- sufficient resources
- specialised auditing capacities and methodologies.
Unintended consequences may include:
Risk of over-complication of procedures among many different institutions.
Applying dissuasive and
enforceable sanctions
Proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, for example:
- lose public subsidies
- confiscation of illegal donations or funds
- fines
- criminal charges such as imprisonment
- ineligibility: loss of elected office, forfeiting right to run for elections
- deregistration or suspension of a political party.
Enforcement of sanctions in a timely manner.
Appraising the system
Reviewing periodically - with the involvement of stakeholders - the functioning of the system and
making necessary adjustments:
- identify new risks to the policy objectives of the system
- identify mitigation strategies.
Support to political
parties
Providing support to political parties to help them comply with regulations:
- setting up a support unit within the monitoring agency focused on supporting compliance
- dialogue between parties and monitoring agencies in order to facilitate adherence to the rules
and allow for better understanding of political finance.
32 – I.1. ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF POLICY CAPTURE
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government”, background paper for OECD conference on Restoring Trust in
Government: Addressing Money and Influence in Public Decision Making,
14-15 November, www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/restoring-trust-in-government.htm.
OECD (2013b), “Investing in trust: Leveraging institutions for inclusive policy making”,
background paper for OECD conference on Restoring Trust in Government:
Addressing Money and Influence in Public Decision Making, 14-15 November,
www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/restoring-trust-in-government.htm.
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (2002), “Financing politics: A global view”, Journal of Democracy
13/4, pp. 69-86.
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (2013), “Facts, sceptical thoughts and policy ideas”, draft
background paper for OECD conference on Restoring Trust in Government:
Addressing Money and Influence in Public Decision Making, 14-15 November,
www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/restoring-trust-in-
government.htm.www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/restoring-trust-in-government.htm
Silver, N. (11 February 2013), “New rove group could backfire on G.O.P.”,
FiveThirtyEight blog, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/new-rove-
group-could-backfire-on-g-o-p.
Speck, B. and W. P. Mancuso (2013) “O que faz a diferença? Gastos de campanha,
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Cadernos Adenauer xiv (2013), nº 2, Candidatos, partidos e coligações nas eleições
municipais de 2012, Fundação Konrad Adenauer, Rio de Janeiro, pp. 37-60.
Straub, S. (2014), Political Firms, Public Procurement, and the Democratization Process
in Paraguay, IDEI Toulouse School of Economics.
Thai, K. V. (2005), “Challenges in public procurement”, United Nations Procurement
Capacity Development Centre (UNPCDC), www.unpcdc.org/media/4899/challenges
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Transparency International (2012), Money, Politics, Power: Corruption Risks in Europe,
www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/money_politics_and_power_corruption_risks_i
n_europe.
Transparency International (2008), “Accountability and transparency in political finance:
Why, how and what for?”, Working Paper 1/2008.
34 – I.1. ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF POLICY CAPTURE
Van Slyke, D. M. (2003), “The mythology of privatization in contracting for social
services”, Public Administration Review 63/3, pp. 296-315.
Warren, M.E. (2003), “What does corruption mean in a democracy?”, American Journal
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Witko, C. (2011), “Campaigning contributions, access, and government contracting”,
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21/4, pp. 761-778.
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 35
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Chapter 2
Promoting a level playing field through balanced funding
This chapter reviews various policy options to promote a level playing field in financing
democracy. Allocation of public funding and the rules for private funding continue to
require special attention to ensure a level playing field for all stakeholders. To be
effective, a comprehensive regulation of political finance should focus on the whole cycle
including the pre-campaign phase, the campaigning period itself, and the period once
elected officials take office. The chapter also highlights that certain shortcomings in the
regulations are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by powerful special interests.
Loans, membership fees and third-party funding can be used to circumvent the
regulations of private funding.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of
such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the
West Bank under the terms of international law.
36
– I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
Finding the right combination of policy measures is key to ensuring a level playing
field
Where strong party organisations exist, the demand for resources comes to cover
recurring annual expenses of political party administration, public outreach as well as
selecting and grooming candidates. In addition, the mobilisation of resources is needed
during election campaigns for professional campaign management, including public
relations, the expertise of consultants, and communication with voters. There is variation
across parties and countries on how their expenditures are spent during campaigns. For
example, in the United Kingdom, advertising expenses is the biggest spending category
apart from unsolicited materials (Figure 2.1). In Japan, printing-related expenses were the
biggest category, followed by advertising and staff salaries (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.1. Expenditures during the 2010 parliamentary general election in the
United Kingdom
Note: Total expenditure during the 2010 parliamentary general election was
GBP 31 838 934 (approximately EUR 44,633,093, exchange rare as of 5 November 2015).
Source: UK Electoral Commission (n.d.), www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-
information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/political-party-
spending-at-elections/details-of-party-spending-at-previous-elections (accessed on
27 October 2015).
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING –
37
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Figure 2.2. Expenditures during the 2013 Upper House election in Japan
Note: Total expenditure during the 2013 Upper House election was JPY 1 569 659 950
(approximately EUR 11 874 460, exchange rate as of 5 November 2015).
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan (n.d.),
www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/83101_2.html (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Recognising the risks associated with vested interests influencing policy making, a
combination of measures to ensure a level playing field among all parties and candidates
has been introduced by OECD countries in political finance regulations. This includes, in
particular, the balancing of public and private funding, the regulation of direct and
indirect state contributions, and spending limits for political campaigns.
The financing of political parties and election campaigns: Private or public
funding?
Balancing private funding through direct and indirect public contributions is
widely adopted in OECD countries
The balance between public and private funding varies across countries. For example,
11 political parties registered in the United Kingdom reported accepting approximately
GBP 14.9 million (approximately EUR 20.8 million) in donations between 1 July and
30 September 2014, while 5 out of 11 parties also accepted over GBP 0.26 million
(approximately EUR 0.36 million) from public funds during the same period. In the 2013
Upper House election in Japan, out of the total expenditure of JPY 1 569 659 950
(approximately EUR 11 874 460), 77% came from private funding.
While private donation is a channel of political participation, if the financing of
political parties and election campaigns is not adequately regulated, money may also be a
means for undue influence and policy capture by powerful special interests. In this
38 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
context, public funding helps to sustain the institutionalisation of political parties in
democracies as they benefit from necessary financial support to conduct their daily
activities. It also reduces their dependence on private funding, while there is a variation in
such dependence across countries (Table 2.1). Such public support strengthens the
capacity of political parties to level the electoral playing field.
Table 2.1. The balance between public and private funding to political parties in selected
OECD countries, 2007 to 2015
Funding = % of party income
Country Public % Private + other %
Belgium 85% 15%
Denmark 75% 25%
Finland 75% 25%
Greece 90% 10%
Hungary 60% 40%
Iceland 75% 25%
Italy 82% 18%
Netherlands 35% 65%
Norway 67.4% 32.6%
Poland 54-90% 10-46%
Portugal 80% 20%
Slovak Republic 87.5% 12.5%
Spain 87.5% 12.5%
Sweden 75% 25%
Turkey 90% 10%
United Kingdom 35% 65%
Source: Adapted from GRECO (n.d.), “Third Evaluation Round (launched in 2007 continuing to June 2015):
Evaluation and Compliance Reports”, Council of Europe,
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/ ReportsRound3_en.asp (accessed on 27 October
2015).
All OECD countries provide direct public funding to political parties, except
Switzerland. Of the remaining 33 OECD member countries, direct public funding to
political parties is provided regularly in 15 countries; in 3 countries direct public funds
are provided only if they are campaign-related. The other 15 OECD member countries
regularly provide funding to political parties and provide funds in relation to campaigns
(Figure 2.3). In some countries, the large majority of political financing is based on public
funding at the national level, such as in Greece and Turkey (Table 2.1).
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 39
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Figure 2.3. Direct public funding to political parties in OECD countries
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East
Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on
27 October 2015).
The eligibility criteria for receiving public funds may depend on the votes in the
previous election, representation in an elected body, or the share of seats in the previous
election, among others (Table 2.2).
In the context of levelling the playing field, the details of eligibility criteria for
receiving public funds are also important (Box 2.1). While many countries adopt the
party’s performance in the previous election as an indicator for the eligibility criteria, the
actual percentages vary across countries. For example, Germany, Slovenia and Turkey
may seem identical in terms of public funding eligibility in Table 2.2, but Germany
requires a 0.5% threshold, whereas Slovenia requires 3% and Turkey 7%. The
OSCE/Venice Commission guidelines on party regulation suggest that the pay-off
threshold for public funding should be lower than the electoral threshold (OSCE/ODIHR
and Venice Commission, 2010).
1
Otherwise, it would make it harder for new parties and
small parties to enter the political arena and compete under fair conditions with better
established parties (Piccio, 2014).
Direct public funding to
political parties are
provided in relation to
campaings: 10%
Direct public funding to
political parties are
provided regularly: 45%
Direct public funding to political
parties are provided regularly
and in relation to campaings:
45%
40 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
Table 2.2. Eligibility criteria for direct public funding to political parties in OECD countries
Share of votes
in the previous
election
Representation
in an elected
body
Share of seats in
the previous
election
Participation
in the
election
Number of
candidates
Registration as
a political party
Other
A
ustralia x
A
ustria x x x
Belgium x
Canada x
Chile x
Czech
Republic
x x
Denmark x
Estonia x x
Finland x
France x
Germany x x
Greece x x
Hungary x x x
Iceland x x
Ireland x
Israel x
Italy x
Japan x x x
Korea x x x
Luxembourg x x
Mexico x x
Netherlands x x
New Zealand x x x
Norway x x x
Poland x
Portugal x x x x
Slovak
Republic
x x
Slovenia x
Spain x x
Sweden x x
Turkey x
United
Kingdom
x x x
United States x x
OECD 33 25 20 3 3 3 2 6
Note: In addition to the categories listed in the table, the category “Other” includes the following: the numbers of party members
in the Netherlands. Party must give notice in New Zealand. For part of the funding there is no threshold in Norway. Spain
doesn’t have someone in a leading position found guilty of serious offence. The share of seats in the next election in the
United Kingdom, and share of votes in next election as well as limit campaign expenses and private contributions. Providing
closed captioning in TV commercials for hearing-impaired individuals in the United States.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data
by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank
under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 41
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Box 2.1. Eligibility criteria for receiving public funds in Austria, Belgium,
Chile and Turkey
In Austria, parties are eligible for public funding if they have obtained at least 1% of the
votes in the previous election.
In Belgium funding is only available to parties with parliamentary representation.
In Chile funding is available to all political parties that nominate candidates in elections.
In Turkey, parties must obtain at least 7% of the votes in the previous election.
Furthermore, the calculation of the allocation of direct public funding to political
parties varies across OECD countries (Table 2.3), amongst equal access and
proportionality are the dominant policy options. In other words, the most common
allocation calculation formula entails an equal sum distributed evenly to all parties that
meet the eligibility threshold and an additional variable sum, which is distributed in
proposition to the votes or seats obtained in previous elections.
Allocation of public funding based on the previous electoral performance may
result in an uneven playing field for the challengers and smaller parties
Evidently, the most common policy option is distributing resources according to past
record, for example proportional to the share of votes or the share of seats in past
elections. This reflects past performance and such distribution helps parties that
reproduce past results. If resources matter for electoral success, and if public funding
covers a significant share of overall expenses, proportional distribution of funding may
result in replicating past results.
Another common allocation is based on equal access to public funding, where all
candidates or parties have access to the same amount of public funding. State funding
based on equal shares of resources creates incentives for new competitors to run for
election. When all parties receive equal shares of resources, and no other thresholds to
participate in elections exist, one expected drawback is to have a proliferation of political
parties run for office.
A third option for the allocation of funds is performance based. After elections,
political parties will have some of their expenses reimbursed, depending on the number of
votes or seats received. The performance of parties depends on the capacity to generate
funding in advance, either from loans or from savings. This system sets strong incentives
for competitors to take risks. Depending on the success at the polls, parties will be able to
balance the budget, or walk away with campaign debts (Box 2.2).
42 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
Table 2.3. Allocation calculation of direct public funding to political parties in OECD countries
Equal
Proportional to
votes received
Proportional to
seats received
Flat rate by votes
received
Share of
expenses
reimbursed
Other
A
ustralia x
A
ustria x x x
Belgium x x
Canada x x
Chile x
Czech Republic x x x x x
Denmark x
Estonia x x x
Finland x
France x x
Germany x x
Greece x x
Hungary x x
Iceland x x
Ireland x
Israel x x
Italy x x
Japan x x
Korea x x x
Luxembourg x x
Mexico x x
Netherlands x x
New Zealand x x
Norway x
Poland x
Portugal x x
Slovak Republic x x
Slovenia x x
Spain x x
Sweden x x x
Turkey x
United Kingdom x x x
United States x x
OECD 33 15 25 12 7 3 3
Note: In addition to the categories listed in the table, the category “Other” includes the following: In Germany, funding cannot
be higher than the private funds raised by the party. In Hungary, 25% is distributed equally among parties with parliamentary
representation, and 75% in proportion to the votes of the party and the candidates of the party in the first valid round in
parliamentary elections. In Italy, 30% of the funds are distributed according to the parties' self-financing capacity (EUR 0,5 for
each euro received annually from private funds, up to EUR 10 000). In the United Kingdom, funding relating to the House of
Commons is proportional to seats and votes won. Funding relating to the House of Lords is determined by the House of Lords
Policy Development Grants, which in accordance with a formula weighted by votes, won in the preceding election.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data
by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank
under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 43
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Box 2.2. Allocation criteria for public funds in Australia, Estonia
and the United States
In Australia, parliamentary parties receive a flat rate for each vote won (EUR 2.50/vote).
For parliamentary parties, the total funding (EUR 4.60/eligible voter) is divided proportionally
by votes won after deduction of EUR 218 000 for each party with at least five parliamentary
seats. This amount is then given equally to each eligible party.
In Estonia, equal amount is provided to smaller parties while larger parties receive funding
proportional to votes and seats won.
In the United States, public funding is distributed equally between eligible major parties in
the general election. Minor parties eligible for public funding receive an amount that bears the
same ratio to the major parties public funding as the number of popular votes received in the
previous presidential election does to the average number of popular votes received by the major
parties.
Earmarking public funding is one way to further ensure that money is spent to
promote a level playing field
Some 43% of OECD countries set provisions on how political parties should use
direct public funding. For instance, in Greece direct public funding should be used for
campaign spending, ongoing party activities and research and study centres. In Ireland, it
needs to be used for ongoing party activities and for the promotion of women and youth
participation. In Mexico and the Netherlands, direct public funding must be used for
campaign spending, ongoing party activities and intra-party institution. In Slovenia, it is
specified that direct public funding cannot be used for loans, settling fines, donations or
to support presidential election campaigns.
Public funding can be used to promote gender equality in politics
Promoting gender equality is also an important element of levelling the playing field.
Political finance for female candidates remains one of the greatest barriers to their entry
into politics. According to research conducted by UN Women in 2013, over 80% of
respondents identified the lack of access to funding as one of the biggest obstacles for
women to participate in a political competition (Ballington and Kahane, 2014). In order to
facilitate participation of female candidates in politics, some countries tie the allocation of
public funding to the enforcement of electoral quotas and the nomination of women as
candidates. Making gender equality as one of public funding allocation criteria provides
political parties financial incentives to take the issue seriously and increase the number of
female candidates.
Such initiatives are still relatively few. France introduced a gender equality law in
1999, with the equal access of both men and women to electoral mandates and elective
positions. Furthermore, an electoral reform in 2000 introduced the penalty for non-
compliance with the parity rule. A political party can lose a portion of its public funding
if there is a greater than 2% difference between the number of male and female
candidates. Portugal introduced a similar reform in 2006, requiring at least 33% of
candidates to be women, and stipulating that parties will lose 50% of public funding if
either gender is represented below 20% or lose 25% of public funding if either gender is
44 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
represented between 20% and 33.3%. Ireland also introduced a similar measure in 2012
by setting 30% quota for female candidates with penalty of loss of up to 50% of public
funding in case of non-compliance. However, it is also pointed out that these measures
may have limited impact on well-resourced parties, which may choose to pay the penalty
rather than nominate more female candidates (Ballington and Kahane, 2014).
Earmarking public funding for activities related to gender equality is also another
measure to promote a level playing field. For example, in Mexico legislation requires
parties to spend 2% of public funding on activities that aim to promote, develop and train
women’s political leadership. Similarly, Korea adopts an initiative requiring political
parties to use no less than 10% of their subsidies to promote women’s political
participation.
Indirect public funding is widely adopted across OECD countries and takes a
number of different forms
Many countries also provide indirect public funding to political parties. It can take a
variety of forms, including tax breaks, free access to public services including airtime,
access to public buildings, provisions of goods, and allocation of financial resources.
Considering the impact of resources on political competition, the two most important
policy options countries use for public subsidies are financial support and free airtime
(Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4. Most common types of indirect public funding in OECD countries
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on
27 October 2015).
Tax exemption is the most common policy option for indirect public funding. For
example, in Finland, donations to parties (and to candidates if total amount donated is less
than EUR 3 400 over three years) are tax exempt. Political parties are not subject to
income tax in Portugal and the United States. For instance in Belgium, campaigns enjoy
4%
15%
4%
11%
13%
15%
40%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
No
Other
Free or subsidised transport
Free or subsidised postage cost
Premises for campaign meetings
Space for campaign materials
Tax relief
% of OECD countries
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 45
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
exemption from tax stamps for election posters, advertising space, preferential treatment
for election mail and free provision of a copy of the electoral register.
Another type of indirect public funding is free or subsidised access to media for
political parties or candidates. The media plays an important role in conveying parties’ or
candidates’ messages to the widest audience possible. While 76% of OECD countries
give free or subsidised access to media for political parties, only 32% do the same for
candidates (Figure 2.5). For instance in Chile, it only applies to television during the
27 days prior to the end of the campaign period, and in the case of legislative elections. In
Hungary, for example, media programme providers publish free of charge the political
ads produced by nominating organisations and candidates on the last day of the election
campaign. In Mexico, political parties are granted free permanent access to radio and TV.
Political parties are not allowed to buy airtime, directly or indirectly. On the other hand,
in Australia, broadcasters must give all parties reasonable opportunity to broadcast, but
must not offer free or subsidised access.
Figure 2.5. Free or subsidised access to media for political parties and for candidates
in OECD countries
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East
Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on
27 October 2015).
Despite a general trend of promoting public funding, doing so also raises questions as
to whether or not it has effectively fostered fair political competition. One of the growing
challenges is, for instance, how to adequately allocate indirect public funding while
ensuring a level playing field between parties. Another concern is to understand to what
extent direct public funding creates a level playing field between stakeholders. For
example, the criteria of allocation to parties according to past electoral performance allow
major traditional parties to rely on public funding while new competitors or small parties
cannot benefit from it. This could lead to a cartelisation of political parties (Katz and
Mair, 1995).
B. CandidatesA. Political parties
Greece
Hungary
United Kingdom
Free or subsidised
access to media for
political parties is
provided: 76%
Free or
subsidised
access to media
for political
parties is not
provided : 24%
PortugalNetherlands
Free or
subsidised
access to media
for candidates is
provided
32%
Free or
subsidised
access to
media for
candidates is
not provided
68%
46 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
Framing private funding to level the playing field
Private funding is an important means for political expression by citizens; if it is
not adequately regulated, however, it may be vulnerable to policy capture
Private funding allows for support from society at large for a political party or
candidate, and is widely recognised as a fundamental right of citizens. Yet, if private
funding is not adequately regulated, it can be easily exploited by special private interests.
Therefore, OECD countries increasingly regulate private funding to ensure a level
playing field among parties and candidates.
Regulating private funding underlies a concept of banning or limiting sources or
amounts of financing. Sources considered inappropriate and therefore banned include
foreign financing, financing from state organisations, such as state owned enterprises,
from corporate donations or from trade unions (Figure 2.6). The rationale for limiting the
amounts of private donations is related to the extent of influence of single donors on the
outcome of elections or on the process of policy making after election day.
Figure 2.6. Types of banned private contributions in OECD countries
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on
27 October 2015).
When private donations play a significant role in political funding, special attention
must be paid to understand the extent to which specific sectors or single donors hold a
large share in the overall amount of funding. In Brazil, for example, corporate funding
responds to 75% of overall campaign costs, and the group of 20 largest donors accounts
for more than 30% of all donations from all 20 000 corporate donors. This represents both
a considerable share and a high concentration. On the other hand, corporate donations
constitute 7% of the annual income of all parties in Germany.
In addition, not all private funding limits shape actual contributions towards more
equality. A few countries also linked contribution limits to the income of the donor.
Companies in Brazil, for example, can contribute up to 2% of their turnover, while the
limit is 10% of income for private citizens. In this case the design of contribution limits
68%
56%
35% 35%
74%
50%
38% 38%
32%
44%
65% 65%
24%
50%
62% 62%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Political parties Candidates Political parties Candidates Political parties Candidates Political parties Candidates
Foreign interests Corporate donations Corporations with government
contracts or partial government
ownership
Trade Unions
No
Yes
% of OECD countries
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 47
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
makes donors unequal under the law. A citizen with a higher income can contribute more
than others who earn less.
Setting the ceiling for donations helps to frame private funding
Many countries also set the maximum ceiling for donations from natural and legal
persons to political parties. Such a ceiling plays an important role in understanding the
room for manoeuvre for potential policy capture, but it is very difficult to strike the right
balance. If the limit is very high, it will have little impact. If the limit is very low, donors,
political parties and candidates will find ways to circumvent the limit, most likely through
splitting and channelling donations through multiple donors (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4. Maximum donation ceilings for individuals in selected OECD countries
Party Candidates
A
ustralia No limit No limit
A
ustria No limit No limit
Belgium EUR 500 N/A
Brazil Yes
1
Yes
1
Canada CAD 1 200 per party CAD 1 200
Chile No limit USD 80 000
Denmark No limit No limit
Finland EUR 30 000 EUR 5 000
France EUR 7 500 EUR 4 600
Germany No limit No limit
Greece EUR 15 000 EUR 3 000
Hungary No Limit No limit
Iceland EUR 2 720 EUR 2 720
Ireland EUR 2 500 EUR 1 000
Japan EUR 146 300 EUR 11 000
Korea No limit USD 10 000/5 000
Netherlands No limit No limit
New Zealand No limit No limit
Norway No limit No limit
Poland Yes
2
- Yes
Portugal Yes
3
Yes
3
Spain EUR 10 000 EUR 6 000
Sweden No limit No limit
United Kingdom No limit No limit
United States USD 33 400 USD 2 700
Notes:
1. Individuals may contribute up to 10% of their gross income of preceding year.
2. Membership fees to parties limited to equivalent of minimum monthly wage as set for each year, political donations to
parties limited to 15x minimum monthly wage
3. Donations from individuals to parties limited to 25x minimum monthly wage as set for each year.
Source: For Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom: GRECO (n.d.), “Third Evaluation Reports on the
Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe, www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/
ReportsRound3_en.asp (accessed on 27 October 2015). For Japan: www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000174716.pdf
(JPY 20 million for party and JPY 1.5 million for candidates, exchange rate as of 12 October 2015). For Australia and New
Zealand: IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015). For
Brazil, Chile and Korea: case studies in this volume.
In Korea, for example, individuals can donate up to USD 20 000 every year to
political fundraising associations. The contribution limit per association is USD 5 000 for
National Assembly members and candidates, and USD 10 000 for presidential candidates.
In Italy, new legislation introduced a limit on corporate donations to political parties.
Under Article 7 of the Law 13/2014, “legal persons’ donations in favour of a single
48 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
political party shall not exceed, in cash or with goods or services of any kind of form,
[…], a value of EUR 100 000 yearly.” This is the first time such a limit was introduced in
Italy; however, its relatively generous donation limit raises the question as to whether
such a limit serves its purpose to mitigate undue influence on political parties. In France,
there is a ceiling of EUR 7 500 per year for all donations paid by individuals to the same
political party or regional or specialist entities attached to it, and the donor must be
identified.
Most countries ban anonymous donations to limit undue influence
Another source of concern is anonymous donations. Half of OECD countries (17) ban
all anonymous donations to parties and 13 countries ban anonymous donations to parties
above certain thresholds. In addition, 10 OECD countries ban all anonymous donations to
candidates and 14 countries ban anonymous donations to candidates above certain
thresholds (Figure 2.7). For example, in Estonia, political parties are not allowed to
accept concealed or anonymous donations, nor donations from legal persons. If possible,
political parties are to return anonymous donations or donations from legal persons to the
donor; otherwise, they have to transfer the donations to the state budget within ten days
for addition of the funds to be allocated to political parties in the following budgetary
year.
Figure 2.7. Ban on anonymous donations to political parties in OECD countries
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the
OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of
international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
KoreaJapan
Yes
50%
Yes (above certain
thresholds)
38%
No
12%
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Regulating private funding remains a very complex matter, as it often generates
debate on how to achieve diverging policy objectives: namely freedom of speech versus
protecting the public interest through ensuring a level playing field. Furthermore, new
ways to circumvent regulations emerge if regulatory loopholes are not addressed
(e.g. using membership fees to conceal donations, or rely heavily on loans and
consequently on credit institutions).
Membership fees and loans can be used to circumvent limits on private
donations
Membership fees to parties can, for instance, also be used to circumvent limits on
private donations. For example, in Korea, political parties are only required to disclose
the total amount of membership fee collected, therefore there is no way to access the
information on party members who paid a large amount of membership fees. According
to financial reports submitted by political parties in 2015, the total amount of membership
fees collected from party members was USD 52 million, amounting to 25.8% of their
total income of USD 201.3 million (Chapter 10).
Aware of such risks, some countries introduced mandatory transparency requirements
in relation to membership fees (Box 2.3): in Estonia, for instance, the 2010 reform of
political financing regulations, obliged parties to register donations and membership fees
separately and to publish them in a public register maintained by the parties on their
websites. This public register must include the name and personal identification of the
party member paying the fee as well as the amount of the fee and date of payment. In
France, membership fees are limited to EUR 7 500 per person.
Box 2.3. Regulation of membership fees as a source of political party funding in
selected OECD countries
Membership fees and subscriptions have been declining as a source of funding for political
parties in recent years. However, many countries do not regulate the amount or frequency of
membership fees as a source of party funding, opening potential loopholes to circumvent annual
donor limitations by individuals.
In Iceland, annual membership fees are capped at a limit of ISK 100 000 (approximately
EUR 670) per year.
In France and Ireland, membership fees are treated as part of overall donations, which are
subject to certain ceilings.
In Poland, membership fees cannot exceed the amount of one month’s minimum wage,
which is set each year by the government. In 2015, this amount is equal to EUR 409.*
In Estonia, parties are required to declare membership fees separately from donations, and
publish them in a public register posted on their websites.
Austria, Denmark, Finland and Germany are just a few of the countries who have no
limitations on the amount or frequency of membership fees that may be paid to political parties.
*Eurostat, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=
tps00155&plugin=1.
50 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
Other emerging risks are the loans granted to parties/candidates or sponsorships. This
may be considered hidden private funding. Countries have defined their own models for
regulating this source of funding. In Spain, for instance, the high indebtedness of parties
was recognised by the Third Evaluation Round of GRECO (Group of States against
Corruption), as a challenge to the independence of parties’ vis-à-vis credit institutions.
The Spanish Court of Audit - also a main institution responsible for the control of party
funding, but with non-binding recommendations - had already highlighted this risk to
parties in particular as it observed many irregularities in the management of the loans
granted to parties.
2
Turkey, on the other hand, has simply forbidden parties from
borrowing money or taking loans. In Italy, while taking loans is not forbidden, all
candidates to the national parliament and regional councils need to include the debts
incurred for campaigning in the accounting report and elections statement that they need
to provide to the Board of Comptrollers.
Globalisation further complicates the regulation of foreign money and interests
in ensuring a level playing filed
Political parties and candidates need to be responsive to their constituents and not
influenced by foreign interests. Too much foreign interference in elections is a danger to a
country’s sovereignty. While 68% of OECD countries ban donations from foreign
interests to political parties and 56% of them also ban such donations to candidates, much
variation exists across OECD countries in terms of regulatory scope of foreign donations
(Table 2.5).
For example, while Australia permits foreign contributions subject only to a reporting
requirement, Mexico does not allow Mexican citizens living abroad to make donations
from abroad. Germany prohibits donations from aliens outside of the European Union if
the donation exceeds EUR 1 000. Contributions from foreign corporations are also
prohibited in Germany. In France, foreign states or foreign legal entities cannot make
direct or indirect donations to political candidates or parties. Foreign individual
contributions are prohibited in Israel in the general election but permitted in primaries.
The United Kingdom prohibits the receipt of contributions from abroad, other than from
British citizens living overseas who are still eligible and registered to vote. In Sweden,
receiving money from a foreign donor or someone acting on behalf of a foreign donor is a
criminal offence if the purpose is to influence public opinion in matters fundamental to
the governance of the country or a matter of national security.
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Table 2.5. Bans on foreign donations to political parties in OECD countries
Ban on foreign donations to
political parties
Details
A
ustria No
A
ustria No However, donations from foreign natural or legal persons must not exceed
EUR 2 500.
Belgium No
Canada Yes
Chile Yes Ban does not apply to foreign natural persons who are registered to vote in Chile.
Czech Republic Yes
Denmark No
Finland Yes Ban does not apply to donations from foreign individuals or international
organisations that share the ideological stance.
France Yes
Germany No There is however a limit on how much foreigners may contribute, which is
EUR 1 000 (approximately USD 1 200).
Greece Yes
Hungary Yes
Iceland Yes
Ireland Yes
Israel Yes
Italy No
Japan Yes
Korea Yes
Luxembourg No
Mexico Yes Not even Mexican citizens living or working in other countries are allowed to
make contributions from abroad.
Netherlands No
New Zealand No Ban applies to “overseas donations” exceeding NZD 1 600 (approximately
USD 1 000).
Norway Yes
Poland Yes
Portugal Yes
Slovak Republic Yes Ban does not apply to foreign political parties, groups of political or legal persons
established or owned in majority by a political party.
Slovenia Yes
Spain Yes
Sweden Yes Receiving money from a foreign power or someone acting on behalf of a foreign
power is a criminal offence if the purpose is to influence public opinion in matters
fundamental to the governance of the country or a matter of national security
(within the purview of parliament or the government).
Switzerland No Ban does not exist on the federal level. The Cantons may however institute their
own regulations.
Turkey Yes
United Kingdom Yes In the UK system a donation to a political party is defined as a contribution
exceeding GBP 500 (approximately USD 820). Foreigners cannot make
donations since they are not listed as permissible donors, except where they
support international travel, accommodation or subsistence or subsistence by
party officers/staff (as long as the amount is “reasonable”).
United States Yes
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such
data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West
Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Despite wide variety of regulations on foreign donations, there are still cases in which
foreign interests might have unduly exerted influence over national interests. For
example, it was revealed that “anti-Islam groups in the United States have provided
financial support to Dutch politician, Geert Wilders, an anti-immigration campaigner.
52 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
While this is not illegal in the Netherlands, it sheds light on the international connections
of Mr. Wilders, whose Freedom Party is the least transparent Dutch parliamentary group
and a rallying point for Europe’s far right. Wilders’ party is self-funded, unlike other
Dutch parties that are subsidised by the government. It does not, therefore, have to meet
the same disclosure requirements” (Deutsch and Hosenball, 2012). According to the same
source, a director of the Philadelphia-based think tank, said his organisation provided Mr.
Wilders’ legal defence fund in 2010 and 2011. It sent an undisclosed amount of money
directly to his lawyer. Another conservative activist also admitted that he paid Wilders “a
good fee” for making speeches in the United States. The same activist also paid for
security costs and for hotel accommodations for Wilders’ Dutch bodyguards in 2009.
Both “denied funding Wilders’ political activities in the Netherlands. Both run non-profit,
tax-exempt research and policy organisations which, under US tax laws, are forbidden
from giving direct financial backing to any political candidate or party. US law does
allow such groups to support policy debates financially. Wilders has not revealed how his
political activities are paid for. Former Freedom Party officials have said he has no
personal funds and relies almost entirely on foreign donations” (ibid.).
Globalisation of corporate donors blurs national borders and its regulation
becomes difficult
Where bans on foreign funding do exist in many OECD countries, money-laundering
schemes and a variety of other techniques are often used to evade them. This is a
particularly challenging area for enforcement agencies, as a number of ways exist for
wealthy foreign individuals and corporations to make contributions to a political party or
candidate without violating prohibitions in place. Globalisation of corporate structures
makes it difficult to prevent foreign nationals from participating in a country’s elections
as long as private money is part of the financing mechanism for political campaigns.
Some notorious ways of evading foreign funding bans include setting up branches of the
political party disguised as other organisations, such as think tanks or party foundations,
sometimes referred to as “offshore islands” of political parties. In other cases, foreign
donors and political parties may simply be able to take advantage of a loose definition of
“foreign” in the prohibition (IFES, 2009).
The globalisation of large firms’ organisational structures allows foreign nationals to
influence a country’s elections in direct and indirect ways. Many of these firms do
business abroad through foreign subsidiaries and/or partnerships with foreign companies.
Firms are linked together through mergers and partnerships into global networks that
share information, engage in long-term contracts, and work within host countries to create
and protect opportunities for other firms within the network. Through these processes,
foreign nationals can become part of the internal decision-making apparatus of domestic
firms. Moreover, many of the foreign firms are companies operated by wealthy families
with close ties to foreign governments (Deutsch and Hosenball, 2012; Weinberg, n.d.).
For example, global corporations spent millions to influence the outcome of the US
presidential and congressional elections in 2012. Records show that scores of banks,
liquor manufacturers and telecom companies outside the United States directed
USD 18.1 million to the 2012 US elections and likely much higher amounts through other
means that are not traceable. Non-US companies circumvented election laws by creating
political action committees (PACs) through their US subsidiaries and by asking their US
employees to donate. While it is not possible to know the extent to which foreign parent
companies are driving campaign donations, some US subsidiaries were highly active
contributors (Table 2.6). UBS, Swiss banking group, donated USD 861 500 in total.
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 53
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Anheuser-Busch, which is now owned by the Belgium-based beer giant InBev, gave
USD 806 381 while BAE Systems, a UK defence contractor, gave USD 747 000. Under
US regulations, foreign companies are not supposed to direct or influence the PAC of a
US subsidiary. But in practice, it is virtually impossible to ensure that these US
subsidiaries are truly independent of their foreign parenting firms.
Minimising the dangers of foreign interference in politics remains problematic. While
public funding can be a useful tool to reduce the interference of foreign interests, it
should not replace private funding from those who favour a certain political party or
candidate. It is crucial to remember that political parties and candidates are supposed to
compete with each other for the support of the voters. Only allowing public funding
would be to treat political parties as public institutions, and such an approach could
potentially give the state a biased incentive to treat ruling parties more favourably,
reinforcing inequality rather than promoting a level playing field. Striking the right
balance between public and private funding remains critical.
Table 2.6. Top 20 US campaign donations from foreign-owned firms in 2012
PAC name Country of origin Total Democrats Republicans
1 UBS
A
mericas Switzerland/UBS AG USD 861 500 USD 461 500 USD 400 000
2
Anheuser-Busch
Belgium/Anheuseu
r
-Busch
InBev
USD 806 381 USD 361 381 USD 445 000
3 BAE Systems (BAE Systems) UK/BAE Systems USD 747 000 USD 286 000 USD 461 000
4
A
straZeneca Pharmaceuticals
(AstraZeneca PLO)
UK/AstraZeneca FLC USD 640 452 USD 296 952 USD 343 500
5 GlaxoSmithKline UK/GlaxoSmithKline USD 521 250 USD 239 000 USD 282 250
6 Credit Suisse Securities Switzerland/Credit Suisse
Group
USD 519 000 USD 239 500 USD 279 500
7 T-Mobile US
A
Germany/Deutsche
Telekom AG
USD 473 500 USD 198 500 USD 275 000
8 Bayer Corp Germany/Bayer AG USD 470 000 USD 150 000 USD 320 000
9 Experian UK/Experian plc USD 426 000 USD 99 500 USD 326 500
10 BASF Corp Germany/BASF SE USD 411 500 USD 118 500 USD 293 000
11 DRS Technologies Italy/Finmeccanica SpA USD 405 300 USD 173 000 USD 232 300
12 Novartis Corp (Novatis AG) Switzerland/NovartisAG USD 330 200 USD 130 500 USD 199 700
13 Sprint Corp (Sprint Nextel) Japan/Softbank Corp USD 312 306 USD 151 500 USD 160 806
14
A
ccenture (Accenture) Ireland/Accenture plc USD 304 500 USD 160 000 USD 144 500
15 Siemens Corp Germany/Siemens AG USD 290 000 USD 138 500 USD 151 500
16
A
ce INA Switzerland/ACE Ltd USD 281 500 USD 121 500 USD 160 000
17 Rolls-Royce North America UK/Rolls-Royce PLC USD 272 250 USD 73 500 USD 198 750
18 Genentech Inc (Roche Holdings) Switzerland/Roche
Holdings
USD 269 500 USD 134 000 USD 135 500
19 Syngenta Corp Switzerland/Syngenta AG USD 255 000 USD 90 500 USD 164 500
20 Compass Bancshares Spain/Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria
USD 249 500 USD 62 000 USD 187 500
Source: Center for Responsive Politics (n.d.), “Foreign-connected PACs”, www.opensecrets.org/pacs/foreign.php?cycle=2012
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
Spending limits for election campaigns: Promoting integrity and fairness or a
limitation of political expression?
Setting spending limits for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns
contributes to reducing the overall cost of elections and prevents a spending race between
political parties and between candidates. Spending limits could limit the incentives for
undue influence and corruption stemming from high expenditures. On the other hand,
opponents of spending limits argue that spending money on political campaigns falls
54 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
under the fundamental freedom of free speech, and that any limitation of spending equals
a limitation of political expression. In 2010, the US Supreme Court ruled in this sense in
Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission. Research has also shown that resources
are more important for challengers than for incumbents. Consequently, spending limits
may only establish equality formally, while de facto causing a disadvantage for
challengers who need more funds to unseat an incumbent candidate.
There are no limits in 35% of OECD countries on the amounts a political party or
candidate can spend. Some 47% of OECD countries have introduced spending limits for
both political parties and candidates. On the other hand, 12% of OECD countries only
limit the amount a candidate can spend, but not political parties, and 6% limit spending
by political parties, but not candidates (Figure 2.8). For example, in France, Iceland,
Ireland, and Japan, there are spending limits on the amount a candidate can spend, but no
limits for political parties. In Spain and the United States, there are spending limits for
political parties, but not for candidates (Table 2.7).
In order to reflect the change the socio-economic circumstances, some countries also
set different amount of spending limits for every election. For example, in Korea,
spending limits for every election are calculated in consideration of voter population,
number of constituencies and the inflation rate. In addition to overall spending limits,
some countries also place spending limits on particular items and services. For example,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico, among others, ban or restrict political party spending on TV
advertisements.
