Table of Contents
Executive Summary .................................................................. 4
Introduction .......................................................................... 8
Section 1: Domestic actors .......................................................... 11
1. Government and political party leaders ........................................ 12
A. Strengthening democratic practices and features .......................... 13
B. Responsible political behavior ............................................... 14
C. Judicial independence and rule of law ...................................... 16
2. Political opposition groups ..................................................... 19
A. Winning an unfair election ................................................... 20
B. Slowing deterioration ........................................................ 24
3. Civil society and independent media ........................................... 26
A. The role of civil society in democracy ....................................... 27
B. Developing leadership teams with high strategic capacity .................. 28
C. Encouraging broad and diverse participation ............................... 29
D.Establishingdenedgoalsandaclearvision ............................... 30
E. Utilizing diverse and varied tactics .......................................... 31
F. The role of independent media in democracy ............................... 32
G. Individual and systemic threats to media actors ............................ 32
H. Maintaining and defending independent media ............................. 33
4. The private sector .............................................................. 36
A. Democracy and business .................................................... 37
B. Avoiding state capture, co-optation, and corruption ......................... 37
C. Corporate best practices .................................................... 38
D. Social media companies .................................................... 40
5. Conclusion of section 1 ........................................................ 42
2 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Section 2: International actors and external assistance ............................ 43
1. Partnering with domestic CSOs and NGOs ..................................... 44
A. Addressing restrictions on CSOs and NGOs ................................. 47
B. Coordinating and diversifying support ....................................... 49
C. Planning in advance and developing core capacities ....................... 50
2. Assisting civil resistance and nonviolent movements ......................... 52
A.Deningcivilresistanceandnonviolence ................................... 53
B. Why support civil resistance, and whom to support?........................ 53
C. Understanding the operating environment .................................. 54
D. Promoting local ownership .................................................. 55
E. Providing training and skills development ................................... 55
F. Boosting efforts of independent media ..................................... 57
G. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution: A case study of external support
to civil resistance movements ............................................... 57
3. Countering disinformation ...................................................... 59
4. Providing foreign government and institutional support ....................... 62
A. Strengthening pre-accession EU tools ....................................... 63
B. Leveraging post-accession EU tools ......................................... 64
C. Advancing institutional approaches ......................................... 66
D. Bolstering U.S. diplomatic and economic tools ............................. 67
E. Better utilizing NATO platforms ............................................. 69
5. Conclusion of section 2 ......................................................... 70
Conclusion ........................................................................... 71
Endnotes ............................................................................. 74
About the Authors .................................................................... 96
Acknowledgments ................................................................... 98
Democracy Playbook 3
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Executive Summary
The Democracy Playbook sets forth strategies and actions that supporters of liberal democracy
can implement to halt and reverse democratic backsliding and make democratic institutions
work more effectively for citizens. The strategies are deeply rooted in the evidence: what
the scholarship and practice of democracy teach us about what does and does not work.
We hope that diverse groups and individuals will nd the syntheses herein useful as they
design catered, context-specic strategies for contesting and resisting the illiberal toolkit. This
playbook is organized into two principal sections: one dealing with actions that domestic
actors can take within democracies, including retrenching ones, and the second section
addressing the role of international actors in supporting and empowering pro-democracy
actors on the ground. Those recommendations are summarized here.
Norman Eisen, Andrew Kenealy, Susan Corke,
Torrey Taussig, and Alina Polyakova
Protesters take part in a
demonstration outside the
oce of the prime minister
in Valletta, Malta.
THE DEMOCRACY PLAYBOOK:
Preventing and Reversing
Democratic Backsliding
4 BROOKINGS
Section 1: Domestic actors
1. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS SHOULD:
(Pages 12–18)
• Be prepared for and invest in protecting against internal and external interference in elections.
• Enact policies that promote and protect broad access to the vote, such as automatic or
same-day voter registration.
• Regulate the role of money in politics to retain trust in the democratic system.
• Uphold institutional obligations and use their political power with restraint–but when
norms break down, further legal mechanisms should be considered.
• Defend the independence of the judiciary by establishing public procedures for the
selection and retention of judges.
• Implement judicial transparency mechanisms.
2. POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUPS SHOULD:
(Pages 19–25)
• Form networks between other opposition groups, local electoral activists, civil society
groups, and, where appropriate, international organizations and actors.
• Create a unied democratic opposition where possible or consider using referenda as
an alternative.
• Increase election monitoring capacity and be prepared to use electoral abuse evidence
as the basis for reform advocacy.
• Engage new voters by presenting a positive and inclusive vision for the future—not only
attacks on illiberalism.
• Forcefully contest each individual illiberal act of non-democratic actors, calibrating the
strength of the remedy to the severity of the threat.
3. CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA SHOULD:
(Pages 26–35)
Civil society should:
• Seek broad, diverse, and large-scale participation in their activities.
• Model organizationally what they seek to achieve in a democracy.
• Establish dened goals, a clear vision, and an actionable agenda.
• Be prepared to use diverse and varied nonviolent tactics to increase the pressure on
government and attract more people to participate.
Democracy Playbook 5
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Independent media should focus their efforts on four key areas:
• Occupational development and education.
• Professional associations to enable and support individual journalists on a range of issues.
• Media self-scrutiny and development of a robust media criticism community.
• Better internal governance of media outlets.
4. THE PRIVATE SECTOR SHOULD:
(Pages 36–41)
• Resist corruption, co-optation, and state capture.
• Aim to do well by doing good, including through activism, philanthropy, and
corporate social responsibility.
• Recognize the key role of social media companies, who should:
• Prioritize digital media literacy.
• Quickly remove material that violates the law and their codes of conduct policies.
• Support narrowly tailored government regulations that do not infringe on users’
rights to free speech.
• Intensify cooperation with other platforms to share best practices.
Section 2: International actors
1. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS SHOULD PARTNER WITH DOMESTIC
CSOs AND NGOs BY:
(Pages 44–51)
• Going local—enhancing collaboration with local NGOs to balance external support to
more well-known and Westernized organizations.
• Building basic capacities of NGOs—especially local ones.
• Coordinating donor support to avoid overwhelming recipient organization bandwidth.
• Responding vigorously to government attacks on NGOs.
• Empowering nontraditional actors in addition to NGOs, such as businesses, individuals,
universities, student groups, and think tanks.
• Developing domestic sources of funding and philanthropy, particularly in countries that
are at risk of democratic backsliding.
6 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
2. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS SHOULD ASSIST DOMESTIC CIVIL RESISTANCE
AND NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS BY:
(Pages 52–58)
• Developing clear criteria for providing support.
• Thinking long-term.
• Establishing the local context.
• Promoting domestic ownership of the issues at the national and local level.
• Focusing on training and skills development across civil resistance and
movement organizing.
• Helping to boost the efforts of independent media.
3. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS SHOULD HELP COUNTER DISINFORMATION BY:
(Pages 59–61)
• Supporting independent media organizations and CSOs working to expose
disinformation campaigns.
• Investing in and expanding organizational capabilities for monitoring disinformation
campaigns emanating from foreign actors.
• Enhancing communication between democratic governance and social media companies.
• Advancing pro-democracy messaging.
4. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS SHOULD PROMOTE
DEMOCRACY BY:
(Pages 62–69)
• Leveraging EU structural funds.
• Enhancing support for civil society and the independent media.
• Encouraging NGO-Government relations, when possible.
• Prioritizing governance and democracy issues.
• Advancing institutional channels.
Democracy Playbook 7
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Introduction
AN ERA OF AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE
Democracies around the world are under stress, their institutions and norms undermined by
illiberal actors and their vulnerabilities exploited by external forces bent on weakening democ-
racy’s appeal. Prominent illustrations include Turkey’s descent into authoritarianism, Poland
and Hungary’s illiberal turns, Russia’s electoral interference in states across the transatlantic
community and, of course, events in the United States. Alongside such headline capturing
developments, there has also been a longer-term erosion of citizen trust in democratic insti-
tutions and elected ocials. These democratic setbacks—both attention grabbing and more
subtle—have emerged across regions in both transitioning and consolidated democracies.
Global democracy indices assert that the world has entered a new wave of autocratization.
1
In 2019, Freedom House recorded its 13th consecutive year of net decline in political rights
and civil liberties.
2
In this time, one in six democracies around the world has failed.
3
In 2019,
the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem), the world’s largest database on democratic
indicators, reported that democratic declines now affect more countries than ever before.
4
While the majority of countries in the world remain democratic, almost one-third of the world’s
population lives in countries undergoing democratic decline.
5
Unlike previous waves of auto-
cratization, this current retrenchment mainly affects democracies and is occurring through
legal transfers of power.
6
European states—the primary focus of this report—are not immune to these realities. Across
the continent, illiberal parties have gained support among citizens who see their governments
as unable to meet their economic and security needs, nor adequately addressing concerns
associated with migration and globalization. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe that
made signicant gains in building their new democracies following the Cold War are now
experiencing a crisis of illiberalism that is weakening the rule of law, the separation of powers,
and the integrity of elections. In older and more entrenched democracies in Western Europe,
societies and governments are grappling with how to handle powerful populist and nationalist
movements that exude illiberal tendencies.
Champions of the democratic openings across Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of
the Cold War are also weakening in their support and standard setting behavior. In the 1990s
and early 2000s, the United States and major Western European powers more consistently
prioritized and invested in policies of democracy promotion and expansion. Now their inability
or unwillingness to uphold democratic norms and institutions internally further complicates
democracy-promotion efforts. This shift is giving authoritarian regimes, including Russia
and China, more condence and inuence to meddle in the internal affairs and processes of
democratic states.
8 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
THE ANATOMY OF ILLIBERAL STATES
Democratic setbacks in Europe today are not driven by overt coup d’états or forceful authori-
tarian takeovers. Rather, backsliding is occurring through incremental steps and often under
a legal façade.
7
It is implemented by illiberal political parties and leaders that have come to
power through relatively democratic and electoral processes. Bastions of support for such
movements tend to come from rural communities outside national capitals and metropolitan
areas and from segments of society that feel left behind by out-of-touch elites.
Once in power, illiberal governments capitalize on popular support
to deploy a discernible toolkit and a loosely predictable sequence
to chip away at democracy and build an illiberal state. As argued in
a related Brookings report, The Anatomy of Illiberal States, “Liberal
principles—political ideas that espouse the importance of individual
liberties, minority rights, and the separation of power across levers of
government—and democratic institutions—processes that translate
popular will into public policy through legitimate elections—are being
pulled apart.”
8
At times, their efforts extend beyond attacks on liberal
principles to include delegitimizing political opposition, diminishing
fundamental political rights to free speech, assembly and media plural-
ism, and clamping down on civil society—all of which are indispensable
for a functioning democracy.
A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
The emergence of self-styled illiberal states across Europe presents a challenge to Western
collective action in an era of authoritarian resurgence. Far-right populist parties, many with
illiberal tendencies, have gained a toehold or the majority in 23 of 28 EU member states’ par-
liamentary systems.
9
But, these systems still have democratic institutions and robust civil
societies, albeit under pressure, that provide avenues for responding. The level of free and
fair competition for political power varies across nations, as does the space for free speech
and assembly, the rule of law, transparency, and government accountability.
10
The ability of
political opposition and civil society to operate gives pro-democracy actors an urgent window
of opportunity to push back on illiberal activity before it becomes further entrenched, and in
turn, more dicult to undo.
To resist the illiberal toolkit, pro-democracy forces must be empowered with a dynamic
playbook of their own. Old tools of democracy support must be adapted to current realities
in which citizens now have less trust in mainstream political actors and the media. While
democracy as a system of governance maintains widespread appeal, there has been a gap
between expectations and delivered benets. Illiberal politicians have seized on this divide
as an opportunity to gain support
11
that will continue as long as citizens remain disillusioned
with democracy.
is playbook highlights
strategies and tactics for
pro-democracy actors to
not only push back against
illiberal and authoritarian-
leaning actors, but also
to renew the promise and
resiliency of democratic
institutions.
Democracy Playbook 9
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Moving forward, democracy must be shown to work. This playbook highlights strategies
and tactics for pro-democracy actors to not only push back against illiberal and authoritar-
ian-leaning actors, but also to renew the promise and resiliency of democratic institutions.
To demonstrate that democracy is the best system to meet citizens’ needs, supporters will
have to revitalize the economic, political, and social pillars that undergird democracy, which
have, in many nations, fallen into disrepair.
A NEW DEMOCRACY PLAYBOOK
The far-reaching consequences of a decade-long run of authoritarian resurgence makes
renewing and reenergizing liberal democracy in the trans-Atlantic space all the more necessary.
As part of this effort, our report provides strategic insights from social science and historical
and contemporary case studies that shed light on how to push back on illiberal forces and
strengthen the pillars of liberal democracy. In section 1, we provide a set of insights—drawn
from the United States and Europe—to help inform and strengthen the strategies of domestic
democratic actors such as:
• The incumbent political establishment;
• The political opposition;
• Civil society and independent media; and
• Private enterprise—including social media enterprises—and ordinary citizens.
Section 2 discusses the indirect role of international institutions and organizations in sup-
porting pro-democracy forces, empowering local actors, and advancing democratic reforms.
This report highlights efforts including:
• Partnering with domestic NGOs;
• Assisting civil resistance and nonviolent movements;
• Countering disinformation campaigns; and
• Providing foreign government and institutional support.
We begin each subsection with a summary of its contents. We conclude each subsection
with recommendations for further reading on the corresponding topic.
To be clear, no single strategy is a silver bullet to the illiberal challenges at hand; context
powerfully shapes the outcomes of particular pro-democracy strategies and tactics. But we
believe that it is possible to distill useful strategic frameworks, principles, and lessons learned
into a “democracy playbook.” We hope that diverse groups and will nd this playbook useful
as they contest and resist the illiberal toolkit.
10 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
People attend a protest
against the government of
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
in Budapest, Hungary.
SECTION 1:
Domestic actors
By Norman Eisen, Andrew Kenealy, and Susan Corke
I
n both ascendant and troubled democracies today, contentious political dynamics are at
play across a wide variety of domestic contexts and actors.
12
People and organizations
working toward advancing democracy sometimes have structural and other winds at their
backs accelerating their progress. At other times, those advocating democracy are ght-
ing their way forward against strong headwinds. Yet negative factors, such as authoritarian
strength, need not be decisive.
13
Nor are backsliding democratic regimes—the focus of this
report—stable and unalterable.
14
Recent scholarship on pro-democracy actors and political history shows that the strategies
they deploy to pursue their goals matter.
15
Describing his own convictions in that regard, Larry
Diamond writes: “I became (and remain to this day) convinced that the failure of democracy
is not foreordained, and that within the various social and institutional constraints, actors act,
making choices that can doom or possibly sustain democracy.”
16
Democracy’s fate rests in
the hands of people, and securing it begins at home.
This section of our report distills principles of strategic action for how domestic actors can
promote democracy in their own nations. We examine scholarship on the roles of governing
political parties and actors, political opposition groups, civil society and the independent
media, and the business sector. Throughout, we illustrate strategic principles with contem-
porary and historical examples drawn primarily from Central and Eastern European nations.
Although we draw upon academic literature that, at times, assesses activity around the globe,
we aim to draw lessons that are especially applicable for actors in nations experiencing, or
at risk of, democratic backsliding in Europe and Eurasia.
Democracy Playbook 11
1. Government and political party leaders
SUMMARY
Government and political party leaders should:
• Be prepared for and invest in protecting against internal and external interference
in elections. Elections are the foundation of a democracy yet advances in digital
technology have rendered elections increasingly complex and vulnerable to interference.
Governments should have a proactive and comprehensive deterrence strategy—with
responsibleactorsinclearlydenedroles—thatwillappropriatelypunishnations
who interfere in democratic elections. Governments and political parties should
invest in the people and systems necessary for the technological security of election
counting, voter registration machines, and political campaign networks.
• Enact policies that promote and protect broad access to the vote, such as
automatic or same-day voting.
• Regulate the role of money in politics to retain trust in the democratic system
throughthecreationofsuchmechanismsaspublicnancingofcampaigns,
disclosure requirements for donations, and limits on the amount of campaign
donations.
• Uphold institutional obligations and use their political power responsibly
through “institutional forbearance” (i.e., politicians should refrain from using the
full breadth and scope of their politically allocated power) and through “mutual
toleration” (i.e., opposing sides regarding one another as legitimate rivals, but not
enemies.) When these norms break down and authoritarian challenges emerge,
further legal mechanisms should be considered to sanction extreme behavior.