The definition of third-party campaigning is subject to debate, and its regulation
remains challenging in many countries
An emerging challenge to spending limits is to effectively apply restrictions on
third-party spending. If not, the limits will be evaded by re-channelling election spending
through supposedly independent committees and interest groups. Third-party
campaigners are sometimes referred as non-party campaigners and may include charities,
faith groups, individuals or private firms that campaign in the run-up to elections, but do
not stand as political parties or candidates. Where spending on certain campaigning
activities can be seen as reasonably intended to influence voters to vote for or against a
political party or a category of candidates, there should be rules that apply. Only a few
OECD countries currently have regulations for third-party campaigning (Table 2.8). In
practice, the activities of many private firms and other organisations and their political
impact are often difficult to measure precisely; therefore, there is a grey area as to what
kind of political activities should be subject to third-party campaigning regulation
(Box 2.4).
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FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Figure 2.8. Spending limits for candidates and political parties in OECD countries
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East
Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed
on 27 October 2015).
Estonia
Countries where
there are limits on
the amounts a
political party or a
candidate can spend
47%
Countries where there are no
limits on the amount a
political party can spend but
there are limits for a
candidate
Countries where there
are limits on the amount
a political party can
spend but there are no
limits for a candidate
6%
Countries where
there are no limits
on the amount a
political party or a
candidate can
spend
35%
56 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
Table 2.7. Spending limits for political parties and candidates in OECD countries
Limits on the amount a political party can spend Limits on the amount a candidate can spend
A
ustralia No No
A
ustria EUR 7 million per party
1
In theory, EUR 7 million, if no other candidate of the
party, nor the party, spends any funding.
2
Belgium EUR 1 million per campaign Depends on candidate’s position on the nomination
list; limit includes fixed amount and amount for
registered voter in previous election.
Canada CAD 0.70 (EUR 0.49) multiplied by number of names on the
electoral list(s)
3
Based on the number of names on the preliminary or
revised lists of electors for each electoral district. The
limit is adjusted for inflation.
Chile One-third of the overall amount of the expenses allowed to its
nominated candidates
Varies from office to office, but in every case is set
according to a formula clearly set forth in the law.
Czech Republic No CZK 40 million (EUR 1.45 million) for presidential
elections (first round), and CZK 10 million
(EUR 361 000) for presidential run-off elections.
Denmark No No
Estonia No No
Finland No No
France No
4
Depends on the kind of election and the population of
each constituency
Germany No No
Greece 20% of the most recent total annual amount of regular public
funding received
- Local elections: Based on the number of seats in
their respective constituency or population in the
relevant prefecture or municipality.
- Parliamentary elections: Based on the amount
applicable for the candidates for the election in the
A'Electoral Region of Athens.
Hungary HUF 1 million (EUR 3 270) per candidate for independent
candidates and nominating organisations on elections. Thus, party
expenditure cannot exceed HUF 386 million (EUR 1.26 million).
Independent candidates may spend maximum
HUF 1 million (EUR 3 270) on the elections.
Iceland No ISK 35 million (EUR 226, 000) (presidential
candidates); ISK 100 000 (EUR 646) (candidate
nomination)
5
Ireland No - European election: EUR 230 000
- 3-seat constituency at a Dáil general or by-election:
EUR 30 150
- 4-seat constituency at a Dáil general or by-election:
EUR 37 650
- 5-seat constituency at a Dáil general or by-election:
EUR 45 200
Israel Election expenses may not exceed 70 financing units. Limits also
vary depending on how many Knesset members a party has on
the determining day (101st day before elections).
6
The limit applies to the candidates party
Italy EUR 1 per vote cast to a party for the elections to the Chamber
and EUR 1 per vote cast for the Senate elections.
EUR 52 000 plus EUR 0.1 per citizen in the electoral
district, in addition to the limit for political parties
Japan No Limit varies depending on registered voters in
constituency and type of election
Korea Multiple of population size in electoral area; multiple varies per
type of election.
Limit is a multiple of the population size in each
electoral area; multiple varies per type of election
Luxembourg No No
Mexico Limit varies for each federal public office
7
Limit varies for each federal public office
Netherlands No No
New Zealand NZD 1.07 million (EUR 666 855) plus NZD 25 000 (EUR 15 652)
per district contested
8
NZD 25 000 (EUR 15,652) for general elections;
NZD 50 000 (EUR 31 300) for by-elections
9
Norway No No
Poland Based on the number of voters and (for legislative elections)
number of seats per constituency
Depends on the number of seats and registered voters
in each district
Portugal From 150 to 12 500 minimum monthly wages depending on
election type
80% of 10 000 minimum monthly wages for first round,
80% of 2 500 minimum monthly wages for run off
round.
Slovak Republic Limit of SKK 12 million for political parties on advertising EUR 132 775 for presidential candidates
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 57
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Table 2.7. Spending limits for political parties and candidates in OECD countries (continued)
Limits on the amount a political party can spend
10
Limits on the amount a candidate can spend
Slovenia Limit is based on the number of eligible voters; exact limit depends
on the type of election
Depends on the type of election
Spain General elections: EUR 0.24 per resident in the electoral districts
where the party presents its list. European Parliament elections:
EUR 0.12 per resident. Municipal elections: EUR 0.07per resident.
Additional EUR 96 162 for each province where the political party
meets certain conditions.
No
Sweden No No
Switzerland No No
Turkey No No
United Kingdom GBP 30 000 (EUR 37 500) per constituency or GBP 810 000
(EUR 1.01 million) (England), GBP 120 000 (EUR 150 000)
(Scotland) and GBP 60 000 (EUR 75 000) (Wales), whatever is the
greater (GBP 30 000 [EUR 37 500] per constituency in Northern
Ireland).
Fixed amount combined with amount per registered
voter, exact amount depends on the type of
constituency, and is higher if Parliament has sat for
over 55 months.
United States Limit for co-ordinated expenditure is USD 0.02 (EUR 0.016)
multiplied by the voting age population of the United States
No
11
Notes:
1. If the same list of candidates is supported by two or more political parties, the maximum amount shall apply to the aggregated
expenses of those parties.
2. The total campaign expenditure limit of political parties is EUR 7 million. In this, all individual candidates' campaign
expenditures are included, which means that the theoretical spending limit of a candidate is EUR 7 million. If, however, a
candidate spends EUR 15 000 or less, this will not count toward the party's limit.
3. The limits for political parties are calculated according to a formula based on the number of names on the preliminary or
revised lists of electors for each electoral district. For a party, the electoral districts are those in which the party has endorsed
confirmed candidates. The amount is adjusted for inflation and the base figure with which the names are to be multiplied is
CAD 0.70.
4. No general ceiling on expenses for political parties fixed before the elections. Political parties must only respect the ceiling on
expenses that is applied in each constituency where they endorse candidates. On the other hand, candidates have to declare the
amount of money that comes from political parties.
5. Limit introduced for presidential candidates in 2010. General limit only relates to the internal selection process (primaries).
6. A “financing unit” is an amount designated by the Finance Committee of the Parliament.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data
by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank
under the terms of international law.
7. The limit for the presidential race is equal to 20% of the public funding allocated to all political parties for campaign
expenses. Candidates for the lower chamber may spend 1/300
th
of the limit set for presidential candidates (equals the funding
limited divided by the number of lower chamber seats), and senate candidates may spend the amount set for the lower chamber
multiplied by the number of districts in the area for which they are campaigning (not to exceed 20x the amount set for the lower
chamber).
8. The Governor-General can set the limit to another amount.
9. The Governor-General can set the limit to another amount.
10. There is a limit of SKK 12 million for political parties on advertising and campaigning expenses. Note that although the euro
was introduced in 2009, the law does not discuss the method and rate of exchange from the original 1994 amount in SKK.
11. The expenditure limits is only applicable to candidates (presidential and for federal office) who accept public funding in the
general election. Candidates who accept public funding must limit spending to the amount of the grant.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
58 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
Table 2.8. Examples of third-party campaigning regulations in selected OECD countries
Regulation of third parties Regulating body Method of regulation
Canada Yes Chief Electoral Officer in Canada
(Elections Canada)
Expenditures of CAD 500 or more
on advertising
1
must file a Third-
Party Election Advertising Report;
Statutory limited on third party
expenditures
2
Ireland
3
Yes Standards in Public Office
Commission (Standards
Commission)
Donation thresholds, restrictions,
and registration requirements
Slovak Republic
4
Yes - presidential elections only Ministry of Finance Reporting
–
publishers or
distributors or advertising firms
who do so for the benefit of a
candidate must report it to the
Ministry of Finance within 30 days
after election
United Kingdom
5
Yes Electoral Commission Statutory limits on expenditures of
third parties; Obligatory reporting
of expenditures: GBP 20 000 in
the United Kingdom, GBP 10 000
in Scotland, Wales or Northern
Ireland
6
United States Yes Federal Election Commission
(FEC) (political committees,
candidates)
Department of Treasury Internal
Revenue Service
7
(501[c] non-profit organisations,
527 political committees)
Registration;
8
Obligatory reporting
of expenditures of political action
committees
9
Public reporting required for non-
profit organisations and certain
political committees
Certain types of expenditures
must also be reported to the FEC
Notes:
1. Canada Elections Act (S.C. 2000, c. 9, Section 349).
2. Elections Canada (n.d.), “Third party election advertising expenses limits”,
www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&document=index&dir=thi/limits&lang=e (accessed on 27 October 2015).
3. See GRECO Second Compliance Report on Ireland (2013) – pg. 7, paragraph 33.
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoRC3%282013%2910_Second_Ireland_EN.pdf
4. GRECO report on the Slovak Republic (2008) – pg. 12, paragraph 49-50.
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3%282007%294_Slovakia_Two_EN.pdf
5. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, §§ 85-94.
6. Electoral Commission (n.d. a), “Introduction for non-party campaigners”,
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/169451/intro-campaigner-npc-ukpge.pdf (accessed on 27 October
2015).
7. IRS (n.d.), “Tax Information for Political Organizations”, www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Political-Organizations
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
8. FEC (n.d. a), “Quick answers to PAC questions”, www.fec.gov/ans/answers_pac.shtml (accessed on 27 October 2015).
9. FEC (n.d. b), “Independent expenditures”, www.fec.gov/info/report_dates_2015.shtml#ie (accessed on 27 October 2015).
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 59
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Box 2.4. Third-party campaigning during the 2015 parliamentary elections
in Estonia
Another emerging challenge for oversight concerned the appearance of stealth campaigning
by third-party groups during the 2015 parliamentary elections. In January 2015, a conservative
civil society organisation distributed across several regions of Estonia flyers calling on voters
not to vote for a number of candidates, who in the previous parliament had voted in favour of a
same-sex partnership law. At the same time it encouraged voters to vote for three particular
candidates, who had opposed the partnership law.
While the first aspect of the flyer (i.e. negative advertising) did not breach any element of
campaign financing law, the second dimension in which the foundation was providing positive
advertisement for certain candidates did. Under Estonia law this could be considered an illegal
campaign contribution, which the candidate in question would have to pay back to the
foundation. When asked about this incident by the press, the foundation claimed that it was
operating merely as a civil society actor wanting to promote a political message. However,
because foundations are also legal persons in Estonia, the group was already in violation of this
provision of Estonian law (that bans legal entities from making campaign contributions). And
even if it claimed that it was distributing its flyers without any active knowledge or help from
the candidates concerned, Estonian law holds the candidates accountable, not the foundation.
The case raised vexing issues in terms of whether candidates in the future might be
vulnerable to having non-party groups suddenly campaigning for them without their approval. In
August 2015, the Estonian Party Financing Supervision Committee (EPFSC) asked the Estonian
police to charge the foundation with a misdemeanour offence based on the financing law
infringements. However, the police authority denied the request, maintaining that because the
foundation had included all of the major parties running for parliament on its flyer, this could not
be seen as favouring any one of them and therefore could not be considered as campaign
advertising. This issue remained unresolved.
Note: For more details, see Chapter 8 in this report.
In the United Kingdom, the Electoral Commission requires individuals or
organisations that spend or plan to spend more than GBP 20 000 in England or
GBP 10 000 (each) in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland on regulated campaign
activities during a regulated period to register as non-party campaigners. If they register
with the Electoral Commission, they will have a higher spending limit. The spending
limits will depend on which election they are campaigning in and once they are
registered, there are rules they must follow on donations, spending and reporting. For the
2015 general elections, the spending limit for a particular constituency is set at
GBP 9 750. A register of non-party campaigners is made public on the UK Electoral
Commission website. For example, as of 7 May 2015, there were 66 registered non-party
campaigners (Electoral Commission, n.d. b).
Abuse of state resources presents a risk to the level playing field, but most OECD
countries limit privileged access to state resources by the incumbents
The already unequal level between the incumbent and a challenger can be further
affected by the misuse of state resources by the incumbent. Abusing government
60 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
resources to promote re-election of those in power, or unilaterally subsidising political
parties, jeopardise the level playing field. The abuse of resources includes government
officials using official vehicles during campaigns, printing campaign material in national
printing offices or holding party meetings and rallies in official precincts. In the case of
incumbent officeholders running for re-election, abuse of public resources includes office
staff working for the campaign and travel costs being billed as expenses. Some 82% of
OECD member countries have banned state resources being given to, or received by,
political parties or candidates, excluding regulated public funding (Figure 2.9).
Figure 2.9. OECD countries that ban state resources being unevenly given to, or received by,
political parties or candidates (excluding regulated public funding)
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East
Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on
27 October 2015).
While the debate on solution for abuse of resources tends to focus on legal measures,
it is important to take into account underlying historic and structural factors. In countries
where one-party regimes were in place for a long time, the separation between the state
and the ruling party is often still blurred. Regulatory measures like bans and limits for the
government to use state vehicles, mobilise public servants or limit public propaganda may
fall short of solving the problem.
Greece
Ban on state resources
being given to or received
by political parties or
candidates
(excluding regulated
public funding)
82%
No ban on state resources
being given to or received
by political parties or
candidates
(excluding regulated
public funding)
6%
No data
12%
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 61
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Some countries employ specific and targeted measures to prevent the government
from abusing its advantage for re-election. There are bans on disproportionate
government spending on advertising before elections, hiring new public servants, and
signing public contracts.
Since communication is a key asset in election campaigns, public advertising is a
target for abuse during election campaigns. One indicator for abuse of public advertising
for electoral purposes is increased spending on government advertising in election years.
Many countries limit or ban political advertisement in media before and during elections.
For example, Japan tightly controls campaign advertisements for candidates. They are
paid for by the government and candidates are not allowed to purchase their own
advertisements. The number and type of candidate advertisements are also limited,
including the size of newspaper advertisements, and length of television and radio
advertisements. Campaign advertisements can only be broadcast during the two-week
official campaign period and are closely monitored for violations of election law. As for
mitigating risks related to public contracting, 74% of OECD countries ban donations from
corporations with government contracts or partial government ownership to political
parties (Figure 2.10). In the United States, it is prohibited for a contractor that provides
goods and/or services to the federal government or any affiliated department or agency to
make any contribution to any political party, political action committee or candidate in
connection with a federal election.
Figure 2.10. OECD countries that ban donations from corporations with government
contracts or partial ownership to political parties
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East
Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on
27 October 2015).
Much variation also exists in terms of regulatory scope to ban donations from these
corporations. Austria prohibits donations from corporations if the state holds a share of at
least 25%. In Chile, a ban applies to cases where the amount of the contract represents
more than 40% of the annual revenue of the corporation.
No
26%
Yes
74%
62 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
It is interesting to note that the combination of spending limits and the abuse of state
resources may lead to unintended consequences. If there is a limit on permitted spending
by candidates in parliamentary election campaigns and if incumbent legislators are able to
use public funds supposedly to carry out their duties to their constituents, but in practice
to campaign for their votes, there will be a double unbalanced effect. First, incumbents
will obtain public funds while the challengers will not; second, the incumbents will be
able to escape the spending limit by funding activities designated as “carrying out their
legislative duties” while challengers will be unable to spend in parallel even if they are
able to raise the funds to do so (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2013).
The issue of the use of public resources for partisan purposes reaches beyond central
governments to legislatures, local government authorities and elected mayors and
councillors, and other public bodies as well as state governments in countries with federal
systems. Underlying facts related to privileged access to state resources still need to be
understood, such as the incumbency factor or incumbency advantage which entails that
political parties have privileged access to certain public resources, thus distorting the
level playing field among all parties and candidates.
Notes
1. For a more detailed discussion on political finance regulations in OECD countries,
see OECD (2013).
2. Recommendation i. “GRECO recommended to take appropriate measures to ensure
that loans granted to political parties are not used to circumvent political financing
regulations” (Paragraph 74).
I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING – 63
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Ballington, J. and M. Kahane (2014), “Women in politics: Financing for gender equality”,
in Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A Handbook on Political
Finance, International IDEA, Stockholm.
Center for Responsive Politics (n.d.), “Foreign-connected PACs”,
www.opensecrets.org/pacs/foreign.php?cycle=2012
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
Chrisafis, Angelique (2013), “French inquiry opens into allegations Gaddafi funded
Sarkozy 2007 campaign”, The Guardian, 19 April, www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/apr/19/french-inquiry-gaddafi-sarkozy-2007-campaign.
Deutsch, Anthony and Mark Hosenball (2012), “Exclusive: U.S. groups helped fund
Dutch anti-Islam politician Wilders”, Reuters, 10 September,
www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/10/us-dutch-wilders-us-idUSBRE8890Q820120910.
Elections Canada (n.d.), “Third party election advertising expenses limits”,
www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&document=index&dir=thi/limits&lang=e
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
Electoral Commission (n.d. a), “Introduction for non-party campaigners”,
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/169451/intro-
campaigner-npc-ukpge.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Electoral Commission (n.d. b), “Register of non-party campaigners”,
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-
campaigning-and-donations/non-party-campaign-spending-and-donations-at-
elections/register-of-non-party-campaigners (accessed on 27 October 2015).
FEC (Federal Election Commission) (n.d. a), “Quick answers to PAC questions”,
www.fec.gov/ans/answers_pac.shtml (accessed on 27 October 2015).
FEC (n.d. b), “Independent expenditures”, www.fec.gov/info/report_dates_2015.shtml#ie
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) (n.d.), “Third Evaluation Round (launched
in 2007): Evaluation and Compliance Reports”, Council of Europe,
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/ReportsRound3_en.asp
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) (n.d.), Political
Finance Database,
www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems) (2009), “Political finance
regulation: The global experience”,
www.ifes.org/files/Political_Finance_Regulation_
The_Global_Experience.pdf.
64 – I.2. PROMOTING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD THROUGH BALANCED FUNDING
IRS (Internal Revenue Service) (n.d.), “Tax Information for Political Organizations”,
www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Political-Organizations (accessed on
27 October 2015).
Katz, R. and Peter Mair (1995), “Changing models of party organization and party
democracy: The emergence of the cartel party”, Party Politics 1, pp. 5-28.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan (n.d.),
www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/83101_2.html (accessed on 27 October 2015).
OECD (2013), ), “Investing in trust: Leveraging institutions for inclusive policy making”,
background paper for OECD conference on Restoring Trust in Government:
Addressing Money and Influence in Public Decision Making, 14-15 November,
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Regulation”, CDL-AD(2010)024, Study no. 595/2010,
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD%282010)024-e.
Piccio, D. R. (2014), “Northern, Western and Southern Europe”, in Funding of Political
Parties and Election Campaigns: A Handbook on Political Finance, International
IDEA, Stockholm.
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (2013), “Facts, sceptical thoughts and policy ideas”, draft
background paper for OECD conference on Restoring Trust in Government:
Addressing Money and Influence in Public Decision Making, 14-15 November,
www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/restoring-trust-in-
government.htm.www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/restoring-trust-in-government.htm
UK Electoral Commission (n.d.), www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-
subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-donations/political-party-spending-at-
elections/details-of-party-spending-at-previous-elections (accessed on 27 October
2015).
Weinberg. A. (n.d.), “Globalization of campaign funding: The problem of private money
in politics”,
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politics/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 65
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Chapter 3
Increasing transparency and accountability through disclosure of
political party and election-campaign funding
This chapter focuses on measures to ensure transparency and accountability in financing
democracy. Comprehensive disclosure of income sources of political parties and
candidates contributes to greater transparency, serving as a deterrent measure to limit
undue influence. For disclosure of information to make sense and inform citizens,
information needs to be organised in an intelligible and user-friendly way.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is
without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international
law.
66 – I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING
A cornerstone of ensuring transparency and accountability in political finance is the
requirement for political parties and candidates to disclose information about how they
raise and spend money. Such information can facilitate better informed voter decisions as
well as effective oversight of political finance. Comprehensive disclosure of financial
information can also serve as a deterrent measure to minimise the impact of undue
influence.
Reporting requirements as a tool for ensuring accountability in the decision-making
process
It is important to keep records of election campaigns expenditure as well as books and
accounts of political parties and their affiliated entities. The primary rationale for
disclosure is to enable public oversight institutions to check the books and accounts of
parties, candidates and donors to verify their compliance with the law. The GRECO
Thematic Review of the Third Evaluation Round stressed that “a system that fails to
ensure that sources of income and accounts are properly disclosed makes it much harder
to monitor the application of the law and impose necessary sanctions” (Doublet, 2012).
While violators cannot be expected to admit to infringements in their reports, requiring
them to provide financial accounts provides a paper trail that can assist in further
investigations. Reporting requirements concerning activities and organisations covered
(party organisations, candidates, fundraising organisations, donors) and the detail of
information (assets and liabilities, income and expenses, organisation costs,
electioneering activities, political advertising) vary widely across OECD countries. While
regular financial reporting by political parties takes place in almost all OECD countries,
68% of OECD countries also require candidates to report on their campaign finances to
the oversight body. In 65% of OECD countries, political parties must report on their
finances in relation to election campaigns (Figure 3.1).
Comprehensive disclosure of both public and private funding is crucial
In some countries, reporting is limited to how public funding was spent. In this case,
reporting requirements that apply to all recipients of public funds also extend to political
parties. For the discussion on how money influences public policies, only providing such
information has limited value.
Public funding is generally tied to stronger rules and controls to ensure that they are
provided fairly to all stakeholders. These controls have been increasingly strengthened
after political scandals showcasing major irregularities in party funding. In Italy, for
instance, public funding regulation was limited to reimbursement of actual campaign
expenditures, rather than campaign expenditures and routine party activities, as it used to
be prior to 1993 (Doublet, 2012). This has, however, led to scenarios in which candidates
rely solely on private funding to avoid tighter controls. In the 2012 US presidential
elections, for instance, both final candidates relied exclusively on private funding (US
Federal Election Commission, 2014).
I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 67
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Figure 3.1. Separate reporting of information on election campaigns by political parties and/or candidates in
OECD countries
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such
data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West
Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Thorough auditing of political finance reports ensures transparency and
accountability
After reports have been submitted, it is of utmost importance to verify and audit the
data submitted. However, even when election campaign accounts are submitted by the
legal deadline, verification and audit of such data are not always carried out thoroughly,
meaning that there is limited incentive for candidates and political parties to present
accurate figures. Verification and audit of financial records are effective measures to spot
irregularities of financial flow in politics (Box 3.1) and should be conducted by auditors
and specialised experts.
In Estonia, political parties are subject to a yearly financial audit by the tax authority
and are required to submit electoral campaign reports and quarterly financial reports to
the Estonian Party Financing Monitoring Committee (EPFMC). EPMFC also conducts
analysis of political parties’ financial health and publishes the results on its website. In
France, annual accounts of political parties are certified by two auditors and submitted to
the National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Funding (CNCCFP). The
CNCCFP can request as necessary the communication of any accounting or supporting
document needed for the accomplishment of its control function. In the United Kingdom,
a political party with a gross income or total expenditure in a financial year that exceed
GBP 250 000 must have its statement of accounts audited. An audit is also required of
any return of party election expenditure if the expenditure exceeds GBP 250 000 during a
campaign period. In addition, the UK Electoral Commission undertakes its own
Political parties
have to report on their
finances in relation to
election campaigns
65%
Political parties do not have to
report on their finances in
relation to election campaigns
35%
Candidates have
to report on their
campaign finances
68%
Candidates do
not have to report
on their
campaign
finances
32%
68 – I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING
compliance checks of the information it receives, e.g. checking the permissibility of
donations, and cross-referencing statements made in different reports to identify any
inconsistencies.
Box 3.1. Verification of financial records sheds light on suspicious use of
political funding in Japan
In Japan, verification of financial records led to the discovery of a number of discrepancies
in political funding reports of two support groups linked to the former trade minister in 2014.
The two groups were both set up to aid her political activities. Among their initiatives, they
organised an annual trip to Tokyo for local voters that included a private performance by a
popular singer at a leading theatre.
They collected fees for the event, but a discrepancy in the accounting was spotted following
verification. The recorded contribution by tour participants was substantially smaller than the
expenses the two groups reported paying the theatre. The discrepancy was reportedly around
JPY 26 million (EUR 200 000 euro) in 2010 and 2011. The financial reports also showed that
expenditures for theatre tours organised for the supporters in 2013 exceeded revenue by
JPY 7.87 million (EUR 60 000 euro). While JPY 10.89 million (EUR 83 700 euro) was recorded
as revenue in the reports, payments to the theatre in Tokyo totalled JPY 18.76 million
(EUR 144 000). The reports were disclosed by the election board.
If the declarations are correct, it would mean the two groups subsidised the trip, a likely
violation of the election campaign law that prohibits bribing voters. But if the participants did in
fact cover all costs, it would mean inaccuracy in reporting, a violation of the political funds
control law. Allegations were also raised that the trade minister’s political funds were used to
buy goods from shops run by her relatives, and other purchases ranging from baby goods to
groceries.
Source: Aoki, Mizuho and Reiji Yoshida (2014), “Two of Abe’s female ministers resign over separate
scandals”, Japan Times, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/20/national/politics-diplomacy/two-of-abes-
female-ministers-resign-over-separate-scandals/.
Where compulsory disclosure of information of all donors is not always
feasible, donations above certain thresholds are usually disclosed to ensure
transparency and mitigate the risks of undue influence
In relation to disclosure provision, identifying individual donors is necessary in order
to track their doing business with the state (Box 3.2). Even in established democracies,
donors may feel the requirement to disclose political contributions as a significant
deterrent to political giving. Donors may simply not wish for their political sympathies to
become a matter of public and media scrutiny. They may in some circumstances also fear
that they will be subject to discrimination in the award of government contracts if they
publicly back the “other party”. The question is therefore whether the aforementioned
issues and loss of privacy can be justified on the basis of preventing public policies
capture by party and election campaign donations. In some countries, the identities of the
donors are only disclosed when their contributions are above a certain threshold. Such
provisions seek a balance between transparency and protecting the privacy of those
making smaller donations while they also limit the administrative burden on those
required to submit reports. Yet, in just over a quarter (27%) of OECD countries, the
identity of donors is reported on a regular basis in reports from political parties and/or
I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 69
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
donors. The identity is disclosed on certain conditions in 73% of OECD countries
(Figure 3.2).
Box 3.2. Donor anonymity in small donations in Japan
Under the Political Funds Control Law in Japan, names of donors who give less than
JPY 50 000 (approximately EUR 380) annually are not required to be listed in political fund
reports, while political organisations must state in their account books the names and addresses
of all donors including those who make small donations of up to JPY 50 000 annually, and the
amount of each contribution.
In 2009, then Prime Minister’s political fund management body was charged with
fabricating a report on approximately JPY 22 million (EUR 170 000) donated from about 90
people between 2005 and 2008. It falsely reported the personal donor names, which included
deceased persons’ names, and also disguised the total amount of JPY 180 million
(EUR 1.4 million) in personal donations of up to JPY 50 000 collected for five years since 2004,
because donations under JPY 50 000 are not required to list donor’s names. His fund
management body also accepted over JPY 340 million between 1998 and 2007 from individuals
anonymously, accounting for 60% of the JPY 590 million (EUR 4.5 million) it accepted in
donations in ten years. This ratio of anonymous donations was significantly higher than the rest
of the members of parliament. It was impossible to know with certainty that donations were
actually made by individuals.
Source: Japan Times (2009), “The price Mr. Hatoyama pays”, Editorial, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2009/12/01/editorials/the-price-
mr-hatoyama-pays/.
Figure 3.2. Requirement to include the identity of donors in reports from political parties
and/or candidates in OECD countries
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the
OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of
international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Reports from political
parties and/or donors
sometimes reveal the
identity of donors: 73%
Reports from
political parties
and/or donors must
reveal the identity
of donors: 27%
70 – I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING
For example, in the Czech Republic, the Law on Political Parties and Movements
requires all registered political parties regardless of whether they receive public funding
or not, to submit a report on their finances to the Chamber of Deputies by 1 April the
following year. There is no separate reporting requirement for election campaigns. The
annual financial report is to include information on income whereby the Law on Political
Parties and Movements provides both a list of permitted and prohibited sources of income
and expenditure. Some of the information on income contained in the reports are
remarkably detailed. As there is no disclosure threshold, all donations, regardless of their
amount, have to be reported, including donors’ names and addresses or in the case of
legal entities, their business names, addresses and identification numbers. In Finland,
political parties are required to file a disclosure form with the National Audit Office if the
value of an individual contribution or the total value of several contributions from the
same donors exceed EUR 1 500 per calendar year. Adding up multiple contributions
received from the same donor and reporting them as a single campaign contribution is
crucial in order to avoid circumvention of the threshold rules.
Public availability of disclosures to enable public scrutiny
Institutionalising transparency and accountability for effective regulation of political
finance is a critical aspect to safeguard the integrity and fairness of public decision
making. International instruments such as the United Nations Convention against
Corruption, requires State Parties to “enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures
for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties” (UNODC,
2003). Transparency has two potential advantages:
1. It is a guard against corruption and improper influence. If a politician is elected to
office with major financial support from an individual donor, corporation or
industry and subsequently uses his or her power unduly to benefit the benefactor,
the link between donation and reward will not pass unnoticed.
2. If donations have to be declared before the poll, transparency may permit the
elector to know the identity of each candidate’s and each political party’s main
backers. This information will permit the elector to be informed about the interests
behind the rival contestants.
One way to promote transparency in political finance is by disclosing information on
political party or candidate sources of funding. Some 93% of OECD countries (excluding
Switzerland where political parties do not report regularly, Spain and Turkey) make
information in the reports from political parties and/or candidates public (Table 3.1). For
example, in Italy, party financial accounts must be published on the websites of the
political parties, the website of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as in newspapers, and
the Official Gazette of the State. In the United Kingdom all parties’ reported financial
information, i.e. donation/loan reports, campaign expenditure returns and statement of
accounts are made available on the Electoral Commission’s website. This includes PDF
(portable document format) copies of invoices and receipts for campaign expenditure. In
addition to online publication of the final report on financial information, online
disclosure of raw data and information submitted by political parties and candidates
would also facilitate further scrutiny by media and civil society organisations (CSOs).
I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 71
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Table 3.1. Public disclosure of information in reports from political parties and/or candidates
in OECD countries
Is information in reports from political parties and/or
candidates made public
Comments
A
ustralia Yes
A
ustria Yes However, not all information is made public.
Belgium Yes Published by the electoral management body.
Canada Yes
A
ll reports are published on www.elections.ca.
Chile Yes The information should be available to any person who
wants to have a copy, as well as published and updated on
the Internet.
Czech Republic Yes
Denmark Yes
Estonia Yes
Finland Yes
France Yes
Germany Yes However, there is no obligation of political parties to publish
their financial records.
Greece Yes
Hungary Yes
Iceland Yes Only certain information.
Ireland Yes Though donations will only be disclosed if they exceed a
certain level.
Israel Yes The public is informed of the volume of income and
expenditures of parties through the State Comptroller’s
report. Details are given in cases where violations have
occurred.
Italy Yes Party financial accounts must be published on the websites
of the political parties, the website of the Chamber of
Deputies, as well as in newspapers, and the Official
Gazette of the State.
Japan Yes
Korea Yes
Luxembourg Yes
Mexico Yes
A
ll financial reports submitted by political parties are
regarded as public information, and as such should be
publicly available.
Netherlands Yes Financial accounts are made public.
New Zealand Yes
Norway Yes
Poland Yes
Portugal Yes
Slovak Republic Yes For political parties.
Slovenia Yes
Spain No Report by Court of Audit is however published, normally
containing summary information on parties’ annual
accounts.
Sweden Yes
Switzerland N/A
Turkey No In practice, some political parties publish summaries of
their financial information.
United Kingdom Yes
A
ll parties’ reported financial information, i.e. donation/loan
reports, campaign expenditure returns and statement of
accounts are made available on the Commission’s website.
This includes pdfs of invoices and receipts for campaign
expenditure. Their financial information is publicly
available.
United States Yes The reports are available at www.fec.gov.
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such
data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West
Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
72 – I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING
Even though in Spain and Turkey regulations do not require publication of party
financial information, there are several transparency initiatives. In Spain, the Court of
Audit report is published and normally contains summary information on parties’ annual
accounts that is published. In Turkey, some political parties publish summaries of their
financial information.
Online technologies facilitate information disclosure being organised in a
timely, reliable, accessible and intelligible manner
Transparency, however, is not synonymous with vast amounts of information. Large
amounts of information or information not adequately presented may have a contrary
effect on citizens. For example, the case studies of Mexico and India presented in this
volume show that establishing an efficient online system for reviewing and publishing
financial reports is one of the major challenges to their political finance reforms.
In order to allow comprehensive, proactive disclosure, data should be timely, reliable,
accessible and intelligible (Pfeiffer and Speck, 2008):
1. Timely information is key where civil society organisations get involved as
watchdogs over political financing. Information available only months or years
after the election or at the end of the fiscal year makes the information less
relevant for public discussion. Long delays in reporting also make the
falsification of information possible.
2. Information might not be reliable when data are first disclosed, but over time
public scrutiny of information and enforcement by state agencies make data more
reliable.
3. Reports are often not accessible, either because there is no legal ground for
disclosure, or because access to reports is difficult and time consuming for most
people.
4. Even when data is disclosed, the information might not be in a readable format. A
hard copy of a financial report in PDF format is different from a database with all
financial records available for download. Data are not information. For disclosure
of information to make sense and inform citizens, they need be organised in an
intelligible and user-friendly way. Ideally, all reports should be submitted and
published in a standardised, machine-readable format so as to ensure their
comparability, clarity and digestibility.
While several countries proactively disclose comprehensive information on line
(Table 3.2), GRECO acknowledged that the US Federal Election Commission website is
an impressive source of information and transparency of political financing, of an
exemplary level (Box 3.3).
I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 73
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Table 3.2. Examples of online availability of political finance information in selected OECD countries
Oversight body Online report
Submission and availability of
reports
Information contained Searchable
Canada Chief Electoral Officer in
Canada (Elections Canada)
Yes, but a signed physical
copy required as well, as the
CEO sees fit (according to
the case study, as found in
this volume)
Information on contributions and
contributors
Expenses related to elections, leadership
and nomination contests, loans and
unpaid claims
Yes
Chile SERVEL (Electoral
Service)
No
Compiled statistics released
periodically
General income statements of parties
Expenses by provider, category
All in Excel spreadsheets
No
Estonia Estonian Party Financing
Supervision Committee
Yes
Within a few days
Party income from membership dues,
state funding, donations or other income
Expenditures, including advertising,
events, publications
Campaign donors and amounts
Campaign expenses such as wages,
advertising, transportation, events and
administrative expenses
Yes
France Commission Nationale des
Comptes
de Campagne et des
Financements
Politiques
(CNCCFP)
No Information on donations by individuals,
loans by candidates or political parties,
and contributions by candidates to their
own funds
Expenses
In-kind contributions by the candidate or
party
Other miscellaneous income
No
Korea National Election
Commission of Korea
No
Available for three months
following the election
A
ll income and expenditure of political
funds, with a detailed statement of income
and revenue of political funds, together
with proof of expenditures and copy of
records of transactions shown in the bank
register
No
Mexico National Electoral Institute
(INE) – Unit for Resources
of Political Parties
Yes
Origin, amount, destination and use of the
income received through any kind of
funding
No
United
Kingdom
Electoral Commission Yes
1
As soon as possible
A
ll income including donations, public
funding, loans, or other sources
All expenditures on wages, offices,
campaign expenses, fundraising costs, or
other miscellaneous expenses
Yes
2
United
States
Federal Election
Commission
Yes
3
Often 24–48 hours after
submission
A
ll income and donations, including
contributor information for donations more
than USD 50, loans, non-monetary and
other miscellaneous income
All expenditures, including information on
the recipient and a receipt or invoice
Yes
4
Source:
1. Electoral Commission (n.d. a), “PEF online user guide”, www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/
electoral_commission_pdf_file/0008/154682/PEF-Online-user-guide-creating-and-submitting-your-statement-of-accounts.pdf
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
2. Electoral Commission (n.d. b), “Registers search site”, http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/?currentPage=0&rows=
10&sort=AcceptedDate&order=desc&tab=1&et=pp&et=ppm&et=tp&et=perpar&et=rd&prePoll=false&postPoll=true (accessed
on 27 October 2015).
3. FEC (n.d. a), “Electronic filing”, www.fec.gov/elecfil/electron.shtml (accessed on 27 October 2015).
4. FEC (n.d. b), “Disclosure data search”, www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/disclosure_data_search.shtml (accessed on
27 October 2015).
74 – I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING
Box 3.3. Transparency and accessible information in the United States
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) requires that the accounts of political
committees contain the name and address of any person making a contribution in excess of
USD 50 along with the date and the amount of the contribution. This implies that anonymous
donations to political committees are not allowed in excess of that amount. Moreover, in respect
of contributions exceeding USD 200 per year, the required details are even stricter in that the
contributor’s identity (i.e. name, address, occupation and employer) is to be noted in the
accounts. The FECA also prescribes that any disbursement over USD 50 is to be accounted for
together with the name and address of the receiver. The accounts are to be held by the committee
for at least three years.
The FECA obliges political committees to submit financial reports to the Federal Election
Commission, which in turn makes them publicly available in person at the FEC in Washington,
D.C. or on line. The FEC has developed detailed standard forms to be used, requiring, inter alia,
precise information concerning contributions, donors, disbursements and receivers. All
contributions to federal candidates are aggregated on the basis of an election cycle, which begins
on the first day following the date of the previous general election and ends on the date of the
election day, while contributions to political party and other political committees are based on a
calendar year.
The intensity of the reporting may differ. For example, a national party committee is obliged
to file monthly reports in both election and non-election years; a principal campaign committee
of a congressional candidate must file a financial report 12 days before and another report 30
days after the election in addition to quarterly reports every year. The FECA prescribes that the
financial reports are to be made public within 48 hours; however, in most cases, the FEC
manages to make reports available on line within 24 hours.
Source: GRECO (2011), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on the United States of America:
Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe, www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/
round3/GrecoEval3%282011)2_USA_Two_EN.pdf.
Similarly, the Estonian Party Financing Supervision Committee (EPFSC) makes
comprehensive political financial information available on its website (www.erjk.ee/et),
including all electoral and financial reports in a searchable database, incoming and
outgoing correspondence relating to the monitoring work of the EPFSC and the EPFSC
protocols. Such a structured database allows greater media monitoring of party finance
and CSO scrutiny. In Finland, the disclosures are to be filed electronically not later than
on the 15
th
day of the calendar month following the month when the contribution was
received, in order to secure the transparency of external funding received both during
election campaigns and during periods in between. In addition, the Act on Political
Parties in Finland has a provision concerning a voluntary advance disclosure , according
to which a political party and a subsidiary association to the party may before the election
day file an advance disclosure with the National Audit Office containing an estimate of
campaign funding and costs.
I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 75
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Creating enabling environments, where CSOs and media can be effective
watchdogs, further increases transparency and accountability
Where campaign finance information is made public, scrutiny from the media and
civil society is an important complement to state oversight. It is claimed that civil society
organisations can be effective watchdogs and have proven instrumental in advancing
transparency and anti-corruption efforts in the field of campaign finance. Transparency of
political donations has led to a third form of soft regulation: disclosing the names of large
donors and of the recipients of funding. In countries where reporting requirements allow
for individual donors to be identified, activists and the media have exposed large
donations, to public criticism. This can be an alternative to bans and limitations
(Box 3.4).
Box 3.4. The monitoring role of CSOs in political finance in the Slovak Republic
and the United States
Slovak Republic: Database for tracing public money
The Slovak Republic reformed its access to information laws in 2000 and created a system
that has grown exemplary over the last 15 years. Freedom of access to information has allowed
CSOs and think tanks to devise innovative solutions to flag risks and to build an information
network, allowing for the detection of conflicts of interest and improper influence on decision
making. The CSO Fair Play Alliance (http://datanest.fair-play.sk/en/pages/index) created a
database that anyone can access via their website. The database focuses on public money paid to
private entities (state subsides, privatisation, tax and custom remissions, grants, European funds,
debts to the public sector) and on public representatives (managers of state institutions,
governments, elected positions, the judiciary, self-governing bodies, Parliament, advisers to
political leaders). It provides media and CSOs with tools for monitoring, and makes public
administration aware of the fact that their decisions can be easily monitored. This database is
also helpful for investigative journalism; for example, the media were able to draw attention to
concrete allegations of illicit practices regarding political party finance including fake donors
and non-transparent party loans. The network has been emulated by CSOs abroad and the
software is used in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Georgia.
United Sates: Center for Responsive Politics
The Center for Responsive Politics is a non-profit, nonpartisan research group based in
Washington, D.C. that tracks the effects of money and lobbying on elections and public policy.
The Center was established in 1983 with aims to create a more educated voter, an involved
citizenry and a more transparent and responsive government. It maintains a public online
database of its information. Its website, OpenSecrets.org, allows users to track federal campaign
contributions and lobbying by lobbying firms, individual lobbyists, industry, federal agency, and
bills. Other resources include the personal financial disclosures of all members of the US
Congress, the President, and top members of the administration. In 2012, OpenSecrets.org
recorded nearly 35 million page views from more than 5 million unique visitors.
Source: European Commission (2014), “EU Anti-Corruption Report: Slovakia”,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_slovakia_chapter_en.pdf; Center for
Responsive Politics (n.d.), www.opensecrets.org/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
76 – I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING
It is important to stress that CSOs can only be effective watchdogs if substantive
political finance information is publicly available for their analysis. As such, it is
important to make sure that the system itself can facilitate their effective participation. In
order to mobilise CSO support in advocacy, political finance information must be more
transparent, creating an enabling environment in which CSOs, media and private citizens
can be effective watchdogs. To create such an environment, legal and regulatory
frameworks mandate that political finance information is published proactively in a
method that allows for timely and effective public scrutiny and comparison.
References
Aoki, Mizuho and Reiji Yoshida (2014), “Two of Abe’s female ministers resign over
separate scandals”, Japan Times, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/20/national/
politics-diplomacy/two-of-abes-female-ministers-resign-over-separate-scandals/.
Doublet, Y. (2012), Fighting Corruption: Political Funding, Thematic Review of
GRECO’s Third Evaluation Round, Council of Europe,
www.coe.int/t/dghl/
monitoring/greco/general/DOUBLET_EN.pdf.
Electoral Commission (n.d. a), “PEF online user guide”,
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0008/
154682/PEF-Online-user-guide-creating-and-submitting-your-statement-of-
accounts.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Electoral Commission (n.d. b), “Registers search site”,
http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/?currentPage=0&rows=10&sort=AcceptedD
ate&order=desc&tab=1&et=pp&et=ppm&et=tp&et=perpar&et=rd&prePoll=false&po
stPoll=true (accessed on 27 October 2015).
European Commission (2014), “EU Anti-Corruption Report: Slovakia”,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-
human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-
report/docs/2014_acr_slovakia_chapter_en.pdf
FEC (Federal Election Commission) (n.d. a), “Electronic filing”, www.fec.gov/elecfil/
electron.shtml (accessed on 27 October 2015).
FEC (n.d. b), “Disclosure data search”, www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/disclosure_data_
search.shtml (accessed on 27 October 2015).
FEC (n.d. b), “Presidential Election Campaign Fund”,
www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.shtml (accessed on 27 October 2015).
I.3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL PARTY AND ELECTION-CAMPAIGN FUNDING – 77
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) (2011), “Third Evaluation Round:
Evaluation Report on the United States of America: Transparency of Party Funding”,
Council of Europe, www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/
GrecoEval3%282011)2_USA_Two_EN.pdf.
IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) (n.d.), Political
Finance Database,
www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Japan Times (2009), “The price Mr. Hatoyama pays”, Editorial,
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2009/12/01/editorials/the-price-mr-hatoyama-pays/.
Pfeiffer, S. and B.W. Speck (2008), “Accountability and transparency in political finance:
Why, how and what for?”, Working Paper #1/2008, Transparency International,
Berlin.
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) (2003), “United Nations
Convention against Corruption”,
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/.
I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS – 79
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Chapter 4
Fostering a culture of integrity among political parties,
public officials and donors
This chapter looks at the importance of fostering a culture of integrity to effectively
promote a holistic approach to connect surrounding integrity issues such as lobbying and
conflict of interest, in order to better understand the impact of money in politics on the
quality of polices. Controls of party and election funding are likely to be ineffective if they
exist in isolation. On their own, they are likely to result merely in the re-channelling of
money spent to obtain political influence through lobbying and other means.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is
without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international
law.
80 – I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS
Embedding political finance regulations in the overall integrity framework
addresses the risk of money in politics more effectively
The regulation of financing of political parties and election campaigns cannot be
complete without taking account the impact of other integrity issues such as codes of
conduct, conflict of interest, asset disclosure, lobbying and whistleblower protection. On
their own, controls of party and election funding are likely to result merely in the re-
channelling of money spent to obtain political influence through lobbying and through
third-party financing. For example, the case of the fossil fuel industry in the Unites States
clearly shows that political finance is just one of many channels through which powerful
special interests exert influence over public policies (Box 4.1).
Box 4.1. Various channels through which powerful special interests exert influence
over public policies: An example from the United States
It was reported that fossil fuel interests had increasingly focused their resources over the
past two years on putting industry-friendly politicians in charge of both chambers and laying the
groundwork for the new congress to promote special-interest priorities, such as approving the
new projects and increasing the export of American oil to foreign buyers. According to an
analysis of contributions and lobbying data from the Center for Responsive Politics and
advertising spending data from Kantar Media Intelligence/CMAG, as published by the Atlas
Project, the fossil-fuel industry directly invested USD 721 million in order to influence a
congress of its choosing and a friendly energy agenda. Of these investments, the fossil-fuel
industry directly contributed more than USD 64 million to candidates and political parties, spent
more than USD 163 million on television ads across the country, and paid USD 493 million to
the lobbyists in the two years leading up to the November 2014 congressional elections.
According to the report, these efforts seem to have brought some favourable results to the
extraction industries including approval of a large-scale mining project and a number of
provisions that would facilitate the industry activities in the Cromnibus spending bill passed in
December 2014.
As mentioned above, the fossil-fuel industry spent more than USD 163 million on television
advertising in media markets across the country throughout 2013 and 2014. These ads aimed to
influence public opinion in favour of industry priorities, promote the industry’s brand, and urge
voters to support industry priorities at the ballot box. It is reported that major energy-related
organisations ran ads throughout the election cycle supporting hydraulic fracturing, promoting
the use and benefits of natural gas in targeted locations and reassuring the public about the safety
of offshore drilling.
In the end, contributions to political parties and candidates accounted for only 9% of total
spending by the fossil fuel industry to influence the US public polices, while 68% and 23% were
spent for lobbying and advertising respectively.
Source: Moser, Claire and Matt Lee-Ashley (2014), “The fossil-fuel industry spent big to set the anti-
environment agenda of the next congress”, Center for American Progress,
www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/12/22/103667/the-fossil-fuel-industry-spent-big-to-set-
the-anti-environment-agenda-of-the-next-congress/#.VJk7TzB0e4o.mailto.
Therefore, any consideration of political funding needs to be part of an overall
strategy to assure public integrity and mitigate the risks of money in politics (Table 4.1).
Certain elements of the integrity framework of a country are particularly relevant to foster
I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS – 81
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a culture of integrity for those who are on the receiving end of political party and
campaign financing.
Table 4.1. Promoting a culture of integrity in the public sector: Key elements
Determining and
defining integrity
standards
Integrity standards and conflict-o
f
-interest policies
1 Code of conduct / code of ethics
2 Pre/post public employment policy
3 Disclosure of private interests by public officials (including asset disclosure)
Recruitment and caree
r
4 Integrity emphasised in recruitment (e.g. background checks)
5 Integrity as criterion for evaluation and promotion
Guiding
towards
integrity
Training and guidance
6 Training on integrity standards
7 Guidance to resolve integrity-related questions and problems
Promoting integrity in the regular discourse
8
A
nnouncing the integrity policy through channels of internal and external communication
9 Creating an open culture of communication where integrity issues can be raised easily
Monitoring integrity
Public scrutiny
10 Citizen complaint mechanisms
Whistleblowing policy/regulation
11
A
ccessible procedures for reporting misconduct
12 Protection for whistleblowers
13 Raising awareness on whistleblowing policy/regulation
Mechanisms for control and audit
14 Integrity-related internal control
15 Integrity risk management/mapping
16 Integrity-related internal audit
Codes of conduct can be seen as a commitment to integrity by political parties and
politicians, but the adoption of an enforceable code is still relatively limited in
OECD countries
Codes of conduct are an important part of fostering a culture of integrity as they
impose binding, enforceable rules for what is clearly legal and acceptable and what is not
for politicians, public officials and other stakeholders. When those in need of political
funding are fully aware of what is expected of them, combined with the possibility of
sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and the fact that they are monitored, render them
more likely to act with integrity. The adoption of an enforceable code of conduct can also
be seen as a commitment to integrity by political parties and politicians. As noted in the
introduction of this report, governments and political parties in many parts of the world
suffer from low levels of public trust. Fostering a culture of integrity is an important
policy lever to restore public trust in public institutions.
In some countries such as Denmark, Finland and Switzerland, rules of procedures in
the civil service cover ethical issues. One example of a code of conduct that governs
legislators’ dealings with private interests is the UK Code of Conduct for Members of the
House of Lords (Box 4.2).
82 – I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS
Box 4.2. UK Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords
The UK Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords states that “Members of the
House shall base their actions on consideration of the public interest, and shall resolve any
conflict between their personal interest and the public interest at once, and in favour of the
public interest.”
Paragraph 8(d) of the Code states that Members “must not seek to profit from membership
of the House by accepting or agreeing to accept payment or other incentive or reward in return
for providing parliamentary advice or services.”
The Guide to the Code of Conduct offers guidance as to how to interpret Paragraph 8(d). It
states that Members may not assist outside organisations or persons in influencing Parliament in
return for payment or other incentives or rewards. This includes “making use of their position to
arrange meetings with a view to any person lobbying Members of House, ministers or officials.”
Although Members are allowed to work for or hold financial interests in organisations that
are involved in parliamentary lobbying on behalf of clients (such as public relations and law
firms), the guidance to Paragraph 8(d) states that:
“Members themselves are prohibited from personally offering parliamentary advice or
services to clients, both directly and indirectly. Also, Members who have financial interest in, or
receive a financial benefit from, a representative organisation (e.g. a trade association, trade
union, staff association, professional body, charity or issue-related lobby group), are not allowed
to advocate measures for the exclusive benefit of that organisation or the trade, industry or
interest that it represents; nor speak or act in support of a campaign exclusively for the benefit of
the representative organisation or its membership.”
Source: House of Lords (2012), “Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords and Guide to the
Code of Conduct”, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldcond/code.pdf.
In Canada, there is a separate code of conduct for the employees of the electoral
management body as well. Elections Canada employees must commit to a specific
additional code of conduct that highlights the environment employees of Elections
Canada face as a result of the unique mandate of the Chief Electoral Officer in Canadian
democracy. In following this code, employees must conduct themselves in a way that
public confidence and trust in the integrity, objectivity and impartiality of the electoral
process is preserved and enhanced. Election administrators (returning officers, assistant
returning officers and additional assistant returning officers) are required by law to
comply with a code of professional conduct issued by the Office of the Chief Electoral
Officer, which highlights that they have an obligation to act in a manner that will bear the
closest public scrutiny. The obligations in this code extend to all acts and transactions
performed by election administrators during their tenure of office, whether or not in the
course of the performance of their duties as election administrators (see Chapter 6).
In addition to codes of conduct, party manifestos may also provide political parties an
opportunity to express their commitment to curb the risk of policy capture through
political finance, demonstrating the political will that is crucial to help level the playing
field for parties and candidates, tackle illicit funding and restore public confidence in the
government. Political leadership is the starting point for meaningful reform and change.
For example, in 2012, the then ruling Democratic Party of Japan published its manifesto
for the general election, featuring proposals to: i) prohibit political contributions by
I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS – 83
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businesses and organisations; ii) disclose the financial statements of political
organisations with ties to Diet members on the Internet; and iii) extend the disclosure
period for financial statements of political organisations with ties to Diet members from
three to five years. Such a manifesto brought the role of money in politics to the centre of
public debate.
Mitigating risks such as conflict of interest and lobbying in relation to political
finance through proactive disclosure of related information is crucial
Most OECD countries employ integrity measures such as conflict-of-interest policies
and asset disclosure provisions to mitigate the risks of policy capture by special interests
within the policy-making process. These measures are effective tools to spot suspicious
flows of money between public officials and private actors, further strengthening political
finance regulations. In 2014, the OECD reviewed the data and experiences of 32
countries in managing conflict of interest in the public service, highlighting good
practices as well as areas for improvement in the future. According to the survey, 69% of
respondents have a central function responsible for conflict-of-interest policies within the
central/federal government (Figure 4.1). Having such a function within the central
government facilitates the oversight of irregular financial flow and other suspicious
interactions between public officials and private sector actors, which could lead to the
discovery of a breach of political finance regulations. Most countries apply the same or
almost same set of definitions of conflict of interest, guidelines for handling the situation
and consequences for non-compliance to their ministries and agencies, ensuring the
consistency of their preventive measures. In terms of developing a specific policy for
managing conflict of interest for particular categories of public officials, 58% of
respondents adopted special measures for their ministers and 48% for senior public
officials while ministerial advisors and staff in ministerial cabinets/offices tend to receive
less attention in this regard (Figure 4.2). Yet, these categories of public officials are
regularly exposed to lobbying and other interactions with private actors, including donors.
Therefore, creating specific conflict-of-interest policies for high-risk categories of public
officials should be considered in order to further safeguard their integrity against undue
influence.
84 – I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS
Figure 4.1. OECD countries with a central function responsible for the development and
maintenance of conflict-of-interest policies
Note: The central function may not necessarily be an independent agency.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights,
East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: OECD (2014a), “Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest”.
Figure 4.2. Specific conflict-of-interest policy for particular categories of public officials
in OECD countries
Source: OECD (2014a), “Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest”.
Chile
Yes:
69%
No:
31%
59%
50%
47%
41%
41%
38%
34%
31%
28%
25%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ministers
Senior public servants
Procurement officials
Financial market regulators
Auditors
Tax officials
Political advisors/appointees
Customs officers
Inspectors at the central level of government
Staff in ministerial cabinet/office
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While disclosure of private interests by decision makers is essential for managing
conflict-of-interest situations and spotting any suspicious financial flows in public
decision making, the level of disclosure of private interests (assets, liabilities, income
source and amount, paid and un-paid outside positions, gifts and previous employment)
and the public availability of the disclosed information varies considerably among
countries and within countries in the different branches of government (Figure 4.3). As
Chapter 3 stated, political parties and candidates report their financial information on a
regular basis in almost all OECD countries. However, comprehensive disclosure of
private interests by different categories of public officials further increases transparency
in the policy-making process and reduces the risk of policy capture by special interests.
Lower levels of disclosure by public officials make it difficult to assess the impact of
private interests on them and cross-check with the information disclosed by political
parties and candidates.
In the executive branch, countries such as Portugal and Korea have a high degree of
information disclosure. Disclosure of selected private interests and public availability of
such information are widely practiced in the legislative branch of most respondent
countries (especially in the Lower House) with the exception of Finland where there is no
requirement for information disclosure for legislators. Disclosure practices are
considerably higher in the executive and legislative branches than in the judiciary. For
example, disclosure is not required for judges and prosecutors in the Czech Republic,
France and New Zealand.
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, auditing the financial reports of political parties
and candidates plays an important role in securing transparency. In this connection, it is
equally important to ensure that public officials’ asset and private interest disclosure
forms are also subject to auditing in order to spot any suspicious financial flow and
mitigate the risk of undue influence. However, according to the OECD survey, only 32%
of respondent countries carry out audits or review the accuracy of the information
following the collection of disclosure forms from public officials in the executive branch,
while 63% of them verify receipt of the forms (Table 4.2).
Figure 4.3. Level of disclosure of private interests and public availability of information in the three branches
of government in OECD countries
Source: OECD (2014a), “Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest”.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHL
CZE
EST
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
HUN
ISL
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KOR
MEX
NLD
NZL
NOR
POL
PRT
SVK
SVN
ESP
SWE
CHE
TUR
GBR
USA
OECD
BRA
COL
LVA
RUS
Executive Branch
Legislative Branch
Judicial Branch
"At risk" areas
Low
level
High
level
86 – I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS
Table 4.2. Actions taken after collecting the private information for public officials in the
executive branch in OECD countries
Verifying receipt of the
submitted disclosure form
Verifying that all required
information was included in
the submitted disclosure
form
A
uditing or reviewing the
accuracy of the information
submitted in the disclosure
form
A
ustralia
A
ustria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Note:
For all those required to disclose private interest
For some of those required to disclose private interest
Action is not taken
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities.
The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and
Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: OECD (2014a), “Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest”.
Over 60% of lobbyists support the disclosure of their contributions to political
campaigns
In addition to management of conflict of interest, there is clear concern from both
sides of legislators, but also lobbyists themselves, about political financing. According to
the OECD 2013 Survey on Lobbying, as many as 84% of surveyed legislators and 64% of
lobbyists are of the opinion that information on lobbyist contributions to political
campaigns should be made publicly available through, for example, a register
(Figure 4.4). However, out of the surveyed OECD member countries with a register of
lobbyists, information on lobbyists’ contributions to political campaigns are only
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disclosed in Slovenia and the United States. In Slovenia, lobbyists must report the type
and value of donations made to political parties and the organisers of electoral and
referendum campaigns. Total contributions per year to political parties are not allowed to
exceed ten times the average monthly wage in Slovenia. In addition, Transparency of
Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act was enacted in
the United Kingdom in 2014. While the bill does not directly require lobbyists to disclose
their political contributions, it increases transparency in relation to spending by some
non-party campaigners/third-party campaigners by requiring them to publish and record
more information about their spending, donations, accounts and board members.
With a consensus among stakeholders and decision makers that lobbying through
political finance should be regulated and is currently inadequately so, the growing
number of countries opting to regulate is an encouraging sign. To date, however, most
have introduced or reformed lobby regulations on an ad hoc basis and largely in response
to political scandals. Securing the necessary consensus among stakeholders before
scandals take place and enough political support is mobilised has been difficult. However,
in countries that have taken a more incremental approach, experience shows that
consensus building has been less challenging.
Figure 4.4. Types of information that legislators and lobbyists believe should be made publicly available in
OECD countries
Source: OECD (2013), “Survey on Lobbying”.
68%
37%
58%
68%
74%
68%
63%
42%
58%
68%
68%
47%
32%
32%
32%
84%
5%
89%
59%
67%
59%
78%
51%
53%
37%
39%
49%
26%
26%
17%
28%
38%
64%
4%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Names (of individuals or organisations)
Contact details
Whether the lobbyist was previously a public official
The names of clients
The name of the lobbyist employer
The name of parent or subsidiary company that would benefit from the…
The specific subject matters lobbied
The name or description of specific legislative proposals, bills,…
The name of the national/federal departments or agencies contacted
The source and amounts of any government funding received by the…
Lobbying expenses
Turnover from lobbying activity
The communication techniques used such as meetings, telephone…
Lobbying activities below certain thresholds (e.g. in terms of time or…
Lobbying activities that are not remunerated
Contributions to political campaigns
No information should be made publicly available
Legislators
Lobbyists
88 – I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS
Whistleblower protection can strengthen a culture of integrity in relation to political
finance; countries are expected to consider introducing or strengthening protection
through dedicated legislation
Protecting public and private sectors persons that report wrongdoing regarding the
financing of political parties and electoral campaigns can be a powerful mechanism to
safeguard public interest. While whistleblower protection mechanisms exist in most
countries either through dedicated law or provisions in another law, dedicated legislation
can provide more comprehensive protection and foster a culture of integrity within the
political finance process. The risk of corruption and policy capture increases in
environments where the reporting of wrongdoing is not protected, since whistleblowing is
not only a way to declare wrongdoing, but can also have a deterrent effect on it.
Providing effective protection for whistleblowers supports an open organisational culture
where employees are not only aware of how to report, but also have confidence in the
reporting procedures.
In this context, translating whistleblower protection into legislation legitimises and
structures the mechanisms under which public officials can disclose actual or perceived
wrongdoings in the public sector, protects public officials against reprisals, and, at the
same time, encourages them to fulfil their duties in performing efficient, transparent and
high-quality public service. If adequately implemented, legislation protecting
whistleblowers, together with an organisation culture to safeguard them, can become one
of the most effective tools to support anti-corruption initiatives, detecting and combating
corrupt acts, fraud and mismanagement (Council of Europe, 2009
).
In addition to whistleblower protection, citizen complaint mechanisms can also
facilitate reporting of wrongdoing in political finance and safeguard public interest
Citizen complaint mechanisms can also contribute to the identification of political
finance malpractices and foster a culture of integrity. Submission of complaints is a way
to draw the attention of oversight bodies to problems, and also to increase pressure on
them to address these issues. Citizen complaints therefore are sources of knowledge and
opportunities for better regulation of political finance in the pursuit of a responsive
policy-making process. For example, as the chapter on India describes, a 24-7 call centre
and a complaint monitoring unit in each district were set up. A toll free telephone number
is now widely publicised for the public to report corrupt electoral practices. For example,
between 1 March 2011, around the time the elections of the Tamil Nadu assembly was
announced, and 15 May 2011, two days after the vote count, the Election Commission of
India received a total of 3 159 calls, with vigilant voters themselves reporting
malpractices and demanding action (Quraishi, 2014).
Private donors are also expected to share the responsibility of strengthening
integrity
Promoting a culture of integrity in the public sector, i.e. in those that receive and use
the financing is only part of the equation. A culture of integrity can and should also be
promoted among those that provide the funding. The OECD has a wide range of legal and
policy instruments designed to promote responsible business practices, including the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the OECD Principles on Corporate
Governance, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the OECD Anti-Cartel
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Recommendations. These instruments advise governments on how to create fair market
conditions, and often provide companies with guidance on how to comply with the rules
set by their governments.
In relation to financing democracy, many companies adopt a global policy against
making contributions to political parties, which is often set forth in their code of conduct
and internal business practices guidelines. These policies prohibit the use of company
resources for contributions to any political party or candidate, whether federal, state or
local. This prohibition covers not only direct contributions but also indirect assistance or
support through buying tickets to political fundraising events or furnishing goods,
services or equipment for political fundraising or other campaign purposes. For example,
the World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) Principles
for Countering Bribery aims to promote private sector initiatives to strengthen integrity,
and recommends that companies consider controls and procedures to ensure that improper
political contributions are not made (Box 4.3).
Private companies should maintain comprehensive compliance procedures to ensure
that their activities are conducted in accordance with their codes of conduct and all
relevant laws governing political contribution activities. Procedures include employees’
annual review and acknowledgment of their code of conduct responsibilities as well as
periodic reviews conducted by an outside law firm and internal audit. In the Unites States,
many companies participate in the political process through setting up a political action
committee (PAC), which is funded by voluntary contributions from their employees and
subject to several integrity measures. For example, Google created the Google NetPAC in
2006. The Google NetPAC Board of Directors, which is a bipartisan group of senior
Google employees, makes the final decisions about the contributions made by NetPAC.
These contributions are closely overseen by Google’s VP of Public Policy and
Government Affairs, along with Google’s Director of State Public Policy, and are also
reviewed by Google’s Ethics and Compliance team and outside ethics counsel. The
private political preferences of Google executives, directors and employees do not
influence political contributions in any way. In the 2012 election cycle, the Google
NetPAC spent USD 1 039 679.
It is important to note that effective implementation of a compliance programme
requires top-level commitment at the level of the board and chief executive officers
(CEOs), who must provide appropriate resources. It is not enough to declare and provide
procedures and processes. Business leaders must make their employees understand them
and incorporate these priorities into their behaviour through adequate training. Companies
should customise procedures against the risk they need to address in order to develop a
real culture of integrity in the DNA of the company. Companies also need to efficiently
communicate their programme to all their business partners involved in their business. A
compliance programme must constantly evolve and be appropriately included in the
business behaviours without preventing the business itself, but becoming a competitive
added value.
90 – I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS
Box 4.3. The World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI)
Principles for Countering Bribery
4.2 Political contributions
4.2.1 The enterprise, its employees or intermediaries should not make direct or indirect contributions to
political parties, party officials, candidates or organisations or individuals engaged in politics, as a subterfuge for
Bribery.
4.2.2 All political contributions should be transparent and made only in accordance with applicable law.
4.2.3 The Programme should include controls and procedures to ensure that improper political contributions
are not made.
4.3 Charitable contributions and sponsorships
4.3.1 The enterprise should ensure that charitable contributions and sponsorships are not used as a subterfuge
for Bribery.
4.3.2 All charitable contributions and sponsorships should be transparent and made in accordance with
applicable law.
4.3.3 The Programme should include controls and procedures to ensure that improper charitable
contributions and sponsorships are not made.
4.4 Facilitation payments
4.4.1 Recognizing that facilitation payments* are prohibited under the anti-bribery laws of most countries,
enterprises which have not yet eliminated them entirely should support their identification and elimination by
(a) explaining in their Programme that facilitation payments are generally illegal in the foreign country
concerned, (b) emphasizing in their Programme that they are of limited nature and scope and must be
appropriately accounted for, and (c) including in their Programme appropriate controls and procedures for
monitoring and oversight of facilitation payments by the enterprise and its employees.
4.5 Gifts, hospitality and expenses
4.5.1 The enterprise should prohibit the offer or receipt of gifts, hospitality or expenses whenever such
arrangements could improperly affect, or might be perceived to improperly affect, the outcome of a procurement
or other business transaction and are not reasonable and bona fide expenditures.
4.5.2 The Programme should include controls and procedures, including thresholds and reporting
procedures, to ensure that the enterprise’s policies relating to gifts, hospitality and expenses are followed.
*Facilitation payments: These are small payments made to secure or expedite the performance of routine action to which the
enterprise is entitled.
Source: World Economic Forum (2005), “Partnering Against Corruption - Principles for Countering Bribery”,
www.weforum.org/pdf/paci/principles_short.pdf.
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Self-regulation of lobbying is an encouraging sign, although its enforcement
remains challenging
Promoting responsible lobbying is also important in fostering integrity and
transparency in financing democracy. To self-regulate, lobbyists come together in
professional groups to regulate their activities, mostly voluntarily, through: i) a code of
conduct; ii) a registry; and/or iii) a monitoring and enforcement system. In general, self-
regulation focuses more on codes of conduct and registers, than monitoring and
enforcement.
At the European Union level, major lobbyist associations regulate the lobbying
activities of their members. Although they have codes of conduct in place, the
associations do not generally have monitoring and enforcement systems in place for
detecting breaches to their codes and applying sanctions.
One exception is the European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (EPACA). It
has drawn up a code of conduct (www.epaca.org/code-of-conduct/text-of-code) and
instituted a professional practices panel for disciplinary hearings. The EPACA code of
conduct includes 12 best practices for public affairs professionals working in
consultancies across the European Union. Signatories of the code commit to abiding by
the practices. EPACA has also set up a Professional Practices Panel (PPP) which is an
autonomous body of such professionals as former members of the European Parliament,
representatives of industry associations, and academics. Although it has no direct ties
with the lobbying industry, the PPP is responsible for judging alleged breaches of the
EPACA code of conduct. However, the effectiveness of this can be questioned. Between
2009 and 2014 only two breaches have come before the management committee of
EPACA. Of these, the committee deemed one to be admissible and referred it to the PPP.
However the PPP threw out the case as it did not directly involve the subject company’s
relationship with the EU institutions.
In addition to the lobbyist associations, the important elements of self-regulation of
lobbying for individual private firms are to ensure that: i) relevant staff assigned to
conduct advocacy activities have a good understanding of transparent, responsible and
thus professional interaction; and ii) accurate and consistent processes and procedures for
transparent interaction with authorities and organisations are implemented in order to
reassure the public that lobbying is done professionally and with high standards. One
example is the French bank, BNP Paribas, which has adopted a “charter for responsible
representation with respect to public authorities” (Box 4.4).
It is important to note that self-regulation alone is sometimes insufficient to alleviate
influence peddling by private donors and the ultimate responsibility for safeguarding the
public interest and rejecting undue influence lies with public officials. Moreover, for
governments wishing to promote a level playing field between actors in the public
decision-making process, a consistent and holistic approach to political finance will be
needed. Together with support from the private donors, money in politics needs to be
addressed in the wider, whole-of-government, integrity framework that is applicable to all
stages of the policy cycle, effectively linking political finance with other risk areas in the
public decision-making process.
92 – I.4. FOSTERING A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND DONORS
Box 4.4. BNP Paribas’ charter for responsible representation with respect to public authorities
In December 2012, BNP Paribas published its charter for responsible representation with respect to public
authorities. The charter applies to all employees in all countries, and to all activities carried out in all countries in
which BNP Paribas operates. BNP Paribas was the first European bank to have adopted an internal charter for its
lobbying activities.
The charter contains a number of commitments to integrity, transparency, and social responsibility. Under
the terms of the integrity commitment, the charter establishes that:
“The BNP Paribas Group shall:
• comply with the codes of conduct and charters of institutions and organisations with respect to which it
carries out public representation activities;
• act with integrity and honesty with institutions and organisations with respect to which it carries out
public representation activities;
• forbid itself to exert illegal influence and obtain information or influence decisions in a fraudulent
manner;
• not encourage members of institutions ad organisations with respect to which it carries out public
representation activities to infringe the rules of conduct that apply to them, particularly regarding
conflict of interest, confidentiality and compliance with their ethical obligations;
• ensure that the behaviour of employees concerned by the Charter is in accordance with its code of
Conduct and internal rules regarding the prevention of corruption, gifts and invitations.”
In addition, BNP Paribas employees and any external consultants who may be engaged must inform the
institutions and organisations with which they are in contact who they are and whom they represent. The bank
has also undertaken to publish its main public positions on its website. BNP Paribas provides employees
concerned with regular training in best practices in public representation activities.
Source: BNP Paribas (2012a), “Annual Report 2012”, p. 7, http://annualreport.bnpparibas.com/2012/ra/index.html#/0; BNP
Paribas (2012b), “BNP Paribas charter for responsible representation with respect to the public authorities”,
www.bnpparibas.com/sites/default/files/ckeditor-
upload/files/PDF/Nous%20Connaitre/Banque%20Responsable/Charter%20representation%20BNPP_UK.pdf.
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I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS – 95
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Chapter 5
Ensuring compliance with political finance regulations
This chapter focuses on policy measures and institutional mechanisms to ensure the
compliance and review of political finance regulations. While most countries have laws
and regulations on party and election financing, if oversight institutions lack the
independence and/or legal authority to meaningfully regulate potential violators, existing
regulations cannot be fully enforced. The chapter also highlights that sound political
finance regulations need sanctions, serving as deterrents for breaches and promoting
compliance.
96 – I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS
Countries should assure independent and efficient oversight over political finance
The regulatory body tasked with the supervision of political finance is a key element
of any well-functioning political finance system. The first question concerning oversight
is which institution holds the power to review reports on party and campaign financing,
followed by the question of how independent such an institution is from political
influence. The 2003 Recommendation of the Council of Europe on Common rules
Against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns
recognised that “member states should provide for independent monitoring” of parties
and campaign funding. Furthermore, “the independent monitoring should include
supervision over the accounts of political parties and the expenses involved in election
campaigns as well as their presentation and publication.”
In 29% of OECD countries, the Electoral Management Body receives financial
reports from political parties and/or candidates (Figure 5.1). In some member countries
(18%) such as France and the United States, a dedicated supervisory body was
established to monitor political financing and ensure high-level compliance with
regulations. In other countries - for instance, Belgium and the Netherlands - a
combination of bodies fulfil this monitoring, investigation and sanctioning functions.
Moreover, parliaments (e.g. in Denmark, Germany), constitutional courts (e.g. in
Turkey), and ministries (e.g. in Finland) could have responsibility for monitoring and
enforcing political financing regulations. Supreme audit institutions (e.g. Iceland or
Slovenia), or judiciary bodies (e.g. Portugal and Turkey) may play such a role as well.
Figure 5.1. OECD country institution(s) receiving financial reports from political parties and/or candidates
Note: Other refers to: In Belgium, to Presidents of the House of Representatives and the Senate; in the Czech Republic, to the Chamber of
Deputies; in Denmark, to the Parliament; in Germany, to the President of the Bundestag; in Greece, to the Expenditure Audit Committee; in
Ireland, to the Standards in Public Office Commission; in Italy, to the President of the chamber the party is running; in Luxembourg, to the
Prime Minister, Minister of State and President of the Chamber of Deputies; in Norway, to the Register of Company Accounts and Statistics; in
the Slovak Republic, to the National Council of the Slovak Republic; in Slovenia, to the National Assembly; in Turkey, to the Office of the
Chief Public Prosecutor; and in the United Kingdom, to the local Returning Officer, often referred to as the (Acting) Returning Officer.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
18%
29%
21%
9%
21%
38%
3%
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Special Institution Electoral
Management Body
Ministry Court Auditing agency Other Not applicable
% of OECD countries
I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS – 97
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In the absence of an independent supervisory body of political financing, the
responsibilities of monitoring and supervising breaches to political financing regulations
are often diluted among different institutions. This raises concerns over effective co-
ordination, information sharing, and responsiveness. It has been recommended that
countries consider at the minimum “proper auditing of political financing accounts by
independent auditors” (Doublet, 2012). Independent audit is a growing practice in OECD
countries (e.g. Norway) to promote the accountability of parties for the funds they use for
their activities or to participate in elections.
In order to strengthen investigatory capacity, some countries also closely co-operate
with the police. In India, a flying squad was set up under each police station to track
illegal cash transactions or any distribution of liquor or other items intended to bribe
voters. These squads are given a dedicated vehicle, a mobile phone, a video camera and
the necessary documents required for seizure of cash or goods. To keep eye on the money
used in the campaign, video surveillance teams are deployed to capture visuals of all big
rallies, processions and public meetings. These video footages are used to assess the
expenses of these meetings in order to deter candidates from suppressing or under-
reporting expenditure (Quraishi, 2014).
Parties in OECD countries have also been promoting internal auditing (e.g. in
Austria) within their structure. The challenge, however, remains in ensuring the
independence of the internal auditor or certified experts vis-à-vis the political party (e.g.
the internal auditor can be a member of the party in the Czech Republic and Germany).
Common standards for internal control procedures could provide further clarity to internal
auditors and party members on the acceptable practices related to political funding.
How to ensure independence of oversight bodies poses a problem
Despite the variety of institutional arrangements, the following factors are considered
critical for a proper functioning of supervisory bodies: i) independent appointment of its
members (independence from both political parties and the executive at the same time)
and security of their tenure; ii) independent budget providing sufficient resources; and
iii) specialised expertise of personnel and methodologies to discover illegal funding of
political parties and candidates.
Concerning the appointment of members of oversight bodies, while there clearly need
to be ways to ensure that they are as independent as possible of those whom they regulate,
this poses problems as well (Box 5.1). According to the US model, there is an equal
division between Democrat and Republican members. This could produce deadlock and
in any case is less suited to countries without a dominant two-party system. If members
are to be appointed according to an independent procedure rather than by division
between parties, the question arises of how that independence is to be assured. In the
United Kingdom, the chair of the Electoral Commission is appointed by a parliamentary
committee chaired by the Speaker of the House of Commons. The Speaker by convention
gives up all party affiliations and acts as a politically neutral figure. However, this is a
matter of political culture and would not work in all countries. In some countries, a senior
judge acts as the head of the supervisory body.
98 – I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS
Box 5.1. Composition of the Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee
(EPFSC)
The EPFSC is comprised of representatives from each party in parliament (from 2011 to
2015 there were four; after April 2015 there are six.) Moreover, these representatives may not be
members of parliament (MPs) or government ministers, and ideally not in the executive bodies
of their party. Hence, the idea is that these representatives serve as autonomous individuals, not
as delegates or conduits for their party’s interests. In addition, the Committee includes three
expert members: one appointed by the Chancellor of Justice, one by the National Electoral
Committee and one by the State Auditor. The Committee is supported by an administrative
advisor and a legal advisor.
While the inclusion of experts in the work of the EPFSC via other state institutions is seen as
positive, it remains a question, whether the prison (i.e. the party finance system) isn’t still being
guarded by the inmates (i.e. the parties). Especially given that the number of party
representatives grew in April 2015 to six (alongside three experts), the need to ensure that the
Committee focuses on more than just party interests remains paramount.
Note: For more details, see Chapter 8 on Estonia.