• Defend the independence of the judiciary by establishing public procedures for
the selection, appointment, and promotion of judges, for the allocation of cases to
judges, as well as codes of ethical behavior that protect the integrity of the judicial
decision-making process from undue political pressure, intimidation, and attacks.
• Implement judicial transparency mechanisms (e.g., opening up courtrooms,
producing publicly available transcriptions of proceedings, and placing cameras in
courtrooms).
Those with institutional control of national-level, democratic political systems bear the respon-
sibility to maintain their vibrancy. This section distills best practices that incumbent executive,
legislative, judicial, and political party leaders can follow in order to maintain the democratic
character of the system within which they operate. These duties manifest in separate but
related ways, from policy choices to institutional behavior to political statements.
12 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
A. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES AND FEATURES
In a democracy, political actors are responsible for strengthening democratic practices and
features. We highlight three of those features in particular: secure, free, and fair elections;
money in politics; and the formation of strong political parties populated by pro-democracy
politicians that are appropriately attuned to a diverse grassroots support base.
Secure, free, and fair elections are the foundation of democracy, yet ensuring them is a
complicated endeavor. Even in well-established democracies, measures must be taken to
guard against partisan efforts to manipulate the vote.
17
Conversely, governments should
enact policies that promote broad access to the vote, such as automatic or same-day voter
registration.
18
Elections must also be secured against international interference of the kind practiced by
Russia across Europe and in the United States.
19
Protecting against external meddling requires
improving the technological security of election counting, voter registration machines, and
political campaign networks. It also entails encouraging social media and other news media
companies to cooperate with the government in addressing the problem of disinformation.
20
Governments on both sides of the Atlantic must also develop a comprehensive deterrence
strategy that will appropriately punish nations who interfere in democratic elections.
21
Second, the role of money in politics must be properly regulated so as to not elevate special
interests over those of the public and foster a lack of trust in the democratic system. To pre-
vent the undue inuence of money in democratic politics, political parties should implement
small donor matching systems or other mechanisms for the public nancing of campaigns,
create disclosure requirements for donations, and set limits on the amount of money that can
be donated to campaigns. These reforms can lead to positive effects such as the emergence
of more political challengers, the reduction of the total cost of campaigns, and even a larger
proportion of budgets being devoted to public welfare spending, which work in tandem to
strengthen democratic institutions and trust in government.
22
Finally, political parties must strike the proper balance between central control and grassroots
inuence. Excessive domination by party bosses has long been viewed as anti-democratic.
23
But too much decentralization of decision-making power in selecting party leaders and candi-
dates may also have perverse effects. One of these effects includes unduly empowering fringe
elements who do not represent the opinion or interests of the majority and special interest
groups.
24
This may reduce the breadth of party appeal, potentially reducing politicians’ incen-
tives to make decisions in the public interest. Recent work has advocated for an approach to
political parties that brings establishment political gures and activists closer together and
emphasizes the value of critical debate among decisionmakers, with the objective of diversi-
fying political discourse to include alternative perspectives.
25
Such an intermediate approach
enables political parties to keep central control in mind while maintaining a diverse base and
remaining in touch with the interests of their grassroots supporters.
Democracy Playbook 13
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
B. RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
In addition to helping foster conditions conducive to democratic consolidation and imple-
menting policies that protect democratic practices, ocials must also use their political
power responsibly in order to safeguard democracy. In practice, politicians who uphold their
institutional obligations will respect two particularly important norms of political behavior:
“institutional forbearance” and “mutual toleration”. In so doing, they can insulate themselves,
their parties, and their democracies from would-be authoritarians.
26
The norm of institutional forbearance holds that politicians should refrain from using the full
breadth and scope of their politically allocated power, when doing so would undermine the
democratic system.
27
Leading political scientists stress the importance of such restraint for
democratic stability and functioning. Institutional forbearance is often a matter of adhering to
norms not written into law, such as not packing courts, respecting term limits, and refraining
from issuing executive orders to circumvent the decisions of other branches of government.
Important work on cooperation in political systems suggests that politicians who exhibit
moderation while seeking the best possible outcome for themselves are making a good stra-
tegic bet. Such behavior will help produce repeated cooperation and sustained “playing” over
the long-term. Intransigence, on the other hand, incentivizes costly retaliation.
28
Signicant
historical evidence suggests that excessive retaliation can lead to system breakdown.
29
Sometimes the solution can be found in strong constitutional protections, but deftly written
constitutions (and where available, amendments) alone are insucient to guarantee democ-
racy. Even the best constitutions include gaps and ambiguities that are subject to competing
interpretations. Moreover, constitutions will unavoidably be vulnerable to what legal scholars
have dubbed “constitutional hardball”.
30
This is the opposite of institutional forbearance and
is exceptionally dicult to guard against.
31
An example of illiberal leaders playing constitutional hardball can be seen in the recent political
turmoil in the Czech Republic. The unabashedly illiberal Czech President Milos Zeman has
used his limited constitutional powers to their fullest extent in order to support the populist
Prime Minister Andrej Babis, who is currently embroiled in a corruption scandal that has
prompted the largest Czech protests since the Velvet Revolution.
32
Zeman allowed Babis’
proposed government to continue in a caretaker capacity even when he lost a parliamentary
vote of no condence in January 2018, and stated that he would reappoint Babis as prime
minister even if he lost another vote of no condence in November 2018 (a vote that Babis
ultimately survived).
33
All of these decisions are technically legal; Zeman has operated within
his constitutional authority. However, Zeman’s purported alliance with Babis has disregarded
generally accepted political norms, particularly the norm of replacing a prime minister after
he or she has lost a no-condence vote.
A second norm crucial to democratic functioning is “mutual toleration”, which addresses how
political opponents treat one another.
34
Politicians who are mutually tolerant acknowledge
14 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
that as long as their opponents follow constitutional rules, they have an equally legitimate
claim to run for oce. Although there may be signicant substantive disagreements between
opponents, and they may not like each other, they do not treat them as existential threats. In
other words, mutually tolerant politicians on opposing sides regard one another as rivals, but
not enemies. This is especially important to sustaining democracy because when politicians
unfairly cast their opponents as illegitimate, dangerous threats, they can also justify using
authoritarian measures to defeat them.
35
Another aspect of responsible political behavior is keeping power out of the hands of extrem-
ist leaders.
36
Political leaders and parties generally enjoy a signicant capacity to curb the
inuence of political extremists through, for instance, making choices about coalitions and
leadership roles. Yet history shows that it is a mistake for pro-democracy establishment pol-
iticians to permit the rise of radical leaders under the belief that they will benet from their
popularity and be able to control their worst impulses.
37
Unfortunately, not all would-be despots are easy to spot. Some of
today’s infamous, illiberal leaders, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, had
promising beginnings. In 1989, Orbán studied civil society at Oxford
University, funded by a scholarship from the Soros Foundation. He
began his political career as a liberal democrat and governed demo-
cratically in his rst term as prime minister from 1998 to 2002.
38
His
turn towards authoritarianism—following his return to power in 2010—
came as a slowly-dawning, unpleasant surprise to some.
39
As an early-warning system of such developments, political scien-
tists have articulated a generally reliable framework for identifying
prospective dictators. Drawing upon the foundational scholarship of
Juan Linz,
40
Steven Levitsky, and Daniel Ziblatt propose four key indi-
cators of authoritarian behavior. They include: “1) Rejection of (or weak
commitment to) democratic rules of the game; 2) Denial of the legitimacy of political oppo-
nents; 3) Toleration or encouragement of violence; and 4) Readiness to curtail civil liberties of
opponents, including the media.”
41
It is important to note that prospective authoritarian leaders
initially tend to demonstrate these behaviors within the connes of existing laws and powers
that they already possess. They often go to great lengths—such as inventing threats to justify
the utilization of emergency powers—to maintain the legality of their actions. Political parties
and leaders must, therefore, respond in turn, using all legal and discretionary tools at their
disposal to isolate and ostracize aspiring politicians who meet one or more of these criteria.
Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest ve mechanisms for how pro-democratic establishment groups
can respond to authoritarian behavior. First, and most importantly, rival pro-democracy parties
and leaders should collaborate in a united front to push back against extremists. Second, they
can refrain from placing would-be authoritarians on party ballots for higher oce, even when
doing so might generate votes. Third, they can purge extremists in the grassroots of their own
parties, by expulsion if necessary. Fourth, political parties can avoid forming any alliances with
History shows that it is a
mistake for pro-democracy
establishment politicians
to permit the rise of radical
leaders under the belief that
they will benet from their
popularity and be able to
control their worst impulses.
Democracy Playbook 15
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
potentially extremist wings on their own side of the ideological spectrum. Finally, they can go
one step further by refraining from appearing or associating with would-be authoritarians,
in turn refraining from providing those groups or individuals with political legitimacy.
42
Such
steps can go a long way toward marginalizing, and in turn defeating, would-be authoritarians.
43
French establishment politicians used a combination of these strategies in the 2017 pres-
idential election to keep the far-right National Front leader Marine Le Pen out of power. All
moderate presidential hopefuls who lost in the rst round of the election immediately endorsed
centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron in the second round. These endorsements provided a
much-needed boost for Macron, who went on to defeat Le Pen in a landslide—albeit with a
lesser margin than in 2002 when France rallied around Jacques Chirac against Jean-Marie
Le Pen, Marine’s father. Reportedly, the French establishment politicians who universally
endorsed Macron did so in order to limit the inuence of Le Pen and her party, whom they
perceived to be a danger to democracy.
44
C. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND RULE OF LAW
Healthy democracies thrive on a partnership between the general public, elected ocials,
and independent institutions.
45
Among those institutions, the judiciary is one of the most
important, particularly in countries veering toward illiberalism. As Christopher Larkins notes,
an independent judiciary serves a unique role in constitutional democracies in enforcing the
constitution, civil and political rights, and other democratic procedures.
46
An independent
judiciary is one that remains impartial, approaches cases without bias, including towards the
politically powerful, and operates without fear.
47
Conversely, an important strategy of the aspiring authoritarian is to operate under a veneer of
legality, and put into place a system that Kim Lane Scheppele calls a “Frankenstate”, wherein
autocrats pull the worst elements of liberal democracies to create a new and wholly illiberal
system.
48
To combat this “autocratic legalism”, it is crucial to view the rule of law as a rst line
of defense against the dismantling of democratic institutions and to defend it vigorously.
49
The increase in Europe of illiberal tendencies poses a serious threat to judicial independence.
In a 2015 survey of 6,000 judges across 22 countries, many “judges did not feel that their inde-
pendence had been respected by government and the media.”
50
Respondents also noted that
the appointment and promotion processes in their countries had been inuenced by factors
other than ability and experience. At a 2016 high-level Council of Europe conference, a British
judge highlighted a myriad of interrelated threats faced by his European colleagues: inade-
quate investment in courts and judicial structure, increased case complexity and workload,
inadequate stang and administrative assistance, corruption, and political interference.
51
Constitutional courts in particular have been targeted by populist leaders. As Bojan Bugarič
and Tom Ginsburg note, “rule-of-law institutions in Central and Eastern Europe always lacked
the necessary support of genuinely liberal political parties and programs, leaving the courts
vulnerable to attacks from populists.”
52
16 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
For example, in Poland, the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has brought the country close
to “a point of no return concerning the independence of its judiciary.”
53
While serving as prime
minister from 2015 to 2017, Beata Szydło packed the courts with new judges, reorganized the
Constitutional Tribunal to decrease power, and changed decision-making rules to “paralyze
the court.”
54
Among several new laws designed to cripple judicial independence was a 2015
amendment that required a two-thirds majority for binding decisions and raised the quorum
to hear cases from nine to 13.
55
Since the court had only 12 justices at the time, the rule ren-
dered the body effectively inoperable. The PiS has in recent years continued to chip away at
judicial integrity through action as well as legal changes: it forcibly removed upwards of 149
regional court ocials for “discretionary” reasons, appointed poorly qualied replacements,
has delayed the adjudication of cases, and re-shaped National Council of the Judiciary (cre-
ated to ensure judicial independence) with political appointees.
56
In response to such predations in Poland and beyond,
57
the Council of Europe in 2016 identi-
ed a series of steps to defend an increasingly besieged judiciary.
58
First, states should seek
to depoliticize the election and appointment of judges. Appointees should neither represent
political factions nor face “political inuence either from the executive or legislature.” Second,
established procedures should guide the selection, appointment, and promotion of judges.
These procedures should be transparent and “based on objective criteria relating to the exer-
cise of judicial oce and focused primarily on ability and experience.” Third, states should
enact codes of ethical behavior for the executive and legislative branches that “restrain (unduly
Ocial posters of the
candidates for the 2017
French presidential election,
Emmanuel Macron (L) and
Marine Le Pen, are displayed
in northern France.
PHOTO CREDIT
Democracy Playbook 17
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
harsh or politically motivated criticism), and protect the integrity of the judicial decision-
making process from undue political pressure, intimidation and attacks.” Fourth, the judiciary
itself should pursue a more “proactive” approach to media to increase public condence and
dispel misunderstandings about processes and cases. Engagement with media might come
through independent “communication services or spokespersons that can answer criticism
on behalf of the judiciary and give general explanations of the legal process.” Fifth, objective
and established criteria should determine the allocation of cases to judges. Sixth, states can
deter corruption through adequate remuneration, working conditions, transparent investiga-
tions, and clear ethical standards.
59
Furthermore, rule of law can be strengthened through judicial transpar-
ency mechanisms. Though transparency is no panacea for spurring
democratic mobilization,
60
empirical research has shown that there
is a positive relationship between judicial transparency and trust in
judges.
61
Therefore, both state actors and members of the judicial
system should work to open up courtrooms by producing publicly
available transcripts of proceedings in a timely fashion, taking steps
to ensure that sealed documents are minimized, and placing cam-
eras in courtrooms. These actions can help to augment both judicial
independence and citizen trust in the judiciary. In addition, emerging
technologies, particularly big data and articial intelligence, pose both
challenges and opportunities in promoting judicial independence and
equity. For example, big data and AI can play a role in litigation by, forecasting which judges
and jurisdictions are responsive to specic arguments, thereby guiding well-funded litigants
while disadvantaging those without access to such tools. They can also play a more bene-
cial role within the judiciary by identifying and serving as tools in mitigating bias in judicial
decisionmaking.
62
As these technologies develop, democratic actors must work to ensure
that their benets are available to all.
SECTION 1.1 KEY RESOURCES:
• Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018).
• Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. (Eds.) The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis,
Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
• “Council of Europe Plan of Action on Strengthening Judicial Independence and Impartiality.”
Council of Europe April 13, 2016, https://rm.coe.int/1680700125.
It is crucial to view the
rule of law as a rst line
of defense against the
dismantling of democratic
institutions and to defend
it vigorously.
18 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
2. Political opposition groups
SUMMARY
Political opposition groups should:
• Form networks between other opposition groups, local electoral activists, civil
society groups, and, where appropriate, international organizations and actors.
• Create a unied democratic opposition where possible or consider using
referenda as an alternative. When opposition groups can build a broad-based
coalition,theysignicantlyincreasetheirchanceofaliberalizingoutcome.
Where forming a coalition is not possible, an alternative model to consider is
implementing a popular referendum that can provide the advantages of a binary
structure and the potential to expose the unpopularity of populist governments.
• Increase election monitoring capacity and be prepared to use electoral abuse
evidence as the basis for reform advocacy. Pro-democratic opposition parties
must prioritize ensuring independent election monitoring. The opposition can
boostitstechnicalprociencybypartneringandcollaboratingwithinternational
election observers and involving them in the process early. Where there is evidence
of electoral abuses, the opposition should be prepared to work with external allies
to apply pressure to the regime to reform electoral practices.
• Engage new voters by presenting a vision for the future. The pro-democracy
political opposition must get voters to the polls. The opposition should partner with
civil society groups to reach new segments of the population and convey optimism
and good cheer to communicate that change is possible. Successful tactics include
bus tours and marches, discussion fora between candidates and citizens, door-to-
door canvassing, street theater, popular music concerts, and satire.
• Remember that the message matters. The opposition must explain the costs of
keeping an illiberal incumbent regime in power. Successful campaigns use positive
and inclusive messaging rather than relying on negative attacks on the incumbent.
• Forcefully contest each individual illiberal act of non-democratic actors within the
bounds of democratic norms. Utilizing institutional measures such as the constitutional
authorities of courts and legislatures can slow or obstruct illiberal reforms.
Opposition leaders may also choose to pursue more extreme institutional measures
availabletothem(e.g.,impeachmentprocesses,votesofnocondence,andrecall
referenda) and/or deploy extra-institutional tools (e.g., protests, strikes, or boycotts).