Sufficient capacity and resources ensure the ability of electoral management bodies
to perform their tasks
Although there is no one-size-fits-all model, establishing a single independent
supervisory body to ensure effective enforcement is desirable. However, even if a
supervisory body is technically independent, they may be reluctant to pursue powerful
politicians and their parties. The third GRECO Evaluation Round observed that countries
with monitoring entities do not always provide the necessary financial and human
resources to effectively undertake its mission (e.g. Spain, Turkey). Oversight bodies are
often run by public servants with a background in law; economists, auditors and
statisticians are rare. Modern auditing of campaign finance reports requires confronting
databases on campaign donations with records from the public budget, contracting or
public work and services, loans from public banks, licenses and permits. While public
interest groups have started exploring this field, oversight bodies are underequipped for
this task. As a result, even where oversight is independent, where the rules are clear and
sanctions are in place, the quality of oversight may remain poor due to limited capacity of
the oversight body. For example, Chapter 11 (the case study chapter on Mexico) clearly
highlights this challenge. In Mexico, the National Electoral Institute (INE) has to analyse
approximately 37 000 campaign reports within 37 days after election day. The limited
capacity of the INE remains an obstacle to effectively dealing with large volumes of
oversight work. In terms of the number of staff and the mandate of the electoral
management body (EMB), there is variation across countries (Table 5.1).
I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS – 99
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Table 5.1. The institutional capacity of electoral management bodies in selected OECD countries
Electoral management body Staff numbers Mandate and powers Budget
Canada Elections Canada
www.elections.ca/
500 staf
f
1
Up to 235 000 temporary
employees to administer
elections or referenda
Provide guidance to political parties and
candidates
Review
Investigate suspected violations
Issue caution letters, engage in public
compliance agreement
Commissioner may disqualify candidates or
levy fines up to CAD 100 000
Refer criminal matters to public prosecutors
CAD 120million
(2014
2
)
Chile SERVEL (Electoral Service)
www.servel.cl/
276 staf
f
80 professional
196 technical and
administrative
A
dministrative review of financial statements
for compliance with laws and regulations
No fine or sanction powers
USD 12.727 million
(2014)
USD 4.678 million
for elections (2014)
Estonia Estonian Party Funding
Supervision Committee
www.erjk.ee/
2 staf
f
Administrative manager
Legal advisor
To support the 9 Committee
members
Review party and candidate financial
disclosures
Investigate suspected violations or complaints
Demand additional evidence from parties or
third parties
Impose civil fines up to EUR 15 000
Refer criminal matters to prosecutors
France
3
Commission Nationale des
Comptes de Campagne et des
Financements Politiques
(CNCCFP)
www.cnccfp.fr/
33 staf
f
Utilises temporary employees
to review campaign accounts
or undertake investigations
Review financial reports- and approve, reject or
revise them
Rejection of accounts can result in non-
reimbursement of expenses
Refer suspected criminal violations to the
public prosecutor
EUR 6.7 million
(2015 case study)
Korea National Election Commission of
Korea (NEC)
www.nec.go.kr
330 staff at headquarters
620 staff
17 metropolitan or provincial
commissions
1 820 staff in district
commissions
Review party financial reports
Issue regulations, conduct investigations into
suspected violations of the Public Official
Election Act or Political Funds Act
Issue administrative fines or correction orders
4
USD 329 million
(2014)
United
Kingdom
Electoral Commission
www.electoralcommission.org.u
k/
127 staf
f
5
14 executives
103 managers/ senior
advisers / advisers /officers
10 assistants
Provide guidelines and advice to parties,
candidates and the public
Review party and candidate financial
disclosures
Investigate suspected violations and
complaints
Conduct interviews
Issue civil fines or compliance or stop notices
6
GBP 20.965 million
(2014-15)
7
United
States
Federal Election Commission
www.fec.gov/
350 staf
f
8
Attorneys
IT professionals Auditors,
administrators
Issue regulations
Review party and candidate financial
disclosures, and conduct audits of disclosure
reports
Investigate suspected violations or complaints
Compel witness testimony or documents
Impose civil fines
Refer criminal matters to federal prosecutors
USD 66 million (FY
2011)
Source:
1. Elections Canada (n.d. a), “The Role and Structure of Elections Canada”, www.elections.ca/content.aspx?
section=abo&dir=role&document=index&lang=e (accessed on 27 October 2015).
2. Elections Canada (n.d. b), “2013–14 Departmental Performance Report”, www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rep/est/dpr2014&
document=financial&lang=e (accessed on 27 October 2015).
3. CNCCFP (2014), “CNCCFP - France’s National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Financing”,
www.cnccfp.fr/presse/kit/cnccfp_en.pdf.
4. Ace Electoral Knowledge (n.d.), “South Korea: An Independent and Neutral Electoral Management Body”, https://aceproject.org/ace-
en/topics/em/electoral-management-case-studies/south-korea-an-independent-and-neutral-electoral.
5. Electoral Commission (2014), “Corporate plan 2014-15 to 2018-19”, www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0006/167091/EC-Corporate-Plan-2014-15-to-2018-19.pdf, p. 33.
6. Electoral Commission (2011), “Enforcement policy, December 2010”, www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0003/106743/Enforcement-Policy-30March11.pdf.
7. Electoral Commission (2014), “Corporate plan 2014-15 to 2018-19”, www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0006/167091/EC-Corporate-Plan-2014-15-to-2018-19.pdf.
8. GRECO (2011), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on the United States of America: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of
Europe, www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3%282011)2_USA_Two_EN.pdf.
100 – I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS
Clear mandate and sufficient power should be given to the electoral management
bodies
Institutions responsible for enforcing political finance regulations should also have a
clear mandate and power, not just the capacity, but the legal power to conduct
investigations, refer cases for prosecution, and impose sanctions. Development of such
powers is critical for the effective enforcement of a transparent and equitable campaign-
finance regime. Well-staffed and well-funded supervisory bodies that lack the
independence and/or legal authority to meaningfully regulate potential violators limit the
extent to which existing regulation can be enforced.
For example, the UK Electoral Commission’s enforcement policy guideline sets out
the principles that underlie the supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning aspects of the
Commission’s regulatory role. It provides details on the sanctions that apply to different
offences and contraventions of political finance regulations, the way in which financial
penalties are calculated, the circumstances in which voluntary enforcement undertakings
may be accepted, and other information relating to the Commission’s regulatory activity
(Box 5.2).
Box 5.2. Supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning aspects of the electoral management body’s
regulatory role in the United Kingdom and Korea
United Kingdom
The enforcement policy guideline of the UK Electoral Commission sets out a number of detailed provisions
of the Commission’s responsibility to ensure compliance with the political finance regulations. Some examples
include:
5.1 As part of its statutory role monitoring compliance, the Commission may need to obtain information
from, and visit premises used by, those it regulates. Where possible, this is done on a voluntary basis, and the
Commission will give advance notice. However, the law provides the Commission with powers to ensure that
information can be obtained where it is necessary.
6.1 The Commission may carry out investigations where it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person
has committed an offence under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) or
contravened any restriction or other requirement of PPERA. The Commission will only use its investigatory
powers where it is reasonable and proportionate to do so.
6.2 Investigatory activity may be instigated for a number of reasons, for example where a statutory report is
not submitted, or where a submitted report indicates a potential breach of the law. Other circumstances which
may lead to an investigation include where an allegation is made to the Commission that the law has been broken
or where the Commission becomes aware of a potential problem through another route, such as a press report.
9.1 Following the conclusion of any investigation, the Commission will review the evidence it has obtained
to determine if a breach has occurred. The standard of proof which the Commission is required to utilise will
vary depending on which provision of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) is
being considered. Certain provisions of PPERA entitle the Commission to apply to a court to seek forfeiture of
an amount equivalent to a donation or a restoration order in respect of a loan. Where the Commission instigates
court proceedings using these provisions, the standard of proof applicable to civil proceedings, namely the
balance of probabilities, applies.
9.2 For all other breaches where the Commission itself will be responsible for determining if a breach has
occurred, it must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a regulated organisation or individual has breached
the law. If this evidential test is met, the Commission will proceed with the sanctioning process
I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS – 101
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Box 5.2. Supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning aspects of the electoral management body’s
regulatory role in the United Kingdom and Korea (continued)
10.1 Sections 11 to 14 of this guidance explain the procedures that the Commission will follow when
seeking to use the civil sanctions available to it. These sanctions are: fixed monetary penalties, discretionary
requirements (variable monetary penalties, compliance notices and restoration notices), and stop notices.
Discretionary requirements can be used either on their own or in combination. A fixed monetary penalty
cannot be used in combination with a discretionary requirement.
10.2 Discretionary requirements can be used either on their own or in combination. A fixed monetary
penalty cannot be used in combination with a discretionary requirement.
Korea
The National Election Commission (NEC) of Korea oversees and controls activities that cause damage to
fairness in election as well as takes preventive actions against election law violations to ensure an equal
opportunity for political parties and candidates and to hold elections in a fair way while the election processes
are complied with.
Its Election Surveillance Unit consists of election malpractice monitoring groups, volunteers and personnel
who report election law violations, and arranges the joint Election Surveillance Units in each metropolitan area
or city to ensure the smooth election process. In addition, the NEC operates the Cyber Election Units to monitor
and control the online activities that violate the election laws.
The NEC has several authorities regarding the investigation of illegal campaign spending:
• To request the submission of relevant documents. This is the authority to request for information that is
necessary for the investigation of election crime.
• To request financial institutions to submit details of financial transactions. The NEC can request
information on bank accounts, copy of the bankbook, name/date of birth/contact information of the
individual that holds the account involved in transactions, the organisation that first issued the cheques
and information of the person that requested their issuance.
• To demand to accompany or summon where necessary for questioning and investigation related to
election irregularities.
• To collect and store evidence used at the scene of crime.
• To request that the communication network provides for the viewing or submission of information
necessary to identify the user in order to investigate crimes using information networks or phones.
The NEC issues a suspension, warning, or correction order against election law violations and imposes a fine
on the violators. If they disobey orders or do not stop their behaviour, the NEC brings a formal charge or
requests an investigation against the violators.
Source: Electoral Commission (2011), “Enforcement policy, December 2010”; Republic of Korea National Election
Commission (n.d.), “Duties and responsibilities”, www.nec.go.kr/engvote_2013/01_aboutnec/01_03.jsp (accessed on
27 October 2015).
102 – I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS
Chile is also undergoing a major political finance reform to expand the institutional
capacity of the Electoral Service (SERVEL) and strengthen its mandate. The structure of
the SERVEL was comprised of 276 permanent staff in 2013, which increased at election
time by temporary staff that perform specific functions only during this period. Of the
permanent staff, 80 (approximately 29 % of the total employees) are professionals, while
the remaining 71% are technical, administrative and support staff. However, Chapter 7
(the case study on Chile) highlights that SERVEL’s current capabilities are limited since
it is not a body with effective control capability. The Bill on Democracy Strengthening
and Transparency, which is currently under consideration by the Chilean Congress, aims
to provide the SERVEL with the power to levy sanctions before, during and after the
elections, particularly in relation to campaign finance. The goal is to strengthen the
supervisory organ and effectively hand over power and capabilities to control and
monitor compliance, thus ensuring that the rules are applied to all political actors (for
more details, see Chapter 7).
Dissuasive and enforceable sanctions can deter breaches and promote compliance
Sanctions are the “teeth” of regulations on financing political parties and election
campaigns, serving as deterrents for breaches and indirectly promoting compliance. In
OECD countries, sanctions range from financial, to criminal and political. Parties may
have to pay fines (74%), have their illegal donations or funds confiscated (44%), or lose
public subsidies (47%) when breaching the laws (Figure 5.2). More severe sanctions
include criminal charges, such as imprisonment (71%), loss of elected office (18%),
forfeiting the right to run for election, or even deregistration (21%) or suspension (3%)
from a political party.
Figure 5.2. Sanctions for political finance infractions in OECD countries
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on
27 October 2015).
74%
71%
44%
47%
18%
21%
3%
15%
6%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Fines Prison Forfeiture Loss of public
funding
Loss of elected
office
Deregistration of
party
Suspension of
political party
Loss of political
rights
None
% of OECD countries
I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS – 103
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In Hungary, for example, late financial reports are fined, unauthorised donations are
confiscated and public funding is reduced by the sum of unauthorised contributions. In
New Zealand, non-submission of reports can lead to fines. If anonymous donations
exceed NZD 1 500 (USD 1 000), the exceeding amount must be paid to the electoral
management body. Persons convicted of corrupt practices lose their right to vote for three
years, and face imprisonment not exceeding two years. In cases of corrupt or illegal
campaign practices, the election of a candidate can be voided. In Korea, voters are also
subject to sanctions in case of vote buying. The fine is equal to 50 times the value of
money or any materials provided by a candidate, his/her family or a third party on behalf
of a candidate. Those reporting any electoral crimes are also rewarded up to
USD 500 000 by the National Election Commission of Korea. In Japan, in certain cases, a
candidate can be prosecuted for illegal fundraising by members of his or her staff as well.
In Switzerland there are no sanctions for political finance infractions at the national level.
However, sanctions are available at the sub-national (cantonal) level in Switzerland.
Sanctions clearly have deterrent effects and promote higher compliance. In the United
Kingdom, since the UK Electoral Commission was given its civil sanction powers,
compliance rates have increased by 9%. Figure 5.3 provides examples of compliance
rates in the United Kingdom since 2010, in respect of delivery of yearly statements of
accounts and quarterly returns of reportable donations by political parties.
Figure 5.3. Compliance rates in the United Kingdom, 2010-13
Source: UK Electoral Commission
GRECO’s Third Evaluation Round showed that countries need to ensure the right
balance in penalising infringements to political finance regulations and define sanctions
that are proportionate and dissuasive (Table 5.2). In some countries, sanctions are not
sufficiently dissuasive, which results in low levels of compliance with the regulations in
place. For instance in France, violations of private donation rules, including donations
from a banned source or exceeding the maximum legal limit of EUR 7 500, are
sanctioned with a maximum fine of EUR 3 750 euro and a one-year prison sentence. The
maximum amount of fines for unlawful funding is EUR 3 750 euro may not deter
84%
84%
90%
93%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
2010 2011 2012 2013
% compliant
104 – I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS
acceptance of a sizeable illegal donation. In Norway, cessation of public funding is the
only sanction available, but this can only be applied for the most serious breaches.
Table 5.2. Variation of sanctions across selected OECD countries
A
dministrative
sanctions
Body responsible for
administrative
sanctions
Criminal sanctions Number of
investigations (last
available year)
Number of
prosecutions or
sanctions
Hungary
1
Violation of financing
rules by political
party:
Fined sum of
illegal/improper
contribution, and
reduction of state
subsidy by the same
amount.
State
A
udit Office
(some offenses)
Public prosecutor
Possible for crimes such
as fraud, embezzlement,
etc.
5
–
violations of
financial
management /
accounting rules
(2009)
Italy
2
Improper reporting (p.
18)
Suspension of public
funding or
reimbursement
Exceeding election
spending
Suspension of
reimbursement
Failure to submit
statement of election
expenses:
Fines from
EUR 51,645 to
EUR 516 457
Failure to disclose
funding sources:
Fines from
EUR 5 147 to
EUR 51 645
Breach of spending
limits:
Fines from .5–3 times
the amount in excess
of limit.
President of the
Chamber of Deputies
- For elections to
Chamber of Deputies
President of the
Senate
- For Senate
elections
Illegal political funding (p.
18)
6 months to 4 years prison
Fines of 3 times the value
of the donation
Irregular reporting:
91 instances by
political parties
(1997–2009)
Failure to file
declaration
statements:
N/A
Illegal political
funding:
6
Failure to submit
financial reports
(public funding):
7
(1996-2011)
Irregular reporting:
6 sanctioned,
remainder had
already received
reimbursement and
could not be
sanctioned
(1997-2009)
Failure to file
declaration
statements:
4 prosecutions, 3 still
pending (2009)
Illegal political
funding:
1 prosecution, 5 still
pending (2009)
Failure to submit
financial reports
(public funding):
1 sanctioned –
remainder were
remedied
(1996-2011)
Norway
3
Failure to comply with
any rules of Political
Parties Act:
Withholding of part or
all public funding
Note: Ministry of
Government
Administration can
also suspend
governments grants
in individual cases.
Political Parties Act
Committee
A
ccounting offenses, false
Reports:
Fines or imprisonment up
to 2 years
Serious or repeated
violations of the Political
Parties Act:
Imprisonment up to 2
years
124 Withheld grants in
112 cases (2008)
I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS – 105
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Table 5.2. Variation of sanctions across selected OECD countries (continued)
Source:
1. All information from GRECO (2010a), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Hungary: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
2. All information from GRECO (2012), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Italy: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
3. All information from GRECO (2009a), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Norway: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
4. All information from GRECO (2008a), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Poland: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
5. All information from GRECO (2010b), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Portugal: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
6. All information from GRECO (2009b), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Spain: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
7. All information from GRECO (2008b), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on United Kingdom: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of
Europe.
A
dministrative
sanctions
Body responsible for
administrative
sanctions
Criminal sanctions Number of
investigations (last
available year)
Number of
prosecutions or
sanctions
Poland
4
Failures to submit
report or rejected
report:
Withholding of party’s
public funds for
following year (or up
to 3 years if appealed
and rejected).
National Electoral
Committee
(appealable to
Supreme Court)
Violation of funding,
expenditure or reporting
rules under Political
Parties Act:
Most violations: Fines up
to EUR 29 000
Some violations: Fines up
to EUR 29 000 and up to 2
years imprisonment
(depending on violation)
13
(2007)
6
(2007)
Portugal
5
Violation o
f
rules of
financing parties:
Fines of EUR 426 to
EUR 170 400
Violations of duty to
communicate and co-
operate with Entity for
Accounts and Public
Financing (EAPF):
Fines of EUR 853 to
EUR 13 632.
Constitutional Court
Entity for Accounts
and Public Financing
Raising or allocation of
prohibited funds:
Imprisonment 1-3 years,
and confiscation of
proceeds
Exceeding spending limits
of accepting prohibited
funds: Imprisonment 1-3
years, and confiscation of
proceeds
54 decisions (1996-
2009), with 12 cases
being assessed fines
Spain
6
Exceeding limits on
donations or
accepting from illegal
source:
Fine of 2 times illegal
contribution
Non-submission of
financial report:
Withholding of public
funds
Court of Audit
Appealable to
Supreme Court
Violation of requirement to
keep accurate accounts
and/or proper use of
public funds:
Fines from EUR 180 to
EUR 1 800, and
imprisonment from 6
months to 3 years
Use of public funds for
personal enrichment:
Imprisonment from 3 to 8
years
70 sanctions of
violations
35 findings which
resulted in
withholding of public
funds
(2007)
United
Kingdom
7
Civil / administrative
sanctions available –
vary by offense
Electoral Commission Criminal sanctions
available, vary by offense
False statements, failure
to provide information on
accounts or donors, file
returns, etc.
29 prosecutions,
resulted in 23
convictions
(2000-08)
106 – I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS
GRECO also found that the sanctions in place are limited in scope (generally only
focusing on electoral campaign funding) and that the sanctions are not consistently
applied. If sanctions are not applied, the entire regulation of political financing is
undermined. Table 5.2 also highlights wide variation in the number of investigations and
prosecutions across countries.
Education and training for political parties as a tool to promote compliance
In order to ensure compliance, providing support to political parties to help them
comply with regulations is also crucial. This is an angle that is often neglected, but very
much in need from the point of view of political parties. This could, for example, take the
form of some sort of parallel support agency or unit within the monitoring agency
focused on supporting compliance. It could also take the form of a space for dialogue
between parties and monitoring agencies, which would facilitate adherence to the rules
and allow for better understanding of where problems lie and how they could be better
addressed. For example, the website of the UK Electoral Commission provides detailed
guidance for political parties to help them comply with the rules as well as a number of
updates to related regulations. The guidance covers issues such as how to register a party
or maintain a party’s details, report donations and loans, report campaign spending, and
submit a party’s accounts.
Similarly, the Election Commission of India noticed that sometimes political parties
and their candidate violated the law because of ignorance. The Commission set up its own
training institute in 2011, India International Institute of Democracy and Election
Management (IIIDEM), which is tasked with organising a training workshop for party
leaders from all the poll-going states and to raise awareness about the new mechanism of
political finance regulations. The rationale was to focus on prevention instead of
punishment or punitive action (Box 5.3).
Box 5.3. India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management
(IIIDEM)
The Election Commission of India set up the India International Institute of Democracy and
Election Management in 2011 in order to provide training on electoral practices to meet
domestic and international requirements.
The IIIDEM has four components:
1. Training and capacity development wing
It seeks to prepare and groom a new generation of well-trained and committed electoral
managers by updating their knowledge, skills and professional competency for building a
positive electoral culture in the country. It also supports a bilateral and multilateral capacity
development programme through direct understanding or in co-operation with international
agencies.
2. Voter education and civic participation wing
It is to build a chorus of positive voices and views in favour of democracy, promote and
sustain it through election literacy, facilitation programmes and enlightened voter participation.
I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS – 107
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Box 5.3. India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management
(IIIDEM) (continued)
3. Research, innovation and documentation wing
This wing works as a resource unit and think tank for the ECO by seeking to explore, study,
and build an authoritative knowledge and information pool, providing research and policy
support to ECI’s programmes, operations and activities.
4. International projects and technical collaboration wing
This unit is to promote inter institutional and international collaboration and provide
technical support to electoral management bodies on request.
Source: Election Commission of India (n.d.), “India International Institute of Democracy and Election
Management: Towards Efficient Elections and Enlightened Participation”, brochure,
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/current/IIIDEM_brochure.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Appraising the system: Identifying evolving risks of policy capture and involving
stakeholders
Countries could review the functioning of their rules and guidelines related to the
funding of political parties and electoral campaigns on a periodic basis and make
necessary adjustments to them in light of experience.
As well as appraising the system on a regular basis, inclusive policy making enhances
public confidence in the system. To this end, stakeholder engagement in the design and
delivery of policy and services regarding party and election financing can help decision
makers better understand the needs of political actors, leverage a wider pool of
information and resources, improve compliance, contain costs and reduce the risk of
conflict and delays downstream.
Informed decisions based on greater stakeholder engagement are likely to: i) raise the
quality of political finance policies and regulations; ii) demonstrate a commitment of
public officials to accountability and transparency; iii) raise the chances for successful
implementation and voluntary compliance; and iv) reinforce the legitimacy of the
decision-making process and its final results in financing democracy.
Consultation is one of the most frequently used stakeholder engagement tools, but
processes differ widely across countries with respect to the timing, availability of
guidelines and the degree of openness of the process. For example, Northern Ireland
Office (NIO) of the UK published draft legislation which would increase the transparency
of donations and loans to Northern Ireland political parties in January 2014. The NIO
conducted an online consultation for 12 weeks to seek views on the draft legislation from
stakeholders. The proposed changes will enable the UK Electoral Commission to provide
information to the public about the scale and sources of funding to Northern Ireland
parties for the first time.
108 – I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS
References
Ace Electoral Knowledge (n.d.), “South Korea: An Independent and Neutral Electoral
Management Body”, https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/electoral-management-
case-studies/south-korea-an-independent-and-neutral-electoral.
CNCCFP (2014), “CNCCFP - France’s National Commission for Campaign Accounts
and Political Financing”, www.cnccfp.fr/presse/kit/cnccfp_en.pdf.
Doublet, Y. (2012), Fighting Corruption: Political Funding, Thematic Review of
GRECO’s Third Evaluation Round, Council of Europe,
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/DOUBLET_EN.pdf.
Election Commission of India (n.d.), “India International Institute of Democracy and
Election Management: Towards Efficient Elections and Enlightened Participation”,
brochure, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/current/IIIDEM_brochure.pdf (accessed on
27 October 2015).
Elections Canada (n.d. a), “The Role and Structure of Elections Canada”,
www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=abo&dir=role&document=index&lang=e
(accessed on 27 October 2015).
Elections Canada (n.d. b), “2013–14 Departmental Performance Report”,
www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rep/est/dpr2014&document=financia
l&lang=e (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Electoral Commission (2014), “Corporate plan 2014-15 to 2018-19”,
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/167091/EC-Corporate-
Plan-2014-15-to-2018-19.pdf, p. 33.
Electoral Commission (2011), “Enforcement policy, December 2010”,
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/106743/Enforcement-
Policy-30March11.pdf.
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) (2012), “Third Evaluation Round:
Evaluation Report on Italy: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
GRECO (2011), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on the United States of
America: Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe,
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3%282011)2_US
A_Two_EN.pdf.
GRECO (2010a), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Hungary:
Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
GRECO (2010b), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Portugal:
Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
I.5. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH POLITICAL FINANCE REGULATIONS – 109
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
GRECO (2009a), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Norway: Transparency
of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
GRECO (2009b), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Spain: Transparency
of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
GRECO (2008a), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on Poland: Transparency
of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
GRECO (2008b), “Third Evaluation Round: Evaluation Report on United Kingdom:
Transparency of Party Funding”, Council of Europe.
IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ) (n.d.), Political Finance
Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
Quraishi, S. Y. (2014), An Undocumented Wonder, The Making of the Great Indian
Election, Rupa Publications, New Delhi.
Republic of Korea National Election Commission (n.d.), “Duties and responsibilities”,
www.nec.go.kr/engvote_2013/01_aboutnec/01_03.jsp (accessed on 27 October 2015).
ANNEX I.1 – 111
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Annex I.1
Bodies responsible for receiving and examining financial reports submitted
by parties and candidates in OECD countries
Receiving body Examining/investigating body
A
ustralia EMB
Australian Electoral Commission
A
ustralian Electoral Commission
A
ustria
A
uditing agency
Austrian Court of Audit
A
ustrian Court of Audit
Belgium Ministry and others
Ministry of Finance and
Presidents of Senate and House of Representatives
Control Commissions
Canada EMB
Chief Electoral Officer (Elections Canada)
Commissioner of Canada Elections (Office of the Director
of Public Prosecutions)
Chile EMB
Servicio Electoral (SERVEL)
SERVEL
Czech Republic Others
Chamber of Deputies
Supervisory Committee within the Chamber of Deputies
Denmark Ministry and others
Ministry for Interior and Social Welfare
Parliament
None
General Audit Office has authority to account for public
money, but does not review party accounts in practice
Estonia Other/independent oversight body
Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee
Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee
Finland Ministry and auditing agency
Ministry of Justice
National Audit Office
Ministry of Justice for regular political party reporting
National Audit Office for Campaign Reports
France Special institution
National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political
Funding (CNCCFP)
National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political
Funding
Irregularities reported to public prosecutor, police or tax
authorities
Germany Othe
r
President of the Bundestag
President of the Bundestag
Greece Ministry, special institution and othe
r
Ministry of the Interior
Expenditure Audit Committee
Control Committee for the Financial Accounts of Parties and
Parliament Members
Control Committee for party accounts and members of
parliament.
Special Investigative Service of Ministry of Economy and
Finance, local committees, chartered auditors
Hungary
A
uditing agency
State Audit Office of Hungary
State Audit Office
Iceland
A
udit agency
National Audit Office
National Audit Office
Ireland Othe
r
Standards in Public Office Commission
Standards in Public Office Commission
Israel
A
udit agency
State Comptroller
State Comptrolle
r
Italy Special institution and othe
r
Corte di Conti (Court of Audit)
Commission for Transparency and Control of Political
Parties’ and Political Movements’ accounts
Japan EMB and ministry
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Central
Election Management Council,
Local Election Management Council
Ministry for Internal Affairs and Communications or
Prefectural Commission check inaccuracies
Korea EMB
National Election Commission of Korea
National Election Commission of Korea
112 – ANNEX I.1
Receiving body Examining/investigating body
Luxembourg Court and others
Courts of Accounts
President, Promise Minister, Minister of State and President
of Chamber of Deputies
Court of Auditors
Mexico EMB
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)
Special Unit of the IFE
Netherlands Ministry
Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations
Ministry of the Interio
r
New Zealand EMB
Electoral Commission
Electoral Commission reports suspected offenses to New
Zealand police
Norway Othe
r
Statistics Norway
Political Parties Act Committee and Party Auditing
Committee
Poland EMB
State Electoral Commission
State Electoral Commission
Portugal EMB and court
Constitutional Court
EMB for Referenda
Political Financing Supervisory Body (EMB)
Constitutional Court
Slovak Republic Ministry and othe
r
Annual and campaign reports to National Council of the
Slovak Republic
Presidential candidate reports to Ministry of Finance
National Council and Ministry of Finance make formal
checks of party reports, Ministry of Finance reviews
presidential candidate reports
Slovenia
A
udit agency and othe
r
Agency for Public Legal Records and Related Services
(AJPES) supervises submission of reports
Supervision of Funding with Court of Audit
Inspectorate for Internal Affairs supervises minor offenses
Ljubljana Local Court has jurisdiction on criminal offenses
Spain
A
udit agency
Spanish Court of Audit
Court of Audit
Sweden Special institution or ministry
Kammarkollegiet (Legal, Financial and Administrative
Services Agency of the Ministry of Finance)
Kammarkollegiet:
Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency
Switzerland None N/A
Turkey Court and othe
r
Constitutional Court
Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor
Constitutional Court
United Kingdom Special institution
Electoral Commission
Electoral Commission has main responsibility, police and
courts can also investigate
United States EMB
Federal Election Commission
Federal Election Commission
Note: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such
data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West
Bank under the terms of international law.
Source: Adapted from IDEA (n.d.), Political Finance Database, www.idea.int/political-finance/ (accessed on 27 October 2015).
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Part II
Country case studies
II.6. CANADA – 115
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Chapter 6
Canada
By Mr. Stephane Perrault
Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Regulatory Affairs
Elections Canada
This case study reviews the Canadian Elections Act, the primary legal framework for
funding and oversight of political parties, candidates and campaigns. It also discusses
role, mandate and practices of the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, and
the challenges presented going forward.
116 – II.6. CANADA
Overview of the mandate and political finance legislation
The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, commonly known as Elections Canada,
is an
independent, non-partisan agency that reports directly to Parliament. Its
mandate is to be prepared at all times to conduct a federal general election, by-
election or referendum. Elections Canada also:
• administers the political financing provisions of the Canada Elections Act (CEA);
• monitors compliance with electoral legislation;
• conducts public information campaigns on voter registration, voting and
becoming a candidate;
• conducts education programs for students on the electoral process;
• provides support to the independent commissions in charge of adjusting the
boundaries of federal electoral districts following each decennial census in each
province.
• carries out studies on alternative voting methods and, with the approval of
parliamentarians, may test alternative voting processes for future use during
electoral events; and
• provides assistance and co-operation in electoral matters to electoral agencies in
other countries or to international organisations.
The political financing provisions can be found in part 18 of the CEA. These
provisions regulate the financial activities of federal political entities. These include
nomination contestants, candidates,
registered
political parties, electoral district
associations (EDAs) and leadership contestants. The Act also
regulates election
advertising undertaken by third parties. While candidates must submit their
nominations to the returning officer, all of these other entities must register with the
Chief
Electoral Officer and are subject, as the case may be, to contribution limits,
disclosure
requirements, public funding and spending limits.
As part of its mandate, Elections Canada also issues guidelines and interpretation
notes on the application of the provisions of the CEA to political entities, as well as
formal written opinions on the application of any provision of the Act to an activity
or
practice that a political entity proposes to engage in. Guidelines and interpretation
notes can be issued at the request of a registered party or at Elections Canada's
own
initiative. These are maintained in a Registry and published on the Elections Canada
website.
To ensure compliance with the Act, Elections Canada has a wide offering of
training programs
for political entities including live information sessions, online
tutorials and brochures. A Help
Line is also operated to supplement those trainings.
The
Canada Elections Act,
and other related information can be found on the
website at
www.elections.ca. Specific sections on the web have been devoted to
Political Financing and Political Participants.
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Political finance rules
In order to promote a fair political competition, the CEA provides restrictions on
spending, and sources of funding received.
Limits on expenses
Although there are no limits on spending for the periods between elections, the
Canada Elections Act provides for limits on expenses incurred by political parties
and candidates during an electoral period. This is intended to facilitate a level playing
field among political participants. The limits apply to the total of all election
expenses, whether paid, unpaid, or accepted as non-monetary contributions or
transfers. The limits on expenses are different for political parties and candidates.
Limits are based on the number of names on the list of electors, and vary depending
on the length of the election period, the electoral district and the number of electoral
districts in which a political party is sponsoring candidates. In the last general
election, the highest election expenses limit for a party was CAD 21 025 793.23 and
the highest election expenses limit for a candidate was CAD 134 351.77.
The Act also provides for limits on the amount of election advertising expenses
that a third
party may incur to promote or oppose a registered party or the election of
a candidate, including by naming them, showing their likeness, identifying them by
their respective political
affiliation, and taking a position on an issue with which the
registered party or the candidate is
associated.
Other entities such as nomination contestants, leadership contestants and electoral
district
associations, are not subject to expenses limits.
Sources of funding
Sources of funding received are broken down into three categories: private
funding, indirect
public funding and direct public funding.
Private funding- or contributions- is defined as monetary contributions
(amount of money
provided that is not repayable) or non-monetary contributions
(commercial value of a service,
other than volunteer labour, or of property of the
use of property or money to the extent that
they are provided without charge or at
less than commercial value).
Only a Canadian citizen or permanent resident can make a contribution to a
political entity.
Corporations, trade unions, associations and groups cannot make
political contributions. In
addition, the CEA provides for limits on contributions and
loans.
1
The 2015 annual limit is CAD 1 500 to each registered party; CAD 1 500 in total
to all the registered associations, nomination contestants and candidates of each
registered party; CAD 1 500 in total to
all leadership contestants in a particular
contest. The limits will increase by CAD 25 on January 1st
in each subsequent year.
There are no limits on the contributions that a third party may receive.
In addition to these amounts:
•
a nomination contestant is permitted to give an additional CAD 1 000 in total
per contest in
contributions,
loans or loan guarantees to his or her own
campaign;
118 – II.6. CANADA
• a candidate is permitted to give a total of CAD 5 000 in contributions, loans and
loan guarantees to his or her campaign
• a candidate is also permitted to give an additional CAD 1 500 in total per year in
contributions, loans or loan guarantees to other candidates, registered associations
and nomination contestants of each party. (This includes contributions to the
registered association in the candidate's electoral district and contributions to the
candidate's own nomination campaign);
• a leadership contestant is permitted to give a total of CAD 25 000 in
contributions, loans and loan guarantees to his or her campaign; and
• a leadership contestant is also permitted to give an additional CAD 1 500 in total
per year in contributions, loans or loan guarantees to other leadership contestants.
Indirect public funding comes in the form of tax credits for eligible monetary
contributions to
parties, candidates and registered EDAs. The maximum tax credit one
can receive is CAD 650. The
cost of these credits is estimated to be at CAD 25M in
an election year.
Direct public funding includes registered party election expenses partial
reimbursement (50% of
eligible expenses), candidate election expenses partial
reimbursement (60% of eligible expenses) and audit subsidies. Other entities such as
nomination contestants, leadership contestants, electoral district associations and
third parties do not receive partial
reimbursements.
Transparency and accountability
The CEA requires political entities to file, within specific deadlines, financial
and
campaign
returns. These returns serve to meet reporting requirements for the
disclosure of all incoming
and outgoing funds. Included in these returns is
information in regards to contributions and
contributors, expenses related to
elections, leadership and nomination contests, loans and any
conditions on them, and
unpaid claims. Event-based political entities must respect reporting
requirements for
the specific event in which they have participated. Ongoing political entities,
such as
EDAs, also have yearly reporting requirements to fulfill. Entities must submit a signed
paper return. An electronic filing system may be used, but a signed paper copy must
also be submitted. Third parties that engage in electoral advertising must be
registered with Elections
Canada if a total amount of advertising expenses incurred is
CAD 500 or more. Every registered third party must file an election advertising
report.
These returns are verified by Elections Canada through a compliance audit process.
This process
ensures that appropriate administrative requirements, systems,
procedures and practices are in
place to properly record, verify and report
information concerning compliance with the financial provisions of the CEA. The
process also validates information concerning receipts for
contributions for the
purposes of the Income Tax Act. The electoral and financial performance of a
political entity and compliance with reporting requirements under the CEA
determine
eligibility for certain disbursements, such as payments and
reimbursements from the
Consolidated Revenue Fund. In addition, the external
auditor appointed by each party must also perform a compliance audit review of the
party's financial returns.
II.6. CANADA – 119
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The disclosure of information is a key feature in monitoring compliance with
legislative
provisions. As required by the Act, the Office of the Chief Electoral
Officer publishes financial and campaign returns of various political entities,
including personal information of
contributors, in the manner that the Chief Electoral
Officer considers appropriate. As such, even
though all contributors who contributed
CAD 200 or more are required to provide their full name and full address, only the
contributor's full name, city, province and postal code are published on the Elections
Canada Web site. In addition, in order to access this information, a requestor must
individually click on each contributor name, which opens a separate window. The
partial
address of each contributor is not available in a downloadable database
format, in hopes to
prevent bulk access and data mining of this information. The rest
of the contribution
information, i.e. the amount contributed, the entity to which it
was made and its party affiliation is downloadable in a plain text version of the
search results.
Alternatively, the CEA provides for transparency of information included in
returns by allowing
for public inspection of returns and all other reports and
statements, other than electoral documents. Upon request, one can inspect these
documents at Elections Canada premises
during regular business hours. In addition,
on payment of a fee, copies of these documents can
be obtained.
Compliance
The financial reports submitted by federal political entities and third-party
election advertisers undergo an audit to ensure they are in compliance with the
financial provisions of the CEA. Instances of
non-compliance are addressed in a
manner that reflects the seriousness of the non-compliance and its impact on the
integrity of the political financing regime, possibly requiring a
referral to the
Commissioner of Canada Elections (the Commissioner).
The Commissioner is part of the Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions and
is responsible for ensuring that the CEA and the Referendum Act are complied with
and enforced. The Commissioner acts independently of the Chief Electoral Officer
He decides in what manner complaints and referrals will be handled, what
investigation are to be carried out, the cases to be referred for possible
prosecution
and the charges to be recommended.
The CEA contains a long list of offences, most of which relate to political
financing. However,
only a small proportion of these offences relate to misconduct
that directly threatens the core values of the regime- fairness, transparency and
preventing the undue influence of money. These core offences relate to:
•
Ineligible contributions -
instances where an agent of a political entity does
not return
an ineligible or excessive contribution or returns it past the
prescribed deadline. In total, 8% of non-compliance cases relate to the
acceptance
of illegal funds into the
regulatory system through ineligible or
excessive contributions that are not returned in a timely
manner.
•
Spending violations -
instances where a candidate registered party,
nomination
contestant or third party advertiser exceeds the expenses limit in a
general election, by- election or nomination contest. In total, 1% of instances
of non-compliance relate to the
exceeding of spending limits as prescribed by
120 – II.6. CANADA
the CEA- either by a candidate, a
registered party, a nomination contestant or
a third party advertiser
.
•
Filing a false or misleading
document
-
instances where an agent of a political
entity
files a financial transactions return that contains a materially false or
misleading statement or does not substantially set out the required
information outlined in the
CEA. Overall, 1% of non- compliance cases
relate to the filing of a false or misleading document.
•
Late and non-filers -
instances of not filing a financial document as required
by the CEA
and of late filing over the prescribed deadline. In total, 19% of
all non-compliance cases are related to
not filing a financial document or late
filing over the prescribed deadline, therefore
compromising an important
core value of the political financing regime; that timely
financial information
regarding regulated political entities be made available to the
public.
Other political financing offences in the CEA are of a less serious nature and may
generally be considered “accessory” in that they concern requirements of the CEA
that serve to support fundamental objectives of the system.
These requirements include
the opening of a bank account, the appointment of an official agent for a candidate and
the issuing of a receipt for a contribution.
The vast majority of contraventions are instances of minor regulatory non-
compliance that do not imperil the integrity of the political financing regime and as a
result the criminal justice
system is ill-equipped to deal with them.
In 2010, Elections Canada developed with the Commissioner an
Administrative
Compliance
Policy for Political Financing.
2
·
Pursuant to that policy, matters of a less
serious nature are
treated through administrative educational measures, rather than a
referral to the Commissioner. Further to the recent separation of the Commissioner of
Canada Elections from
Elections Canada, as a recent of the coming into force of the
Fair Elections Act in 2014, this
policy is currently under review.
For cases that are not dealt with through the administrative compliance policy,
depending on the gravity of the offence, penalties can range from a member of
parliament being unable to
vote or sit as a member, an individual not being eligible
to be a candidate at future elections, fines up to CAD 100 000, or imprisonment.
Integrity
Canada's public service as a whole must follow the Values and Ethics code for
public servants, as well as the Policy on Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment.
Moreover; lobbyists
(individuals who are paid to communicate with federal public
office holders) are bound by the
Lobbying Act and code of conduct to ensure
transparency and accountability in order to
increase the public's confidence in the
integrity of government decision-making.
In addition, the Public Service Commission is responsible for safeguarding the
political
impartiality of the public service and public servants' involvement in
political activities, including:
•
Providing guidance with respect to involvement in political activities;
•
Granting permission and leave for candidacy in federal,
provincial
, territorial
and
municipal elections; and
II.6. CANADA – 121
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•
Investigating allegations of improper political
activities
and taking corrective
action when they are founded.
Elections Canada employees must also commit to a specific additional Code of
conduct that
highlights the environment employees of Elections Canada face as a
result of the unique mandate of the Chief Electoral Officer in Canadian democracy. In
following this code,
employees must conduct themselves in a way that the public
confidence and trust in the
integrity, objectivity and impartiality of the electoral
process is preserved and enhanced.
Election administrators (Returning Officers, Assistant Returning Officers and
Additional Assistant Returning Officers) are required by law to comply with a code of
professional conduct issued by the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, which
highlights that they have an obligation to act in a manner that will bear the closest
public scrutiny. The obligations in this code extend to all acts and transactions
performed by election administrators during their tenure of office,
whether or not in
the course of the performance of their duties as election administrators.
There is currently no code of conduct for political parties and their entities.
Historically, the
assumption was that political parties would regulate their own
behaviour, and, if they crossed
ethical lines, the remedy resided in the electoral and
wider political process. In 2014,
the Chief Electoral Officer recommended to
Parliament that the establishment of a code of
conduct for political parties be
considered.
Challenges and risks
Canada's electoral regime has seen the introduction of a complex, sophisticated
and detailed regulatory framework over the years seeking to enhance accountability
and transparency of
political entities.
The complexity of this system has become one
the most significant challenges given that
political campaigns are largely conducted
by volunteers. In carrying out its responsibilities to provide guidance to entities in
regards of the
political financing provisions, Elections Canada has developed a
number of administrative tools
and delivered training programs to help political
entities understand the statutory
requirements and facilitate their compliance.
Another challenge relates to the fact that, while candidates, nomination
contestants and leadership contestants are all required to provide supporting
documentation for their reported expenses, registered parties have no similar
obligation. This has been partly compensated for in recent legislation by
adding
external compliance audits the election expenses returns submitted by political
parties. However, the transparency of political party finances, and the ability of
the Chief Electoral Officer to monitor compliance with the rules remains very
limited, despite the fact that election expenses of political parties are heavily
subsidised.
Finally, the
Canada Elections Act
can be enforced only through the criminal
courts, not
administrative penalties, even for purely regulatory matters. As a result,
only a very small portion of non-compliances ever get
sanctioned. A list of major
Court Cases Relating to the Federal Electoral Legislation can be found
in the resources
section of the Elections Canada website.
122 – II.6. CANADA
Notes
1. Limits to contributions and loans apply to: total contributions, the unpaid balance of
loans made during the contribution period and the amount of any loan guarantees
made during the contribution period that an individual is still liable for. The sum of
these three amounts cannot at any time exceed the contribution limit.
2.
The Administrative Compliance Policy for Political Financing is on Elections
Canada’s website.
II.7. CHILE – 123
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Chapter 7
Chile
By Ms. Pamela Figueroa Rubio
Chief of the Studies Division
Mr. Francisco Espinoza Rabanales
Advisor of the Studies Division
Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency
This case study presents the proposed reforms to political funding and election oversight
in the Republic of Chile put forth by the administration of President Michelle Bachelet. It
details the measures to increase public funding, ensure transparency in finances, and
create effective sanctions for violations.
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Introduction
This chapter aims to explain in detail the bill put forward by President Michelle
Bachelet (2014-18) on Democracy Strengthening and Transparency, which is currently
under consideration by the Chilean Congress, and will become law of the republic in the
second semester of 2015. The system of financing political parties and candidates in
Chile is currently based on the Law 19,884 on Transparency, Limit and Control of
Campaign Spending. The purpose of this law is to monitor campaign spending, meaning
any payment made for the financing of equipment, office space, political parties and
candidates.
The financing structure provided in the current legislation applies only over the
period of time between the expiration of the declaration of candidates and the day of the
respective elections. Only disbursements during this period will be considered as election
expenses.
Current legislation combines a system of public and private funding. Public funding is
understood as any contribution and reimbursement of election expenses incurred by
candidates and parties by the state upon presentation of tickets or invoices. On the other
hand, private funding is understood as any funding made to a party and candidate in the
form of a grant, loan, or any free agreement, whether or not it has payment associated for
the financing of election expenses. The current law allows for contributions from private
individuals to electoral campaigns with a maximum of 2 000 UF (1 UF is equivalent to
about USD 40) for one candidate or political party, and 10 000 UF for multiple
candidates or political parties.
However, in order to strengthen transparency and political financing, Law 19,884 has
a number of limitations, summarised in three main aspects: i) weak auditing powers of the
Electoral Service; ii) a restrictive definition of informers, preventing citizen complaints;
and iii) it erodes the principle of control and transparency of election income and
expenses.
This initiative is part of the recommendations of international organisations, as well
as various proposals that have emerged from the debate on the development and
improvement of democracy in Chile since 2000. In particular, with the aim of responding
to three central variables that have been diagnosed as the key areas for improvement, this
initiative focuses its efforts on three essential pillars for the functioning of the democratic
system: equity, transparency and democratic control.
Equity in political participation requires the State to assume a more active role in
creating contexts for participation and competition among various political actors on
equal terms, levelling the playing field so that unequal access to financing will no longer
be decisive to the outcome of elections, and economic inequality does not replicate as
political inequality.
Transparency, meanwhile, has a dual role in politics. On the one hand, it is a
disincentive to corruption, and secondly, enables the democratic and citizen control of
public funds. In politics, transparency is the key to ensuring that personal interests do not
take precedence over general interest.
But transparency alone does not prevent conflicts of interest from arising in politics.
It not only seeks to prevent and meet potential conflicts of interest, but what is required is
to proscribe them from political activity. For this, rules are required that prohibit
institutions that defend purely commercial or private corporate interests involved in
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politics. Furthermore, it is essential to have an effective control system of such rules,
which involves the strengthening of control and sanctions, in order to create a deterrent
effect that encourages respect for democratic rules.
All of the above is at the core of the proposed policy reform, and comes to reflect an
interest in raising Chilean democracy to the highest standards of probity and
transparency, fairness in political competition and control of the main political actors, and
in this way to contribute to and consolidate greater legitimacy and stability in the Chilean
political system.
State of the art/diagnosis
Chile is in the process of undertaking major reforms, as democracy requires
institutions to be able to adapt to new challenges. In this sense, one of the main
challenges aims to find new value in political activity and raise its importance in society.
In recent years, a significant disaffection has been shown to parties and politicians
both locally and internationally. One of the main reasons for this is related to the
perception of interference of money in politics.
It is a fact that politics has an operating cost that needs to be settled. For example, the
last presidential election, in the first round, cost CLP 10 623 534 969, while total
expenditures on campaigns for deputies was CLP 14 104 479 095, and in the case of
senators was CLP 11 128 078 256. These figures include the total spending of all
candidates for each election. It is essential that it is the democratic system that controls
the money, and not the other way round (Moboji, 2003). In this sense, the regulation of
financing, including its institutional structure, has a direct effect on generating
opportunities, barriers and incentives in the way that political actors behave and,
therefore, on how democracy works. In this regard, to ensure fair competition, to monitor
the effect of money and material resources on the results of political representation, to
adequately protect freedom of expression and association, to ensure transparency, and to
limit the space for influence peddling, corruption and circulation of illicit funds are
crucial objectives to consider in the design of political financing systems (UNDP, 2015).
Having legislation in line with these capabilities will allow Chile to adopt
international standards and to create democratic mechanisms that allow greater control
and transparency of the activities associated with politics.
Currently, the legislation governing the relationship between money and politics is a
matter of debate in the Chilean parliament. However, it should be noted that this debate is
not new, but dates back to 2000, where under the administration of former President
Ricardo Lagos (2000-06), the first regulations and standards on the relationship between
the public and private world appeared. It has been a gradual process and today, in the
current administration of Michelle Bachelet (2014-18), where a concrete commitment has
been made to promote an agenda of Probity, Transparency, State Modernisation and
Strengthening of Democracy, aiming to make progress and improve the quality standards
of democratic in the country will advance and improve. So to fulfil this commitment, in
December 2014 the bill on Democracy Strengthening and Transparency was sent to
Congress. It seeks to strengthen the Chilean democratic system by introducing high
standards of transparency, control and public financing to public and electoral activity, in
order to ensure adequate public service of authorities and political parties.
The bill, based upon a detailed analysis of political and social reality, considers the
recommendations provided by various international agencies for the proper functioning
126 – II.7. CHILE
and development of contemporary democracies. In this regard, greater democratic quality
is closely linked to the search for greater social equality, the effective fight against
poverty, and the expansion of the rights of citizens. Such is the conviction of the need to
provide new tools for equal political participation that it has been proposed to establish
institutional principles that achieve greater equity in the access to positions of popular
representation.
The need for democracy strengthening and transparency
After 25 years of democratic rebuilding, Chilean society has evolved rapidly, where
concepts that were previously questioned are today the basis of requirements for a more
open, transparent and participative government. It is precisely in light of this evolution
that the country’s institutions have lagged behind national momentum. One of the most
concrete ways to advance concerns legal amendments to establish a new and improved
framework for political activity, where access conditions and electoral competition can be
improved; the role of political parties as articulators of social interests be revitalised; and
the establishment of clear and strict rules on transparency, arrangement and access to
information produced by political parties in view of the public resources received can be
concretised.
The effort aims to address the aforementioned three key elements to respond to
repeated requests from the public regarding government elements and the political system
as a whole:
1. the need for better politics quality:
a) promoting democratic governance and strengthening the political system.
2. to raise the role of parties in the pursuit of the common good:
a) deepening the institutionalisation of political parties, the emergence of new
leadership and the generation of long-term projects
b) providing greater legitimacy to political parties to channel the general interests
of society.
3. to strengthen the role of government in promoting democracy:
a) improve standards of transparency and control to respond to new demands of
citizens and for citizens to know how political parties are funded and spend
money.
All democratic systems assume that for proper development, political parties must be
provided with a financing system that complies with the principles of transparency and
political equality in order to establish clear and concrete institutional conditions to
achieve greater equity in access to elected office.
Thus, equal participation in democratic processes and effective realisation of the
rights of political participation are fully viable only if there is a system of political
financing that prevents contributions from individuals who could influence the behaviour
and decisions of such entities and authorities later. This view is shared by various
international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), Transparency International and the European Council, who have
sought to establish and promote basic international standards to regulate the public
financing of political parties and candidates, against contributions of legal persons,
arguing that the influence of corporate interests on politics must be controlled, and thus to
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promote the autonomy of the parties regarding possible capture of private interests,
reducing corruption and undue influence peddling, as well as being able to consolidate
trust, institutional framework and transparency of political parties and democratically
elected authorities.
Promoting a level playing field: Equity in political competition
Increasing public funding
Double public contributions to political parties
A permanent contributions fund to political parties will be created. The objective of
this aims to strengthen the public role of political parties and enable them to develop
research activities, and develop civic education, among others.
In addition to the above, it states that at least 10% of funds received by the parties
shall be for activities to promote the participation of women in politics.
A decreased campaign spending limit is also established, by defining a distinct
reduction for each type of election.
The objective is that campaigns are more austere, where advertising spending, radio
appearances or street signs do not trespass on the city’s daily life. This measure presents a
challenge for candidates, since they must find new ways of campaigning and attracting
citizens to their political ideas.
Framing private funding
A limitation is established on the contribution that a candidate can make to his own
campaign so that the money a person has would not be an advantage when applying for
public office. In this line, ideas are favoured over access to campaign finance itself.
Contributions from legal entities are prohibited. The reasons for regulating and
gradually eliminating such contributions consider both normative arguments as effective
equity. Indeed, the constitutive nature of legal persons is established that legal persons,
besides not having the right to vote, usually represent interests and not preferences. Its
aim is to maintain and increase their assets so the link with politics cannot be other than
related to the political system to that end.
The limit on contributions from individuals to political campaigns is decreased. This
seeks to ensure that contribution from an individual to a candidate does not result in
possible future pressure from donor to the representative.
Anonymous donations are regulated and reserved contributions are eliminated. Also,
electoral advertising in public spaces is prohibited, only exceptionally allowing electoral
propaganda in public squares and parks floes, when previously authorised by the
Electoral Service and prior to a report by the City Council to such effect.
Finally, regulation of expenditures on media by political parties and candidates is
established. This specifies that the press and radio stations are only allowed electoral
propaganda if they inform SERVEL of their fees within the time limits fixed by law,
thereby discouraging discretion in price schemes that could favour one candidate or party
over another.
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With the above, the role of money is limited in democracy, slashing the amount that
candidates and parties can spend on a campaign, and reducing the impact and dependence
on private contributions themselves, and in election campaigns.
Ensuring more transparency
In order to qualify for public financing contributions, any political party shall appoint
a General Manager of the Funds, established in Chile, who will be personally responsible
for civil and criminal misuse of State funds delivered to the party. While in the case of
private financing, parties must permanently keep public all available information about
such contributions through their websites: the monthly balance of income and expenses,
updated quarterly, and broken down into specific categories. All contributions, whether
public or private, should be made publicly available.
Transparency in politics discourages corruption and allows citizen control. This is the
key to ensuring that private interests do not take precedence over general interest. It is for
this reason that only low amounts of anonymous donations are allowed and these will
vary according to the type of election.
In this regard, OECD member countries have adopted similar regulations in this area,
in order to promote transparency and confidence in political parties. One such measure
concerns the regulation of financial contributions from private donors to ensure
transparency of donations, avoid damaging political activities and ensure the
independence of political parties (OECD [2011], Integrity and Transparency in Political
Finance).
Integrity
There are several mechanisms in Chile that seek to ensure the integrity of public
service. Of these, three are important to note, given the effect they have on public
officials’ actions and the way citizens can exercise control over their representatives:
1. The Law on Access to Public Information (2008), obliges the authorities and
officials of the state administration to strictly comply with the principle of
transparency in public service: that is, to respect and promote the publicity of acts,
resolutions, procedures and documents management, as well as all base
information, and to facilitate the access of any person to such information, either
by publishing all information described above on line (active transparency), as
well as providing any person with the possibility of requiring all the history of
documents appropriated in accordance with the provisions of the law (passive
transparency).
2. The Lobby Act, which regulates lobby and the conduct representing particular
interests for authorities and officials, constituting a breakthrough for providing
tools to public activities that make its exercise more transparent. The entry into
force of this law represents a profound change in the relationship between the state
and the people, establishing the duty of the authorities and public officials (having
the status of “passive subject”), the recording and publicising of: i) the meetings
and hearings requested by lobbyists and special interests managers aiming to
influence a public decision; ii) any travels made in the exercise of their functions;
iii) any gifts received as authority or official.
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3. The Statement of Assets and Interests, which aims to expand the legal obligation
of high responsibility officers to show to the public the absence of conflict to
exercise their positions in the various departments of the State. This has been
deepened with the Law of Probity in Public Service, which increases the number
of subjects who must make this declaration of assets and interests. Declarations of
assets and interests are one of the mechanisms that draw close and clear the link
between the authority and administration official to public scrutiny. It fosters a
culture of transparency and probity in public administration, to discourage corrupt
and abusive practices, because it allows the public to be informed about the
financial position of the respondents.
Control, enforcement and supervision
Currently, electoral bodies are one of the main solutions to secure, monitor, control
and sanction the open, clean and fair elections, and to generate and increase confidence in
the elections, playing a key role in the consolidation of democracy. They are called
legitimacy providers within each electoral process to resolve conflicts that may occur in
the context of modern democracies.
Clearly, to ensure that the rules become effective, the mere determination of an act as
wrongful is not enough, but also require an adequate system of control, supervision and
sanctions, which must be accompanied by a strong institutional framework that allows
this organism to supervise the effective implementation of the regulation.
In the Chilean case, the Electoral Service (SERVEL) is the highest body of electoral
administration in the country, and one of its specific functions is to ensure compliance
with the electoral law. In particular, the control function of the financial statements of the
candidates or political parties is exercised exclusively by this body. The structure of the
Electoral Service is comprised of 276 permanent staff by 2013, which is exponentially
increased at election time by people that perform specific functions only during this
period. Of the permanent staff, 80 are professionals, equivalent to 29% of the total, while
the remaining 71% are technical, administrative and support staff. SERVEL’s current
capabilities are limited, since it is not a body with effective control capability, and in
practice, mainly plays an administrative role. To change this situation it is essential that
the new Electoral Service may exercise control and the power to levy sanctions before,
during and after elections, particularly as related to campaign finance. The goal is to
strengthen the supervisory organ and effectively hand over power and real capabilities to
control and monitor compliance, thus ensuring that the rules are applied to all
participants.
In this context, the reform of the electoral body in Chile to expand its institutional
capacity appears imperative to achieve higher levels of legitimacy and improve the
quality of democracy. The bill identifies this flaw in the system and addresses the need to
strengthen the transparency and legitimacy of the electoral process by creating a suitable
institutional framework to the requirements it entails a stronger and consolidated
democracy.
A strong body is needed with oversight and sanction powers appropriate for the role it
plays in democracy, protecting transparency in the electoral processes. To achieve this,
the political reforms that are being carried out seek to provide SERVEL with the
necessary tools to effectively monitor the compliance of the rules governing the financing
of democracy. The supervisory body, in order to monitor campaign spending, should have
130 – II.7. CHILE
sufficient powers to monitor accountability, conduct and order audits of annual
statements of public account, and should have the power to enter the premises where
political parties or candidates are based and the ability to access the books of accounts
and documents, to monitor the financial status of the subjects under their supervision,
among others, as well as during campaign time as on election day itself. This is the only
way in which an in situ and ex post control can generate disincentives for any behaviour
outside the law, and can create incentives for better performance of both parties and
election campaigns.
Penalties as mechanisms to ensure effective compliance
The proposed mechanism for effective compliance with the rules is the application of
a series of sanctions, mainly financial, relative to the crime committed.
1
Thus, the
strengthening of the supervisory body will be linked to a strong system of sanctions, a
theme on which our country had a number of shortcomings, due to the inability of
SERVEL audit noted above.
The objective is to implement a general administrative disciplinary proceeding, which
shall determine the penalties payable by the offending party or candidate determined by
SERVEL by taking into consideration a number of factors, such as damage to public
property or the number of infractions, among others. In addition, penalties will be
established for the candidate or General Manager of the Funds of political parties that
obtain State contributions through misrepresentation or deception.
In this matter, the relationship between SERVEL, as the body in charge of the
electoral administration, and the Electoral Court (TRICEL), which, in the Chilean legal
system certifies national elections, resolves complaints and proclaims the elect, becomes
very important.
To have a solid monitoring and compliance body, it’s imperative that the work of
these two entities be co-ordinated. In this sense, the initiative establishes that in those
cases where violations of the law of parties may involve the suspension, dissolution or
inability to fill management positions, the competent court to resolve this issue will be the
TRICEL.
Concrete measures to respond to citizens and adopt international standards on
money and politics
Modifications to campaign spending and contributions to campaigns:
• Double public contributions to political parties.
• Election expenditure limit on campaign period is reduced.
• Contributions by legal persons are prohibited to election campaigns.
• The contributions by natural persons is regulated by lowering the limit on the
amount an individual can donate to one or more candidates or parties during a
campaign.
• The contributions of candidates to their own campaigns are regulated.
• Transparency rules are established where all contributions made to candidates or
their parties during the campaign period must be made through the website of the
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Electoral Service. It is further stated that public contributions should be open and
transparent.
• No party may contract services with companies that do not respect labour
standards.
• There shall be no reimbursement owed for the number of votes obtained if there is
any pending fine.
• Finally, contributions to political training institutes are regulated, stating that
these contributions are public and may only be made by political parties or
individuals.
Regulation of electoral propaganda with fairness and respect for citizenship:
• The concept of election expenditure expands, not only considering this as one that
seeks to influence the vote, but also aimed at promoting candidates.
• A period of 90 days is established for conducting written press and radio
campaigns and 30 days for campaigns in the street.
• The role of radio as media and broadcast power is enhanced, creating
opportunities for radial debate and disseminating information spots with election
information.
• The obligation is established for radios to report their rates to the Electoral
Service.
• Use of public spaces is regulated where the installation of electoral propaganda is
permitted.
With respect to enforcement and penalties:
• The powers of the the Electoral Service and auditing standards are strengthened.
• A system of penalties and efficacy more severe is established, with sanctions
including dismissal from office in the case of non-compliance.
On permanent contributions to political parties:
• A permanent contributions fund to political parties will be created to strengthen
the public role of political parties and enable them to develop research activities,
and develop civic education, among others.
• In addition to the above, it states that at least 10 % of funds received by parties
shall be for activities to promote the participation of women in politics.
Challenges
The improvement of the parties financing system should be part of the discussion of
the political system as a whole. The success of any reform will be primarily attained
based on the ability of the Government and Congress to adopt an integral view of the
political system, as it is already being done with the presentation of the project that seeks
to strengthen political parties, regarding the institutional strengthening of the Electoral
Service, and the already approved constitutional autonomy of this body of electoral
administration and management.
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Political periods that fit properly is a complex issue and it represents the main
challenge to give Chile a modern political system that can respond to a new society, and
where it is necessary for institutions and processes to function in a co-ordinated way,
meeting the needs of citizens. To the extent that the triad: money in politics (campaigns
and parties), reform of the law on political parties, and strengthening the electoral
management body work in harmony, it is highly likely that the objectives pursued in the
reform plan can be successfully achieved and can provide the political system greater
legitimacy in its role as co-ordinator of social interests.
Note
1. The current bill establishes a sanctioning administrative procedure and a series of
fines for violations to the Law on Transparency and Control Limit Campaign
Spending (Law 19,884). These fines are applied by the Director of the SERVEL and
their amounts depend on the percentage of the amounts of money given or received
illegally.
Besides this sanctioning administrative procedure applied by the SERVEL, our
system provides the possibility of jointly applying appropriate criminal penalties on
the candidates or their representatives for the crimes they would have committed. The
most common criminal offenses in these cases are tax fraud and embezzlement of
public funds, which are punished with imprisonment and fines, following the
declaration as guilty in a due court proceeding.
Thus, the competent court may judge the facts at the same time the SERVEL provides
the necessary background information. During the proceedings the parties may be
summoned to declare and to gather records for finally passing sentence, in strict
compliance with the rules of due process. It is noteworthy that the judicial process
will take place and give sentence independently of what the SERVEL decides, so it
may happen that while one discards the charges, the other finds it guilty. Criminal
liability does not depend on what the SERVEL determines on administrative grounds.
On the other hand, a disciplinary procedure can be developed by the Comptroller
General of the Republic in the event a civil servant or an authority is involved in
illegal practices. In these cases, any person may present the corresponding complaint,
duly providing the background on which it is based.
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References
Mojobi, E. H. (2003), “África francófona”, in Carrillo, M. et al., Dinero y contienda
político-electoral, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico.
UNDP (2015), “Presentation to the Committee on the Constitution, Legislation and
Justice of the Chamber of Deputies”, record available in Spanish at
www.undp.org/content/dam/chile/docs/gobernabilidad/Minuta_PNUD_Financiamient
o_Camara_Diputados.pdf.
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Chapter 8
Estonia
By Dr. Vello Pettai
Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Tartu
Member, Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee
This case study presents the Political Parties Act, the legislative framework for funding,
regulating and monitoring political parties and candidates. It also discusses the Estonian
Party Funding Supervision Committee, the electoral management body charged with
overseeing compliance with the Political Parties Act.
136 – II.8. ESTONIA
Overall description
Estonia presents the case of a post-communist country, which has slowly developed
an integrated system of party finance regulation, reporting and oversight. The system is
based on parties receiving relatively generous amounts of state funding, while
contributions by corporate bodies are banned. Parties are therefore more insulated from
quid pro quo politics. But controversy remains around whether this system has created a
cartel of dominant political parties (Pettai, 2013). It has also not prevented some parties
from engaging in questionable campaign practices, such as using local government
resources to carry out veiled electoral campaigning. The Estonian Party Funding
Supervision Committee plays a central role in both monitoring political party finance
reports well as investigating and punishing violations of these regulations. The
Committee is not a completely autonomous body, since a majority of its members are
from the political parties themselves. However, during its first four years it has proven
itself to be above these possible pitfalls and has been able to implement a rigorous and
efficient oversight structure.
In Estonia, political party finance is regulated by the Political Parties Act, first
adopted in 1994 and most recently amended in 2014. The Act oversees all aspects of
political parties, including their founding, registration, membership rules, dissolution and
certain areas of party governance. In addition, the Act establishes ground rules for party
finance, meaning it lays out the permitted types of party income and expense, regulations
for reporting party finance and the operating procedures for the main party financing
monitoring body, the Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee (EPFSC). It should
be noted that in Estonia, independent, single candidates may also run for a seat in
parliament as well as for local government councils; likewise, in local elections non-party
citizen alliances may field candidates. Both of these electoral types are also covered by
the financing rules stated in the Political Parties Act.
The regulation of party finance in Estonia is separate from electoral management. The
Estonian National Electoral Committee oversees the organisation of all elections,
including Estonia’s unique system of Internet voting. Because, however, party finance is
something that is not linked uniquely to elections or campaigning, it was felt that the
monitoring of this domain should be carried out by a separate body.
1
This orientation also
grew out of how party financing was monitored from the mid-2000s to 2011, namely
through a special parliamentary anti-corruption commission comprised fully of members
of parliament (MPs). This indicated that the main approach toward monitoring party
finance would involve party representatives, and not uniquely independent experts,
judges or officials.
During the mid-2000s, party financing received a lot of public attention. Scandals
surrounding the mysterious ways in which parties were financing electoral campaigns led
to much criticism in the media, but also to a special constitutional review complaint filed
by Estonia’s Chancellor of Justice (or ombudsman) arguing that parliament’s failure to
enact effective party finance regulation constituted a breach of good governance
principles enshrined in the country’s constitution. After four years of wrangling, the
Chancellor of Justice lost his appeal. However, the debate did eventually lead to a
thorough re-examination of the Political Parties Act.
In April 2011, the Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee was created as an
independent oversight body (based in administrative law) with the task of compiling party
and other electoral finance reports, enforcing the accuracy of these reports, investigating
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complaints surrounding party finance as well as issuing administrative penalties and
seeking criminal fines where party finance regulations have been violated. The
Committee therefore has a clear mandate to monitor and enforce a broad range of issues
related to political finance.
The Committee’s composition is also broader than the anti-corruption commission in
parliament that previously oversaw party finance. The Committee is comprised of
representatives from each party in parliament. (From 2011 to 2015 there were four; after
March 2015, there were six.) Moreover, these representatives may not be MPs or
government ministers, and ideally not in the executive bodies of their party. Hence, the
idea is that these representatives serve as autonomous individuals, not as delegates or
conduits for their party’s interests. In addition, the Committee includes three expert
members: one appointed by the Chancellor of Justice, one by the National Electoral
Committee and one by the State Auditor. The Committee is supported by an
administrative advisor and a legal advisor.
During its first four years of operation, the EPFSC has built up an efficient and
transparent financial reporting system, established numerous precedents in terms of
investigatory and sanctioning power, and gained a reputation of credibility and integrity
in the eyes of the public and most politicians. Needless to say, political finance remains
controversial in Estonia, with certain parties calling for a drastic reduction in the amount
of money that parties receive from the state budget. Likewise, because many of the
EPFSC’s investigations have focused on one particular party (the Centre Party), the
Committee has sometimes been accused of being biased in its activities. However, all
major parties in Estonia have come under the Committee’s scrutiny at one point or
another and no party has so far voiced a desire to alter or boycott the system.
Practical implementation of political finance regulations
Level playing field
As a post-communist country, Estonia has been developing its democracy over the
last 25 years through various stages. An important milestone in this process was a
decision in 2003 to forbid private companies and other legal persons from contributing
money to political parties together with a tripling in the level of public funding for
parties. The rationale here involved the widespread notion that extensive public financing
for political parties helps to insulate them from business and other lobbying interests and
thereby improve governance. Hence, Estonia first introduced public funding for parties in
1996, although initially this system remained modest and existed alongside private
individual and corporate donations to parties. When the decision was made to ban
corporate funding in 2003, public financing was raised from 20 million kroons (EUR 1.28
million) to 60 million kroons (EUR 3.84 million). In 2008, this figure rose to 90 million
kroons (EUR 5.75 million), and for 2015 the overall amount was EUR 5.4 million.
This shift prompted a commensurate decrease in the share of private funding for
political parties. Whereas previously parties had received upwards of 90% of their income
from members and private sponsors (Sikk, 2006, p. 74), roughly 80% of parties’ funding
came from state allocations in 2014. Another 18% came from individual private
contributions and merely 2% came from formal party dues (Figure 8.1).
138
– II.8. ESTONIA
Figure 8.1. Sources of political party income in Estonia, 2014
In EUR
Source: Party reports filed with the EPFSC
.
It is an open question to what extent this heavily public system of party finance
creates a level playing field. Firstly, the system distributes money according to parties’
representation in parliament, thereby allowing larger electoral parties to spend more
during a legislative term and thereby maintain their political advantage. Second, although
the system does allocate money to non-parliamentary parties, these sums have been paltry
when compared to those earned by parliamentary parties. Up until 2014, a party that just
missed Estonia’s 5% electoral threshold would receive only a tiny fraction of what a party
would get once it entered the legislature (EUR 15 978 as opposed to EUR 320 406).
Parties that received between 1% and 4% of the national vote received just EUR 9 587
annually. All of this is in stark contrast to the amount (over EUR 1 million) that a party
would get with, say, 20 seats in Estonia’s 101-seat parliament.
In 2014, thanks to a prolonged public discussion over the openness of Estonia’s
political system, the party financing system was changed to accord slightly more money
to non-parliamentary parties.
2
However, the overall amount of public party financing
remained the same. This therefore became a major campaign issue for a new political
party in Estonia, the Free Party, which successfully entered parliament during elections in
March 2015. One of its key demands was to halve the amount of public money given to
political parties. After the elections, Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas invited the newcomer
party to hold coalition talks. But this same party financing issue became a stumbling
block, and the Free Party went into the opposition.
During the March 2015 elections, parties and candidates reportedly spent around
EUR 6 million (Koch, 2015; EPFSC). This figure was approximate and a combination of
two sources. On the one hand, parties are required to submit one month after an election a
report to the Estonian Party Funding Supervision Committee that details all personal
campaign expenses incurred by candidates running on a party list or as an independent
candidate. These figures are presented in Table 8.1.
II.8. ESTONIA – 139
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Table 8.1. Personal campaign expenses incurred by candidates on party lists and by independent candidates,
2015 Riigikogu elections, Estonia
Expense
category
CP SDE RP PPRPU FP CPP
Other
parties
Independent
candidates
Total
A
dvertising
expenses
173 874 40 977 27 598 129 678 6 688 7 465 4 474 4 275 395 031
T
V
24 808 240 3 888 19 993 0 0 0 0 48 930
Radio 8 004 6 883 1 239 11 169 230 0 732 0 28 259
Internet 3 838 3 915 1 384 9 561 602 331,2 214
2
19 850
Outdoo
r
17 825 960 0 2 15
6
0 1 703 0 0 22 645
Print media 24 354 10 435 7 773 26 145 945 2 313 2 000 4 117 78 085
Promotional
materials
95 042 18 543 13 313 60 651 4 910 3 117 1 526 156 197 260
Public relations 3 890 816 70 0 0 0 0 0 4 776
Publications 0 0 0 18 053 0 0 0 0 18 053
Events 9 193 5 667 643 4 355 0 0 83 4 19 947
Other expenses 31 212 10 305 1 933 4 834 564 7 258 147 68 56 325
Total 218 170 57 766 30 245 156 922 7 253 14 723 4 704 4 348 494 134
Legend: CP = Center Party, SDE = Social Democratic Party, RP = Reform Party, PPRPU = Pro Patria and Res Publica Union,
FP = Free Party, CPP = Conservative People’s Party.
Source: Party reports filed with the EPFSC.
At the same time, personal candidate expenditures amount to only about 10% of what
is actually spent during a campaign. The reason is that typically parties will spend their
national funds on advertising and events for the entire party (in particular, TV and radio
advertising). These amounts, however, are not reported as formal campaign expenditures,
since it is felt that it is too difficult (or sometimes too arbitrary) to require parties to
specifically designate certain expenses as being linked to an electoral campaign, when the
activity might also be about promoting the party as such. Likewise, it is difficult to
establish a starting date after which all party expenses (or donations, for that matter)
might be automatically considered as linked to an electoral campaign.
3
Until mid-2011,
parties in Estonia were required to submit campaign finance reports. However, since there
were no unified rules about what counted as a true campaign expense or funding source,
the reports varied in their quality and were not seen as very useful in terms of either
aggregating statistics or holding parties accountable.
As of 2011, parties are required simply to submit quarterly income and expense
reports, within which one of the expense categories relates to “political activity”
(alongside basic administrative costs and wages). It is under this rubric that parties
incorporate most of their electoral campaign expenses. In this respect, one can look at
what these political activity expenses were for the final quarter or two before an election
in order to assume that some part of this money must have represented campaign
expenses. Table 8.2 gives an indication that during the end of 2014 and early 2015 the
four parliamentary parties did ramp up their spending on political activities. However,
simply adding up these figures does not give a definitive account of campaign financing.
Because campaign finance reporting is not fully elaborated in Estonia, it is difficult to
say how much public as opposed to private funding is used specifically for electoral
campaigns. As a rule, money spent by individual candidates can be classified as private
campaign spending. Hence, the roughly EUR 500 000 listed in Table 8.1 belonged to this
category during the 2015 campaign. Money spent by the parties as a whole originates
mostly from their state subsidy, partly from individual donations, minimally from party
dues, and occasionally from bank loans (see Figure 8.1).
140 – II.8. ESTONIA
Table 8.2. Expenditures on political activities by the four parliamentary parties in Estonia, 2014-15
Party 2014, 1
st
quarte
r
2014, 2
nd
quarte
r
2014, 3
rd
quarte
r
2014, 4
th
quarte
r
2015, 1
st
quarte
r
Center Party 25 814 250 665 20 011 97 668 900 091
Reform Party 202 661 474 425 168 827 425 923 1 237 593
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 168 021 550 220 72 925 482 696 1 015 314
Social Democratic Party 98 722 252 187 47 836 185 568 879 588
Source: Party reports filed with the EPFSC.
The results of the 2015 elections showed that although Estonia’s party financing
system favours established, parliamentary parties, it is possible for new parties to break in
if there is enough popular support behind them. Both the Free Party (mentioned above)
and another new party, the Conservative People’s Party, entered into parliament in 2015
with eight and seven seats, respectively. While the Free Party campaigned explicitly on a
platform of democratic political reform, the Conservative People’s Party espoused a more
Eurospectic programme, but still called for a broadening of the party system. The fact that
together these two parties received nearly 17% of the vote after having spent just
EUR 220 000 over the past year (as opposed to over EUR 7 million by the four
parliamentary parties), showed that the system was still open to newcomers.
Transparency and accountability
Both the campaign expense reports as well as quarterly finance reports submitted by
political parties are relatively detailed. Each must itemise their figures into a number of
specific categories listed in Table 8.3.
Table 8.3. Categories of information to be provided within party finance reports, Estonia
Quarterly finance reports Campaign expense reports
Expenditures Income Expenditures Donations
1) Advertising, including:
TV
Radio
Internet
Outdoor
Print media
Printed materials
2) Public relations
3) Publications
4) Events
5) Other expenses
1) Membership dues
2) State subsidy
3) Individual donations
4) Sale of party property
1) Administrative costs,
including communications
2) Salaries and wages paid
3) Advertising expenses
categorised by type
4) Public relations costs
5) Publications
6) Transportation
7) Rental expenses
8) Events
9) Other expenses
1) The names of individuals
donating to the party or
independent candidate
Source: Political Parties Act (RT I, 12.07.2014, 39), Sections §12
1
(8) and (9), §12
8
(9) and (10), §12
1
(2),
§12
8
(8), respectively.
In addition, each entry representing income for parties or campaign donations for
individual candidates must state:
1. the date of the receipt of the donation
2. the type of income (mostly for parties: dues, state allocation, donation, sale of
property)
3. the name of the payer
4. the personal identification or registry code of the payer
5. the amount of income received.
II.8. ESTONIA – 141
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Meanwhile, each line of expenditure must include:
1. the date of the expense receipt
2. the number of the expense receipt
3. the name of the recipient
4. the personal identification or registry code of the recipient
5. the cost type
6. the price of the cost
7. the cost amount paid
8. the cost amount payable
9. the date of payment.
Lastly, each party must disclose at the end of each quarter a list of all expenses still
unpaid as well as the balance sheet of its accounts. Quarterly finance reports must be
submitted to the EPFSC by the 10th of the month following the end of a quarter.
Campaign finance reports must be submitted no later than one month following an
election. All reports must be submitted electronically, using a special spreadsheet
prepared by the EPFSC. They must also be signed digitally using Estonia’s digital
signature system.
4
The entire system is streamlined in such way as to make the reports speedily
accessible to the public. Generally within a few days of each deadline, the information is
already available on the EPFSC’s website. The database is searchable according to any
number of categories, beginning with individual parties and successive elections
(including individual municipal elections), but also including the names of donors, the
names of expense recipients, the types of expenses and the types of income sources.
Media outlets regularly monitor the EPFSC’s website and scrutinise every new reporting
period looking for news on large-scale individual donors as well as data on broader trends
(Koch, 2015).