Democracy Playbook 19
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Political opposition groups face stark challenges in governments controlled by illiberal pol-
iticians, who, surrounded by loyalists, have gradually degraded democratic processes and
consolidated their own holds on power.
63
To varying degrees, authoritarian-leaning political
parties and leaders in countries like Turkey and Hungary have already signicantly eroded
their nations’ democratic natures. Elections in such places are heavily tilted to favor the party
in power, if not outright rigged; pro-democracy political opposition parties have been mar-
ginalized or extinguished altogether; and freedoms of speech and assembly are warped or
non-existent. These conditions constrain the operating space of pro-democratic opposition
actors and, in turn, make illiberals harder to oust. While this should not discourage pro-dem-
ocratic actors from working toward improved conditions in those nations, it highlights the
importance of preventing deterioration in nations that may be ashing warning signs.
The iterative process of democratic backsliding provides opportunities for pro-democratic
political opposition parties to resist these trends. Especially in early stages of democratic
reversal, political opposition groups still have many tools available to them to compete for
power through standard political processes, both at the polls and within legislative bodies.
Although would-be authoritarians should be expected to continue to try to tilt the rules of the
game in their favor, pro-democracy opposition parties have a very important role to play.
64
What, then, should pro-democracy political opposition parties in backsliding nations do to
restore democracy? Based upon recent scholarship, this section provides detailed recommen-
dations for leaders and members of the political opposition—broken down between electoral
strategies and institutional and extra-institutional tools.
65
A. WINNING AN UNFAIR ELECTION
Elections, even when warped by authoritarians in hybrid states, have the potential to lead to
liberalizing outcomes and provide real opportunities for transformational political change.
66
They can serve as an important mode of democratization that political opposition groups
should aggressively pursue, even when the odds seem stacked against them.
Political scientists Valerie Bunce’s and Sharon Wolchik’s analysis of eleven elections in nine
nations suggests that variance in opposition group electoral strategy was the most import-
ant explanation of success or failure. Ambitious and innovative opposition groups exhibited
strong performance in elections and, in turn, improved democracy.
67
Bunce and Wolchik outline the “electoral model,” a set of electoral strategies for opposi-
tion campaigns against authoritarians.
68
To implement the model, pro-democracy political
opposition must practice long-term planning, as well as pay close attention to detail, coor-
dination, and lessons learned from past failures. Perhaps most importantly, pro-democracy
parties must pursue an overarching process through which they form transnational networks
between civil society groups, other opposition groups, local electoral activists, international
organizations, and nations striving to promote democracy.
20 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
The electoral model includes several important components. The rst, which has received
signicant scholarly attention, is forming a unied democratic opposition. Although far from
a guarantee of electoral victory or ultimate democratization, empirical analysis of elections
in competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2002 suggests that there is great
value in taking this step. Even in challenging cases, when oppositions were able to build a
broad-based coalition, the likelihood of a liberalizing electoral outcome increased by over 80%.
Across ten tested variables (including structural factors such as economic growth and the
prior occurrence of a liberalizing electoral outcome), the opposition’s formation of a coalition
was the best predictor of a positive result.
69
Although overcoming differences can be a challenge, forming a unied opposition provides
multiple benets. Most obviously, coalitions can reduce the number of squandered votes for
different pro-democracy groups. Collaboration can also signal commitment to contesting
power and demonstrates that the groups involved possess the political skills necessary to
effectively govern. This can persuade skeptical citizens, civil society groups, and external
democracy promoters to join the cause.
70
Although institutional factors such as electoral
rules and social cleavages do shape the formation of political coalitions before elections,
scholarship suggests that their effects in hybrid regimes are only modest.
71
Thus, political
opposition groups in backsliding nations enjoy agency to set their own electoral coalition
strategies; environmental factors are not deterministic.
Of course, coalition formation can be excruciatingly dicult, especially in contexts where illiberal
leaders have engineered or exploited divisions. Voters also face diculties with this approach,
as strategic voting may point them toward candidates whose views they nd unpalatable. As
Jan-Werner Müller argues, one way out of this political dilemma is the use of referenda.
72
With
their binary yes-or-no structure and potential to craft pointed questions that reect unity among
opposition parties, referenda offer an opportunity to citizens to decisively communicate their
aversion to a populist government. While not possible in all contexts, such exercises of direct
democracy could serve as alternatives to coalition formation when the latter is beyond reach.
A second core component involves voting processes themselves. As we know, in hybrid
regimes the ruling party works to tilt the playing eld in its favor. Election rigging techniques
can be sophisticated, and at times, even include meddling with vote counts.
73
In response,
the pro-democratic opposition must work hard to ensure independent election monitoring
as well as nd innovative solutions to counteract these practices.
The opposition can boost its technical prociency by partnering and collaborating with interna-
tional election observers and involving them in the process early. While independent election
monitors are most effective, as they can more easily deect claims of bias, opposition parties
should also work to have their own trained election monitors where possible. Moreover, once
armed with evidence of electoral abuses, the opposition should work with external allies to
apply pressure to the regime to reform electoral practices.
74
We discuss possible synergies
in greater detail in section 2 of the report, which focuses on how international actors can
best promote democracy.
Democracy Playbook 21
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
A third and nal critical element of the electoral model is generating high turnout. There is
no way around it: to win back power, the pro-democracy political opposition must get voters
to the polls and must be prepared to counter unfair voter suppression tactics. Opposition
parties in hybrid states often lose elections partly because citizens opposed to the regime
nonetheless abstain from voting due to their frustration with the opposition’s frequent inght-
ing or incompetence.
75
Others are young and are potentially rst-time voters. The opposition
must tune their messaging to win over both groups, generating new votes. Recent research
investigating 61 competitive authoritarian elections after the end of the Cold War shows that
increased voter turnout is directly associated with a larger vote share for the opposition.
76
How can the opposition mobilize votes? Here again, partnerships with
a broad swath of civil society (and with international actors, who can
help to provide an enabling environment, support political space, and
provide skill-building opportunities for opposition groups) are valuable.
The opposition should also maximize media opportunities to dissemi-
nate messages to a broader audience. Civil society groups can provide
a key link to segments of the population that are otherwise dicult to
reach. International organizations can also play a role; we say more
about this in section 2 of this report.
The opposition must clearly explain to the public the costs of keeping
the incumbent regime in power and promote direct contact between
opposition political leaders and citizens outside of major cities. The
opposition must articulate, in clear terms, how particular encroach-
ments place the system at risk, and advantage the incumbent. Also effective is a positive
and inclusive message that does not solely rely upon negative attacks on the incumbent. The
opposition should go beyond rhetoric by improving upon policy failures and proposing better
solutions that will meet the needs of real people.
77
To do so effectively, the opposition must
understand the conditions of anger and disillusionment along the electorate that led to the
rise of authoritarian leaders in the rst place; merely seeking a return to the previous status
quo is unlikely to suce.
Pro-democracy parties must also adjust to the changing digital landscape for political
campaigns. Despite initial optimism about the internet’s potential to make elections more
democratic, it has become clear that the web is a double-edged sword for political cam-
paigns, one that seems to favor illiberals. On the one hand, the internet enables candidates
to fundraise, run less expensive campaigns, organize supporters, and mobilize voters.
78
But,
as the legal scholar Nathaniel Persily argues, “what the internet uniquely privileges above all
else is the type of campaign message that appeals to outrage or otherwise grabs attention.”
79
As a result, extreme actors have been able to harness the power of the internet better than
their pro-democratic counterparts. Social media platforms such as Facebook have enabled
democratic vulnerability, provided fora for false information and hate speech, and fueled par-
tisan divisions. Although such platforms have begun to make changes in the face of public
pressure, these measures are unlikely to prove adequate on their own. As Persily points out,
ere is no way around
it: to win back power, the
pro-democracy political
opposition must get voters
to the polls and must be
prepared to counter unfair
voter suppression tactics.
22 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
“democracy depends on both the ability and the will of voters to base their political judgments
on facts, or at least on strong intermediary institutions that can act as guardrails to channel
decisionmaking within the broad range of democratic alternatives.”
80
Democratic campaigns will need to learn from the success of illiberal candidates and imple-
ment a targeted digital strategy that maximizes message virality, connects better with
supporters on social media, and employs clever mobilization tactics. At the same time, oppo-
sition campaigns should take the high road by being truthful and inclusive in their messaging.
Moreover, until governments and tech companies can plug digital vulnerabilities, the reality is
that campaigns will also need a cybersecurity risk management plan. A successful example
of a prepared and nimble campaign can be found in Emmanuel Macron’s 2017 presidential
election. Despite a “coordinated attempt to undermine” Macron’s candidacy in what is now
referred to as the “Macron Leaks” operation, Macron’s campaign was able to fend off the
attack, win the election, and boost its credibility as a modern, tech-savvy party.
81
Social media strategies can be used in combination with oine mobilization tactics to increase
citizen engagement. These tactics can include, but are not limited to, bus tours and marches,
discussion fora between candidates and citizens, and door-to-door canvassing. In successful
campaigns, youth groups have used street theater and satire to ridicule and de-legitimize
would-be authoritarians, as well as rock concerts and the media to add energy to what is often
considered a dull process. In the words of participants in Slovakia’s Civil Campaign OK’98—
who successfully ousted the illiberal Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar through an ambitious
electoral campaign—such activities were aimed at making participation in elections “fun and
not just a duty.”
82
As Bunce and Wolchik assess, Slovakia’s pro-democracy movement in the
lead-up to the 1998 elections helped create “a climate of optimism supporting the ideas that
votes count and that change was possible.”
83
Appropriately calibrating and implementing electoral policies designed to favor the incumbent
is more dicult for authoritarian leaders than is generally assumed, even when they face few
legal or institutional obstacles.
84
And even the most extreme election fraud (such as ballot
box stung, multiple voting, voter intimidation arising from a lack of voter secrecy, or the
falsication of vote counts), presents signicant management problems for the authoritarian.
Recent scholarship suggests that the uncertainty and collective action problems inherent to
implementing electoral fraud tend to produce unintended results that are not ideal from an
authoritarian’s perspective. There may be either excessive fraud that produces a agrantly
false margin of victory drawing widespread condemnation, or too little rigging, such that the
authoritarian loses.
85
Indeed, as strong independent analyses by election observers in nations
such as Russia and Hungary have shown, vote rigging is very dicult to conduct undetected.
86
Even when incumbents are actively trying to secure their re-election using the most extreme
election rigging measures, they may fail. To push back against election rigging, opposition par-
ties (and the movements that support them) should proactively develop plans ahead of time
in the event that such fraud occurs. Relevant mechanisms include election monitoring, exit
polling, and a mass mobilization strategy if discrepancies arise. In competitive authoritarian
contexts, political opposition campaign strategies and individual votes can make a difference.
Democracy Playbook 23
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
B. SLOWING DETERIORATION
Although winning elections should be a centerpiece of pro-democratic political opposition
parties’ strategies to promote democratic change, it cannot be their only objective. While
running ambitious and energetic campaigns, the opposition must also compete within the
government (and, at times, outside of it) to slow the process of democratic backsliding as
much as possible. As we know, when leaders and parties with authoritarian tendencies gain
power in democracies, they will take incremental steps to tilt the playing eld to their advan-
tage.
87
The political opposition must vigilantly contest each individual act.
Despite narrowing democratic space, the political opposition does have a broad menu of
institutional and extra-institutional options of varying severity available to them. How, then,
should the opposition best compete? The answer is context dependent. However, as a gen-
eral rule, the opposition should not resist would-be authoritarians by breaking the democratic
norms that it ultimately seeks to strengthen.
Instead, opposition members should draw mainly upon institutional measures, the standard
tools of the democratic game, to slow or obstruct illiberal reforms.
88
These measures derive
primarily from the constitutional authorities of courts and legislatures to maintain a check on
executive power. Though exact mechanisms vary depending on a country’s political system,
opposition legislators should work to obstruct the passage of an executive’s anti-democratic
agenda. If justied, opposition leaders may also choose to pursue more extreme institutional
measures available to them, such as impeachment processes, votes of no condence, and
recall referenda. To raise the prole of their campaign against democratic erosion, opposition
leaders can also utilize extra-institutional tools—engaging in or encouraging, for example, a
protest, strike, or boycott, in conjunction with civil society.
Mayor of Istanbul Ekrem
Imamoglu of the main oppo-
sition Republican People’s
Party (CHP) and his wife, Dilek,
greet supporters from the top
of a bus outside City Hall in
Istanbul, Turkey.
PHOTO CREDIT
24 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
In this model, the norms of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance—which incumbents
must practice to preserve democracy—still maintain their importance, even as the political
opposition resists an illiberal leader. While the goal of the opposition is to gain control of the
government in order to halt democratic decay and begin a process of reform, they must also
keep the system running. Full breakdown, which becomes more likely when the opposition
casts these two norms to the wind, will always favor the incumbent. It provides him or her
with increased incentives, further justication, and greater means to crack down and seize
ever more control.
89
Moreover, one important prize at stake in the contest between the
would-be authoritarian and the opposition is legitimacy. Legitimacy
confers tangible benets: without it, rulers exercise coercive power—not
authority.
90
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that aspiring authoritarians
expend great effort attempting to maintain their nation’s democratic
façade, even as they work to dismantle its democratic character.
91
The
pro-democratic opposition, then, must work within the system and
partner with civil society experts to expose the ways in which would-be
authoritarians are mimicking, but actually violating, the rule of law. Kim
Lane Scheppele, for example, argues that the seemingly normal continuity of the surface-level
indicators of rule of law can conceal creeping autocratic legalism. She therefore contends
that deeper legal forensic analysis and wider education of citizens on constitutionalism are
needed to combat growing dysfunction.
92
The pro-democratic opposition must not abandon
democratic principles in their contest with illiberal leaders. Extreme, extra-institutional resis-
tance measures will usually serve neither end.
93
Recent steps by Turkey’s pro-democracy political opposition offer a promising example of the
aforementioned strategies. Despite more than 15 years of democratic deterioration led by the
authoritarian-leaning President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development party
(AKP), opposition parties have generated recent electoral successes.
94
These parties formed
a strategic alliance with one another, focused campaign rhetoric on nding constructive solu-
tions to Turkey’s economic problems, undercut Erdoğan’s legitimacy with clever social media
messaging using his own words against him, and emphasized face-to-face interaction with
a broad array of Turkish voters.
95
SECTION 1.2 KEY RESOURCES:
• Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in
Post-Communist Countries. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
• Gamboa, Laura. “Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy
in Colombia and Venezuela.” Comparative Politics 49, no. 4 (July 2017): 457-477.
• Morjé Howard, Marc, and Philip Roessler. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2
(April 2006): 365–381.
e opposition should not
resist would-be authoritarians
by breaking the democratic
norms that it ultimately seeks
to strengthen.
Democracy Playbook 25
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
3. Civil society and independent media
SUMMARY
Civil society groups should:
• Seek broad, diverse, and large-scale participation in their activities.
• Model organizationally what they seek to achieve in a democracy. Leadership
teams should conduct open, regular grassroots deliberations and decision-making
authority rather than concentrate decision-making power in the hands a few.
• Establish dened goals, a clear vision, and an actionable agendawithspecic
desiredchangestothestatusquo.Organizationsshoulddenewho is mobilizing
whom to do what.
• Be prepared to use diverse and varied nonviolent tactics to increase the pressure
on government and attract more people to participate.
Independent media should focus their efforts on four key areas:
• Occupational development and education to provide a pipeline to up-and-coming
media actors able to notice and resist threats to the industry.
• Professional associations to enable and support individual journalists on issues
like professional values, employment conditions, legal questions, and editorial
standards.
• Media self-scrutiny and development of a robust media criticism community.
Such a community could increase public trust, and thus public support, through
the transparent and constructive questioning of the relationship between
journalists and politicians and advertisers.
• Internal governance. As with civil society organizations (CSOs), media outlets
should assume responsibility for improving their own internal governance and
develop mechanisms to deal fairly with audience complaints and develop all work
contracts to cover all employees to prevent self-censorship.
Most people in a nation are neither politicians nor government ocials. Centuries of schol-
arship and millennia of political history show that people can exert extraordinary inuence
on politics and government through separate avenues. This section addresses those seek-
ing to inuence politics from outside the public sector. We begin with recommendations to
leaders and members of civil society, and then turn to professionals working in perhaps the
democratic institution most often attacked–independent media. Both civil society and the
media are critical parts of the democratic process, and we thus aim to distill best practices
for ensuring their strength and ecacy.
26 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
A. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEMOCRACY
There are numerous denitions of civil society. For purposes of this section, we follow Kohler-
Koch and Quittkat’s representative denition: “Civil society includes all those organisations
which play an important role in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and in delivering ser-
vices that meet people’s needs,” including grassroots organizations and NGOs.