A final level of scrutiny involves the annual audits that parties must submit to the E-
Business Register. In addition to tax authorities verifying these reports, the EPFSC also
examines them and makes public a written analysis of parties’ financial health, drawing
attention to those parties that have considerable debt or may otherwise be weak
financially and therefore perhaps vulnerable politically.
Needless to say, any reporting system prompts false reporting from time to time. In
2012, the Center Party came under special scrutiny, when its secretary general asked the
EPFSC to amend an earlier income report and add a list of EUR 11 030 in donations
made to the party in the fall of 2010. Upon closer examination, Estonian authorities began
to suspect that the secretary general of the party, Priit Toobal, had faked the receipts
certifying these donations, and hence had laundered money for the party. The state
prosecutor took the matter to court and in October 2014 Toobal was convicted of
falsifying documents. A year later, however, Toobal was still appealing the decision to
the Estonian Supreme Court.
142 – II.8. ESTONIA
Integrity
The system that has been developed around the EPFSC is gradually helping to build
integrity within the party financing system. The credibility of party finance reports has
grown thanks to specific rules for itemisation as well as the procedures for electronic
submission. The EPFSC has also gained in stature by starting investigations not only
when called upon by individual complaints, but also on the basis of media reports. When
a newspaper reported that an Estonian member of the European Parliament (MEP) was
using her expense money to rent an office in Tallinn and was sharing that space with her
home party in Estonia, the EPFSC examined whether this constituted an illegal in-kind
donation to the party. In the event, the Committee concluded that because the MEP was
paying the same rent as the party and was also actually using the office space (alongside
occasionally allowing her home party to use a room for meetings), this did not constitute
a hidden contribution to the party.
Likewise, in November 2014 the Committee investigated a promotional video made
by the governing Reform Party, in which Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas was shown at one
point walking down a runway at an Estonian airforce base. The video was made even
more powerful when producers superimposed a clip of fighter jets streaking above the
prime minister’s head. The image of the fighter jets had been obtained from another,
unrelated source; they were not Estonian equipment. However, the fact that the prime
minister was filmed walking on military territory as part of a party-political advertisement
did raise objections that this was an abuse of state resources.
Estonia’s military authorities attempted to stem the controversy by immediately
announcing that other parties could also use the military facility if they so desired. This
was an attempt to come into compliance with the Political Parties Act that says that if all
parties are given access to a particular resource, then its use is not discriminatory.
However, eventually the minister of defence forbade any use of military facilities, and it
was left up to the EPFSC to decide what to do. Following various queries to individuals
involved with the incident, the Committee concluded that the idea for filming the prime
minister at the air base came from the producer hired for the video, and there was no sign
of the prime minister’s office having exerted any influence on the decision. Therefore the
Committee did not find any direct fault with the Reform Party. The Committee did,
however, chide the air base’s officials for having allowed the filming in the first place.
Compliance and oversight
There are three important levels at which the Estonian Party Funding Supervision
Committee contributes to compliance and oversight. The first involves the verification
and analysis of finance reports that the EPFSC and its staff conduct on a regular basis.
The fact that these reports are scrutinised thoroughly is extremely important in terms of
establishing credibility. This includes checking up on cases, where a party, for example,
has not paid an invoice for more than six months, and therefore there is a suspicion that
the party and supplier have agreed to write off the expense as an in-kind contribution.
Secondly, the EPFSC has extensive powers to demand supplementary information or
documents from not only political parties and candidates, but also from whomever else
might be involved with an investigation. Hence, the Committee can ask purveyors of
services what terms, prices or conditions they may have given to parties when providing
their services, whether these services have been paid for, etc. The Committee can also
demand to see payment documents or other relevant information.
II.8. ESTONIA – 143
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Thirdly, the Committee can impose administrative penalties or request law
enforcement officials to issue criminal fines against individuals and/or parties who violate
political finance rules. Administrative penalties can range from EUR 500 to EUR 15 000.
Generally these have to do with independent candidates who have not submitted their
campaign reports on time, or if a candidate or party does not pay back on time campaign
expenses that the Committee has determined to have been improper. Criminal fines can
be imposed on candidates and parties if they knowingly submit false information or fail to
report required information to the Committee. In these instances, the Committee must
pass the complaint on to law enforcement officials, who then pursue the matter according
to criminal procedure.
While the EPFSC’s overall authority is clear, this does not mean that all of its
decisions go uncontested. During late 2013, the Committee began to scrutinise a series of
media campaigns (videos, outdoor banners) launched by the Tallinn City Government
that promoted special events or achievements by the city authorities, but that also usually
featured the mayor, Edgar Savisaar, as well as many other members of his Center Party,
who were all running in the October 2013 municipal elections. The Committee was
obliged to investigate, whether these public information campaigns constituted veiled
electoral advertising for the Center Party and its candidates prior to an election. If this
were the case, the cost of the videos and banners would represent an in-kind contribution
to the Center Party by the Tallinn City Government, and the Center Party would be
obliged to reimburse the city for these expenses.
5
After a period of investigation, the
Committee decided to issue a penalty to Savisaar and several other party members,
directing them to pay back the city for these videos and banners. Savisaar and his allies,
however, appealed the penalties in court, maintaining that the different activities were
part of any city’s responsibility to inform its residents about current affairs. The case
promised to have important ramifications, since it would help establish judicial practice in
relation to how veiled electoral campaigning could be investigated as well as whether the
EPFSC could reach that far.
Another emerging challenge for oversight concerned the appearance of stealth
campaigning by third-party groups during the 2015 parliamentary elections. In January
2015, a conservative civil society organisation, the Foundation for the Defense of Family
and Tradition, distributed across several regions of Estonia flyers calling on voters not to
vote for a number of candidates, who in the previous parliament had voted in favour of a
same-sex partnership law, and at the same time it encouraged voters to vote for three
particular candidates, who had opposed the partnership law.
While the first aspect of the flyer (i.e. the negative advertising) did not breach any
element of campaign financing law, the second dimension in which the foundation was
providing positive advertisement for certain candidates did. Under Estonia law this could
be considered an illegal campaign contribution, which the candidate in question would
have to pay back to the foundation. When asked about this incident by the press, the
foundation claimed that it was operating merely as a civil society actor wanting to
promote a political message. However, because foundations are also legal persons in
Estonia, the group was already in violation of this provision of Estonian law (that bans
legal entities from making campaign contributions). And even if it claimed that it was
distributing its flyers without any active knowledge or help from the candidates
concerned, Estonian law holds the candidates accountable, not the foundation.
The case raised vexing issues in terms of whether candidates in the future might be
vulnerable to having non-party groups suddenly campaigning for them without their
144 – II.8. ESTONIA
approval. Presumably, the incident involving this foundation will serve to create a
broader understanding that engaging in such stealth campaigning may not do a candidate
or party any favours, if the candidate or party is later forced to pay the cost of the external
group’s efforts. Nonetheless, there was plenty of ambiguity in terms of determining what
needed to be regulated. As of May 2015, the EPFSC was still examining the matter. In
August 2015, the EPFSC asked the Estonian police to charge the foundation with a
misdemeanour offence based on the financing law infringements. However, the police
authority denied the request, maintaining that because the foundation had included all of
the major parties running for parliament on its flyer, this could not be seen as favouring
any one of them and therefore could not be considered as campaign advertising. This
issue remained unresolved.
Challenges and risks
Estonia’s system of party finance regulation and oversight has evolved gradually over
20 years, and still has a number of grey areas to be resolved. On the one hand, the system
rests firmly on the principle of strong public funding for parties, totalling around EUR 5.4
million per year. While few in Estonia argue that public funding should be done away
with, many question whether this particular amount of funding is warranted. The reason is
that parties spend most of this money on electoral campaigning, and this means that
parties spend nearly EUR 7 per voter to get out their message. Some believe this is too
much. Limits on campaign spending have never been seriously considered in Estonia.
Secondly, the approach to oversight involves a mixture of party and non-party
representatives. While the inclusion of experts in the work of the EPFSC via other state
institutions is seen as good, it remains a question whether the prison (i.e. the party finance
system) isn’t still being guarded by the inmates (i.e. the parties). Especially given that the
number of party representatives grew in April 2015 to six (alongside three experts), the
need to ensure that the Committee focuses on more than just party interests remains
paramount. This has been a priority of the Committee’s first chair, Ardo Ojasalu (from
the Social Democratic Party), and has been reinforced by a very committed staff.
In 2016, parliament will need to renew the mandate of the EPFSC. In the process, it
may make certain amendments to the Political Parties Act in order to clarify a few
procedural matters that remain open. As it is, the original Political Parties Act from 1994
has been amended nearly 30 times and could stand a complete re-writing in order to
clearly lay out the current system. Likewise, parliament will have to review the EPFSC’s
own financing. When the Committee was originally created, it did not reckon with having
to prepare dozens of legal documents, especially in instances were defendants took the
Committee to court. Over the last three years the Committees outlays for legal
representation have grown considerably. Making sure that parties in parliament support
funding for the EPFSC to continue its work will be essential.
II.8. ESTONIA – 145
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Notes
1. Estonia’s very first procedure for campaign finance reporting (adopted in 1995)
required parties to submit to the National Electoral Committee an approximate
disclosure of expenses and campaign finance sources, in relation to which, however,
the Committee had no formal powers of scrutiny or oversight. It merely received the
disclosures and put them on file.
2. Henceforth, parties receiving between 2-3% of the vote during parliamentary would
receive annually EUR 30 000, between 3-4%, EUR 60 000 and between 4-5%,
EUR 100 000.
3. Elections are formally announced by the president of the republic three months before
the election day. However, this announcement is generally a constitutional formality
and has little to do with when parties begin their election expenditures.
4. Occasionally this stipulation has caused difficulty, since some independent candidates
have either not been in possession of a chip-embedded ID card necessary for digital
signatures or they have not been able to come to terms with the electronic
spreadsheet. In these cases, EPFSC staff have been ready to help candidates fill out
the form at the EPFSC’s office in Tallinn or they have agreed to accept a campaign
finance report submitted simply on paper.
5. It was not within the Committee’s jurisdiction to determine whether Edgar Savisaar or
other city officials had misused municipal funds by having such videos and banners
made so close to an election. Rather, it was to determine whether these municipal
expenditures could be interpreted as illicit campaign spending. In January 2015,
Estonia’s State Auditing Office did issue a report, in which it alleged that the Tallinn
City Government had systematically used city money to stage various public
information campaigns just prior to the 2013 municipal elections and that these
involved prominent members of the Center Party. However, the Office could merely
produce an analysis of the situation; it was up to the EPFSC to issue penalties.
146 – II.8. ESTONIA
Bibliography
Koch, Tuuli (2015), “Erakonnad käivad, käsi pikas, riigi poole. Aga ise?” Postimees, 15
April, p. 4.
Pettai, Vello (2013), “The contribution of party law and regulation to party system
stabilization: The case of Estonia”, paper presented at the 20th International
Conference of Europeanists, Amsterdam.
Sikk, Allan (2006), “Highways to power: New party success in three young
democracies”, PhD dissertation, University of Tartu, Tartu.
Sikk, Allan and Riho Kangur (2008), “Estonia: The increasing costs and weak oversight
in party finance”, in Roper, Steven. D. and Janis Ikstens (eds.), Public Finance and
Post-Communist Party Development, Ashgate, Hampshire, pp. 63-76.
II.9. FRANCE – 147
FINANCING DEMOCRACY: FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE © OECD 2016
Chapter 9
France
By Mr. Yves-Marie Doublet
Expert on Political Finance Legislation for the Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO)
Author of “Droit des elections” (Elections Law) with Laurent Touvet, Economica
2007 and 2014
Deputy Director, National Assembly
This case study presents the French system of funding for political parties and
campaigns, the expenditure rules that apply to campaigns, as well as the transparency
and reporting measures in place. It also discusses the role of the French oversight body
charged with ensuring compliance with existing rules.
148 – II.9. FRANCE
Level playing field
France’s legislation on electoral campaigns and parties funding is treated separately
and has three characteristics:
• Legislation on electoral campaigns finances dates from 1988, but it has been
amended several times: 1990, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2013 and
2015. Legislation on party funding adopted in 1988 is much more stable.
• Rules on electoral campaign finances owe much to jurisprudence put upon the
electoral courts involved in the proceedings.
1
• Public funding represents the most important part of electoral campaigns and
party funding.
Public financing of parties
Public financing of parties directly from the State budget represents roughly
EUR 61 million each year. This amount is split into two instalments.
The first one depends on the results of the parties in the previous parliamentary
elections. To be eligible for these funds, candidates put forward by political parties must
have obtained 1% of the votes in the first ballot in at least 50 constituencies, and the
allocation of public funds is proportional to the number of votes gained by the party.
Payment of the first instalment of public funding must comply with the principles on
gender parity. When the difference in the number of candidates of each gender having
declared to be affiliated to a party or a political group at the last elections to the National
Assembly exceeds 2 % of the total number of candidates, the amount of the first
instalment given to this party or this group is reduced by a percentage corresponding to
three-quarters of that difference in proportion to the total number of candidates. In 2013,
political parties paid EUR 6 million in fines for that reason.
The second half of direct public party financing is based on the number of seats of the
political parties in both chambers of Parliament that benefit from the first half of
financing. The reattachment of a parliamentarian corresponds to EUR 45 000 each.
In 2015, the first half is EUR 28.4 million and the second half was EUR 33 million.
The Socialist Party received EUR 25.4 million in 2014 and the opposition party, UMP
(Union pour un mouvement populaire), EUR 18.1 million.
If we refer to the annual report of the National Commission for Campaign Accounts
and Political Funding (CNCCFP), which is the supervising body of political party and
electoral campaign finances, in 2013 direct public funding of political parties was 37.8%
of the total income of political parties. But this figure does not totally reflect the different
forms of indirect public funding to which political parties benefit, such as tax
deductibility of donations,
2
broadcasting time, supply of staff and premises by local
bodies, funding of political newspapers with small advertising subsidies or funding of
parliamentary groups and foundations close to political parties. Direct and indirect public
funding of political parties is estimated, in reality, to be between 60% and 70 % of the
total income of the parties. Other sources of party funding are the followings: 20.3% from
elected representatives’ contributions, 14.7% from donations of physical persons, 14%
from member contributions and 13.3% from others sources.
II.9. FRANCE – 149
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In 2013, 408 political parties filed their accounts but of this total, approximately 10
play a significant role. The total amount of political parties’ income was EUR 199.6
million and the total amount of political parties’ expenses was EUR 192.9 million.
Public funding of electoral campaigns
Limits of electoral expenditures apply to all elections in constituencies over
9 000 inhabitants. The spending limit for the 2012 presidential election was EUR 16.851
million for the first ballot and EUR 22.509 million for the second. The average spending
limit for legislative elections is approximately EUR 60 000. This ceiling is readjusted
every two years for inflation. If the candidate obtains 5% or more of the votes cast in the
first round, he or she receives a flat reimbursement. The maximum amount of this flat
reimbursement allowed by law is equal to 47.5% of the upper limit of electoral expenses,
defined by each constituency according to the number of its inhabitants. To be
reimbursed, the candidate must meet several requirements: appoint a financial agent, an
individual or an association; file campaign accounts that must be submitted by an
accountant registered with the Association of Chartered accountants in the legal time
limit. The amount of flat reimbursement was EUR 36.3 million for the 2012presidential
election, and EUR 49.3 million for legislative elections the same year.
Private funding of electoral campaigns
Only donations from individuals - domestic and foreign persons - are allowed with a
limit of EUR 4 600 per donor per year for a candidate and EUR 7 500 per donor per year
for a party. Contributions may be made by members and elected officials to parties. The
only donations from legal persons to candidates which are allowed are donations from
parties. French electoral code prohibits all public figures and state-owned enterprises
from giving donations or other benefits to a candidate. Campaign accounts may be
rejected on the ground that the candidate enjoyed a benefit within the meaning of these
provisions. It is for the CNCCFP and the electoral court to assess whether the campaign
accounts should be rejected accordingly, having regard to all the circumstances and in
particular to the value of the benefit, the conditions in which the benefit, the in-kind
contribution was given and its amount. For instance, the occasional use of a photocopier
by a candidate, given the amount, the nature and the benefit, does not justify rejection of
the candidate’s campaign account.
3
Public funding for the organisation of elections
The French State paid EUR 415 million for the organisation of the presidential and
legislative elections in 2007 (EUR 1.90 per voter) and EUR 600 million for the same
elections in 2012 (EUR 2.76 per voter).
Electoral expenses
At the last presidential election in 2012, if we refer to candidates who gained more
than 5% of the votes cast, the breakdown of electoral expenses was the following: 45.9%
for public meetings; 16.6 % for paper advertising; 10.3 % for personnel costs; 5.0% for
Internet expenses; 4.5% for premises, equipment, telephone; 3.6% for other advertising
expenses; 4.2% for fees; 2.7% for receptions; 1.8% for advice in communication, polls
and enquiries; and 0.5% for postal costs.
150 – II.9. FRANCE
From a general point of view, French funding regulations of politics has two merits.
They have limited expenditures on elections, and they have a reduced dependence on
private donations.
Exceeding the expenses ceiling results in the rejection of the campaign account by the
CNCCFP. If it is confirmed by the electoral court, and if this excess is significant (17%
for instance), the candidate may lose his/her flat reimbursement and he/she may lose
office for three years. The same rule applies in the case of a significant infringement of
the regulations on electoral campaign funding, when, for instance, before 2013 candidates
made direct payments without going through an agent. This electoral sanction of
ineligibility is not available for presidential elections but applies to other elections. For
the legislative elections in 2007, the penalty of ineligibility has been applied twice for
elected members of parliament (MPs), for the legislative elections in 2012, three times.
Transparency and accountability
Disclosure by candidates and political parties is achieved in two ways.
Candidates’ campaign accounts
In constituencies of more than 9 000 inhabitants, all candidates in an election,
whether presidential, legislative, senatorial, regional, cantonal, municipal or European,
are required to file a campaign account. This campaign account must be submitted by a
chartered accountant to the CNCCFP by the tenth Friday after the first round. Candidates
who did not obtain 1% of the votes at the first ballot are exempt from this required
submission of a campaign account.
This campaign account must include donations by individuals, the candidates’
personal contributions, bank loans taken out by candidates, borrowings from political
parties, expenses paid by electoral parties, in-kind contributions by the candidate, the
political party and miscellaneous income.
In the same constituencies and for the same elections, candidates are required to
appoint a financial agent or an electoral financial association. They are the sole
intermediaries regarding campaign financing. The agents have to collect campaign funds
over the course of the year before the first day of the month in which the election takes
place, and up to the date of the filing of the candidate’s accounts, i.e. the tenth Friday
after the first ballot. They settle expenses incurred directly by the candidate or on his/her
behalf. They must open a single bank or post office account for all transactions of the
electoral campaign. According to the relevant provision of the Electoral Code, the
account’s title shall show that the holder is acting as financial agent for the duly named
candidate. This agent shall be declared at the Prefecture of the residency of the candidate.
These agents have to be declared when candidates submit their candidature and serves as
a way for candidates to ease the centralisation of expenses and income of the electoral
campaign.
Receipts enclosed to donations from physical persons below a threshold of
EUR 3 000 serving as proof of payment for tax administration do not mention the
candidate to whom the donation was given. The Group of States Against Corruption
(GRECO) in one of its recommendations
4
suggested to French authorities to lay down an
appropriate threshold above which the identity of the donor must be disclosed. French
authorities view that it would excessively undermine the principle of freedom of political
opinion, one of the consequences of which is the principle of the secret ballot. Given the
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small amount of these donations (EUR 4 600 to a candidate and EUR 7 500 to a political
party), the risk of an excessive influence of individuals on political actors should not be
exaggerated.
Political party’s accounts
Political parties must establish annual accounts, i.e. a balance sheet, and a profit and
loss statement. These documents must be certified by two auditors and submitted to the
CNCCFP before the 30
th
of June of the following year. These accounts are consolidated
accounts including accounts of political parties or groups and all organisations or entities
in which the party has more than the half of the authorised capital, holds seats in the
managing body or within its exercises decision-making or managing authority, and
prepared under accounting methods defined by the National Accounting Board. The
political party itself determines the scope of its influence and the extent of the
consolidated accounts. On the basis of guidelines, categories of expenditures include
propaganda and communication, financial support for candidates’ election campaigns,
other financial support, purchase of consumables, other external expenses, interest
expenses and bank charges, extraordinary expenses, depreciation and amortisation.
Donations must be received through a financial agent or an association. Donations to
associations are the most commonly used practice. Donations may not exceed EUR 7 500
per person per year and are eligible for tax deduction.
5
Fees to the party of national or
local representatives are not included in the ceiling. Donations from foreign physical
persons are permitted. Donations from foreign legal persons are prohibited but loans from
foreign legal persons are permitted. For instance the National Front took out a loan of
EUR 9.4 million from the First Czech Russian Bank in 2014. Political parties must
submit to the CNCCFP the list of the individuals having made donations.
Concerning supervision of party accounts, the CNCCFP has three duties: establish
whether there has been a breach of the rules for setting up accounts or donations by legal
entities; publish the summary party accounts of political parties in the French Gazette;
and determine and transmit to the Prime Minister the list of political parties that met their
accounting obligations and may claim public funding.
Public information on party accounts is available in the French Gazette and on the
CNCCFP website.
In practice, supervision relies mostly on the auditors. Two auditors from two different
firms check the consistency of the accounts and compliance with legal regulations that
prohibit donations from legal persons. Prior to an amendment adopted in 2013,
6
the
CNCCFP had no means of investigating party funding. It did not have access to
supporting documents, nor was it empowered to perform on-site supervision procedures.
The 2013 amendment to the Act 88-227 of 11 March 1988 enabled the CNCCFP to
request as necessary the documents of any accounting or supporting documents needed
for its monitoring duties. Such provision strengthens the supervision power of the
CNCCFP, however it may not issue any injunction or order to the party, and a party’s
refusal to co-operate is not liable to sanctions. But an injunction power would not comply
with freedom of activity of political parties embodied in the Constitution.
Some 296 political parties submitted their accounts to the CNCCFP in 2012 and 408
in 2014.
152 – II.9. FRANCE
Compliance and supervision
The CCNCFP is an independent administrative authority composed of nine active or
honorary members from the highest courts: three from the Council of State, three from
the Court of Cassation and three from the Audit court. These members are tasked with the
election of their chair. Its budget amounted to EUR 6.7 million in 2015 (EUR 4.2 million
for personnel costs and EUR 2.5 million for management costs). Some 47 employees
work in the commission. It is expected to treat 11 600 accounts of candidates for
departmental elections and 250 accounts of lists for regional elections in 2015.
Supervision of political parties funding
As previously mentioned, under Article 4 of the Constitution, the formation of
political parties and groups and the performance of their activities are free. So regarding
the constitutional status of the political parties, the CNCCFP is an independent
administrative body with limited remits. For instance, it is not entitled to monitor the
expenses of the political parties, and its monitoring must be focused on the lawfulness,
but not on the expediency, of the financial operation. If a political party did not meet its
obligations, it will not benefit from public funding. This means the loss of public funds
for the party and for the funding of the candidates who participate in the electoral
campaign. But the loss of public funds is not necessarily deterrent in practice, insofar as
80% of the parties presenting accounts with the CNCCFP do not receive public funds.
Another sanction is the loss of the tax benefit attached to the donations to the party.
Besides this financial sanction, the CNCCFP may declare to the National Financial
Intelligence unit any acts for which there are reasons to suspect a tax offence. With
respect to party funding if the powers of the CNCCFP are weak, the police and the
judiciary may obtain access to political parties’ accounts in the context of legal
proceedings.
Other sanctions that may apply are administrative and penal sanctions. If a funding
association fails to meet its obligations, its authorisation may be withdrawn by the
CNCCFP. Fines of EUR 3 750 and a one-year prison sentence for persons who have
made or received donations unlawfully may be applied.
Supervision of electoral campaign’s accounts
In the case of the campaign’s accounts, the CNCCFP has six months to approve,
reject or revise them. Some 2.5% of accounts were rejected for the 2007 legislative
elections, 2.1% for the 2012 legislative elections.
If the account is accepted, the State grants candidates with at least 5% of the votes
cast at the first round 47.5% of the flat reimbursement of electoral expenditures. There
are various possible reasons for the rejection of a campaign account: no account opened
by an agent, a deficit unaccounted for, no invoices attached to the account, or a
significant excess of the ceiling of expenses. In the event the CNCCFP rejects the
campaign accounts, it refers the matter to the court with jurisdiction for the election. In
the event the CNCCFP suspects that a criminal offence has been committed, it refers the
matter to the public prosecutor.
If the CNCCFP has to deliver its decisions within a period of six months from the
deadline for the submitting the accounts, this period is reduced to two months if the
election has been challenged by a voter who has an interest in pursuing legal procedure.
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Decisions of the CNCCFP may be challenged by the candidates before the relevant
election jurisdiction.
7
A sanction which may be applied is ineligibility, which is one of the main
characteristics of the French system. This ineligibility may be ordered by the court if the
campaign account has been rightfully rejected on grounds of fraud or serious breach of
the rules on electoral campaign funding. It applies for a maximum of three years and to
all elections, but not for the previous elections. It is a very effective sanction. Out of the
6 603 candidates at the 2012 legislative elections, 195 were declared ineligible by the
Constitutional Council. In 18 cases, the candidate corrected his/her situation during the
procedure, and in 19 cases the Constitutional Council determined that the infringement of
the rules was not sufficiently serious to justify the penalty of ineligibility. If this penalty
applies for only three years, in practice the disqualified elected representative may not be
elected for the whole duration of the mandate, which will be fulfilled by another elected
representative. One point has to be emphasised. Ineligibility applies to all elections except
for presidential elections, because the announcement of the results of the election by the
Constitutional Council is a judicial decision, just after the second ballot, which cannot
later be questioned. Pursuant to Article 62 of the Constitution, this announcement shall be
binding on public authorities, on all administrative authorities and all courts.
In the event the CNCCFP considers that a criminal offence has been committed, it can
refer the matter to the public prosecutor. The Electoral code provides for sanctions of
criminal offences with fines of EUR 3 750 and/or a prison sentence of up to one year.
Conclusions
The constitutional status of political parties prevents an increase of the investigative
powers of the supervision body. If we benchmark French regulations regarding
transparency, supervision and sanctions, we have to admit that these rules are honourable.
They have succeeded in reducing the influence of money in politics, enhanced
transparency of party funding, reduced expenses in legislative and local elections and set
up an independent supervision body.
154 – II.9. FRANCE
Notes
1. There are various courts with jurisdictions for elections in France: the Constitutional
Council for Presidential, legislative elections, elections at the Senate and referendum
and administrative courts and Council of State as court of appeal for municipal and
cantonal elections, Council of State as unique court for regional elections and
elections to European Parliament.
2. Some 66% of the amount donated within a limit of 20% of taxable income. Donations
from individuals may be paid by cheque, bank transfer, direct debit or bank card. The
amount of donations and fees was EUR 90 million in 2011 and 2012, what is
considered as a tax expenditure of EUR 60 million by the CNCCFP.
3. CC, 97-2194AN, 9 décembre 1997, AN Loire-Atlantique, 5 ème circ., Rec. p. 285.
4. See www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3%28008)
5_France_Two_EN.pdf.
5. See http://bofip.impots.gouv.fr/bofip/5869-PGP.
6. Art.17 loi 2013-907 11 octobre 2013.
7. See Endnote 1, above.
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Chapter 10
Korea
By Mr. Heeman Koo
International Cooperation Division
National Election Commission of the Republic of Korea
This case study presents the system of funding for political parties and elections in Korea.
It also discusses the role of the National Election Commission in overseeing, monitoring
and enforcing election regulations.
156 – II.10. KOREA
Definition and basic principle of political funds
Since being enacted in 1965, the Political Fund Act in Korea has undergone 24
revisions for the purpose of guaranteeing the fair provision, and transparency, of political
funds. In the Political Fund Act, the term “political funds” is defined as money, securities
or goods that are provided to persons who are engaged in political activities, including
political parties, in addition to expenses that they need to undertake political activities,
including elections.
With the aim to guarantee the proper provision of political funds, secure the
transparency of political funds, and contribute to the sound development of democratic
politics by preventing illegal political funding, the Political Fund Act lays out the
following basic principles:
• No one shall contribute or receive any political funds that are not prescribed in
this Act.
• Political funds shall be fairly and justifiably managed in order to keep them free
of suspicion. Their accounting materials shall be open to public.
• Political funds shall be disbursed only to reimburse expenses required for political
activities and shall not be disbursed for private expenses or illegal purposes.
• Anyone who makes a one-time contribution of political funds in excess of
USD 1 200 or pays a one-time expense for political activities in excess of
USD 500 (for election expenses, USD 200) shall make such contributions or pay
such expenses by means of cheque, credit card, account transfer or by other
means that ascertain the identity of those who donate and spend.
• Everyone shall be prohibited from contributing political funds in the name of
another person or in a false name.
Also, pursuant to Article 31 of the Political Funds Act, foreign nationals are banned
from making political contributions in Korea. Any corporations or groups at home and
abroad are prohibited from contributing political funds or donating funds in connection
with any corporate entities or groups. This ban stemmed from a large amount of illegal
funds that political parties received from companies to cover their campaign expenses for
the 2002 presidential election. In August 2005, the National Assembly of the Republic of
Korea revised the Political Funds Act so that any corporations or groups were
fundamentally prohibited from making political contributions with the aim of initiating
political reforms and addressing problems with illegal political funds.
Although the Political Funds Act does not directly prohibit public officials from
making political contributions, the Political Parties Act stipulates that public officials
(except in certain cases) are not allowed to join a political party. In addition, since the
State Public Officials Act bans any civil servants, not allowed to join a political party,
from engaging in political activities, it is interpreted that public officials are not allowed
to pay political party membership fees or donate political contributions to a fundraising
association.
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Restrictions on political fundraising and contributions
Under the Political Fund Act, any political party may collect party membership fees.
However, the Act does not set an upper limit on the amount of fees which may be paid by
an individual political party member. When a fundraising association that raises political
funds for a National Assembly member or a candidate to run in an election for public
offices submits a financial report, it is required to disclose the personal information of a
donor who makes contributions exceeding a set amount. In comparison, political parties
are only required to disclose the total amount of membership fees collected, therefore the
general public has no way of accessing the information on party members who paid a
large amount of membership fees.
According to financial reports submitted by political parties in 2015, the total amount
of membership fees collected from party members was USD 52 million, 25.8% of their
total income of USD 201.3 million. South Korea’s ruling Saenuri Party collected
USD 26.4 million in membership fees, which made up 27.0% of their total USD 97.6
million income. The New Politics Alliance for Democracy party collected USD 21.2
million, making up 23.1% of its USD 91.7 million total income.
Previously, political parties were allowed to raise political funds through fundraising
associations. However the revision to the Political Fund Act in 2008 prohibited political
parties from raising campaign funds from the public. Political parties that hold seats in the
National Assembly or obtained a certain percentage of votes in previous elections are
entitled to receive national subsidies for the operation of parties and campaigning for
presidential, National Assembly member and local elections.
For political activities and for election campaigning, a National Assembly member or
a candidate who runs for public office uses his/her private assets, including bank loans. A
candidate nominated by his/her political party is allowed to receive funds from his/her
own party and use them. A National Assembly member or a candidate in public office
elections (except candidates running for local council member elections) can designate an
association for fundraising. The designated association is allowed to collect political
contributions when registered with the Election Commission.
A fundraising association is permitted to raise funds within the limit of contributions
set forth in the Political Fund Act. A fundraising association for a presidential candidate
is allowed to raise an amount up to the equivalent of 5% of the ceiling amount of election
expenses. For a fundraising association of a National Assembly member, up to
USD 150 000 (the amount will double in the year when nationwide public office elections
take place), and for a fundraising association for a candidate running in an election to
elect the head of local governments, up to 50% of the ceiling amount of election expense.
When a fundraising association raises contributions, it is required to promptly forward
those funds to the National Assembly member or the candidate who has designated the
association, after deducting expenses directly incurred in the course of fundraising.
The limit on contributions an individual can make to a fundraising association in a
year is USD 20 000: USD 10 000 a year to a fundraising association for a presidential
candidate, and USD 5 000 a year to a fundraising association for every National
Assembly member or fundraising group of a candidate running for the National Assembly
election. Donors are required to reveal their names, dates of birth, addresses, occupations
and telephone numbers. However, donors may anonymously make a one-time
contribution of not more than USD 100, and not more than USD 1 200 a year.
158 – II.10. KOREA
Restrictions and reimbursements of campaign fund expenses
Beside what is stipulated in the Political Funds Act, new means to raise election funds
from voters that do not violate the Act were first introduced in 2010. In the same year, a
potential candidate running for the election for Gyeonggi-do governor set a goal of
raising USD 4 million for election expenses, and within a matter of days had raised more
than USD 4 million. Even though the method employed by the candidate to raise funds
was not included in the Political Funds Act, it was accepted because the method was
interpreted as the candidate borrowing funds under an open agreement between a
candidate and a multiple number of individuals. One of the elements that encouraged
voters to participate in the fundraising scheme was due to the following campaign
expenses reimbursement. When candidates submit the financial report of their campaign
spending to the Election Commission, the Commission is required to reimburse 50% of
disbursed campaign spending to candidates who won 10% or more of the total votes cast
in the election. If a candidate wins 15% or more of the total votes cast in the election,
he/she is eligible to get reimbursed the total disbursed campaign spending by the
Commission no later than 60 days after election day. With these reimbursed funds, the
candidate was able to pay back the donors with interest, which was calculated based on
the average interest rate at the time. Consequently, in this way of fundraising, the
borrowed funds for campaign spending from donors are paid back from either the
national budget for presidential and National Assembly elections, or from the budget of
local governments for local elections, depending on the result of election. This method of
fundraising is often utilised by candidates who are high profile but do not have sufficient
funds.
According to the Public Official Election Act, “election expenses” are defined as
money, goods, debt or other things of economic value used for election campaign in the
election concerned and borne by a candidate. Expenses disbursed by a third party for the
election campaign of the relevant candidate also fall under election expenses.
Vote-buying practices are strictly prohibited, and candidates who buy votes are
subject to stern punishment, so as to promote fair elections. In order to reduce the
inequality of opportunity in election campaigning caused by the difference in financial
resources available to candidates, a limit has been set on the total amount of election
expenses that can be disbursed for campaigning purposes by political parties or
candidates running in official public elections.
The Election Commission is required to publicly notify political parties and
candidates prior to each election of the ceiling amount of election expenses that have
been calculated for each election. The ceiling amount is set by considering population and
the number of Eup/Myeon/Dong (administrative districts) in each constituency as well as
reflecting the fluctuation rate of national consumer prices. Different calculations of the
ceiling amount of election expenses are applied depending on the type of elections, as
follows:
• Presidential election: Population × USD 0.95
• National Assembly member election in district: USD 100 000 + (population ×
USD 0.20)
(the number of Eup/Myeon/Dong × USD 2 000)
The Election Commission is required to calculate those campaign expenses that are
accepted as legitimate spending from the financial report submitted by a candidate or
political party. The Election Commission is required to reimburse those legitimate
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campaign expenses from the national budget or the budget of the relevant local
governments (for local elections), as follows:
• Candidates who obtain 15% or more of the total votes are reimbursed the entire
amount of election expenses calculated above, while candidates who obtain
between 10% and 15% of the total votes are reimbursed half of their election
expenses.
• Political parties are reimbursed for the entire amount of election expenses when
any candidates from the party list are elected for proportional representatives.
Contributions of political funds through the National Election Commission
Individuals (including public officials who are prohibited from donating political
funds to fundraising associations) may deposit their contributions to the Commission for
the purpose of supporting the activities of political parties. The amount each individual
can contribute each year is between USD 100 000 and less than 5% of his/her income of
the previous year, whichever is larger. Every quarter, the National Election Commission
distributes the deposited political funds to the headquarters of each political party, based
on the distribution ratio of subsidies provided from the national budget.
Before the Political Funds Act was revised in 1997, corporations or individuals were
able to designate a political party to which they wanted to donate and entrust their
contribution with the Election Commission, which resulted in almost all political fund
deposits being distributed to the ruling party. Upon the strong request from the opposition
party, the Political Fund Act was revised, and thus, the deposit is now distributed to
parties according to the number of seats at the National Assembly that each party has and
the proportion of votes gained by each party in public official elections, similar to the
distribution ratio of subsidies from the national budget. Nevertheless, this political fund
deposit system became meaningless since people rarely entrusted their contribution with
the Election Commission, as they were no longer able to designate the political party they
wanted to donate to. Therefore, the Political Funds Act was revised again in 2004 to give
contributors a tax rebate of up to USD 100. Such a revision encouraged the public to
again entrust political funds to the Election Commission. In 2014, the National Election
Commission distributed and paid more than USD 4.45 million to political parties, funded
by 48 186 citizens.
Public subsidies to political parties
Article 8 of the Constitution stipulates that political parties shall enjoy the protection
of the State and may be provided with operational funds by the State under the conditions
as prescribed by this Act. Thus, the State shall appropriate subsidies for political parties
to the national budget under the Political Fund Act. The amount of annual subsidies
provided to political parties is calculated by multiplying the total number of eligible
voters in the most recent National Assembly election by the amount that the National
Election Commission determined considering the fluctuation rate in nationwide consumer
prices (USD 0.97 in 2014). In 2014, approximately USD 38.9 million in subsidies were
evenly divided in each quarter and provided to eligible political parties. In a year during
which a presidential election, a nationwide National Assembly election or local elections
are held, the National Election Commission shall, prior to the election, additionally
distribute and provide election subsidies equivalent to the calculated amount stated above
to each political party that nominated candidates. Four parties among those that
160 – II.10. KOREA
participated in the local elections held in June 2014 were subsidised with approximately
USD 38.9 million for election expenses.
The public subsidy is distributed based on the following principles: 50% of the total
subsidy shall be evenly distributed and provided to political parties that form negotiating
groups in the National Assembly as they have 20 or more seats in the National Assembly.
Political parties that hold 5-19 seats in the National Assembly are provided 5% of the
subsidies, while political parties that hold less than 5 seats in the National Assembly and
obtained 2% or more in the most recent National Assembly election or obtained 0.5% or
more in the nationwide local elections are given 2% of the subsidies. Of the remaining
subsidies, 50% shall be distributed to political parties according to the ratio of seats
against the total seats in the National Assembly at the time of distribution of the
subsidies, and the other 50% shall be provided according to the ratio of votes obtained in
the previous National Assembly election.
Meanwhile, in order to promote women’s political participation, the state provides
subsidies to political parties that nominated female candidates to run for district National
Assembly elections and local council members. The amount of the subsidy, calculated by
multiplying the total number of eligible voters in the most recent National Assembly
election by USD 0.10, is provided to political parties according to each party’s ratio of the
number of nominated female candidates, the number of seats in the National Assembly
and the proportion of the votes won in the most recent National Assembly election. In
2010, in order to support the political participation of persons with disabilities, a system
to provide subsidies to political parties that nominate persons with disabilities to run for
public official elections was introduced. Such subsidies for nominating females and
persons with disabilities shall be disbursed for the election expenses of female and
disabled candidates only. While the State paid subsidies for nominating female candidates
to two political parties that recommended 5% or more female candidates to run for
district National Assembly elections held in 2012, the State did not to give subsidies for
nominating persons with disabilities to any political party as there were no parties that
met the requirement for the subsidies, which is to nominate 1% or more candidates with
disabilities. In local elections in 2014, USD 2.06 million of subsidies was distributed to
political parties that nominated female candidates to run for City/Do council members,
and the elections for autonomous Gu/Si/Gun council members. Also, approximately
USD 520 000 in subsidies was distributed to two political parties for nominating
candidates with disabilities.
Taking a look at the proportion of the national subsidy in the total income of each
political party, in 2014, the Saenuri party’s income from the national subsidy accounted
for approximately USD 36.3 million, making up around 37.2% of the USD 97.6 million
in total income. New Politics Alliance for Democracy, the leading opposition party,
received nearly USD 33.8 million, which was 36.9% of USD 91.7 million in total income.
This shows that the national subsidy makes up the largest portion of the total income of
political parties.
Tax benefits for political funds
In order to encourage political contributions, political parties and fundraising groups
that raise campaign funds are exempt from income tax and donation tax. As part of an
effort to promote political donations, t
hose who contributed up to USD 100 are
eligible to claim a tax deduction for the entire amount of their donation.
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Contributions over USD 100 are entitled to a deduction from the taxable income
by the exceeding amount of the donation.
Income and expenditure of political funds available to the public through financial
reports
Political parties and fundraising groups that raise political funds, and all politicians
who receive political donations, are required to appoint a treasurer and report his/her
personal information to the Election Commission. The income and expenditure of the all
political funds are required to be managed by the treasurer alone, through a bank account
previously identified to the Commission.
The treasurer is required to provide the financial report on the income and
expenditure of the political funds to the Commission. A treasurer for a candidate running
for a public official position needs to submit the financial report on income and
expenditure within 30 days after election day (or within 40 days for presidential
elections). In addition, political parties are required to present a financial report showing
income and expenditure every year by 15 February of the following year. If the parties
were involved in nationwide public official elections, their financial report must be
submitted within 30 days after election day (within 40 days for presidential elections).
The financial report is required to include the detailed statement of income and
revenue of political funds, together with proof of expenditure, such as a receipt, in
addition to a copy of a record of transactions shown in the bank book. The treasurer of
fundraising groups is obliged to report personal information and the amounts contributed
by those who donated more than USD 300 in one donation or more than USD 3 000 in a
year (USD 5 000 for presidential elections).
The Commission that receives the financial report is required to keep it on file, make
it available to the public, and open it to public inspection for three months by posting it
on its website. Anyone can request a copy of a financial report on income and
expenditure of political funds from the Commission.
The Commission reviews each financial report on income and expenditure of
campaign funds submitted by a candidate for public official elections, and investigates
whether there is a false statement, illegal spending or if they have exceeded the campaign
expenditure ceiling.
Investigation and enforcement of control over political funds
In cases where the Commission suspects there have been violations of the Political
Fund Act, the Commission and its staff can have access to the scene or summon the
suspect before the Commission for inquiry and investigation. The Commission and its
staff may also request the submission of additional documents necessary for the
investigation, and ask heads of financial institutions for the submission of bank
transaction records.
After investigating suspected violations of the Political Fund Act, when it turns out to
be a serious violation, the Election Commission brings the case for prosecution. Those
who are found to have violated the Political Fund Act may be punished with a fine or
imprisonment following a court ruling. Depending on the extent of punishment, those
punished are forbidden to be hired or serve as public officials for between five and ten
years. If already sworn in or hired, they can be forced to resign. In the case that the
162 – II.10. KOREA
winner of an election is subject to a punishment of imprisonment or a fine of USD 1 000
or more, the election will be invalidated. The Election Commission can also impose
administrative fines on minor violations against the Political Fund Act, such as a delay in
issuing receipts or reporting by treasurers.
Since illegal political funds tend to be provided secretly, it is often revealed through a
report or information brought by those concerned or related in the case. Therefore, the
Political Fund Act has a provision to protect and reward informants. For instance, the
driver for a company executive reported an illegal political contribution of USD 50 000
made by the executive to a former National Assembly member. The National Election
Commission confirmed the charge and brought it for prosecution, resulting in a court
ruling that punished the former National Assembly member for violation of the Political
Fund Act. The driver was awarded USD 200 000 by the National Election Commission.
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Chapter 11
Mexico
By Mr. Rafael Riva-Palacio
Director of International Cooperation and Liaison
National Electoral Institute of Mexico (INE)
This case study presents the legislation and compliance framework for the Mexican
political system. It also includes information on public and private funding of political
parties, candidates and campaigns. This chapter includes information taken from
documents elaborated by the International Affairs Unit of the National Electoral Institute
of Mexico.
164 – II.11. MEXICO
Introduction
Enforcing regulation of finance and oversight procedures for political parties has been
a permanent issue in all Mexican electoral reforms since the last century.
In 1986, political parties achieved the constitutional right to receive public funding
for activities aimed at fulfilling their duties.
Since then, electoral legislation has established, developed and perfected provisions
aimed at regulating, controlling and supervising the funding system for political parties
and electoral campaigns in a clear, accurate and comprehensive way.
Political parties in Mexico are entitled to receive permanent public financing both
directly and indirectly. They also have the right to obtain private financing, although there
are some limitations. By law, public funding must prevail over private sources of funding.
There are also specific rules for transparency and accountability for political parties’
money including filing temporary reports. Political parties are subject to fines if they do
not observe applicable regulations.
According to the Mexican constitution and electoral law, the National Electoral
Institute (INE), formerly the Federal Electoral Institute, is in charge of allocating and
distributing both direct and indirect public finance to political parties at the federal level.
The INE is also charged with managing free radio and television airtime for electoral
matters, including political parties at the federal and local level, but also for electoral
authorities around the country.
The INE has a special unit to receive and review political parties’ reports on
financing. The electoral management body is legally entitled to fine political parties in the
event of a proven violation. Political parties have the right to appeal to the Electoral
Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Branch, which is responsible for deciding these issues in
a final and irrefutable manner.
In June of 2015, Mexico elected 500 deputies of the Lower Chamber of the Federal
Congress. This chapter aims to share main aspects of financing procedures for political
parties and candidates as part of our current federal election.
Finance for political parties and candidates
Political parties in Mexico are permanently entitled to receive direct and indirect
public financing for their ordinary activities and campaign expenses. They receive money
on three different concepts, and they also receive permanent and free access to radio and
television, exemption from payment of postage and telegraphic fees, and a special fiscal
regime.
Political parties also have the right to obtain private financing, both for permanent
activities and for campaign purposes. The law establishes those sources who are eligible
to give money to political parties, as well as those who are forbidden to contribute.
Direct public funding
Direct public funding is granted to political parties for three different purposes:
permanent ordinary activities, specific activities as entities of public interest and
campaign expenses.
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It is important to state that the Mexican Constitution establishes a formula to
determine the amount of public funding for political parties. This formula is based on the
number of citizens registered in the Electoral Roll in July every year and 65% of the
minimum wage established for the Federal District.
1
The INE is in charge of determining the amounts based on procedures provided by
the law. Public financing for permanent ordinary activities and for specific activities as
entities of public interest are delivered proportionally each month. Campaign expenses
during specific periods are delivered proportionally each month before election day.
The main characteristics of direct public funding are:
1. Political parties receive funding to support their daily operation activities. Of this,
30% of the total amount is allocated in equal parts to all political parties with
parliamentary representation, and the other 70% is distributed according to the
percentage of votes gained of the total sum cast for each political party with
representation in Congress in the preceding election for Lower Chamber
members at the national level.
Additionally, each political party that has obtained their legal registration after
the last election receives 2% of total amount.
It is important to state that each political party must spend at least 3% of its
funding for the training, promotion and development of political leadership of
women.
2. Regarding specific activities as entities of public interest, political parties receive
specific funding to finance activities that concern political training and education,
socio-economic and political research, as well as editorial tasks. The subsidy
granted for these activities aims at supporting political parties in activities. With
this purpose, an additional amount that equals 3% of the amount for ordinary
activities.
3. For campaign expenses, political parties receive specific funding. This funding is
intended to finance activities to obtain votes; therefore, it is only granted in
election years.
In years of general federal elections (President, Lower and Upper Chamber),
each party is granted an additional amount equal to 50% of the funding for
ordinary activities corresponding to that year.
During the years when only the 500 seats of the Lower Chamber are renewed,
each political party receives an amount equal to 30% of the amount received for
ordinary activities for campaign expenses.
These provisions are considered for all political parties legally recognised at the
Federal level, no matter if they have parliamentary representation.
Table 11.1 sets out a breakdown of public finance at the federal level for the Mexican
political parties in 2015.
166 – II.11. MEXICO
Table 11.1. Public finance at federal level for Mexican political parties in 2015
In USD
Political party Ordinary activities Specific activities
Campaign
expenses
Total
National Action Party (PAN) $57 249 659.02 $17 174 897.71 $1 717 489.77 $76 142 046.50
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) $68 161 440.59 $20 448 432.18 $2 044 843.22 $90 654 715.99
Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) $43 643 274.41 $13 092 982.32 $1 309 298.23 $58 045 554.97
Labour Party (PT) $18 797 028.88 $5 639 108.66 $563 910.87 $25 000 048.40
Green Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM) $21 548 923.44 $6 464 677.03 $646 467.70 $28 660 068.18
Citizen Movement (MC) $17 727 493.86 $5 318 248.16 $531 824.82 $23 577 566.84
New Alliance Party (PNA) $17 870 383.46 $5 361 115.04 $536 111.50 $23 767 610.00
National Regeneration Movement
(MORENA)
$5 212 727.74 $1 563 818.32 $156 381.83 $6 932 927.89
Humanist Party (PH) $5 212 727.74 $1 563 818.32 $156 381.83 $6 932 927.89
Social Encounter (ES) $5 212 727.74 $1 563 818.32 $156 381.83 $6 932 927.89
Total $260 636 386.88 $78 190 916.06 $7 819 091.61 $346 646 394.55
Source: National Electoral Institute of Mexico (MXN 15 = USD 1).
Law also establishes that independent candidates have the right to receive public
direct finance for campaign expenses.
As a sole entity, all independent candidates receive the same amount as a political
party that has obtained their legal registry after the last election. For general elections,
this amount is divided into three equal amounts and distributed to each group of
independent candidates: presidential, Senate and Deputies. At the midterm election, the
total amount is delivered to independent candidates for the Chamber of Deputies.
Once public funding is allocated in the proper groups, the amount is equally
distributed among all candidates. According to the law, no independent candidate can
receive more than 50% of the total amount allocated to his/her group or the amount
established as the limit of campaign expenditures. Money is delivered in two parts, and
candidates must return unspent funding.
For the 2015 election, 22 independent candidates have successfully registered.
Considering the legal rules, each one of them would receive USD 71 082.65.
Indirect public funding
Regarding indirect public funding, there are three main areas:
1. Permanent and free access to all radio stations and the TV free channels that
operate in the country. The INE has the power, as the only authority that can
administer the State’s airtime on radio and TV times, to guarantee both the
political parties’ access rights in all the elections conducted in the country,
and ensure that federal and local electoral authorities comply with their
obligations.
It is important to state that radio and television time used for electoral purposes is part
of the taxation paid by broadcasting enterprises. The INE is the only authority with
constitutional powers to buy additional time, should it be necessary. Any other use of
radio or television airtime for electoral purposes, other than that provided and regulated
by the INE, is a violation of the law.
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The law establishes allocation time as:
• During non-electoral periods, the time available for electoral purposes is 5
minutes 45 seconds on television, and 7 minutes 48 seconds on radio. Of this,
50% is equally distributed between all political parties. This means about 3
minutes on TV and about 4 minutes on radio, divided into 20-second slots; and a
5-minute monthly programme to each political party. The other 50% is used by
the INE for its own purposes or for other electoral authorities.
• During electoral periods, the distribution of time clearly distinguishes between the
ones of pre-campaigns, amounting to 30 minutes per day per radio station or
television channel, and the ones of campaign, which are increased to 41 minutes
to each media, although not equally distributed but under the same proportionality
formula used for direct public funding: 30% equally and 70% according to the
number of votes obtained in the previous Lower Chamber election.
• Independent candidates have the right to receive free time on the radio and
television. For these purposes, they are considered as a sole political party, and
proper time is allocated equally among all of them.
• During electoral periods (pre-campaigns and campaigns) the time is divided into
30-, 60- and 120-second slots, assorted to be broadcasted between 6:00 a.m. and
11:59 p.m.
It is important to state that all parties (including pre-candidates and candidates) may
only access the media by means of the slots in radio and television allotted to the State.
The use of those slots is exclusive of the political parties and entirely free. The INE is the
only authority responsible for managing these slots.
2. Exemption from postal and telegraph payment, whenever necessary to achieve
their functions. For 2015, each political party has a postal and telegraph
exemption of USD 1 042 545.55. Independent candidates also receive support on
postal and telegraph exemptions in the amount of USD 78 980.72 each.
3. Political parties also benefit from a special taxation system that includes a 25%
tax exemption in members’ fees and rent incomes, among others.
Private funding
Political parties have the right to receive private funding as permanent income and to
cover campaign expenses.
The law specifies and regulates four sources of private funding for political parties,
and limitations on these incomes:
1. From members, comprising the ordinary and extraordinary fees of members and
the contributions of their social organisations, whose amounts and frequency are
freely determined by each political party. It also includes the voluntary and
personal fees that the candidates of each party contribute to their own campaigns.
2. From supporters, including all donations and contributions, in money or goods,
freely and voluntarily made by Mexican individuals or corporations that reside in
the country, provided they are not comprised among the categories specifically
prohibited by law.
168 – II.11. MEXICO
3. Self-financing, referring to all the income obtained from promotional activities,
such as conferences, shows, games, draws, cultural events, sales of publications
or similar that are carried out in order to collect funds and the internal party body
in charge of its finances establishes the ceilings.
4. From financial yields, comprising the yields generated through the funds that the
political parties may create with their own patrimony in Mexican banks.
Limits and restrictions
Limits on private funding and ceilings on campaign expenditures
The law entitles the INE to set ceilings for expenses that the political parties and
candidates may incur during the electoral campaigns for president and members of
Federal Congress.
The formulas used by the General Council of the INE to determine the ceilings are:
1. For presidential elections, the ceilings must be equal to 20% of the public funding
for campaign expenses established for all parties in the year of presidential
elections.
2. For relative majority Lower Chamber members, the amount is that resulting from
dividing the ceilings for the presidential election campaign into 300, that is, into
the number of districts into which the national territory is divided for the Lower
Chamber representatives.
3. For each one of the Upper Chamber members elected by the majority principle
(by state), the ceiling amounts from the result from multiplying the ceilings for
the Lower Chamber representatives by the number of districts comprised by the
entity, but without considering a number of districts more than 20.
For the 2015 election, the ceiling for campaign expenditure is set at USD 84 002.56.
Restrictions to party funding
The electoral legislation points out the different private and public agencies, both
domestic and foreign, that may not make contributions or donations to the political
parties, whether in money or goods, either by themselves or through third parties. Among
them are:
• the federal executive, legislative and judicial branches; the state and town halls
• autonomous entities at federal, state and municipal level
• labour unions
• religious ministers, and associations, churches or groups of any religion or sect
• foreign political parties, individuals or corporations
• international organisations of any nature
• people who live or work abroad
• Mexican mercantile corporations.
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Likewise, it sets forth that political parties and groups may not request credits from
the Mexican Development Bank to finance their activities, nor receive contributions from
unidentified individuals, except for those obtained through collections in rallies or on the
street.
Accountability and transparency
Reports of political parties
Political parties must appoint an internal agency in charge of receiving and
administering resources, as well as of filing annual, pre-campaign and campaign reports
on the origin, amount, destination and use of the income received through any kind of
funding. The agent must file four different reports, according to the following terms:
1. An annual report within 60 days after the last day of December of the fiscal year
being reported. In this report, political parties must list all income and ordinary
expenses that must be clearly accounted for, including a combined report of its
patrimony, the expenses assigned to their internal selection processes and pre-
campaigns, and the income obtained for their funding. This report must be
authorised and signed by an external auditor appointed by the party itself.
2. Quarterly reports: during non-electoral years, within the first 30 days after the end
of every quarter for informative purposes. Political parties must report the
advance of ordinary income and expenses.
3. Pre-campaign reports: within the first 30 days after the end of the pre-campaigns,
political parties must file a report for each one of the registered pre-candidates,
specifying the origin, amount, and expenses made, as well as a list of the pre-
candidates who failed to file their information according to the law.
4. Campaign reports: political parties must file a report for each candidate every
30 days from the beginning of the campaign, and present it within three days
after each 30-day period concludes. Independent candidates must present these
reports as well.
Control and oversight procedures
Control and oversight of the resources of the political parties and their campaigns is
the responsibility of a specialised unit of the INE, the Oversight Unit for the Resources of
the Political Parties (UTF).
The UTF reviews all reports presented by political parties and candidates, focusing on
whether they have received financial support from legal sources. In order to accomplish
this task, it has important powers; especially not being limited by bank, fiscal or fiduciary
secrecy for the performance of its activities, among other tools and procedures.
Additionally, the INE has recently created the National Registry of Providers as an
instrument that allows the UTF to verify the individuals and entities who are executing
contracts for goods and services with political parties, candidates and independent
candidates according to the provisions of the law, which states that registered suppliers
may only provide goods and services to political parties, candidates and independent
candidates.
If errors or omissions are detected, the UTF asks to the political party or candidate to
submit the correct information, during a specific period of time.
170 – II.11. MEXICO
Once the UTF has reviewed the reports, it presents to the Audit Commission of the
General Council of the INE a draft resolution that contains the results and conclusions of
the review of the reports, the mention of errors or irregularities found in them, and
clarifications or corrections submitted by the parties after having notified this purpose.
The Audit Commission analyses the results presented by UTF and determines a
resolution project to be presented at the General Council.
The General Council receives the resolution project and it can be approved, or the
Council can ask for some additional information.
If the political parties disagree with the resolution approved by the General Council,
they can appeal it to the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Branch, which is tasked
with requesting a new review, or to settle the appeal in a final and irrefutable manner.
Transparency
The procedures and mechanisms for transparency of financial resources collected and
handled by political parties have developed simultaneously with the widening and
strengthening of the provisions regarding the political parties funding system.
Every interested person has the right to access political parties’ information. Thus, the
INE is committed to ensure maximum publicity of the accounting records and
transactions of parties and candidates, in order to involve citizens in accountability and
oversight and promote the scrutiny of public bodies.
Fines and penalties
The INE has the legal power to impose penalties on political parties or independent
candidates who violate the laws regarding financing procedures, both in campaign
periods or in ordinary reports.
Common violations of political parties and candidate finances in Mexico are:
• untimely accountability
• exceeding expense limits
• illegal funding sources or amounts.
A graded scale of penalties is applied, ranging from public reprimand to a reduction
in public subsidy, but the penalty must be proportional to the violation: the greater the
violation, the stricter the penalty. For serious and repeated violations of financial
obligations, there is the possibility that a party could lose its legal status.
The recent electoral reform in Mexico established a system of annulment of federal
and local elections for serious, intentional and decisive violations in the following cases
regarding financing matters:
• exceeding the ceilings of campaign expenditures by 5% or more
• receiving or using resources of illicit or public origin.
To this effect, it is stated that the violations must be accredited objectively and
materially, and they will be assumed to be decisive when the difference in votes between
the first and second place is less than 5%.
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In the 2012 general elections, political parties were fined USD 22 791 803.80 for
violation of finance rules.
Challenges
As a result of a recent electoral reform in Mexico, the INE has more duties regarding
the preparation and management of elections, both at the federal and local level.
Regarding political party finance, there are two main challenges for the 2015 election:
1. Due to its new duties as sole authority in charge of reviewing the financial reports
of political parties both at federal and local level, the INE will have to analyse
approximately 25 000 campaign reports. The deadline for this activity is no later
than 37 days after election day, or before the election is declared valid.
2. Looking for more efficient procedures on reviewing financial reports of political
parties, the law requires that the INE implement an online accountability system.
As a result of this duty, the INE has developed an accountability system in
collaboration with the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). Since
6 April, the system is operational and can receive information from political parties and
candidates.
Once the current election has finished, INE will be able to receive feedback
concerning this new tool.
Note
1. In July 2014, there were 85 801 510 citizens in the Electoral Roll, and the minimum
wage for the Federal District in 2015 was MXN 70.10 (approximately USD 4.67).
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Chapter 12
United Kingdom
By Mr. Rupert Grist, Regulatory Lawyer
Mr. Nick Wright, Senior Project Officer
UK Electoral Commission
This case study presents the UK legislation, the Political Parties, Elections and
Referendums Act, which controls the funding of political parties and campaigns. It also
presents some key election statistics collected by the UK Electoral Commission.
174 – II.12. UNITED KINGDOM
Legislative framework
The main piece of legislation providing for registration and regulation of political
parties (and certain other political entities), and also setting out the scope of functions and
oversight of the Electoral Commission as the regulator, is the Political Parties Elections
and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA).
1
Provisions regarding general elections to the UK Parliament, and other elections,
including regulation of candidates, are set out in the Representation of the People Act
1983.
2
Other legislation makes provision for other elections, including elections to the
devolved legislatures within the United Kingdom.
The Electoral Commission is the UK body responsible for monitoring and taking
steps to ensure compliance with many of these requirements. It makes sure people
understand the rules around political party finance. Alongside this work, it also takes
action when the rules are broken, and publishes information on political finance. The
wider policy objectives are the responsibility of the UK and devolved Governments.
Practical implementation of political finance law
Level playing field – reporting of funding and expenditure
UK law does not prescribe relative amounts of public and private funding available
for those campaigning at elections. But there are a wide range of provisions on funding
and associated matters.
Public funding
There are provisions for specific state funding and services. This includes money
given to opposition parties (“Short money” for parties in the House of Commons and
“Cranborne money” for parties in the House of Lords), policy development grants to
parties with two or more members of Parliament (administered by the Electoral
Commission), and money for parties in the Scottish Parliament. There are restrictions on
what this money can be used for: Short money and Cranborne money can only be used
for a party’s parliamentary business, and policy development grants can only be used to
assist the party with the development of policies for inclusion in its manifestos. Services
provided include the limited use of free mail for election material and free use of rooms
for meetings.
Private funding
There are restrictions on the sources of private funding (mainly UK-based individuals
and organisations), but no limits on the amounts that can be given.
Spending limits
Limits are imposed on the amount of election expenditure.
There are requirements to report relevant financial information. These include reports
on expenditure and funding, and statements of accounts (showing, for example, total
income and expenditure, and assets and liabilities, over a year).
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Similar provisions concerning private funding and election expenditure apply to
individual candidates as well as political parties.
There are also similar provisions on private funding and election expenditure
regarding “third party” campaigners – those who campaign for candidates and parties.
This is to ensure that indirect funding is also made transparent.
In addition to reporting funding through donations, parties are required to report
certain loans and similar transactions that support their election expenditure.
Note that there are similar, but separate, provisions regarding the financing of
campaigns at referendums in the United Kingdom.
Media spending
Media spending is included as part of regulated party expenditure (including party
political broadcasts, albeit these are tightly restricted), subject to the exceptions set out in
the legislation. One of those exceptions concerns spending on print media. There are also
provisions including certain media spending as regulated expenditure by candidates and
third parties. There is no separate regulation by the Electoral Commission of spending on
media activities.
Figures 12.1-12.4 show reported figures for funding and expenditure of the main
parties and their candidates, and the main third parties, in the run-up to the last UK
parliamentary general election, held on 7 May 2010. (The parties and third parties shown
have been included on the basis of the highest sums reported in each case.)
Transparency and accountability
The legislation provides – and the Commission ensures – public disclosure of all
information required to be reported by political parties and third-party campaigners.
Candidates provide reports to the local returning officer, but the Commission receives
copies and collates information on a national level. All this information is available on the
Commission’s website as soon as possible after it has been reported. All data on
donations, loans and statement of accounts is made available on line on the Electoral
Commission website.
3
The legislation provides for some reports to be independently audited. For example, a
political party with a gross income or total expenditure that exceeds GBP 250 000 in a
financial year must have its statement of accounts audited; and an audit is also required of
any return of party election expenditure if the expenditure exceeds GBP 250 000 during a
campaign period. In addition, the Commission undertakes its own compliance checks of
the information it receives by, for example, checking the permissibility of donations and
cross-referencing statements made in different reports to identify any inconsistencies.
176
– II.12. UNITED KINGDOM
Figure 12.1. Public funds and donations to political parties in the United Kingdom,
1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010
Source: UK Electoral Commission.
II.12. UNITED KINGDOM –
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Figure 12.2. Candidate spending at the UK Parliamentary General Election 2010, by political party in the
long campaign and short campaign
Note: The “long campaign” is the period of several months prior to a person formally becoming a “candidate” at a general
election, for which there is one limit. The “short campaign” is the period of weeks after a person formally becomes a candidate
and ending with polling day, for which there is another limit.
Source: UK Electoral Commission.
178
– II.12. UNITED KINGDOM
Figure 12.3. Campaign expenditure, by category, at the UK Parliamentary general election 2010
Source: UK Electoral Commission.
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Figure 12.4. Campaign expenditure (non-party campaigners) at the UK Parliamentary general election 2010
Source: UK Electoral Commission.
Integrity – advice and guidance by the Commission
In the United Kingdom, the Electoral Commission is responsible for taking steps to
ensure compliance with the requirements regarding party, candidate, and third-party
finance. The Commission’s policy is to regulate in a way that is effective, proportionate
and fair, in line with the principles of good regulation. Wherever possible, it will use
advice and guidance proactively in order to secure compliance. The Commission is
committed to providing those it regulates with a clear understanding of their regulatory
obligations. It produces comprehensive guidance on a wide range of subjects, responds to
requests for advice, and provides training where requested.
4
The Commission is
committed to making sure it is as easy as possible for people to comply with the rules,
through good guidance and systems, publishing guidance that explains how to comply
with the rules, offering advice in response to enquiries and continuing to find ways to
reach out to those we regulate to keep them informed of the rules and how to comply with
them.
The Commission is also proactive in encouraging compliance, for example in giving
specific advice to newly registered parties, and issuing reminders to parties before
deadlines for reports. It regularly meets with parties to discuss emerging issues, and
180 – II.12. UNITED KINGDOM
conducts campaign monitoring to determine whether individuals and organisations may
need to be alerted to regulatory requirements impacting on them.
Compliance and oversight
As noted above, the Commission seeks to use advice and guidance to secure
compliance wherever possible. Where necessary, however, there are a range of powers
that can be used to obtain information and penalise contravention of the law.
The Commission and the courts have a number of supervisory and investigatory
powers, requiring the supply of information, attendance at interviews, and inspection of
documents, including at specific premises. The Commission also has a number of civil
sanction powers, comprising the imposition of fixed or variable monetary penalties, the
issuing of compliance or restoration notices (requiring steps to be taken to stop non-
compliance or undo its effects), the issuing of stop notices (failure to comply with which
is a criminal offence), and agreeing enforcement undertakings. It may also refer cases to
prosecuting bodies for criminal prosecution.
The Commission’s Enforcement Policy sets out how it carries out its functions in this
regard.
5
Compliance with the requirements is generally high. Since the Commission was given
its civil sanction powers, compliance rates have increased. Figures 12.5 and 12.6 provide
examples of compliance rates since 2010, in respect of delivery of yearly statements of
accounts and quarterly returns of reportable donations by political parties.
Figure 12.5. Compliance rate (statement of accounts) in the United Kingdom, 2010-13
Source: UK Electoral Commission.
84%
84%
90%
93%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
2010 2011 2012 2013
% compliant
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Figure 12.6. Compliance rate (quarterly returns) in the United Kingdom, 2010-12
Source: UK Electoral Commission.
The Commission has issued 25 sanction notices since it was given these powers in
2010, including a range of different monetary penalties and compliance notices. Many of
these sanction notices stem from the late reporting of donations or loans, late or non-
delivery of annual accounts, and acceptance of impermissible donations. None of these
has been appealed to the courts. The Commission will continue to seek to improve these
compliance rates and to improve compliance in other areas.
Challenges and risks
The issue of how political parties should be funded continues to be discussed, in the
UK legislatures and elsewhere. While there is evidence of public disquiet at aspects of
private funding, there is little evidence of public support for increased public funding.
The most recent legislative change to political finance provisions concerned the
requirements on third-party campaigners, by the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party
Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014. It widened the scope of those
entities that could be affected by the rules, as well as increasing certain reporting
requirements. The Commission has engaged with those potentially affected to increase
awareness of the new provisions, and has produced a revised suite of guidance for third
parties in advance of the legislation coming into force.
Further devolution of powers is likely (to Scotland, and possibly to other parts of the
United Kingdom), following the UK Parliamentary general election on 7 May 2015, and
that is likely to have an impact on how political finance is regulated.
The Commission engages with Government, Parliament and interested bodies on any
proposed legislative change. The Commission is politically neutral, but strongly supports
any measures that are in the interests of voters, and ensures that its voice is heard
whenever proposals are made that might affect voters’ interests.
96.7%
94.1%
94.3%
96.4%
96.8%
97.9%
98.1%
99.1%
98.7%
99.3%
99.1%
90%
91%
92%
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
Q1
2010
Q2
2010
Q3
2010
Q4
2010
Q1
2011
Q2
2011
Q3
2011
Q4
2011
Q1
2012
Q2
2012
Q3
2012
% compliant
182 – II.12. UNITED KINGDOM
Notes
1. For additional information on the Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act,
see www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contents.
2. For additional information and the text of the Representation of People Act 1983, see
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/contents.
3. All data on donations, loans and statement of accounts is made available on line at
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-
campaigning-and-donations.
4. The Election Commission’s guidance is made available on line at
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/i-am-a/party-or-campaigner/non-party-
campaigners/guidance.
5. The Commission’s Enforcement Policy can be found on line at
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/106743/Enforcement-
Policy-30March11.pdf.
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Chapter 13
Brazil
By Mr. José Antonio Dias Toffoli
President of Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court and Justice of the Federal Supreme
Court
This case study provides an overview of the Brazilian political financing system,
including the applicable legislation, categories of political parties and funding,
regulation mechanisms and transparency initiatives. It also reviews some of the tools
provided to political actors to comply with the legal standards, and draft legislation
designed to strengthen and reform the political funding system.
184 – II.13. BRAZIL
Introduction
As of the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988, Brazil has been experiencing an
unprecedentedly long period of democratic stability. Our democratic basis has expanded
substantially. Presently, the republican principle that establishes that self-governing
people choose their representatives is achieved by means of universal suffrage and
popular direct and secret vote of equal weight to all, as set forth in Article 14 of the
Federal Constitution. Voting is compulsory for Brazilians aged 18 years and older; and
optional for the illiterate, those over 70 years of age, and those over 16 and under 18.
Presently, registered voters account for 71% of the Brazilian population. With more
than 142.8 million voters, Brazil is the world’s fourth largest democracy, ranking after
India, the United States and Indonesia.
In October 2014, for the seventh time since democracy has been restored in the
country, Brazilians attended the largest election in Brazil’s history and went in an orderly
and peaceful manner to the polls to decide the future of their nation. They elected the
president, governors and lieutenant governors in all Brazilian states and the Federal
District, a number of senators and all representatives at the Chamber of Deputies (House
of Representatives) and at the legislatures of all Brazilian states and the Federal District.
More than 115 million voters appeared to vote in the first round of elections, and more
than 112 million in the second round.
Nevertheless, there is still much to contemplate and advance so as to ensure the
continuous improvement of the democratic process that enables us to choose our political
representatives following free and equitable campaigns that ultimately implement the
genuine will of the Brazilian people.
Our process of democratisation has not yet been able to prevent electoral financing
from allowing economic power to abduct civil rights.
That being said, it is worth noting that the discussions on electoral financing
necessarily comprise the debate on “the financing of democracy”. The question that must
be asked is: who is entitled to finance democracy and how can this be done? As the
Tribunal sees it, the answer is to protect the foundations of democracy at all times, and
that includes the sovereignty of the people, the freedom to vote, and the trust in the
integrity of State policies.
Based on Brazil’s history, it is possible to infer that the capture of the State by
economic groups results from the combination of expensive electoral campaigns and the
need to have them funded by private companies. That is the reason why the president of
the Electoral Court has been advocating the prohibition for companies to fund political
parties and electoral campaigns, as such entities create undue pressure upon politicians
who are elected to represent the people before the Executive and Legislative Branches.
Currently, private companies constitute the largest funders of political parties,
electoral campaigns and, indirectly, Brazilian candidates. Such private sector investments
point to a natural and instinctive performance that seeks to ensure its own survival, being
not limited by market or capitalist regulations. However, rules governing the public
sector, which seek to limit the participation of the State or establish a very strict set of
rules for it to occur, clash with the ones that regulate the private sector.
Thus, it is rather understandable that corporations are increasingly driven towards the
public sphere, not with the purpose of imposing corrupting effects upon it, but seeking to
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manage a portion of its power and wealth instead. It is precisely this indulgence of the
activism of legal entities in elections, and exactly as it happens in Brazil.
This matter is already being examined before Brazil’s Supreme Court, in Direct
Action for the Declaration of Unconstitutionality n. 4,650, which was filed by the Federal
Council of the Brazilian Bar Association. The votes presented so far constitute a majority
favouring the unconstitutionality of the participation of legal entities in party and
electoral funding, but four justices still need to issue their votes so that a decision is
reached. After Justice Gilmar Mendes requested to see the record, case proceedings were
stayed, remaining in that condition up to now.
I examine below the model currently adopted in Brazil, pointing to the fact that the
country is increasingly subscribing to the need for reforms that ensure greater equality of
conditions for candidates to run electoral races, eliminating potential sources of bribery
and the abuse of economic power to the detriment of the legitimacy of elections and the
balance of existing political forces.
Applicable legislation – the main competencies and attributions of Brazilian
Electoral Courts in place to inspect, regulate and control party and electoral
funding mechanisms
Brazil´s legal system comprises rules designed to monitor and prevent the abuse of
economic power, bribery and other forms of distortion in local politics, adding to the
protection of constitutional and republican principles, popular sovereignty and democracy
itself. Such rules are established in the following law and statutes:
• Federal Constitution of 1988
• Law N. 4,737/1965 (Electoral Code)
• Law N. 9,096/95 (Political Parties Act)
• Law N. 9,504/97 (Elections Act)
• LC (Supplementary Law) N. 64/90 (Ineligibilities Act)
• Resolutions issued by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE).
In Brazil, the Electoral Court System is responsible for regulating and inspecting the
amount of resources allocated in the democratic and political game. It constitutes an
autonomous body of the Judicial Branch, and is granted administrative, judging and
normative powers, which indicates the peculiar features that describe Brazil’s electoral
judicial and administrative system. Its institutional design combines the technicality and
impartiality of the Judicial Branch with the temporary exercise of electoral functions,
which mitigates the concentration of so many different powers within one single body.
Regardless of being a permanent institution, it does not have its own staff. Electoral
judges usually serve for only four years, and are not allowed to perform their attributions
in two successive elections for the same elective office.
Its administrative and organisational attributions range from the organisation of the
registration of voters and the registration of political parties to the disclosure of the results
of elections and the certification of elected candidates. With regard to its judicial
attributions, the Electoral Court System is responsible for settling electoral disputes,
including objections to candidacy registration requests and lawsuits resulting from
electoral crimes, such as abusive publicity in the media, abuse of power because of the
186 – II.13. BRAZIL
undue use of the structure of public administration, and the unlawful winning of votes
(vote buying), which may lead to the cancellation of a candidate’s registration or even the
impeachment of an elected representative. In addition to being required to respond to
consultations on electoral matters, Electoral Courts are also responsible for issuing
resolutions that regulate general provisions set forth in the electoral legislation in place.
It is worth noting, albeit in a concise manner, that the attributions of Electoral Courts
in Brazil are as follows:
1. analysis and appraisal of annual accounts of political parties
2. analysis and appraisal of campaign accounts of political parties, financial
committees and candidates
3. Analysis and appraisal of complaints, enquiries and criminal actions based on
unlawful acts related to irregular revenues or expenditures, slush funds, electoral
bribery (criminal and non-criminal jurisdiction) and abuse of economic power to
the detriment of the organisation and legitimacy of elections
4. normative attribution: specification of the rules established in the electoral
legislation that are related to the funding of political parties and elections.
Categories of party and electoral funding
Brazilian legislation provides for a system of mixed funding of political parties and
election campaigns, including the (direct and indirect) sources listed below:
1. party fund money
2. donations made by individuals and legal entities
3. tax exemption1
4. free airtime on radio and television (by means of the offsetting of taxes).
The party fund comprises the following revenues: i) monetary fines and penalties
imposed pursuant to the electoral legislation in place; ii) financial resources allocated to it
by law on a permanent or temporary basis; iii) donations made by individuals or legal
entities by means of direct bank deposits credited in the Party Fund account; iv) annual
budgetary appropriations of the Federal Government, provided they are always higher
than the total number of voters registered by 31 December of the year that precedes the
budgetary proposal, multiplied by BRL 0.35, according to rates consolidated in August
1995 (Article 38 of Law N. 9,096/95).
The amount approved for the party fund in the Federal Government’s budget for 2015
was three times higher than the one of the previous year, totalling USD 322 million.
2
The
distribution of monies from the party fund complies with the following criteria: 5% of the
total amount shall be distributed in equal shares to parties that have registered their
articles of incorporation before the Superior Electoral Court;
3
and 95% shall be
distributed among parties proportionally to the votes obtained in the last general election
for seats at the Chamber of Deputies (Article 41-A of Law N. 9,096/95).
Political parties are entitled to receive donations from individuals and legal entities.
The donations made by legal entities to political parties shall not, either directly or
indirectly, not even as publicity of any sort, originate from: i) foreign entities or
governments; ii) public authorities or agencies; iii) self-regulated public bodies, public
companies or utilities, government-controlled companies and foundations established in
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law, which resources include funds from government bodies or agencies; and
iv) professional associations or unions (Article 31 of Law N. 9,096/95).
Individuals and legal entities may also make donations to the party fund, the political
parties or electoral campaigns during an election year, provided the legal figures that are
usually constituted during this period are identified. Such figures include “candidate”,
“financial committee” and “campaign accounts”.
Candidates, financial committees and political parties that raise funds and choose to
use them in electoral campaigns are required to open “campaign accounts”, which are
aimed at recording all financial transactions made during such a period. Such accounts
are created for this single purpose only, and the aforementioned individuals and entities
are forbidden to make use of previously existing bank accounts (Head provision of
Article 22 of Law N. 9,504/97). Additionally, they may use goods and services that have
cash value in electoral campaigns, provided they also report their estimated value.