96
A robust civil
society helps preserve democratic vibrancy, provides citizens with information that can help
inform their voting, and presents opportunities for powerful collective action. Even when these
social connections and activities are completely unrelated to political or governance issues,
their depth and frequency bear important implications for the strength of democracy, and
paths of democratization.
97
In the words of two political scientists, civil society organizations
can “sensitize society to pressing domestic and international issues, build cohesion within
communities, help citizens to articulate their beliefs and interests, exercise control over those
holding political power, and provide social services.”
98
In contrast to civil society groups writ large, civil resistance movements are formations of
individuals engaged in particular kinds of collective tactics. We follow the International Center
on Nonviolent Conict in dening civil resistance as “a way for people (often ordinary people
with no special title, status, or privilege) to wield power without using or threatening physical
violence. It consists of (a) acts of commission, in which people do things they’re not supposed
to do, not expected to do, or forbidden from doing; (b) acts of omission, in which people don’t
do things that they’re supposed to do, expected to do, or required to do; or (c) a combination
of both acts of commission and omission.”
99
Acts of commission include demonstrations,
petitions, and civil disobedience. Acts of omission include boycotts, strikes, and divestment.
100
While many of the recommendations we make can be adapted by
leaders with a wide range of goals, we place emphasis on associations
and movements that adopt political ends and push to bolster democ-
racy through non-institutional channels. These groups can protect civil
liberties and other democratic institutions through persistent advocacy
for democratic rights and norms and civil resistance against author-
itarian encroachment. Czech dissident (and later president) Václav
Havel’s Charter 77, which ultimately became the political movement
called Civic Forum, is one famous example.
101
How do groups like
Havel’s surmount enormous obstacles to successfully promote dem-
ocratic renewal?
Despite relying on nonviolent tactics and operating without access to standard levers of
government control, civil society groups and civil resistance movements are able to wield
great inuence, because ultimately, power derives from the consent of the governed. As Gene
Sharp argues, would-be authoritarians may use lies, economic inducements, and a variety
of coercive tools to obtain that consent, but without it, they are powerless.
102
Indeed, in order
to carry out policy initiatives and government functions, modern would-be authoritarians
are dependent on a wide variety of other people and organizations, many of whom exist
For advocates of democracy,
among the most encouraging
academic ndings from
the past decade is that civil
resistance works.
Democracy Playbook 27
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
outside the government. Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam note that modern nation-states
exist within “strategic action elds,” units of collective action that include both state and non-
state actors.
103
If enough of those actors withdraw their consent, the state can lose its basis
of authority and capacity to rule. Citizens and organizations can do their part by withdrawing
their consent and applying pressure on other actors to do the same. Eventually, pillars of
authoritarian power start to show cracks, and a nonviolent group can coerce valuable, or
even transformative, concessions from the government.
104
In other words, everyday citizens,
working together, can turn the entire system upside-down. Several scholars have substanti-
ated this idea empirically.
105
Indeed, for advocates of democracy, among the most encouraging academic ndings from
the past decade is that civil resistance works. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan argue that
nonviolent resistance can be an effective means of promoting democratic consolidation and
transition, even in especially challenging scenarios.
106
Moreover, after analyzing 323 violent
and nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006, the authors nd that nonviolent
groups were more than twice as likely to achieve a full or partial success as their violent coun-
terparts.
107
Other work by Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman supports this nding. In fact,
they argue that a public’s capacity to engage in collective action to hold leaders accountable
is among the most important predictors of democracy.
108
B. DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP TEAMS WITH HIGH STRATEGIC CAPACITY
Not every civil society organization or social movement, of course, achieves its goals. The
decisions made by civil society groups and social movements are important to their ultimate
success or failure.
109
In this section, we review which kinds of approaches and tactics seem
to correlate most with success.
110
We begin by discussing a fundamental question, especially considering the context-
dependence of particular strategies. Why do some groups make better decisions than others?
Scholar and activist Marshall Ganz seeks to answer this question by proposing the concept of
“strategic capacity.” He writes that leadership teams with high strategic capacities are better
able to think and plan creatively, respond to shifting and uncertain environmental conditions,
and mobilize supporters around shared goals than those with lower capacities.
111
In other
words, leadership teams with high strategic capacities are more likely to succeed.
According to Ganz, a group’s strategic capacity derives from two principal sources: biographi-
cal and organizational.
112
Biographical sources include a leadership team’s combined identities,
social networks, and tactical repertoires. Organizational sources refer to a leadership team’s
bureaucratic structures, including its deliberative processes, resource ows, and account-
ability mechanisms.
28 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Across biographical sources, diversity is crucial. To maximize its biographical strengths, a
movement must build a leadership team from a diverse array of people, with different back-
grounds, networks, and skills. Leaders with diverse identities will bring relevant knowledge
from a wide range of constituencies that can allow for innovative problem solving.
113
As Ganz
summarizes, “[a] leadership team’s strategic capacity grows out of who its members are.”
114
Organizations and movements can also maximize their organizational sources of strategic
capacity by following a series of best practices. For instance, the organizational structure
itself matters. Hierarchical organizations tend to have more centralized decision-making
processes; in turn, because rank-and-le members have less say in group decisions, their
commitment to the organization can be lowered.
115
Leadership teams that conduct “regular,
open, and authoritative deliberations” will benet from the full diversity and innovation of their
team, producing better strategy than groups that concentrate decision-making power in the
hands of one leader who makes choices without broader input.
116
Ganz details a wide array
of additional best practices in his work.
117
C. ENCOURAGING BROAD AND DIVERSE PARTICIPATION
While the characteristics of an organization or movement’s leadership are critical, so is the
make-up of the entity’s member base. The most successful movements and organizations
are those that appeal to broad and diverse audiences. Srdja Popovic, a leading civil resistance
practitioner and thinker, emphasizes that building bridges between disparate societal groups
is key. As he colorfully puts it, “It’s unity, stupid!”
118
Participants’ diversity within a movement—
in gender, age, religion, ethnicity, ideology, profession, and socioeconomic status—makes it
harder for a government to ignore, discredit, or isolate it.
119
Quantitative research conrms
that robust social ties reduce the effectiveness of repression.
120
In addition to having diverse participants, civil society organizations
and civil resistance movements should strive to have as many mem-
bers or followers as possible. Initiatives with large numbers of people
participating are fundamentally more likely to succeed than small
movements. Chenoweth and Stephan conrm this empirically: con-
trolling for other variables, nonviolent resistance movements with high
participation levels are signicantly more likely to succeed.
121
To gather a large and diverse support base, Popovic recommends
that movements work hard to gure out what people truly care about.
They should assume that a majority of potential participants will be
generally uninterested and set political priorities that will be popular.
Two notable historic political movements, the American Revolution and Mahatma Gandhi’s
campaign for Indian independence, chose British taxes on simple, everyday goods as the
foci of their struggles. Choosing a broadly relatable symbol—in the American case, tea, and
in the Indian case, salt—helped the revolutionaries inspire the ordinary masses into action.
122
e diversity of a movement—
in gender, age, religion,
ethnicity, ideology, profession,
and socioeconomic status—
makes it harder for a
government to ignore,
discredit, or isolate it.
Democracy Playbook 29
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
In addition to picking popular policy goals, groups and movements should adopt widely
appealing rhetoric and culture. Too often, contemporary pro-democracy campaigns end up
being dened by one particular segment of the population, thus losing their appeal to the
rest of the populace. For example, Pussy Riot, a Russian anti-authoritarian, punk rock protest
group, has appealed far more to educated, primarily urban youth than it did to rural and older
Russians who may not relate to the colorful satire of the demonstrators. Popovic contrasts
this example with the success of his own pro-democracy movement, Otpor! (“Resistance!”),
after it adopted a simple, universal slogan, “He’s nished,” to dene its campaign against
Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević.
123
Of particular note is the importance of encouraging broad and diverse participation within
trade and labor unions, including because union members sit squarely in a demographic
often targeted by right-wing populist politicians for support. Research has shown that labor
union participation has a negative effect on extreme right-wing voting—that is, “unioniza-
tion immunizes voters” from the messages of extreme right-wing populists, likely due to
the principles and values of labor movements.
124
While unionization is not a magic bullet
against increased populist support, unions can serve as a bulwark for democracy. They can
also serve as a model by integrating migrants, women, and other historically marginalized
workers,
125
and adopting democratic and inclusive practices and procedures within their own
decision-making structures.
126
D. ESTABLISHING DEFINED GOALS AND A CLEAR VISION
Having an area of passionate concern is not enough; organizations and movements should
have an actionable agenda with specic desired changes to the status quo. These goals do
not need to be sweeping or all-encompassing: Chenoweth and Stephan nd that maximalist
goals are perceived to be less likely to succeed than more limited ambitions.
127
As Sharon
Erickson Nepstad notes, advocates of civil resistance often seek specic political or eco-
nomic reforms in society or within a particular regime or institution, rather than pursuing a
full-edged political transition.
128
An example of an organization that has set specic goals to great effect is Rekonstrukce Státu,
or Reconstruction of the State, in the Czech Republic—a country faced with longstanding
and endemic corruption. Despite its name, Rekonstrukce Státu did not seek to reorganize
the entirety of Czech government to eliminate corruption; instead, it set forth nine practical
principles for government anti-corruption efforts that could be easily written into law. They
include transparency in public procurement, publishing government contracts on the inter-
net, and increased independence of public prosecutors. These specic goals have helped
the organization achieve success, with a majority of the nine goals being passed into law
in three years.
129
30 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
E. UTILIZING DIVERSE AND VARIED TACTICS
The exact tactics employed by activists vary widely depending on context, resources, and
mission. As a general rule, however, groups should aim to diversify their tactics. Employing a
range of different nonviolent strategies increases the pressure on government and attracts
more people to participate based on the activities that appeal to them most. In contrast,
limiting an organization to one particular tactic, or even type of tactic, can constrict a move-
ment’s reach and ecacy.
By way of example, Popovic points to the Occupy Wall Street movement that began in 2011,
during the “Great Recession.” The group was focused on the scale of economic inequality and
wealth disparity in the United States. It garnered national and global attention at a time when
many felt that those responsible for the economic downturn were facing few repercussions.
Yet, argues Popovic, Occupy failed to capitalize on the massive popular frustration with cap-
italism’s failures. He contends that one of the Occupy movement’s predominant errors was
that it named itself after a single tactic. To participate in Occupy meant to conduct sit-ins,
immediately limiting the number of people willing to engage. Many of those sympathetic to
the cause who would have been willing to support the movement in other ways were not
able to skip work, class, or other obligations to participate in open-ended sit-ins. Occupy also
overlooked other tactics that might have worked to apply pressure. Articially limiting its
support base and restricting its tactical repertoire likely prevented Occupy from generating
more meaningful change.
130
Slovakia offers an inspiring contemporary example of a civil resistance campaign that uti-
lized diverse tactics to achieve meaningful change. In February 2018, a Slovak investigative
journalist named Ján Kuciak was shot dead in his home, along with his ancé. In the months
leading up to his death, Kuciak published dozens of articles on Slovak corruption. He exposed
potential corrupt ties between Slovak businesses, state agencies, as well as the ruling political
party, Direction–Social Democracy (SMER-SD).
131
The murders sent shockwaves through the
nation. Recognizing the widespread public frustration, and the opportunity it presented to push
for political change, a small group of students, calling their movement “A Decent Slovakia”,
organized an assembly and candlelight tribute in the center of Bratislava. Five hundred people
attended the rst gathering. Next, the group organized a memorial march. Over 135,000
people ooded the streets in Bratislava and 55 other Slovak cities. Weekly protests grew
ever larger, reaching sizes unseen in Slovakia since the Velvet Revolution. The massive public
mobilization succeeded in forcing the resignations of three key government gures in March:
Prime Minister Robert Fico, Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák, and Police Chief Tibor Gašpar.
132
Effectively demonstrating the importance of employing diverse tactics, A Decent Slovakia
next pivoted to electoral politics. One of its co-founders, Juraj Seliga, noted that although
protests were able to purge problematic ocials, “real, lasting change would have to come
through elections.”
133
Accordingly, the movement has worked with and endorsed pro-democ-
racy political candidates seeking to mobilize votes. All signs suggest that these efforts are
continuing to work. In June, Slovakia inaugurated its rst female president: the moderate,
Democracy Playbook 31
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
pro-democracy Zuzana Čaputová. Her unlikely win was broadly perceived as a strong rebuke
of the populism, illiberalism, and democratic erosion that have plagued Slovakia and many
of its neighbors in recent years.
134
F. THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN DEMOCRACY
In addition to a robust civil society, democracy cannot ourish without an equally strong
media sector. A free and independent press fullls critical democratic roles, including moni-
toring public ocials, providing a platform for debate, and informing citizens.
135
An informed
citizenry serves as a check on powerful ocials by ensuring that “representatives uphold
their oaths of oce and carry out, broadly, the wishes of those who elected them.”
136
James
Curran and Toril Aalberg highlight the positive impact of well-informed citizens on society:
stable and meaningful opinions on issues, linked interests and attitudes, and preference
for political candidates who represent their views.
137
Freedom of the press plays a “crucial
role” in democracy as the “‘matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form
of freedom’, and indeed of the democratic process itself.”
138
G. INDIVIDUAL AND SYSTEMIC THREATS TO MEDIA ACTORS
The independent media has become a popular target of illiberal politicians looking to con-
solidate power across Europe. Indeed, the Council of Europe this year called press freedom
“more fragile now than at any time” since the end of the Cold War.
139
Journalists increasingly
face obstruction, hostility, and overt violence in their investigations.
140
Following a new “illib-
eral toolbox,” populist leaders have used a variety of strategies to undermine independent
news: government-backed takeovers, arbitrary tax investigations, unjustied
lawsuits, selective enforcement of laws, abuse of regulatory and licensing
practices, and verbal harassment.
141
In Italy, for example, members of a coa-
lition government subjected journalists to hostile rhetoric, intimidation, and
threats to withhold public funding and protections.
142
Widespread action
against independent media across the EU led the Council of Europe to caution
that the “space for the press to hold government authorities and the powerful
to account has been diminished.”
143
Two cases in particular illustrate the risks posed to media independence. In
Turkey, President Erdoğan and the AKP have carried out a “massive purge”
of independent media following the 2016 attempted coup.
144
Over the past
few years, Erdoğan has pursued his assault on media across several fronts:
hostile rhetoric amplied by pro-regime press, legal and regulatory constraints, outright cen-
sorship, and consolidation of media companies. Other tactics have included buying off or
forcing out media moguls, intimidation, mass rings, wiretapping, and imprisonment of jour-
nalists.
145
As a result, Freedom House has deemed the country’s media as “not free,”
146
and
Reporters Without Borders ranks it at a dismal 157 out of 180 countries for press freedom.
147
A free and independent
press fullls critical
democratic roles
including monitoring
public ocials, providing
a platform for debate,
and informing citizens.
32 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Another example of increasingly restricted media freedom is in Hungary, where physical
threats against journalists coupled with systemic efforts to compromise independence
have led Freedom House to rate its media as “partly free.”
148
Orbán and his regime have
reshaped the media landscape to gain control and exert sway over “most of the country’s
media.”
149
In November 2018, for example, pro-government media outlets merged to create
a “huge right-wing media conglomerate under the direction” of an Orbán ally.
150
The new
conglomerate has intensied concern about media pluralism due to its lack of transparency,
exemption from external scrutiny, and close ties to the ruling regime. Those outlets that have
maintained autonomy face numerous obstacles, including “lack of advertising revenue, a
restrictive regulatory environment, and public campaigns to discredit independent journal-
ists.”
151
However, Hungary’s media environment is not necessarily static. Especially as the
U.S.-based news outlet Radio Free Europe seems increasingly likely to return to Hungary to
bolster access to independent media, there remains some hope and opportunity for Hungary’s
media landscape.
152
H. MAINTAINING AND DEFENDING INDEPENDENT MEDIA
Media actors in backsliding democracies should focus their efforts on ve key areas:
• Occupational development. Journalism classes should integrate practitioners and
draw on the collective knowledge of older generations of media actors
153
to “foster
occupational socialization.”
154
The aim is to provide a critical mass of up-and-coming
media actors able “to recognize and withstand” threats to the industry.
155
• Professional associations. These should enable and support individual journalists
on issues like professional values, employment conditions, legal questions, salaries,
and editorial standards.
156
The European Commission in 2014 noted that many
problems faced by media result from the “civic weakness of the media community,”
which is “largely fragmented and politically polarized thereby giving ample space for
clientelism and a decline in professional standards.”