With regard to the raising of funds to electoral campaigns, Brazilian legislation has
already prohibited certain legal entities from making donations with the purpose of
preventing foreign entities, unions, public institutions and entities funded with public
resources from interfering in elections. Thus, political parties and candidates are
prohibited from receiving donations that originate from: foreign governments; bodies and
agencies established under direct or indirect public administration; foundations
maintained with government resources; public-utility companies; legal entities governed
by private law that benefit from mandatory contributions established by law; public-
utility types of entity; professional associations or unions; non-profit organisations that
receive funds from abroad; entities devoted to charity and religious affairs; sports
organisations; non-governmental organisations that receive public funds; and civil society
organisations of public interest (Article 24 of Law N. 9,504/97). As established in a
resolution issued by the Superior Electoral Court, with regard to the general elections of
2014, contributions that originated from notarial and registration offices were also
prohibited (Article 24, item XIII of Resolution N. 23,406 of 2014).
Regarding electoral campaign donations made by individuals and legal entities, the
legislation in place does not establish objective limits. Instead, it establishes a percentage
to be calculated over the income of campaign donors. Thus, individuals are entitled to
donate up to 10% of the gross income earned during the year preceding an election. With
respect to candidates who choose to make use of own resources, the limit will be
equivalent to 50% of its patrimony in the year preceding the election. Finally, donations
made by legal entities are limited to 2% of gross sales revenues earned during the year
preceding elections.
The establishment of maximum donation amounts based on the income of donors
perpetuates the critical economic influence on election campaigns, such a measure being
unable to prevent that the inequality of resources among competitors becomes a major
condition for one winning the electoral race. Such a context is aggravated by the lack of
legal limits to electoral expenditures, as explained further in this chapter.
Let’s check selected data related to donations made to electoral campaigns in Brazil.
Data retrieved from the systems operated by Brazilian Electoral Courts clearly points to
increasing corporate influence when examining the percentage share of donations made in
elections that were held between 2004 and 2014
4
(Tables 13.1 and 13.2).
188
– II.13. BRAZIL
Table 13.1. Percentage share of donations made in Brazilian municipal elections, 2004-12
Municipal elections Percentage share (%)
2004 38.84%
2008 36.07%
2012 45.40%
Table 13.2. Percentage share of donations made in Brazillian general elections, 2006-14
General elections Percentage share (%)
2006 66.49%
2010 74.72%
2014 76.48%
It becomes perfectly clear that, as of 2010, the share of corporate donations accounts
for more than 75% of the funding of state and national campaigns, creating numerous
distortions in Brazil´s political system and even leading to countless allegations of bribery
and other unlawful acts related to electoral and political funding. With regard to
municipal elections, although the funds raised by political parties and candidates are more
balanced, the percentage share of donations made by legal entities is still rather
significant.
Figures 13.1 and 13.2 demonstrate the evident lack of proportion between revenues
obtained from legal entities and those earned from other sources of electoral funding in
the 2014 elections.
Figure 13.1. Percentage share of party fund money and private resources with regard to
campaign donations, Brazilian general elections, 2014
II.13. BRAZIL –
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Figure 13.2. Percentage share of individuals and legal entities with regard to campaign donations,
Brazilian general elections, 2014
Such lack of proportion is even more evident when we analyse electoral campaign
data related to the latest presidential race. Regarding the 2014 elections, the donations
made by legal entities to all presidential candidates amounted to more than
USD 232 million,
5
which represents a share of more than 90% of total resources.
It is also worth noting that the donations made to presidential races by the ten largest
corporate donors totalled USD 61 million. Such a figure points to unequal participation
during the elections, with special attention to widely known holders of greater economic
power. And that is the reason why it seems necessary to establish uniform limits to
donations and campaign expenditures, regardless of the income of donors.
During the elections of 2014, the largest campaign donors were companies from
sectors that are heavily influenced by government regulation or that maintain contractual
relations with the government, such as those representing the food industry, civil
construction and the financial sector.
The massive presence of private companies belittles popular participation in the
electoral race. The donations made to presidential campaigns by individuals have
accounted for only a 2% share of total used resources. This suggests a contradiction, as
the central figures in an electoral process should be the citizens, not corporations.
Electoral expenditures
The high cost of electoral campaigns is one of the most significant reasons why
parties and candidates seek funding sources that are compatible with increasingly higher
spending.
In Brazil, there are no legal limits on expenditures made by political parties and
candidates during an election campaign. There are provisions set forth in Brazilian
legislation (Article 17-A of Law N. 9,504/97) establishing that the spending limit for
190 – II.13. BRAZIL
campaigns aimed at filling public elective offices shall be established by law, with
observance to local peculiarities, by 10 June of each electoral year. In the event such a
law is not edited in time, each party shall be deemed responsible for establishing their
own spending limits, being then required to report such figures to the Electoral Court
System. Given that no law was ever edited to regulate the matter, political parties have
been establishing their own spending limits for each electoral campaign.
Table 13.3 sets out data on political party spending during the presidential races held
between 2002 and 2014. Let us examine it carefully.
Table 13.3. Political party spending during the Brazilian presidential elections, 2002-14
Election yea
r
Expenditures related to presidential campaigns, per election (in USD)
1
2002 33 985 632.95
2006 133 387 582.29
2010 216 467 881.16
2014 367 288 491.75
Overall total 751 129 588.15
1. In US dollars, according to the currency exchange rate of 3 October 2014 (BRL 2.4926).
It is worth noting that Brazil’s 2014 presidential elections were the most expensive in
the country’s history (Figure 13.3). Candidates and financial committees spent more than
USD 259 million. The presidential candidates who participated in the runoff, Dilma
Rousseff (PT) and Aécio Neves (PSDB), spent USD 140 and USD 89 million,
respectively.
Figure 13.3. Total spending of Brazil’s presidential candidates, 2002-14
In USD
50 000 000
100 000 000
150 000 000
200 000 000
250 000 000
300 000 000
350 000 000
400 000 000
2002 2006 2010 2014
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As a consequence of the lack of legal limits to campaign spending, we find
increasingly higher campaign costs. Unsurprisingly, both parties and candidates depend
immensely on contributions and campaign donors, which, as we noted earlier, are often
represented by large corporations.
Mechanisms designed to regulate campaign advertising and the access of
political parties and candidates to free airtime on radio and television
With regard to free campaign advertising (which starts 45 days before the eve of
election day), free airtime is distributed among parties and coalitions that have running
candidates, provided the following conditions are observed: i) two-thirds distributed in
proportion to the number of representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (House of
Representatives), considering in cases of coalitions, the total number of representatives of
all parties that form such coalitions; ii) out of the remaining amount (of free airtime), one-
third is to be equally distributed (among all parties) and two-thirds to be distributed in
proportion to the number of representatives elected in the immediately preceding election
to the Chamber of Deputies (House of Representatives), considering in cases of
coalitions, the total number of representatives of parties that form such coalitions. The
number of seats of each party in the Chamber of Deputies (House of Representatives)
shall be determined by election results.
Regardless of the broadcasting of free airtime, radio and television stations may also
transmit debates on majority and proportional elections, provided they ensure the
participation of candidates of parties that have seats in the Chamber of Deputies, being
also entitled to invite candidates from other parties.
Political parties are also eligible for free airtime in radio and television stations during
non-election years so as to disseminate party-related information, which, as established in
local legislation, consists of: reporting to party affiliates on the execution of a political
party programme, related events and activities; disclosing the views of the party on
political and community issues; promoting and disseminating greater participation of
women in politics, making sure to allot women a share of airtime that is to be established
by the party’s national steering body, provided a minimum share of 10% is observed.
The granting of free airtime for the dissemination of party advertising shall meet the
following criteria: i) to parties that have duly registered their articles of incorporation
before the Superior Electoral Court, and have participated or are able to participate in
general elections for the Chamber of Deputies (House of Representatives), electing, in
two consecutive elections, representatives in at least five different states, obtaining also
1% of the total votes counted across the country, disregarding all blank and spoiled
ballots, it will be ensured: a) nationwide broadcasting of a 10-minute programme per
semester; b) the allotment of a total of 20 minutes (of free airtime) per semester, divided
in 30-second or 1-minute inserts; ii) to parties that have elected and maintained as
affiliates at least three representatives from different states it is ensured an annual
nationwide broadcasting of a 10-minute programme; iii) to parties that do not meet the
conditions established in the previous items, it is ensured a semi-annual nationwide
broadcasting of a 5-minute programme, noting that such minutes are not to be combined
with the amount of free airtime provided for in the items above (TSE Resolution
N. 20,034/97, as amended by TSE Resolution N. 22,503/06).
As established in Brazilian legislation, political parties and candidates are prohibited
from making use of paid publicity on radio and television networks, and on the Internet,
192 – II.13. BRAZIL
with advertising allowed only in the printed press, provided certain conditions are met
(Articles 36, 43 and 57-C of Law N. 9,504/97).
Transparency of parties’ and candidates’ accounts: On the requirement to render
accounts and sanctions in the event of failing to meet said requirement
The requirement to submit accounts to Electoral Courts is expressly provided for in
the Federal Constitution and its purpose is to ensure transparency regarding the origin and
destination of all financial resources used by political parties and candidates, thus adding
to the integrity of the political system as a whole.
The processes related to the rendering of accounts are regulated by principles of
morality, honesty and transparency. The mechanisms were designed to ensure the
enforcement of these principles: i) monetary donations shall be made via crossed cheques
payable to the chosen political party or via direct bank deposits credited in the political
party account; ii) all donations must be reported to Electoral Courts, along with a
statement featuring their receipt and respective destination, and the related financial
statement; iii) political parties and candidates are required to open a bank account for the
sole purpose of registering all financial transactions related to their respective campaigns;
iv) political parties must submit the financial statement of the previous fiscal year to
Electoral Courts on an annual basis, by 30 April of the following year; v) political party
leaders and committees, including the treasurer, are held subject to civil and criminal
liability for any irregularities or mistakes they may commit; vi) political parties are
required to keep supporting documentation of their respective accounts for at least five
years; vii) during an election campaign, political parties, coalitions and candidates are
required to post on the Internet, on a specific website developed by Electoral Courts, a
report detailing all cash resources and assets easily convertible to cash that they received
for campaign-funding purposes as well as all expenditures made during said period.
Omissions regarding the rendering of accounts or irregularities identified in any
financial transaction performed by political parties and candidates may result in different
sanctions, ranging from the application of fines and suspension of the transfer of party
fund shares to the cancellation of a party registration. The applicable penalties may reach
candidates, who can be denied the issuance of a voting release certificate, have their
certification cancelled or be impeached, or be rendered ineligible in the event of
conviction for the perpetration of unlawful acts, including illegal capture of votes and
abuse of economic power.
Within the criminal sphere, it is worth noting that electoral bribery (vote buying) and
misrepresentation on a public or private document consist of conduct provided for in
Articles 299 and 350 of the Brazilian Electoral Code, subject to punishment by
imprisonment and fines, suspension of political rights and restrictions on the passive
electoral capacity of citizens (ineligibility).
Integrity in the political funding process; the support rendered to parties and
candidates, enabling them to comply with legal standards; and the bills drafted to
promote the reform of political funding
The integrity of political funding processes requires Electoral Courts to remain
continuously active and, as seen in many other democratic countries, Brazil is
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encouraging the debate and promoting reforms targeted at ensuring greater transparency
and morality of electoral and political financing mechanisms.
In addition to bearing jurisdiction to regulate and examine the matter, Electoral
Courts also offer political parties the benefits detailed below, which add to the continuous
improvement of processes designed to review and appraise the rendering of accounts:
• Organisation of public hearings with the purpose of gathering proposals on how
to prepare a draft of campaign accounts.
• Organisation of technical meetings with representatives of national steering
bodies of local political parties in order to discuss the rules, regulations and
systems to be used during elections.
• Training events for representatives of regional courts, organised with the purpose
of discussing the rules, regulations and systems to be used during elections.
• Publishing of the Handbook on Electoral Campaign revenues, expenditures and
rendering of accounts, to be made available on the website of the Superior
Electoral Court (TSE).
• Open access online course on the rendering of campaign accounts, accessible on
the website of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). The course covers rules,
regulations and systems applicable to the rendering of election accounts (it is
worth noting that more than 1 500 people registered for this course in 2014,
having successfully completed the programme on the rendering of campaign
accounts).
• Operational support to electronic systems that integrate the processes of rendering
of accounts, with the aim of assisting internal and external audiences.
Finally, it should be noted that regardless of the many different control mechanisms
already provided for in Brazilian laws, there are many bills being presently examined at
the National Congress that are related to political financing, including, but not limited to,
the following proposals: exclusively public campaign financing; criminalisation of the
lack of registration of electoral donations; prohibition preventing legal entities from
making campaign donations; reduction of campaign time and costs, and increase in the
magnitude of sanctions to accounting and financial irregularities; the Superior Electoral
Court (TSE) to be considered the competent jurisdiction to set the spending limits in
electoral campaigns in the event the existing legislation fails to establish them; political
parties to be required to post periodic reports on the Internet, detailing funds raised and
expenditures made during electoral campaigns, etc.
In Brazil, however, the discussions about electoral financing have been occasionally
reduced to a dichotomy between exclusive public financing and private financing of
campaigns by individuals and legal entities without distinction.
And that is why I have already expressed my views on this matter at the Federal
Supreme Court (STF). As I see it, our Constitution does not admit the prohibition of
citizens’ participation in the maintenance and financial support of their preferred political
parties and candidates. As holders of popular sovereignty, citizens have the right to
financially contribute to democracy, provided such contributions are made within legal
limits.
Considering the aforementioned assumptions, as President of the Superior Electoral
Court, I have filed proposals before the National Congress and other institutions involved
194 – II.13. BRAZIL
with the promotion of political reforms in our country. The purpose of such
recommendations was to prohibit private companies from engaging in political financing,
and to establish uniform spending and donations limits.
Another proposal that should be taken into consideration provides for the reduction of
campaign periods from 90 to 45 days, with an additional two weeks in the event of a
runoff. In addition to the obvious advantage of reducing campaign costs, I believe the
suggested regulation could encourage electoral campaigns – which are presently
extravagant, diffuse, and gruelling - to address issues of substantial interest to the
population. That would certainly prevent the country from grinding to a halt for months,
as it currently occurs, because of the reduction of activities performed by the Legislative
and Executive Branches. In line with such a statement, I find it also relevant to reduce the
free airtime on radio and TV from six to three weeks, so that campaign programmes
could be improved, focusing more on the platforms of the running candidates and their
respective government plans, and refraining from making use of special effects and
related pyrotechnics, which presently constitute the most significant expenditure in
electoral campaigns.
Finally, it is worth pointing to the relevance of having campaign accounts instantly
disclosed on the Internet, as that provides for greater transparency and increased
awareness of voters regarding the financers of their candidates. Furthermore, that adds to
the continuous and appropriate monitoring exercised by the press. Free and well-informed
voting encourages reciprocal control among political parties, which tends to adjust their
conduct in order to meet the legal requirements in place.
A relevant and recurrent topic that appears in all proposals for political reform is not
focused on rules for campaign funding, but on who is entitled to finance democracy: the
people or corporations with private economic power? To make sure that popular will is
respected, electoral campaigns must be free and fair, immune to the influence of large
economic groups. This is what I call democratic financing of elections: the private
funding of political parties and candidates, within isonomic limits, by voters, combined
with the maintenance of the Party Fund, with monies from the national treasury, as
established in Brazil’s legislation, in conformity with the proportionality of the political
representativeness expressed in the polls by popular will.
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Notes
1. It is worth noting that although campaign donors are not eligible for tax incentives
when making donations to political parties, according to Article 150, item VI, sub-
item c of the Federal Constitution of 1988 (CF/88), the property, revenues or services
provided by political parties, including their foundations, are granted with tax
immunity. As established in Article 99 of Law N. 9,504/97 and in the sole paragraph
of Article 52 of Law N. 9,096/95, radio and television stations are also eligible to the
offsetting of taxes because of the allotment of free airtime.
2. In US dollars, according to the currency exchange rate of 2 January 2015
(BRL 2.6923).
3. In Brazil, there are presently 32 political parties that have registered before the
Superior Electoral Court, and 28 parties with seats in the National Congress.
4. In 2004, 2008, and 2012, municipal elections were held to elect Mayors, Vice-Mayors
and City Councilors; and in 2006, 2010, and 2014, general elections were held to
elect the President and Vice-President of the Republic, State Governors and
Lieutenant Governors, Senators, Congressmen and women, and State Representatives.
In the municipal elections of 2012, for example, there were 482 000 candidates
running for the different elective offices; and in the general elections of 2014, there
were approximately 22 000 candidates.
5. In US dollars, according to the currency exchange rate of 3 October 2014
(BRL 2.4926).
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Chapter 14
India
By Dr. S.Y. Quraishi
Former Chief Election Commissioner of India
This case study presents the current system of public funding of political parties and
campaigns in India. It also discusses the major challenges to electoral and financial
transparency.
198 – II.14. INDIA
Introduction
India follows a multi-party democracy. There are some political parties active in the
entire country, whereas most of the parties operate only at the regional or state level.
While all the political parties are registered with the Election Commission of India (ECI),
a few of them are “recognised” as National or State parties on the basis of their electoral
performance. This “recognition” entitles them to certain benefits (described later in this
chapter).
High election spending and the potential for corruption go hand in hand. When the
parties spend a lot of money, they need to collect a lot of money, by all possible means,
fair or foul. Besides, large sums of money in politics undermine the level playing field, as
all candidates or parties do not have equal access to funds. The ECI is seriously
concerned about the growing influence of money in elections. “Big money” used in a
non-transparent manner undermines the rule of law and vitiates the electoral process.
Vote buying is the biggest mode of such non-transparent use of money in elections.
The excessive use of money much beyond the legal limits has been reported by many
parties, candidates, media and civil society organisations. Several parliamentarians have
also raised concerns in the House about the use of excessive money in election campaigns
and have asked the Commission to take urgent steps to curb such malaise.
In the recent elections, particularly in the 2014 elections to the House of the People
(the lower house of Parliament), the ECI took several steps to curb the misuse of money.
However, the absence of express legal provisions for enforcement hinders these efforts.
The Ministry of Law and Justice, in association with the Election Commission, organised
a nationwide consultation on electoral reforms, including reform of political finance rules
and transparency norms, but the recommendations have not yet converted into the desired
amendment of electoral law.
Political finance and disclosure norms in India
Funding of political parties
There is no state funding of parties in India. However the parties enjoy certain
indirect benefits, which include:
• free copies of electoral rolls for candidates and recognised political parties
• free airtime on state-owned radio and television for recognised political parties
• free use of space in state capitals for the offices of recognised political parties
(these three limited only to the recognised parties)
• tax exemption on the income of the political parties
• tax exemption on donations to the political parties and electoral trusts, subject to
certain restrictions, including prohibitions on donations from foreign sources and
state-owned enterprises.
The issue of public funding to political parties has been debated, but political
consensus around possible measures to address this has yet to materialise.
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Private funding
Individuals or companies can make donations to political parties, subject to certain
restrictions:
• Corporate donations are capped at 7.5% of average net profits of three financial
years (Section 182 Companies Act, 2013).
• Donations by foreign companies and government companies are prohibited
(Section 29B of RP Act 1951). A foreign company is defined in Section 3 of the
Foreign Contributions Regulation Act 2010 (FCRA)and includes:
1. a foreign company under S. 182 of Companies Act, 2013 (a company or
body corporate incorporated outside India having a place of business in
India, whether by itself or through an agent, physically or through
electronic means and conducting any business activity in India in any other
manner)
2. an Indian subsidiary of a foreign company
3. a multi-national corporation.
Corporate donations
In 1968, the Government banned corporate donations to political parties. However, an
amendment to the Companies Act in 1985 allowed corporate donations to political parties
under certain conditions. Corporations may contribute up to 7.5% of their average net
profit over the previous three years to political parties, subject to approval by the Board
of Directors and disclosure in the profit and loss account statement in the audited annual
accounts of the company. Further:
• Income tax laws in India allow deductions for donors to political parties (if paid
through bank cheque), and the receipts in the hands of the political parties are not
taxable.
• Recently, the income tax law was amended, allowing the creation of Electoral
Trusts as pass-through entities for the funding of political parties. The receipts of
the Electoral Trusts and contributions made to them are exempt from tax.
However, corresponding changes have yet to be made in the Representation of the
People Act of 1951 (RPA), which governs as the electoral law of India.
Expenditures
At present, there is a statutory limit on the amount that can be spent on a candidate’s
election campaigns. Recently, the ceiling of the expenditure incurred by a candidate on a
campaign was increased from EUR 22 400 to EUR 39 200 for elections to the State
Assembly, and from EUR 56 000 to EUR 98 000 for elections to Lok Sabha (Lower
House of Parliament). Further:
• There is no ceiling, however, on election expenditures by political parties. The
expenditures made by political parties in favour of their candidates do not count
in election expenses incurred by a candidate for the purpose of the ceiling. This
effectively renders the limit on expenditures irrelevant.
• The candidates are also not required to disclose their pre-nomination campaign
expenditures, nor are those expenditures considered within the ceilings.
200 – II.14. INDIA
The electoral expenditures reported by major national political parties in India in the
2014 general elections are set out in Table 14.1.
Table 14.1. Electoral expenditures, by category and party, in the 2014 Indian general elections
In EUR thousands
Political party
Travel
expenses on
star
campaigners
Travel
expenditure on
leaders other
than star
campaigners
Expenditure on
media
advertisements
Expenditure on
publicity
material
Expenditure on
public
meetings
Any other
expenditure
Total
BahujanSamaj
Party
2 423 0 546 923 315 0 4207
Bharatiya Janata
Party
19 761 2 520 47 931 4 389 12 524 12 621 99 746
Communist Party
of India
8 13 .8 54 21 216 312.8
Communist Party
of India (Marxist)
47 209 124 351 166 205 1 102
Indian National
Congress
17 559 570 40 490 3 376 4 631 1 442 68 068
Nationalist
Congress party
465 57 3 479 766 92 50 4 909
Source: Election Commission of India.
Public funding contributed to political parties and candidates
1. Indirect funding by way of tax exemption on the donations made by individual or
companies to political parties above EUR 280 from a single entity (on disclosure
of the contributions in a prescribed format to the Commission [ECI]).
2. The national political parties have submitted to the Commission their Annual
Contribution reports regarding receipt of donations in excess of EUR 280 in a
financial year under Sec 29C of the RPA (Table 14.2).
Table 14.2. Donations received in excess of EUR 280 by political parties in India, 2010-14
In crore rupees
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
Bahujan Samaj Party 0 0 0 0
Bhartiya Janata Party 14.51 37.33 83 166.77
Communist Party of
India
1.18 0.60 0.34 1.28
Communist Party of
India
(Marxist)
1.566 2.26 4 2.09
Indian National
Congress
7.41 10.93 101.75 66.47
Nationalist Congress
Party
0.14 2.55 0.05 14.02
Source: Election Commission of India.
The above reports are uploaded to the Commission website for public viewing. It is
important to note that in reality there is a lot of under-reporting, and the contributions
disclosed to the Commission are reported to be only a small fraction of the actual total
contributions received by some of the parties.
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Mechanism to regulate media spending by political parties and candidates
More than one-third of campaign expenditure is generally incurred on media and is
increasing with its vast expansion. However, the Election Commission of India has no
regulatory power over the media. Nevertheless, Media Certification and Monitoring
Committees (MCMC) are established in each district per instructions from the Election
Commission to monitor the content of political advertising and to keep a watch on
suspected paid news, whereby media does surrogate publicity for a party or candidate in
the guise of news – a new scourge.
The Election Commission does not have sufficient capacity to undertake pre-
censorship of all advertisements on the various cable networks and television channels.
Instead, it has delegated its powers to the respective District Magistrates (DMs) of the
States or Union Territories by a general order.
These officers act under the supervision of the Election Commission. Appeals against
DM orders can be made to the Chief Electoral Officer of each State. The Chief Electoral
Officer may appoint a committee for hearing the complaints or grievances of any political
party, candidate or any other person in regard to the decision to grant or to refuse
certification of an advertisement. Decisions of the committee are binding. Orders for
modification or deletion of the advertisements must be complied with within 24 hours of
receipt of the decision, and the modified advertisement may then be resubmitted for re-
evaluation. The committee also communicates its decision to the Election Commission.
Provisions of Section 126 of RPA apply allowing any political party, candidate or any
other person to appeal a decision of the committee, the Designated Officer or Election
Commission. The appeal may be heard by the court for clarification or appropriate orders.
No other court, tribunal or authority may hear any petitions in regard to a complaint
against such advertisement.
Under Section 127A of the RPA no person shall print, publish, or cause to be printed
or published any election pamphlet or poster, handbill or other document without
mentioning the name and address of the printer and the publisher. It is the responsibility
of such press to deliver a copy of the declaration along with a copy of the document to the
DEO/CEO within a reasonable time after printing the document.
Transparency and accountability
Funding disclosure
With regard to the funding of parties:
• Political parties are required to disclose to the Commission annually, prior to the
income tax return filing date, the names and addresses of persons donating more
than INR 20 000 (or EUR 280) (Sec 29C of the RPA) at a time. If they fail to
submit the report to the Commission in time, the tax exemption on the
contributions will not be allowed by the Income Tax Department, as per
provisions of the RPA. The Commission forwards these reports to the Income Tax
Department for necessary action, and to the Ministry of Home Affairs for
verification of contributions from foreign sources, and to the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs for verification of the corporate donations under the Companies
Law.
202 – II.14. INDIA
• However, the parties are neither required to maintain the details, nor required to
disclose to the Commission, if the one time contribution made by a person is not
more than EUR 280. They are also not required to disclose total contributions
received, and, therefore, anonymous donations are not restricted or prohibited.
Similarly, there is no penal provision if political parties accept or receive
donations from prohibited companies or sources, in violation of Section 29B of
the RPA. The parties exploit this – over 75% of the total funds received do not
disclose the source.
With regard to funds received by candidates:
• Candidates may raise funds from any source, as there are no restrictions on
fundraising by candidates, nor is there any requirement to maintain and disclose
the names and addresses of the persons from whom they receive the funds.
• On the direction of the Election Commission, the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India (ICAI) has issued guidelines prescribing accounting and
audit standard for the parties. However, there is no penal provision for the
violation of such guidelines by the candidate or the party. Theoretically though,
the ICAI can revoke the licence of the chartered accountant.
• During the election period, the Commission appoints independent Expenditure
Observers, who work as the eyes and ears of the Commission. During the election
campaign period, the candidates are required to submit their day-to-day election
expenditure statements three times to the Expenditure Observer for inspection.
The final accounts with bills and vouchers must be submitted to the Designated
Election Officer within 30 days of the end of elections. Failure to submit this
statement to the DEO within the timeframe and manner prescribed may result in
the candidate’s disqualification by the Commission for a period of three years.
• The Commission has issued instructions that each candidate should open a
separate bank account for election expenses, and incur all expenses from that
account by cheque, excluding small payments below INR 20 000 (or EUR 280).
But there is no penal provision to enforce this.
Disclosure of election expenditures by candidates
Disclosures measures are designed to make political parties and candidates observe
the campaign expenditure ceilings, as well as prevent illegal, prohibited or otherwise
restricted expenditures. Candidates must also file an affidavit providing details of their
assets, liabilities and any pending criminal cases against them.
Accounting and reporting procedures
With regard to maintenance of day-to-day accounts of election expenses, cash and
bank registers:
• Candidates are required to maintain books and registers of their election
expenditures, e.g. register of day-to-day accounts, cash register and bank register.
• Every candidate may appoint an additional agent for assisting the candidate in
various expenditure-related matters.
• The candidate is required to submit the register to the Expenditure
Observer/designated officer for inspection at least three times during the
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campaign period, as per the schedule of inspection prepared by the Returning
Officer.
• In the case of non-production of the election expenditure register for inspection on
the day fixed for this purpose, a notice is issued by the Returning Officer.
• If the candidate does not produce the register within three days of service of the
notice, the candidate’s permission for use of vehicles during election may be
withdrawn, The withdrawal of permission for use of vehicles is made known to
all Surveillance Teams and Flying Squads deployed in the constituency, and
vehicles may be impounded. If the candidate still does not produce the register of
election expenditures for inspection, a complaint under Section 171-I of the IPC
shall be filed in the competent court.
Disclosure of expenditures by political parties
Political parties are required to disclose a partial statement to the Commission within
30 days of the declaration of election results detailing funding given to candidates, as well
as a full disclosure within 75 days of the state assembly elections, and 90 days of
Parliament (Lok Sabha) elections, the total amount of election expenses incurred. But
there is no penal provision should the parties decline to submit the report or submit an
incomplete or incorrect report. The Commission has issued instruction in its transparency
guidelines for the political parties that the report should be verified by a chartered
accountant, but there is no penal provision to ensure this. The Commission makes these
reports publicly available on its website. The contribution reports and the annual audit
reports submitted by the political parties are also posted on the Commission’s website for
public viewing.
In the Election Expenditure Statements, political parties are required to provide
details of expenditures made under different categories (e.g. travel expenses, expenditures
on media advertisements, expenditures on publicity materials, lump sum amounts paid to
each candidate for campaigning purposes, etc.). These statements filed by political parties
are made publicly available on the Commission website.
The Commission has issued transparency guidelines directing the parties to file the
Annual Audited Accounts with the Commission within seven months of the end of
financial year. It has also issued guidelines that the parties should not incur any
expenditure above INR 20 000 in cash to a single person in a day (excluding the
transactions in areas not having banking facilities). In the absence of penal provisions,
some parties do not comply with these requirements.
Scrutiny/audit of the information submitted by political parties and candidates
According to the transparency guidelines of the Commission, accounts maintained by
political parties should conform to the guidance note on Accounting and Auditing of
political parties circulated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. Annual
accounts are required to be audited and certified by qualified practising Chartered
Accountants. In addition, all political parties are expected to submit to the Commission
copies of their audited annual accounts, along with the Auditor’s report for each financial
year (i.e. April to March), before 31 October of each year. Annual audit reports submitted
by the political parties are sent to ICAI for further examination. Apart from posting the
contribution reports on the website for public scrutiny, the reports submitted by the
204 – II.14. INDIA
political parties are also sent to the Income Tax Department, the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs for further scrutiny.
Format in which the information is made available to the public
Scanned copies of all financial reports of the political parties (contribution reports,
annual audit reports and election expenditure reports) are made publicly available on the
Commission’s website within seven days of submission.
Transparency guidelines
In the interest of conducting free and fair elections, maintaining the purity of the
election process, and providing guidelines to encourage transparency and accountability
with regard to political party funds, the Commission has issued transparency guidelines
that apply to all political parties. The main features of the transparency guidelines are as
follows.
To maintain such books of accounts and other documents that conform to the
guidance note on Accounting and Auditing of political parties, issued by the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India. The Annual Accounts shall be audited and certified by
qualified, practicing Chartered Accountants.
Political parties are required to submit to the Commission a copy of the audited
Annual Accounts with the Auditor’s report for each financial year, before 31 October of
each year.
For this, they shall maintain the names and addresses of all individuals, companies or
entities making a donation, except petty sums, donated by the public only during its
public rallies. Further, any amounts/donations received in cash shall be duly accounted
for in relevant account books, and deposited in the party’s bank account within a week of
its receipt. However, the party can retain a reasonable amount of cash required for the
day-to-day functioning of the party and for defraying cash expenses.
If a party incurs any expenditure, it shall ensure that no payment in excess of
INR 20 000 is made in a day to any person or company or entity in cash, except where:
i) the payment is made in a village or town, which is not served by a bank; or ii) the
payment is made to any employee or party functionary towards salary, pension or for
reimbursement of his/her expenses; or iii) cash payment is required under any statute.
Section 77(3) of the RPA provides a ceiling of election expenditure for a candidate
irrespective of the source of the funds. Therefore, if the party desires to provide any
financial assistance to its candidates for their election expenses, such assistance shall not
exceed the prescribed ceiling. Any payment in this regard by the party shall be made only
through crossed account payee cheque or draft or through bank account transfer, and not
in cash.
Integrity
During the last elections, a 24/7 call centre was set up in each district, allowing voters
to make toll-free calls to register complaints of any suspected violations or other corrupt
practices. All complaints received were recorded and forwarded to the relevant “flying
squad” (mobile enforcement team). Phone numbers of the local expenditure observers
were also made public with invitations to the public to register any complaints of
electoral code violations. Complainants were informed of follow-up action taken. In
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addition, between 1 March (announcement of elections) and 15 May, the Election
Commission received 3 159 calls from voters to report suspected misconduct.
Fostering a culture of integrity within the public sector, among political parties
and private donors
The Election Commission supports campaigns propagating ethical voting, engaging
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), village level/ward level awareness groups
(VAGs/WAGs), civil societies, and by announcements on legal provisions, uploading
facility of photo/audio/video of corrupt practices. It has also begun engaging in booth-
level awareness groups (BAGs).
Compliance and oversight
In India various measures are taken to ensure effective compliance, as described
below.
For effective compliance of the Commission’s instructions in connection with the
expenditure by candidates and political parties, various teams are formed:
1. Flying Squad: Dedicated Flying Squads under each Assembly
Constituency/Segment for tracking illegal cash transactions or any distribution of
liquor or any other items suspected of being used for bribing the voters.
2. Static Surveillance Team (SST): These teams put check posts and watch for
movement of large quantities of cash, illegal liquor, any suspicious item or arms
being carried in their area. The entire process of checking is video-recorded to
prevent harassment or bribery.
3. Video Surveillance Teams: Capture all the expenditure-related events and
evidence for any future reference as proof. Expenditure-related events and
evidence are reviewed by the Video Viewing Teams and Accounting Teams to
prepare Shadow Observation Registers for each candidate.
4. Media Certification and Monitoring Committee (MCMC): This district-level
committee is set up for the certification of campaign advertisements, and to also
monitor both print and electronic media including cable networks, and record
either in CD or DVD. They maintain photocopies of all advertisements/paid
news/election-related news of the contesting candidates/political parties.
A scanned copy of the Abstract of expenditure statements of all the candidates along
with copies of all notices issued by the RO, and the replies thereto must be posted on the
website of the CEO within three days of lodging the account of election expenses by the
candidate.
Accounts maintained by the candidates are scrutinised by the Observers and other
district-level teams during the election process, as elaborated above.
Most of the information in connection with the funding and expenditure of the
political parties and candidates are posted on line for public scrutiny. Anyone can also ask
for the information under Right to Information Act 2005. There are many NGOs like the
Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR), National Election Watch, etc., who are doing
commendable jobs by doing research on electoral reforms and even filing Public Interest
Litigations (PILs)s to cleanse the political system in India.
206 – II.14. INDIA
Conducting investigations, referral of cases for prosecution
In addition to the district authorities, the ECI takes assistance from various law
enforcement agencies like state excises, the Income Tax Department, the Central Police
Force, etc. to conduct investigations.
Sanctions applied following the breach of political finance regulations -
disqualification
Candidates are issued notices to date for failure to submit election expenditure
accounts within the prescribed time limit. Out of the five returned candidates who were
issued notice, one was unseated and disqualified.
The list of other persons (non-returned candidates) disqualified for three years under
Section 10A of the RPA is posted on the Commission’s website (www.eci.nic.in).
1
Helping political parties and candidates comply with regulations
The Commission has introduced e-filing of certain forms and statements, by
candidates and political parties and launched a new “Election Commission Return
Preparer (ECRP) Scheme” to assist them in online filing of the forms, affidavits, etc.
The Election Commission of India set up the India International Institute of
Democracy and Election Management in 2011 in order to provide training on electoral
practices to meet domestic and international requirements of election managers. The
institute also organises training and orientation programmes for political parties.
Challenges
Challenges and emerging risks in relation to a level playing field
1. In view of the high costs of election campaigning in terms of media
advertisements and public rallies, use of “big money” in politics is a major
concern today. The Commission is open to the idea of expanding the in-kind
subsidy for election campaigns, with simultaneous reforms for transparency and
accountability of parties and candidates.
2. Vote buying is another challenge. Political parties often indulges in distributing
cash, liquor and gifts to buy the support of voters.
3. The policy of financing of political campaigns but not political parties results in
continued distrust of government and major economic actors. Political parties’
main source of fundraising, namely donations from undisclosed sources,
perpetuates the idea that these donations result in crony capitalism – that is
preferential policies, favours, or other rewards to criminals, corporations, and
government contractors. State funding for political parties could help resolve this
problem. One possible way to implement this would be through a party funding
system which allocates funding to parties according the number of votes
received. This system would be further complemented by a ban on corporate and
anonymous donations, thereby minimising the appearance of quid pro quo
arrangements.
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Challenges and emerging risks in relation to transparency and accountability
1. There is no uniform method of accounting by the political parties and no ceiling
for expenditure by political parties.
2. There is no requirement of disclosure of campaign-expenditure by a third-party
campaigner, i.e. a person not authorised to campaign by either the party or the
candidate.
3. The cash economy in India encourages the use of black money and vote buying.
4. There is a new phenomenon of “paid news” – advertisements masquerading as
news and hence expenditure not accounted for.
Challenges and emerging risks in relation to compliance and oversight
1. There is no penalty for non-compliance by parties. The Commission has
recommended having legislation authorising sanctions for non-compliance.
2. There is no law regulating the parties, as the Election Commission of India is not
a regulator of political parties under current law. In addition, the Commission
does not have the authority to deregister or impose civil penalty on political
parties.
Plans to reform political finance regulations
1. The Law Commission in its 255th Report has dealt with electoral reforms and
made detailed recommendations.
2. The Election Commission held a national consultation to discuss the issues in
context with the Law Commission’s report, which was attended by various
recognised political parties, senior election officials, journalists, academics,
NGOs, students, legal experts, etc. The outcome of the consultation has been
forwarded to the Government for consideration.
3. The Commission has made various recommendations on electoral reforms in the
past as well.
Conclusion
The money power in elections continues to evade solutions. While India is not the
only country grappling with the problem, it is no consolation. It underlines the need for
the world community to put their heads together to come up with workable solutions.
Without further delay, OECD and International IDEA can lead this effort as they have
indeed begun to do. Let 2016 be the year for clinching the issue at last.
Note
1. See http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ElectoralLaws/disqualified-person-list-13012015.pdf.
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OECD Public Governance Reviews
Financing Democracy
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE
OECD Public Governance Reviews
Financing Democracy
FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
AND THE RISK OF POLICY CAPTURE
Contents
Part I. Funding of political parties and election campaigns, risks of policy capture and policy options
Chapter 1. Addressing the risks of policy capture
Chapter 2. Promoting a level playing field through balanced funding
Chapter 3. Increasing transparency and accountability through disclosure of political party
and election-campaign funding
Chapter 4. Fostering a culture of integrity among political parties, public officials and donors
Chapter 5. Ensuring compliance with political finance regulations
Part II. Country case studies
Chapter 6. Canada
Chapter 7. Chile
Chapter 8. Estonia
Chapter 9. France
Chapter 10. Korea
Chapter 11. Mexico
Chapter 12. United Kingdom
Chapter 13. Brazil
Chapter 14. India
ISBN 978-92-64-24944-8
42 2015 26 1 P
Financing DemocracyOECD Public Governance Reviews