157
Strengthening the capacity and
representativeness of professional associations may help alleviate that threat.
• Media self-scrutiny. Additional efforts should focus on the development of a robust
media criticism community. Such a community could increase public trust, and thus
public support, through the transparent and constructive questioning of “journalists’
relations with politicians and advertisers.”
158
• Internal governance. Media outlets should assume responsibility for improving their
own internal governance. The European Commission offers several suggestions: adhere
to clearly and publicly dened ethics codes, develop mechanisms to deal “honestly
and transparently with readers’/viewers’ complaints,” develop all work contracts to
cover all employees to prevent self-censorship, and offer opportunities for professional
development.
159
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The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
• Financial independence and sustainability. Finally, where possible, media outlets
should seek to avoid capture by state and state-aliated funders. In Hungary and
Serbia, for instance, pro-government actors have acquired prominent media entities
and used advertising and other nancial means to gain leverage over other press
organizations.
160
To maintain independence, media actors in backsliding nations
should explore alternative funding models such as crowdfunding, subscriptions,
paywalls, and grants.
161
Freedom House further recommends support for social media as an “alternative outlet for
free expression.”
162
Indeed, new technologies like social media offer the chance to better
engage citizens, provide space for opposition, and hold elites accountable for their actions.
As shown by Matthew Placek, social media can increase demands for democracy and be
used to mobilize and express dissent.
163
Notably, Placek nds that social media is associated
with higher support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. It also helps to facilitate the
ow of societal commentary and political information that may “diffuse democratic norms.”
164
The positive impact of new technology has been further outlined in Larry Diamond’s theory
of “liberation technology”: forms of “information and communication technology (ICT) that
can expand political, social, and economic freedom.”
165
ICTs like social media can contrib-
ute to a “more pluralistic and autonomous arena of news” in illiberal regimes.
166
They serve
several functions: supporting transparency, monitoring actions of ocials, and mobilizing
dissident networks.
Press photographers
take pictures in France.
34 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Social media and similar technologies are not, of course, without potential downsides.
Illiberal states sometimes filter content on the internet or deny access. The advent of
disinformation—“false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and
promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit”
167
—poses an additional serious
challenge to democracy by social media. A 2018 European Commission report noted
that digital media enables some disinformation by public officials who “actively seek to
directly or indirectly control” news media.
168
The report goes on to highlight strategies for
combating disinformation: enhance transparency of online news, promote media literacy,
develop tools to tackle disinformation, protect the diversity of news media, and continue
research on the problem.
SECTION 1.3 KEY RESOURCES
• Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of
Nonviolent Conict. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
• Popovic, Srdja. Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other
Nonviolent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change
the World. New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015.
• Ganz, Marshall. Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the
California Farm Worker Movement. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
• Sharp, Gene. The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 1973)
and From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (New York:
The New Press, 2012).
Democracy Playbook 35
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
4. The private sector
SUMMARY
The private sector should:
• Resist corruption, co-optation and state capture. Corporate actors that shape the
systemtoworkforthem,ratherthanthepublic,are,bydenition,fundamentally
undermining representative democracy and may be undermining economic
growth. History is replete with examples of businesspeople who disregarded these
dangersandcametoruedoingsoforthesakeoftheirrms—andthemselves.
• Aim to do well by doing good. Beyond merely avoiding the negative, the business
sectorshouldseekarmativewaystohelpprotectdemocracyand,inturn,
promote its long-term interests. These include activism, philanthropy, and
corporate social responsibility.
• Recognize the key role of social media companies. They should:
• Prioritize digital media literacy.
• Quickly remove material that violates the law and their codes of
conduct policies.
• Support narrowly tailored targeted government regulations that do not
infringe on users’ right to free speech—focusing on mechanisms like
political advertising and disinformation prevalence measures.
• Intensify cooperation with other platforms to share best practices.
In this section, we address the role that the business sector can play in protecting democ-
racy.
169
Corporate behavior can be inuential for the health of democratic institutions. The
private sector also has a profound capacity to increase societal prosperity, which in turn, pres-
ents signicant opportunities to protect and promote democracy.
170
We review why advancing
democracy is in the corporate interest, how businesses sometimes harm democracy, and
recommend strategies that both local companies and multinational corporations can use to
support democracy.
Since social media companies face unique challenges as gatekeepers of information, we
address them separately at the end of this section.
36 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
A. DEMOCRACY AND BUSINESS
Democracies and business are co-dependent: a healthy democracy needs successful com-
panies, and successful companies require a healthy democratic society. Outputs of strong
democratic institutions and processes such as the rule of law, property rights, education,
human rights, access to healthcare, and low levels of corruption all facilitate economic growth
and corporate sector protability.
171
These operating conditions, which democracies provide,
allow business to ourish.
172
Authoritarian and democratically backsliding nations tend to be reliably poor places to conduct
business. Russia, for instance, is ridden with structural and political issues that harm busi-
nesses. Business leaders and property holders accused of failing to comply with laws (often
with little or no legitimate evidence) can be stripped of ownership rights or have their revenues
seized.
173
Russian corporations can also be pressured to sell their shares to the government,
as happened with the protable oil company Yukos in 2004.
174
Western-based
corporations, in particular, are often targeted with government threats of reg-
ulatory changes, unplanned inspections of facilities, and other increased and
arbitrary regulation that slows eciency.
175
Conversely, when democratic conditions improve, so too does the business
environment. According to a recent quantitative study, higher levels of democ-
racy have led to more positive labor market outcomes in Central and Eastern
European countries. The study found that democracy increases average annual
hours worked and employment rates, in addition to reducing general and long-
term unemployment rates.
176
Thus, corporations that work to advance democracy
will be furthering their labor pool, and so their lasting interests.
177
B. AVOIDING STATE CAPTURE, CO-OPTATION, AND CORRUPTION
Corporate corruption is inimical to democracy, and avoiding corruption is perhaps the most
fundamental thing businesses can do to support democracy. At its most drastic level, cor-
porate corruption takes the form of state capture, where rms seize such control of the
mechanisms of government that they “shape the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e.,
laws, rules, decrees, and regulations) through illicit and non-transparent private payments to
public ocials.”
178
Corporate actors that shape the system to work for them, rather than the
public, are, by denition, fundamentally undermining representative democracy.
Less obviously, they are also undermining the economic growth and overall business envi-
ronment of the countries in which they are operating: one study found that the growth rates
of captured economies over a three-year period were reduced by 10 percentage points,
179
and raising regulatory barriers for new rms to enter the market sties competition and the
long-term health of the captured economy.
180
Avoiding corruption
is perhaps the most
fundamental thing
businesses can do to
support democracy.
Democracy Playbook 37
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Instances of multinational corporations actively proting from dealings with others who are
corrupt and authoritarian also merit attention. For example, McKinsey, the U.S.-based consult-
ing giant, has recently courted controversy as a result of its dealings with authoritarian and
corrupt actors in countries such as China, Russia, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
181
In Ukraine, for instance, McKinsey took on a contract to help presidential candidate Viktor
Yanukovych improve his public image, despite Yanukovych’s previous criminal convictions
and attempt to rig an election. Yanukovych went on to win the presidency and lead Ukraine
into upheaval and illiberalism.
182
McKinsey also notably did business with the state-connected
South African power companies, Eskom and Trillian, who came under re for their corruption
and undue inuence over the government.
183
The contract was initially lucrative for McKinsey,
reportedly making up more than half of its African revenue.
184
After the widespread publica-
tion and protest of McKinsey’s activities, however, the consulting company lost most of its
South African clients and had to pay back the $74 million that it had gained from the deal.
185
Companies should take note of these matters and exercise more prudence in their business
dealings with potentially corrupt and illiberal actors.
Businesses can also be misused by governments as a tool to undermine democracy, as in the
case of Microsoft in Russia. Russian authorities seized the computers and other equipment of
democratic organizations working to hold the government accountable under the guise that
they were cracking down on piracy of Microsoft software. While software piracy is a legitimate
problem in Russia, government authorities selectively and exclusively targeted pro-democratic
organizations.
186
Given that the Russian government claimed to be seizing equipment to pro-
tect Microsoft, activist groups engaged in Russia argued that Microsoft had an obligation to
speak out against this behavior.
187
The Moscow Helsinki Group denounced Microsoft’s failure
to push back on Russian ocials, and accused them of taking part in the “persecution of civil
society activists.”
188
Microsoft ultimately sought to make amends by announcing it would
provide free software licenses for independent media and NGOs in Russia.
189
C. CORPORATE BEST PRACTICES
In addition to avoiding corruption and the like, there are armative ways that the business
sector can work to help protect democracy and, in turn, promote its long-term interests.
These include activism, philanthropy, principled investments, and smart corporate social
responsibility.
Corporations can exert positive inuence as public advocates for democratic values.
190
From
the CEO of a leading global nancial institution speaking out for the rights of LGBTQ individuals
to 14 CEOs of the world’s largest food companies co-signing a letter to call for meaningful
climate change policies, CEO activism has become an increasingly important method that
companies use to promote their engagement with social and political causes.
191
Frequently,
CEO activism is inuential in framing public discourse, particularly because the media is
likely to report comments from CEOs of recognizable corporations.
192
Other promising
developments include the work of the Business Network on Civic Freedoms and Businesses
38 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
for Social Responsibility, who recognize that
attacks on civic freedoms are also attacks on
the business sector, and publicly advocate for
improved democratic conditions.
193
Corporate philanthropy is another way that
businesses can work to strengthen demo-
cratic principles. Nike’s global Community
Impact Fund, for example, partners with sev-
eral community-based organizations in both
the United States and Europe to support grass-
roots movements that work to provide equal
opportunity for children.
194
Corporations can
also work to bolster the rule of law and gov-
ernment accountability. General Electric, for
example, contributed to government reform in
emerging markets by meeting with business
leaders, NGO leaders, and government ocials
from a Southwest Asian country to discuss reforms to strengthen the rule of law. It also
sponsored legal and educational training for government ocials to ensure the effectiveness
and legitimacy of GE’s action.
195
Corporations should also avoid providing a veneer of legitimacy to illiberal leaders, and instead
ensure that investment decisions are informed, principled, and sensitive to the country con-
text. For example, Hungary’s Orbán has encouraged the continued investment of the German
car companies such as Audi and Daimler in the country, granting them tax reductions, sub-
sidies, and access to decisionmakers.
196
In return, he has used their support to legitimize his
economic policies, which contributes to his continued grip on power. Such companies should,
as Thorsten Benner has argued, disinvest from the Hungarian economy, and demonstrate
their support for the liberal democratic institutions that Orbán is working to dismantle.
Companies can act in support of the elements of democratic systems by engaging in corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR). As dened by the UN Industrial Development Organization,
CSR is “a management concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental con-
cerns in their business operations and interactions with their stakeholders.”
197
The principles of
CSR can help promote transparency, corporate accountability, and sustainable development,
and help businesses keep in mind the long-term democratic health of their society.
198
CSR can
include donations, employee volunteering, and pro bono work for civil society organizations.
199
Within the framework of CSR, companies can also work to defend established standards and
regulations that can counter democratic backsliding, and can themselves propose their own
policies that promote and protect democratic values, even when the state itself rolls back
such protections.
200
Wads of British Pound
Sterling banknotes are
stacked in piles in Vienna,
Austria.
Democracy Playbook 39
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
At the same time, corporations must take care not to undermine the role of the state or of
democratic institutions when designing CSR programs. As Anthony Bebbington argues, CSR
programs are typically presented to the public not only as “acts of corporate good will,” but,
notably, as “responses to states that lack signicant capacities in the development of pro-
grammes of social welfare and environmental protection,” wherein “corporations assume roles
they would really rather not but feel they have to.”
201
By replacing the role of the state, these CSR
programs can have the perverse effect of undermining government
institutions themselves; because corporations are not responsible to
the public, democracy is undermined by the replacement of state insti-
tutions with those run by the private sector.
202
Moreover, governments
could be incentivized to free ride on corporate efforts, and no longer
face incentives to provide those same services to maintain public sup-
port. Like other corporate functions, CSR is also susceptible to abuse.
For example, it can be used as a convenient cover for paying bribes
to government ocials. Or well-intentioned reduced price or outright
gifted technology can be deployed for purposes of surveillance. Firms
and their compliance departments should be keenly attentive to these
risks when designing and implementing CSR programs.
D. SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES
Social media companies face unique challenges and responsibilities, given their immense
capability to aid or harm democracy in the countries in which they operate. Through their roles
in enabling, facilitating, and monitoring debate in the public arena, these companies have in
effect created a new governing ecosystem within which democracies function. As social media
platforms become more integral to daily life, early optimism about the technology’s democratic
potential has shifted into profound concern about misuse by authoritarian and illiberal actors.
As a result, social media companies have faced increasing pressure to prioritize platform reg-
ulation and corporate responsibility. In this section, we briey overview risks posed by social
media platforms and related responsibilities for those who own them.
How anti-democratic actors have polluted democratic space online
Anti-democratic actors have weaponized democratic space online through a multifaceted strategy
that includes propaganda, trolls and bots, cyberattacks, and misuse of private data. Given the
estimated 3.2 billion people who are active on social media, “state-aliated threat groups have
access to massive troves of personal data that can inform sophisticated spear phishing cam-
paigns.”
203
Several key risks posed to democracy by social media include polarizing civil society
through echo chambers, amplifying and spreading disinformation, algorithms that create distorted
reality, gathering data to manipulate behavior, and facilitating harassment of target groups.
204
While individual actors are responsible for some democracy-disruptive action, governments
in authoritarian regimes tend to fund and coordinate the bulk of bad behavior.
205
Samantha
Bradshaw and Philip Howard found that among 28 countries they surveyed, “every authoritarian
Social media companies
face unique challenges and
responsibilities, given their
immense capability to aid
or harm democracy in
the countries in which
they operate.
40 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
regime has social media campaigns targeting their own populations.” Illiberal leaders rely
on constantly evolving methods operationalized by “cyber troops” (government actors who
receive public funding) “to spread disinformation and attempt to generate false consensus.”
206
Social media can also enable illiberal leaders to communicate directly over platforms. In
doing so, these leaders’ actions affect the proper functioning of democracy. Illiberal lead-
ers, by highlighting anti-democratic tendencies, “subvert established protocol, shut down
dissent, marginalize minority voices, project soft power, normalize hateful views, showcase
false momentum for their views, or create the impression of tacit approval of their appeals
to extremism.”
207
How to address the challenge
Numerous studies and articles have outlined recommendations for social media companies
to ght the spread of misinformation. At the user level, social media companies should pri-
oritize digital media literacy to teach users how to spot and report misleading content.
208
In
addition, data should be well protected and responsibly shared for academic research that
furthers the study of disinformation.
209
At the content level, social media companies should
quickly remove material that violates policy. To ensure that this critical task receives ade-
quate attention, companies should hire someone to oversee “company-wide responsibility for
combating false information”—and, critically, give them the budget and authority to carry out
their mandate.
210
Decisions to take down content should be governed by clear criteria that
illustrates the “connection between facts, rational argument, and a healthy democracy.”
211
In
addition, companies should develop and maintain a robust appeals process run by employees
not involved in the initial decision.
At the company level, executives should design algorithms to reduce “the outrage factor” and
thereby diminish falsehoods. Regular training should be provided to staff on current threats
and “to exchange views on the potential for further improvement.”
212
Companies should sup-
port “narrow, targeted government regulation” that does not infringe on users’ rights to free
speech—focusing on things like political advertising and disinformation prevalence measures.
213
Lastly, companies should intensify cooperation with other platforms to share best practices.
214
SECTION 1.4 KEY RESOURCES:
• Chatterji, Aaron K., and Michael W. Toffel. “The New CEO Activists.” Harvard Business
Review 96, no. 1 (January 2018). https://hbr.org/2018/01/the-new-ceo-activists.
• “Business for the Rule of Law Framework.” United Nations Global Compact, 2016,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/library/1341.
• Deb, Anamitra, Stacy Donohue, and Tom Glaisyer. “Is Social Media a Threat to Democracy?”
The Omidyar Group. October 1, 2017, https://www.omidyargroup.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/Social-Media-and-Democracy-October-5-2017.pdf.
Democracy Playbook 41
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
5. Conclusion of section 1
This section reviewed the challenges faced by four major kinds of actors with capacity to
promote democracy within their own nations: the incumbent political establishment; political
opposition; civil society and independent media; and private enterprise. Throughout, we out-
lined challenges faced by each group, as well as strategies they might employ to improve odds
of success. The next section explores how international organizations and foreign partners
can best support domestic actors. But before transitioning to international actors, we would
be remiss if we did not say a word about the role of the individual citizen.
As we have argued, those who lead in international organizations, politics, business, and civil
society all have critical domestic roles to play in the defense of democracy, and this section
has surveyed strategies they might choose to do so. Yet just as important to democracy as
leaders are ordinary citizens. At the end of the day, democracy expresses the will of the people,
and the choices made by ordinary people shape the spirit of the governing order. Not every
citizen will take an active role in political life by running for oce, becoming a civil servant,
joining a civil society organization, or even attending a demonstration. However, everyday
choices can have an important impact on the democratic process.
That is no less true in countries where democracy is under threat. While the full literature on
this subject is beyond our scope,
215
Timothy Snyder’s recommendations for people in such
nations are a suitable coda to this section. First, of course, citizens should vote, ensuring the
continued existence of multi-party elections.
216
When possible, they should take part in state
and local elections in addition to national contests. Beyond merely voting, Snyder calls on
people to reject symbols of hate and exclusion, refrain from repeating divisive and extremist
rhetoric, and focus on veriable information. Furthermore, citizens should respect and recog-
nize the importance of democratic institutions in their daily lives, being sure not to take them
for granted. As Snyder puts it, “choose an institution you care about—a court, a newspaper,
a law, a labor union—and take its side.”
217
People queue to enter
the voting booths at a
polling station during the
parliamentary elections
in Odense, Denmark.
42 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Demonstrators march
as part of the United for
Global Change movement
in Madrid.
SECTION 2: International
actors and external assistance
By Torrey Taussig and Alina Polyakova
I
nternational actors can play a signicant role in bolstering the efforts of domestic pro-
democracy actors. This section highlights best practices of engagement for U.S. actors
(including Congress, the Department of State, and USAID); donor partners and foundations;
and international institutions, specically in the wider European context. We explore in partic-
ular how support from this set of international actors can aid domestic NGOs, bolster civil
resistance and nonviolent movements, counter disinformation campaigns, and push back
against illiberal governments’ use of corruption and repression. The following best practices
and policy recommendations stem from the operating assumption that democratic govern-
ments and international organizations can and should continue to support and strengthen
democracy globally, and particularly in countries experiencing backsliding, and where inter-
national actors have the most leverage.
Maintaining strong relations across democratic states through economic, political, informa-
tional, and social ties has historically helped to generate and maintain democratic institutions.
Support from external pro-democracy actors is even more important in an increasingly con-
tested international environment of global democratic stagnation. Now more than ever in
the post-Cold War era, powerful authoritarian states such as Russia and China are lending
support and presenting an alternative governance model to bolster the strength of illiberal
regimes in Europe and elsewhere. They are also subverting and weaponizing digital technol-
ogies—once thought of as a boon to global democracy—to develop and export models of
digital authoritarianism.
Democracy Playbook 43
As Gene Sharp notes, “the main brunt of the struggle must be borne by the grievance group
immediately affected by the opponents’ political elite. Third party action can be seen as at best
supplementary and complementary to internal resistance, never as the main actions of the
struggle.”
218
An indirect approach to supporting democracy by international actors and foreign
governments thus works best. These outside actors should aim to empower local actors not
by managing them but by collaborating with them to incentivize democratic reforms, support
organic democratic development, and empower an active pluralistic civil society.
It is also necessary to recognize that the ecacy of diplomatic pressure varies across target
states. Efforts to leverage trade or aid in support of democratic outcomes may not be effective
with states less dependent on trade with or aid from the relevant outside actors.
219
Despite
these limitations, democratic foreign governments and international institutions have their
own toolkits to promote and support free and fair elections, rule of law, freedom of the press,
and human rights, and to counter democratic backsliding, particularly in countries where
recently established democratic institutions are coming under attack. But foreign economic
incentives or nancial support will not change the situation on the ground unless there is a
powerful and genuinely domestic movement to hold public gures and institutions account-
able to democratic rules and principles.
1. Partnering with domestic CSOs and NGOs
SUMMARY
International actors should partner with domestic CSOs and NGOs by:
220
• Going local. Foundations and other international donors should enhance
collaboration with local NGOs such that external support to well-established,
well-known, and Westernized organizations is balanced with cooperation with
local entities.
• Building basic capacities. Where local NGOs lack the capacities of more
established organizations in national capitals, donors can help develop basic
coreorganizationalcapacities,especiallynancialmanagementandhuman-
resources management.
• Coordinating donor support. A multiplicity of foreign donors can overwhelm a
recipient organization’s bandwidth and undermine their effectiveness through
competing demands and priorities. Establishing networks of donors supporting
democracy and coordinating support across organizations would help to
mitigate the problem.
44 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
• Responding to government attacks on NGOs. External actors including donors,
NGOs,andgovernmentocialsshouldissuesystematic,coordinated,and
high-level responses to government authorities’ restrictions on NGO activities,
while taking steps to avoid the perception that activities are solely externally
driven. In more supportive environments, donors and governments should
vocally promote laws that safeguard NGOs and activists to help create an
environment that is conducive to their activities.
• Empowering nontraditional actors. Donors should help develop pro-democracy
networks of actors such as businesses, individuals, universities, student
groups, and think tanks. In parallel, efforts should be made to help establish
mechanisms and incentives to induce well-established NGOs to provide training
to the less well-established groups. Such training needs to be relevant to the
location and culture.
• Developing local sources of funding and philanthropy. Particularly in countries
that are at risk of democratic backsliding, donors should help NGOs diversify
their external support, develop local sources of funding, and build local habits
of corporate philanthropy to help build sustainable civil society ecosystems
over time.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in both
emerging and backsliding democracies are important partners for international engage-
ment.
221
Although international actors and foreign governments have supported domestic
NGOs for decades, CSOs did not emerge as a focal point for external support until the
late 1980s and early 1990s, as donors grew frustrated with operating through corrupt and
uncommitted state institutions.
222
At the time, leading academics were also embracing
neo-Tocquevillian ideas about the relationship between civil society and democracy. Robert
Putnam argued that civil society built social capital by facilitating cooperation, building trust,
and encouraging solidarity.
223
Similarly, Larry Diamond suggested that civil society was vital
for democratic consolidation.
224
The “third wave” of democratization swept across Southern Europe, Latin America, and Central
and Eastern Europe between the 1970s and the 1990s, and was most prominently captured
with the citizen-led protests that toppled the Berlin Wall and facilitated the Central and Eastern
European democratic transitions of 1989. International donors came to see civil society as
a “domain that is nonviolent but powerful, nonpartisan yet prodemocratic, and that emerges
from the essence of particular societies, yet is nonetheless universal.”
225
The 1990s witnessed
the “NGOization” of civil society, and aid from the West increased massively.
226
The number
of NGOs and other CSOs skyrocketed, and between 1970 and 2000, there was a sevenfold
increase in resources transferred through international NGOs.
227
Democracy Playbook 45
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
NGOization, however, did not start out as an inclusive endeavor.
228
Foreign governments, foun-
dations, and other donors initially preferred to work with Western NGOs. Collaboration with
local NGOs was generally limited to organizations based in a country’s capital and resembled
patron-client relationships as opposed to more equal partnerships. This proved costly and
unsustainable.
229
It was expensive to y in and host Westerners, and NGOs struggled to build
genuine relationships with local citizens and organizations. In Russia, for instance, citizens
“repeatedly rejected what they saw as a paternalistic model positioning them as recipients
of aid and instead advocated for equal partnerships in the design and delivery of projects.”
230
EU funding to CSOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, and Georgia also point to a risk
of widening disconnects between CSOs and the public. EU funding has incentivized many
domestic NGOs in these countries to prioritize EU-friendly projects that are more short-term
and measurable.
231
In each country, there are a handful of organizations that are selected
to receive funds owing to their competitive advantages, such as having employees uent in
English and familiar with the application and report writing process. Consequently, an “elitist
civil society sector” has emerged.
232
And, as Sarah Bush has argued, Western democracy
assistance programs have contributed to a “taming” of democracy promotion by shifting
to the support of technical programs rather than those aiming at transformative change.
233
This elitist civil society sector’s power is reinforced by the media, which calls upon rep-
resentatives from those organizations to provide input on certain issues. This cycle has
harmed grassroots organizations and distanced many big CSOs from the public.
234
In Cyprus,
for example, citizens describe many NGOs that receive foreign funding as “articial” and
“externally driven,” while those in Bosnia and Herzegovina see them as corrupt entities.
235
Understandably, confusion emerges as a result of this divide, with many citizens not being
informed about how foreign funding works, how CSOs operate, and what their goals are.
In response to these weaknesses and criticisms, external assistance became a more local
endeavor starting in the mid-1990s.
236
“Going local” was cheaper and more effective, and
external actors and donors began to prefer working with local NGOs because of their many
comparative advantages.
237
This remains true today, although working with local and less well-
known organization also has its drawbacks. In terms of their strengths, they can be deeply
aware of the local context, less constrained by bureaucracy and sovereignty laws than ocial
government actors, maintain clear goals and professional structures that match donor needs,
and are better trained to organize pro-democracy movements. Advocacy NGOs in particular
can aggregate citizen demands and push for government action and accountability, acting
as a “transmission belt” between civil society and the state.
238
Local NGOs, however, can have
limited capacities, be overly dependent on competing and inecient donor agendas, and lack
powerful political contacts.
239
External assistance to CSOs and NGOs in Kosovo make it clear that international donors
conceptualize local consultation in different ways, and that there is no one size ts all model
when it comes to working with partners on the ground.
240
Some organizations such as the
German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung have employed local staff and consult with them, while
46 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
others have more formal processes.
241
For instance, the EU has held multi-level consultations
with various local actors, while the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency have sent delegations to Kosovo
while interacting with domestic actors through formal institutions, like advisory boards. Other
donors rely more on reports and data to shape their approach: the UN Kosovo Team is guided
by its own Human Development reports as well as the UN Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) and Kosovo’s European integration agenda, which already have input from Kosovo
specialists and groups operating in the area.
242
A. ADDRESSING RESTRICTIONS ON CSOs AND NGOs
Over the last decade, illiberal government actors intent on consolidating power have taken
steps to restrict the activity of independent NGOs by enacting censorship laws; restricting free-
dom of assembly; banning or limiting foreign funding; requiring approval by the government
for operations; creating registration requirements; not issuing visas to employees of foreign
partner organizations; and labeling NGOs as foreign agents.
243
Another complicating factor is
when regimes sponsor or create NGOs or GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental
organizations) to further their own political interests. GONGOs can confuse external actors
by making it dicult to discern what is a genuine civic group and what is not.
Restrictions on NGOs—especially foreign-funded ones—date back to the post-cold war
years.
244
In the aftermath of major waves of decolonization that took place in the 1950s and
1960s, external actors tended to give aid—which was aimed at facilitating socioeconomic
development as opposed to political reform—directly to governments. This was a way of
respecting the agency of newly independent recipients wary of continued Western inter-
ventionism, given their colonial history.
245
But by the end of the Cold
War, donors were focused on democracy promotion and preferred to
channel aid through NGOs.
246
Initially, governments in countries with
a growing third sector didn’t see NGOs and democracy assistance as
a threat—a perception that was reinforced by the end of the Cold War,
which reduced concerns about Western interventionism.
247
However, NGOs quickly became prominent and powerful. Their
development worried host governments, who reacted by restrict-
ing the ability of NGOs to receive foreign aid.
248
These regulations
were exacerbated by the “color revolutions” in the early 2000s,
which showed the world the capacity of opposition parties and
organizations that received Western support.
249
Between 1993
and 2012, more than a quarter of low and middle income coun-
tries enacted laws (e.g., administrative burdens, limitations on the use of foreign funds,
reporting requirements, and high taxes) that restricted foreign contributions to local NGOs.
250
In recent years, the overall
environment for CSOs in
Central and Eastern Europe
has been deteriorating, a
development closely connected
to the rise of illiberal populism
in the region.
Democracy Playbook 47
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
In recent years, the overall environment for CSOs in Central and Eastern Europe has been
deteriorating, a development closely connected to the rise of illiberal populism in the region.
Governments in many Central and Eastern European countries have been cracking down on
NGOs. In 2017, Hungary passed an act on “the transparency of organizations supported from
abroad” similar to Russia’s “foreign agent” law discussed below.
251
The law requires a CSO that
receives funding from foreign sources above a certain amount register as “foreign funded”
and label itself as such on all publications and websites.
252
The law, which is the rst of its
kind in an EU member state, also includes stringent reporting requirements. Noncompliance is
punishable by high nes and even eventual dissolution. Other nations have to varying degrees
passed laws that have imposed burdensome restricting requirements and administrative
duties on foreign-funded NGOs.
253
That being said, there have been some positive devel-
opments. Macedonia’s VMRO-DPMNE Party, which had overseen democratic backsliding,
attacks on civil society, and a spree of nationalist building projects, lost power to the more
pro-democracy Social Democratic Union of Macedonia in 2017.
254
Prioritizing joining NATO
and the European Union, the new government resolved the country’s long-standing name
dispute with Greece and has accelerated governance reforms.
255
Lawmakers understand that adopting legislation that hampers civil society comes at a cost.
In enacting restrictive legislation, governments risk being named and shamed by the inter-
national community, losing valuable services provided by NGOs, and being met with public
disapproval. Yet governments often think that these costs are outweighed by political sur-
vival, which can be threatened when civil society, and society as a whole, is empowered to
demand accountability, rights, and democratic rule, and takes active steps to pursue these
goals. Governments fear, and rightfully so, that external support and international attention
can facilitate their efforts.
Activists join sts in solidarity
ahead of a protest march.
48 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Crackdowns that draw the most attention tend to take place in semi-authoritarian or com-
petitive authoritarian regimes, who try to retain some form of legitimacy in the eyes of the
international community (e.g., through pluralist elections or allowing some NGOs to do advo-
cacy work) while hampering challenges to the regime.
256
Common forms of restriction include:
257
• Hampering civil society: enacting censorship laws and restricting freedom of assembly;
• Targeting foreign funding and support: banning or limiting foreign funding, requiring its
approval by the government, creating registration requirements, and not issuing visas to
employees of foreign partner organizations; and
• Intimidation and harassment: labeling NGOs as foreign agents, threats to public order,
violent actors, or even terrorists, suing activists, and carrying out
illegitimate audits.
In light of these repressive tactics, international donor responses matter.
When international organizations, including aid agencies, take decisive
action to signal disapproval of attacks on civil society and rule of law,
governments are forced to respond. Uncoordinated action can have the
opposite effect of facilitating further attacks on civil society.
258
Based on
these assumptions, below is a series of best practices and case studies
to help international actors assess both the pros and cons of partnering
with domestic NGOs.
B. COORDINATING AND DIVERSIFYING SUPPORT
The multiplicity of donors operating in similar spaces and with similar organizations on the
ground can overwhelm recipients’ bandwidth and even undermine their effectiveness through
competing demands and priorities. To address this, donors should coordinate and diver-
sify their support. One possible model of pro-democracy networking is the Community of
Democracies that works with civil society to coordinate the efforts of their member states for
democratic processes and institutions.
259
As illiberal governments implement restrictive laws
targeting foreign funding of civil society organizations, it is important to foster coordination
among like-minded donors as well as among local organizations. Responses include creat-
ing platforms (e.g., in international organizations) for activists who have been affected by a
closing civil society space and bringing domestic NGOs together to develop joint responses
to restrictive government policies. A lack of systematic, coordinated, and high-level responses
to government authorities’ restrictions on NGO activities opens more opportunities for heavi-
er-handed approaches that will further hamper local actors’ freedom of operation.
Donors should also diversify support among smaller and nontraditional recipients in order
to go around repressive government policies that target well-known and more Westernized
Donors should also
diversify support among
smaller and nontraditional
recipients in order to
go around repressive
government policies.
Democracy Playbook 49
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
CSOs. This involves providing aid through smaller grants (and therefore developing small
grant funding models) to less Westernized groups and local organizations operating outside
the capital cities.
260
It also involves working to empower nontraditional actors such as busi-
nesses, individuals, universities, student groups, and think tanks.
261
For example, one way
of supporting local pro-democracy actors is through scholarships to specic individuals.
In parallel, efforts should be made to help establish mechanisms and incentives inducing
well-established NGOs (which donors typically favor) to provide culture and location specic
training to the less well-established groups.
C. PLANNING IN ADVANCE AND DEVELOPING CORE CAPACITIES
In countries that are at risk of democratic backsliding, donors should help CSOs and NGOs
develop local sources of funding and build local habits of corporate philanthropy—all of which
can build sustainable civil society ecosystems over time. Donors can also help organiza-
tions develop core organizational capacities, especially nancial management and human
resources management, rather than just providing support for project
activities with limited time horizons. Kosovo in recent decades has proven
why it is important for external actors to help develop basic capacities
among native CSOs and NGOs. In the 1990s, external donors and orga-
nizations did not enter Kosovo with hopes of supporting democratization
by collaborating with young CSOs. Instead, they came in as part of an
emergency, attempting to balance the provision of humanitarian aid and
the facilitation of peacebuilding in the aftermath of a devastating bloody
conict. As a result, many of Kosovo’s NGOs were left inexperienced and
needing to “depend entirely on international donor funding.”
262
Second,
there are “no developed NGO networks with relevant and appropriate
capacities for advocacy, project management, service provision, or basic
community development,” save for a few in the capital, Pristina.
263
As the political situation in Kosovo changed (e.g., with the declaration of
independence in 2008), so did donor priorities. External actors such as the EU now work on
democracy promotion by collaborating with government institutions and NGOs. However,
early enthusiasm from external actors proved that funding NGOs’ initiatives is not enough to
maximize their ecacy; it is also crucial to do basic organizational capacity-building activities
and equip them with important skills like advocacy and grant management.
In more supportive environments, external actors should vocally promote laws that safe-
guard NGOs and activists and create an environment that is conducive to their activities
(e.g., recognizing freedom of speech and peaceful assembly). One example is Article 56
of Montenegro’s Constitution that states that “Everyone shall have the right of recourse to
international organizations for the protection of their own rights and freedoms guaranteed by
Donors should help
CSOs and NGOs develop
local sources of funding
and build local habits of
corporate philanthropy—
all of which can build
sustainable civil society
ecosystems over time.
50 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
the Constitution,” thereby welcoming NGO and activist access to international organizations
where they can advocate for their causes.
264
In countries where governments employ narratives of “hypersovereignty” to restrict civil
society actors, foreign governments and international organizations should work toward
reversing and/or mitigating restrictions through diplomatic pressure and sanctions on the
home government.
265
Condemnation of repressive tactics should be issued immediately and
pressure applied (even if it solely rhetorical) consistently. Meanwhile non-government actors
can encourage citizens to support NGOs in any way that they can (e.g., protests, donations,
lobbying, advocacy, citizen journalism). Donors should keep in mind that illiberal governments
tend to target NGOs after favorable national elections, when they can justify their actions with
the veneer of democratic legitimacy on nationalist/sovereignty grounds by painting NGOs
as foreign agents.
To foster greater resiliency before restrictions occur and in places where backsliding is already
taking place, ocial actors including the U.S. State Department and USAID should increase
longer-term support for independent civil society and investigative independent media in
Central Europe, with Hungary and Poland as the most urgent priorities. This funding program
should prioritize projects that will demonstrate to communities outside of national capitals
(by providing services, education, etc.) the benets of democratic institutions. It should also
improve government accountability and transparency through in-depth investigative reporting
on, for example, misuse of public resources.
266
In addition, donors can encourage NGOs to
develop productive relationships, when possible, with central and local governments, moving
away from the idea that advocacy NGOs must naturally take a completely independent, or
even antagonistic, stance toward their governments.
SECTION 2.1 KEY RESOURCES
• Merriman,Hardy.“SmallGrants,BigCommitment:ReectionsonSupportforGrassroots
Activists and Organizers.” International Center on Nonviolent Conict, January 10, 2019.
https://www.nonviolent-conict.org/blog_post/small-grants-big-commitment-reections-
support-grassroots-human-rights-activists-organizers.
• Carothers, Thomas. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2011.
Democracy Playbook 51
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
2. Assisting civil resistance and nonviolent movements
SUMMARY
International actors should assist civil resistance and nonviolent movements by:
• Developing clear criteria for providing support. Civil resistance movements
involve many actors and organizations. It is therefore important to make
informed decisions about whom to support both during and after civil resistance
campaigns. Baseline criteria for a campaign to receive support should include:
a public commitment to nonviolence; campaign goals that are consistent with
internationally recognized human rights; and clear independence from registered
political parties (although total electoral disengagement is not a prerequisite).
267
• Thinking long-term. There is always work to be done in the aftermath of
successful civil resistance campaigns. This involves supporting newly empowered
political actors and taking steps to avoid a power vacuum. These political actors
must be trained in policymaking and processes of deliberative governance.
Building democratic governance institutions and processes can take years and
requires patience from all actors involved.
• Establishing the local context.Giventhedicultiesaroundidentifyingappropriate
internal partners within a jurisdiction, a starting point for external support must
be understanding the local context and expressed needs of local activists. This
knowledge transfer should occur through frequent interactions with a broad range
of civil society and other local actors.
• Promoting local ownership. External support to nonviolent movements, while
benecial,canincertaincontextsbeusedbydomesticgovernmentstodelegitimize
homegrown movements. Support that is poorly administered can also be detrimental
to their success. Therefore, it is critical to advance local ownership and involvement.
This can help prevent possible free-riding and encourage domestic support from those
who might have concerns about association with a foreign actor.
268
• Focusing on training and skills development. Invest in developing and sharing
knowledge across civil resistance and movement organizing, so that activists have
greater opportunities for learning and cultivating skills.
• Helping to boost the efforts of independent media. Independent journalism plays an
important role in raising awareness of and supporting the goals of civil resistance
and nonviolent movements. Enhancing media effectiveness should involve training
journalists inside and outside of resistance movements. Independent journalists and
news outlets need to be sensitized to the dynamics of civil resistance movements,
and nonviolent activists must be trained as effective spokespeople for their causes.
52 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
A. DEFINING CIVIL RESISTANCE AND NONVIOLENCE
Per section 1, we follow Gene Sharp in dening civil resistance or nonviolent struggle as “a
technique used to control, combat, and even destroy the opponents’ power by nonviolent
mean of wielding power.”
269
Generally, it emerges when political, economic, or social griev-
ances go unaddressed with no feasible way to enact change in the status quo.
270
It tends
to occur when more traditional channels including dialogue negotiations and institutional
processes such as elections and legal recourse fail to produce results.
B. WHY SUPPORT CIVIL RESISTANCE, AND WHOM TO SUPPORT?
Why should international actors support civil resistance and nonviolent movements?
They work. One reason for their success is that they tend to attract sympathetic international
attention, especially when the regime responds disproportionately. This attention can be
highly valuable. For instance, international divestments, sanctions, boycotts, and even barring
sports teams from international competitions, all played important roles in ending apartheid
in South Africa.
In recent decades international actors have provided various types of assistance to civil
resistance campaigns through diplomatic engagement, material support, sanctions, and
international coverage.
271
Steps supported by external actors include:
• Challenging government cover ups through investigations and reports;
• Bringing issues and civil resistance leaders to multilateral institutions (e.g. EU, UN, OAS,
G-7) to bolster their international legitimacy;
• Promoting dialogue and peaceful conict resolution;
• Developing and sharing knowledge about civil resistance and movement organizing, so
that activists have greater opportunities for learning and cultivation of skills;
272
• Monitoring and attending trials of political prisoners;
• Attending protests, activist trials, and vigils;
273
• Supporting independent media;
• Pressuring the government to enact changes or step down; and,
• Creating safe spaces for activists to meet and organize.
These forms of assistance have helped to promote the aims of civil resistance movements
and enforce human rights standards in oppressive environments.
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The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Civil resistance movements involve many actors that coordinate actions, recruit participants,
and inform the international community. As such, it is important for external actors to make
informed decisions about whom to support during and after civil resistance movements.
274
Diplomats are inuential due to their political connections, have an easier time getting in
contact with government gures, and are protected by diplomatic immunity.
275
Diplomats
and government aliated organizations can help convene civil society actors with funders,
and they can facilitate meetings between government supporters and opposition groups.
276
Domestic CSOs and NGOs are also powerful partners, as they tend to be more informed about
the situation on the ground, less constrained by bureaucracy and sovereignty laws, and better
trained to organize resistance movements.
More broadly, Hardy Merriman and Peter Ackerman of the International Center of Nonviolent
Conict (ICNC) outline three basic criteria for campaigns to receive assistance: a public com-
mitment to nonviolence and calls for nonviolent discipline from all supporters; campaign goals
that are consistent with internationally recognized human rights, as outlined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; and maintaining independence from registered political parties
(although total electoral disengagement is not a prerequisite).
277
In terms of timing of support, there are two additional elements for external actors to keep
in mind. First, there is still work to be done in the aftermath of a successful civil resistance
campaign in order to support newly empowered political actors and avoid a power vacuum.
As leaders of a successful movement and new political parties move onto
the political stage, they must be trained in policymaking and processes
of deliberative governance, such as participatory budgeting.
278
Second,
building democratic governance institutions can take years and requires
patience from external actors. Supporters must avoid buying into the
“graduation myth” that countries become immediately stable, democratic,
and peaceful after a certain combination of years and funds.
279
C. UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
Given the diculties around identifying appropriate internal partners, a starting point for any
discussion of external support must be understanding the domestic context and expressed
needs of national and local activists. This knowledge transfer should occur through frequent
interactions with a broad range of civil society actors. External organizations and institutions
must also be aware of the legal, political, and social constraints faced by activists. According
to Hardy Merriman of the ICNC, civil resistance movements face daunting challenges to build-
ing unifying visions and networks of trust; eliciting broad participation and mobilization; and
spreading knowledge about how nonviolent conict works. A key component to their success
is developing local and national level strategies that work in unison to challenge powerholders
and institutions.
280
For external actors to support these goals, a deep understanding of the
operating environment and range of actors engaged in civil resistance movements will help
to better coordinate resources and avoid duplicative efforts.
Building democratic
governance institutions
can take years and
requires patience from
external actors.
54 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
D. PROMOTING LOCAL OWNERSHIP
While external support for civil resistance movements can be incredibly valuable, it can also be
detrimental to their success—a risk that all international actors must take into consideration
when considering support of domestic campaigns. Governments can use external assistance
to delegitimize homegrown movements, portraying them as foreign agents. Moreover, large
amounts of funding that are poorly administered can destroy resistance movements inter-
nally. While we believe that external assistance to movements can do more good than harm,
it is important that international actors make every effort to encourage local ownership.
281
Deep knowledge of the national and local context can help avoid (although not entirely) the risk
of internal quarrels, accusations of proteering, and the loss of movement momentum and
people.
282
Local involvement can help prevent free-riding as well as the dissuasion of locals
who might choose not to participate in order to avoid being associated with a foreign actor.
283
One successful example of civil resistance came in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, when citizens in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia initiated efforts
to gain independence from the Soviet Union.
284
The West was initially
reluctant to help the Baltic states, whose governments were declaring
their sovereignty and condemning military occupation by the USSR,
though the longstanding policy of the United States of not recognizing
their incorporation into the Soviet Union gave symbolic assistance to
the uprisings.
285
The independence movements cooperated across Estonia, Lithuania,
and Latvia, with some backing from other nationalist movements in the
USSR. Activists shared tactics and ideas, and they coordinated protests.
286
Perhaps one of the most memorable manifestations of this cooperation
was the Baltic Way demonstration of August 23, 1989, that saw approx-
imately two million people form a human chain across Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. Organizers across the Baltics worked together to map the chain, organize
transportation to maximize participation, and disseminate information about the protest.
287
E. PROVIDING TRAINING AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
To support in-country efforts, training and mentoring in strategic nonviolent action and
coalition building can help improve the skills and effectiveness of local activists. Trainings
(in-person and virtual) should highlight practical ways to maintain nonviolent movements in
repressive environments including: codes of conduct, lessons of dealing with security forces,
and diversifying tactics to maintain resiliency. Training in activities such as political party
development, voter mobilization, and election monitoring can complement support for civil
resistance activities.
288
Trainings—online and in person—can also be facilitated by convening
diverse actors engaged in a civil resistance movement from across the political and NGO
spectrum to coordinate and share best practices, and to help convene and recruit participants.
A key component to civil
resistance movements’
success is developing
local and national level
strategies that work
in unison to challenge
powerholders and
institutions.
Democracy Playbook 55
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
In Serbia, international support and trainings helped end the repressive regime of Slobodan
Milošević after the September 2000 presidential election, which was rife with irregularities.
289
The nonviolent movement that ended Milošević’s rule was organized by the domestic activist
group Otpor. It drew the support of hundreds of thousands of people in Serbia, and received
support from various international actors. Otpor received aid and trainings from two American
organizations, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican
Institute (IRI), and the Serbian organization Center for Civic Initiatives gave copies of Gene
Sharp’s foundational work From Dictatorship to Democracy to demonstrators.
290
External actors also helped counter government censorship of independent media outlets
such as the Serbian broadcaster Radio B92. When domestic outlets were censored or shut
down, foreign outlets like the BBC and VOA broadcast some of their content.
291
Furthermore,
external actors like the EastWest Institute understood the importance of bringing activists
together. They started the Bratislava Process in 1999 by facilitating meetings between anti-Mi-
lošević parties and organizations, Slovak NGOs, Slovak activists, and media correspondents
to “build a broad coalition of all relevant democratic actors in Serbian society and friends from
the international donor community.”
292
American and European ocials also participated in
some of these meetings and provided advice and aid.
293
In Georgia, external actors who had experience in civil resistance against repressive regimes
worked with Georgian activists prior to the Rose Revolution in 2003, which ousted the
entrenched authoritarian President Eduard Shevardnadze. Giga Bokeria of National Movement
and Levan Ramishvili of the Liberty Institute met with Otpor activists in Belgrade in the spring,
and young Georgian activists were trained by Otpor volunteers in the summer.
294
Georgian
NGOs, which “had a disproportionate inuence on the Rose Revolution and its peaceful
A pro-democracy banner is
pictured in a protest during
the EU-Asia leaders summit
in Brussels, Belgium.
56 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
outcome,” also received assistance from international actors seeking to support civil soci-
ety: the U.S. government, the EU, the World Bank, and other organizations like the Eurasia
Foundation gave hundreds of millions of dollars to the “third sector” of Georgia, which helped
push for democratization and helped organize protests.
295
For example, the Georgia-based
International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, which received Western funding,
helped train election monitors, conducted exit polling, and coordinated protests.
296
That said,
it is important to note that many Western governments had supported Shevardnadze in the
past (he had even been awarded the National Democratic Institute’s Harriman Democracy
Award for leadership in democracy and human rights), which helped legitimize his regime.
297
F. BOOSTING EFFORTS OF INDEPENDENT MEDIA
As noted earlier in this report, independent journalism has played histor-
ically important roles in raising awareness of and supporting the goals
of civil resistance and nonviolent movements. Enhancing media effec-
tiveness involves training inside and outside of resistance movements.
From the outside, independent journalists and news outlets need to be
“sensitized to the dynamics of civil resistance;” on the inside of move-
ments, nonviolent activists must be trained as effective spokespeople
for their causes.
298
Traditional media outlets including television, print,
and radio, are often the rst target of authoritarian regimes in minimizing
voices critical of government policies. Social media outlets are harder
for government forces to regulate and can highlight shared grievances,
expose regime propaganda, present governance alternatives, and facili-
tate communication among local activists.
G. UKRAINE’S ORANGE REVOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
TO CIVIL RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
Ukraine’s nonviolent Orange Revolution of 2004 helped to bring the democratically elected
Viktor Yushchenko to power after widespread election fraud had resulted in the victory of
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.
299
External actors, including USAID, the Westminster
Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the Alfred Moser Foundation
had been supporting Ukrainian civil society for several years prior to the election.
300
Ongoing
efforts included running seminars on civil society activism and democratic principles.
301
One
of the leading organizers of the Orange Revolution, Pora (meaning, “It’s Time”), received grants
from the German Marshall Fund, Freedom House, the Canadian International Development
Agency, and others, helping them to spread awareness about their movement and develop
their organizational capacity.
302
Pora also received assistance from other groups that had
triumphed over repressive regimes: Otpor leader Aleksandar Marić ran seminars for Ukrainian
activists in Serbia, while Slovak organizations who had defeated Vladimir Mečiar helped Pora
to strategize.
303
Independent journalism
has played a historically
important role in
raising awareness of and
supporting the goals
of civil resistance and
nonviolent movements.
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The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Diplomats coordinated their actions, at times using their own embassy funds to fund inde-
pendent media outlets like Ukrainska Pravda and exit polls.
304
They also used their diplomatic
immunity to protect activists. For example, on October 23, security services attempted to
search the house of Pora leader Vladyslav Kaskiv; their entry was blocked by two members
of parliament from the opposition (who had parliamentary immunity), three diplomats from
France, and some representatives from the OSCE and European Commission. Eventually, the
security forces withdrew.
305
Moreover, international representatives on both sides of the con-
ict (Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, and, EU
Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana) helped broker talks between Yanukovych and Yuschenko.
306
SECTION 2.2 KEY RESOURCES
• Stephan, Maria J., Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala. Aid to Civil Society: A Movement
Mindset. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2015. https://www.usip.org/sites/
default/les/SR361_Aid_to_Civil_Society_A_Movement_Mindset.pdf.
• Ackerman, Peter and Hardy Merriman. Preventing Mass Atrocities: From a Responsibility
to Protect (RtoP) to a Right to Assist (RtoA) Campaigns of Civil Resistance. Washington:
InternationalCenteronNonviolentConict,2019.https://www.nonviolent-conict.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Right-to-Assist.pdf.
• Merriman, Hardy. “Supporting Civil Resistance Movements: Considerations for
Human Rights Funders and Organizations. International Center on Nonviolent
Conict
,September11,2018.https://www.nonviolent-conict.org/blog_post/
supporting-civil-resistance-movements/.
• Kinsman, Jeremy and Kurt Bassuener. A Diplomat’s Handbook for Development Support.
Waterloo, Can.: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013. http://www.
democratizationpolicy.org/diplomats-handbook/.
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The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
3. Countering disinformation
SUMMARY
International actors should counter disinformation by:
• Supporting independent media organizations and CSOs working to expose
disinformation campaigns. International actors should use targeted funding to
support the investigative capacities of domestic watchdog groups that monitor and
exposemediaconsolidationthroughnontransparentnancialschemes,journalist
harassment and censorship, raids of independent news outlets, and other abuses of
publicresourcesaimedatstiingthespaceforindependentmedia.
• Investing in and expanding organizational capabilities. The EU, NATO, G-7 and
other international organizations should invest in and expand capabilities for
monitoring disinformation campaigns emanating from foreign actors.
• Enhancing communication between democratic governance and social media
companies. Establish better communication and information sharing processes
between social media companies and democratic governments.
• Advancing pro-democracy messaging. Develop positive narratives around
democratic values and principles to counter anti-democratic ones.
Russia has pioneered a toolkit of digital and traditional disinformation to undermine democ-
racies.
307
These techniques were rst and foremost deployed against the Russian people as
the Kremlin sought to control information ows, propagate negative narratives about the
West and liberal democracies, and suppress independent domestic voices.
308
After Vladimir
Putin came to power in 2000, the Russian government moved to consolidate control over
domestic media and co-opt the digital domain. It did so by placing media networks in the
hands of pro-regime oligarchs, using the police and intelligence agencies to harass indepen-
dent journalists, shutting down independent news outlets under trumped-up charges, labeling
journalistic organizations as foreign agents or undesirables, and inltrating social media
networks to spread disinformation narratives.
309
Journalists, pro-democracy activists and organizations, and human rights proponents are
among the most vulnerable groups in Russia today. Anna Politkovskaya, a prominent Russian
investigative journalist and human rights activist reporting on the Russian government’s brutal
activities in Chechnya, was gunned down in her apartment building in 2006 after years of
intimidation and violence against her.
310
Boris Nemtsov, a former Russian government ocial
turned anti-government opposition leader, was assassinated near the Kremlin in 2015.
311
Other opposition leaders are routinely harassed, searched, and face cyber and disinforma-
tion attacks by Russian government proxies. During non-violent protests in 2011–2012
312
and 2019,
313
Russian opposition leaders, student activists, and protesters were arrested and
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The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
sentenced to jail time. In the time since,
the government’s security services have
intensied their repressive efforts with
nation-wide raids on opposition move-
ments’ oces.
314
Indeed, for decades, Putin’s regime has
been crafting an increasingly repressive
and nuanced legal and administrative appa-
ratus to expel foreign NGOs and impose
costs on local CSOs that receive any nan-
cial support from foreign sources—public
or otherwise.
315
The process began in 2006
with a federal law that put initial limits on
access to information by so-called undesir-
able foreign NGOs. This law was followed
by multiple amendments and a 2012 law that requires any CSO receiving foreign funding to
register as a foreign agent.
316
A 2015 legal extension allows the Kremlin to ban any organization
it considers undesirable, de facto creating a blacklist of organizations.
317
The Kremlin applies
the “foreign agent,” “undesirable,” or “extremist” labels to any organization that challenges the
government.
318
The foreign agent classication greatly limits an organization’s ability to operate
in Russia.
319
Put together, these measures have set up a complex legal web of repression while
granting the Russian government the power to block access to information that it designates
extremist or undesirable, including any distributed information appealing for public protest.
As a result, well known international NGOs such as the MacArthur Foundation, NED, Open
Society Foundation, and IRI have all closed their operations in Russia after being classied
as undesirable foreign agents.
320
USAID is also banned from operating in Russia.
321
And local
CSOs, particularly those with a focus on democracy, human rights, electoral transparency,
and even environmental issues, have been ned, audited, and raided either for failing to prove
that they are not foreign agents or refusing to voluntarily register as such.
322
In this repressive
environment, foreign actors’ abilities to support local actors have been limited to supporting
independent media and CSOs that have moved operations abroad or using passthroughs to
get very limited funding for groups still operating in Russia.
323
The Kremlin’s consolidation of traditional media (e.g. television networks and newspapers)
in the hands of government linked oligarchs has allowed the regime to control domestic
information ows and narratives.
324
More recently, the government has moved to force tech
companies and other digital media platforms, such as Tinder, to provide data access to gov-
ernment agencies, most notably the intelligence services.
325
As with NGOs and CSOs, the
Kremlin erected a complex legal structure that, among other things, requires companies to
install surveillance hardware on their systems, store data in Russia rather than abroad, and
give away encryption keys to the Russian security services.
326
With these tools, the govern-
ment is able to monitor communications between individuals and groups, acquire personal
Facebook and Twitter logos
are seen on a shop window
in Malaga, Spain.
60 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
information, and monitor online activities on social media platforms. Using this suite of tradi-
tional and digital media resources and surveillance capabilities, the Kremlin is able to control
messaging at home and attack opposition activists.
327
Abroad, Russian state-funded outlets, such as RT and Sputnik, and Russian-linked social
media entities (e.g., trolls, bots, cyborgs) lend support to far-right political movements and
like-minded governments while propagating anti-democratic narratives and content.
328
This
Kremlin toolkit nds appeal among political parties and leaders who aim to stie opposition
and criticism in their own countries.
In addition to supporting independent local media, as outlined above,
international actors should help support domestic watchdog groups that
monitor and expose media consolidation through nontransparent nan-
cial schemes, journalist harassment and censorship, raids of independent
news outlets, and other abuses of public resources aimed at stiing the
space for independent media. When such abuses take place within the
EU, for example in Hungary, the EU should take immediate steps to pub-
licly condemn such behavior while pressing for government leaders to be
held publicly accountable for their repressive actions. For example, the
European Commission publicly rebuked the Orbán government’s disinfor-
mation campaign spreading false information about the EU’s migration policy.
329
In addition,
international donor organizations should fund local media outlets that identify disinformation
campaigns not only from foreign states, such as Russia, but also those that emanate from
their own governments.
Lastly, the United States, European national governments, the EU, and NATO, should introduce
and enforce transparency standards, including with respect to foreign-origin political and issue
ads on both traditional and social media, and otherwise monitor and notify their publics in
real time about the activities of foreign propaganda outlets. In order to combat disinformation
campaigns, governments should seek to emulate initiatives by EU’s East StratCom, NATO’s
StratCom Center of Excellence in Riga, the Helsinki Hybrid Center of Excellence, and the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
330
SECTION 2.3 KEY RESOURCES:
• Fried, Daniel and Alina Polyakova. Democratic Defense Against Disinformation. Washington:
The Atlantic Council, 2018. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/
report/democratic-defense-against-disinformation.
• Helmus, Todd C. et al. Russian Social Media Inuence: Understanding Russian Propaganda
in Eastern Europe. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2018. https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2200/RR2237/RAND_RR2237.pdf.
• European Commission. “Policy: Tackling Online Disinformation.” https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinformation.
International donor
organizations should fund
local media outlets that
identify disinformation
campaigns.
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4. Providing foreign government and institutional support
SUMMARY
Foreign governments and institutions should:
• Leverage EU structural funds. The EU should adopt rule of law conditionality
for member states to receive structural funds. Conditionally should be imposed
fairly across the EU, including in long-tenured member states as well as those
that joined in the 2004 and subsequent enlargements. An alternative approach
would be to link overall levels of EU funds provided to a member state to a rule of
law index, whereby states that score higher on the index have greater access to
funds.
331
• Enhance support for civil society and independent media. Ocialactorswithin
the EU, the U.S. State Department, and USAID should increase support for
independent civil society and investigative, independent media organizations.
More funding should be allocated to countries where checks and balances are
under attack, and particularly to organizations operating outside of national
capitals.
• Encourage NGO-Government relations, when possible. Positive relations between
NGOs and central and local governments should be encouraged, when possible.
This would help move away from the idea that advocacy NGOs must naturally take
a completely independent, or even antagonistic, stance toward their governments.
• Prioritize governance and democracy issues.High-levelocials,aswellasocial
actors within the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs and
the U.S. embassies in countries of concern should engage in ongoing dialogue
with ruling political forces. This engagement should prioritize messages that
the U.S. does not support democratic rollbacks, infringements on human rights,
censoring of independent media, universities and NGOs, and the hindering of
judicialindependenceandecacy.
• Advance institutional channels. Nearly all European countries are members of
the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation
inEurope(OSCE).TheOSCEcontainsanOceofDemocraticInstitutionsand
Human Rights (ODIHR) and CoE members are subject to the European Court of
Human Rights and European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been an
important institution for EU member states. While support from these institutions
can only go so far (given weak enforcement mechanisms based on member
government compliance), they do produce rulings and reports that create a record
and that can deter misbehavior by governments that fear reputational damage.
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The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Foreign governments and international institutions have historically played critical roles
in advancing democratic movements in Europe by placing pressure on governments and
supporting pro-democracy actors. Efforts include orchestrating sanctions, providing press
coverage, creating economic and trade incentives for change, and issuing statements of
condemnation at multilateral fora. The United States in particular, as a leading economic
and democratic power, has tremendous leverage in applying carrots and sticks in pursuit of
democratic outcomes in the region.
At the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990s, the United States lent support to con-
solidating democratic governance in countries across Central and Eastern Europe. Today,
this support is once again of critical importance. During a time of heightened illiberal and
authoritarian-leaning trends in Europe, it remains a key U.S. interest to bolster democracy at
home and abroad. Scholars, however, point out that this interest should
be qualied by the Hippocratic responsibility to rst do no harm.
332
The
United States has a long track record of both working with authoritarian
governments to advance national interests and attempting democratic
advancements that result in unintended consequences. This does not
mean that Washington has not and will not continue to learn valuable les-
sons from past efforts, moving forward with humility and better informed
of best practices.
European institutions have also historically been a powerful impetus
behind advancing democracy in the region.
333
Today, the European Union,
as a supranational quasi-government aiming for “ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe” since the Maastricht Treaty created it from predecessor organiza-
tions in 1992, has the broadest toolkit to advance democratic institutions in prospective
member states, and to a lesser degree in member states.
334
These criteria incentivized post-
communist countries like Poland and Hungary seeking admission to democratize their
domestic institutions.
335
A. STRENGTHENING PRE-ACCESSION EU TOOLS
Today, the EU’s pre-accession requirements remains one of the EUs most important tools
of leverage to strengthen democracy and rule of law in a country, although they have faded
as an incentive for European countries in recent years. In the accession process, candidate
countries have to adopt a large body of EU law over a number of years; engage in technical
negotiations with the European Commission to open and close 35 chapters of the acquis
communautaire, including on the judiciary and fundamental rights; and face scrutiny and
detailed public reports by the Commission until they meet the Copenhagen Criteria.
336
Slovakia was a notable success story. The illiberal populist prime minister, Vladimir Mečiar,
had run the country from before independence in 1993; he was ousted in a general election
in 1998 (although his party nished rst in that and the subsequent election) amid U.S. and
During a time of heightened
illiberal and authoritarian-
leaning trends in Europe, it
remains a key U.S. interest
to bolster democracy at
home and abroad.
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EU pressure for the Slovak government “to alter its policies and redress past violations as
a condition for NATO and EU membership.”
337
Kevin Deegan-Krause notes that the Euro-
Atlantic organizations’ demand for respect for institutional accountability was a disincentive
for Mečiar’s government, which had built power by dismantling restraints. Public opinion in
favor of European integration—and the ballot box—led to Mečiar’s loss of power.
Deegan-Krause’s point is also relevant for Turkey and the Western Balkan countries. Elites
in these countries can benet from a close relationship with the EU, but fully meeting the
Copenhagen Criteria requires more reform, rule of law, and accountability than many are
comfortable with. Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007, three years after the “big
bang” enlargement of other post-communist member states, are also widely perceived as
having been given entry before they truly met criteria. They have been subject to additional
monitoring and remain outside the Schengen borderless area.
B. LEVERAGING POST-ACCESSION EU TOOLS
The European Union is more limited in its ability to impose costs on member states that are
infringing on democratic institutions and the rule of law at home. On the extreme end of the
spectrum, the EU maintains the power under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, passed
in 1999, to suspend certain rights from a member state if it is identied by the European
Council as breaching the EU’s founding values of human rights, democracy, and the rule
of law. The activation of Article 7 was debated when Austria’s far-right Freedom Party was
included in a coalition government in 2000 and mentioned when the French government
expelled thousands of Roma in 2009 as well as during a power struggle between President
Traian Băsescu and Prime Minister Victor Ponta in Romania in 2012.
338
However, ongoing examples of democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary highlight the
limitations of Article 7 and other EU institutional responses. In 2015, after eight years of dom-
ination of Polish politics by Civic Platform, a center-right party well-regarded in Brussels (its
leader Donald Tusk was elected president of the European Council the year prior), the Law and
Justice Party (PiS) won the Polish presidency and a narrow parliamentary majority.
339
Joanna
Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk write, “Since then, the PiS government has sought to impose
its will in a ruthlessly majoritarian fashion, taking on the high court, the prosecutor’s oce,
the public media, and the civil service in a campaign meant to dismantle existing checks and
balances while leaving the opposition and the general public little say.”
340
Jarosław Kaczyński,
the party’s leader, was thwarted on policy by the country’s Constitutional Tribunal a decade
prior as prime minister and immediately targeted it when PiS returned to power. The govern-
ment amended the law regulating the Tribunal and has refused to recognize its rulings.
341
After only two months of PiS rule, the EU activated its new “pre-Article 7” procedure for Poland,
a “framework to safeguard the rule of law in the European Union” adopted by the European
Commission in March 2014.
342
In December 2017, in the face of Warsaw’s intransigence,
the Commission moved to the “nuclear option” of invoking Article 7 itself.
343
While this was
64 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
an important step, the outcome is not yet clear, since a suspension of voting rights would
require unanimity among other member states and many expect Hungary would veto the
punishment of Poland.
Returning to power in Hungary in 2010 with a legislative supermajority, Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán’s party Fidesz was able to write and implement a new constitution without opposition
input and take legislative action to threaten the independence of the judiciary and the media.
The European Commission frequently expressed legal concerns and demanded changes via
its infringement process. Around the same time, the European Commission referred Hungary
to the European Court of Justice over its Higher Education Law,
344
amended in April 2017 in
what was broadly seen as an attack on Central European University, an American institution
in Budapest founded by nancier and “open society” champion George
Soros. In September 2018, the European Parliament triggered Article 7
against Hungary. Broadly speaking, Budapest has not ignored Brussels
but has made largely cosmetic adjustments.
345
The potential effective-
ness of this step has also been blunted by European party politics, as the
European People’s Party (EPP), of which Orbán’s Fidesz is a member, has
helped shield Orbán from political recourse and is an obstacle to effective
democracy protection in the EU.
A more successful example of the EU helping to check democratic back-
sliding was in the case of Romania in 2012, when Victor Ponta of the
center-left Social Democratic Party took power as prime minister and
impeached center-right president, Traian Băsescu, removing constitu-
tional checks on the impeachment procedure to ease the task. Issue
linkage increased Brussels’ leverage in Romania. The country remains
outside the Schengen Area and with Bulgaria is subject to post-accession monitoring via
the EU’s Mechanism for Cooperation and Verication, instituted in 2006 shortly before their
accession to assess progress against corruption, organized crime, and judicial reform.
346
Ponta complied with Commission and Council demands, including reinstating a 50-percent
turnout requirement to validate the referendum to conrm the impeachment. This was a
miscalculation by Ponta;
347
the opposition opted for a strategy of boycotting the referendum
that then failed to meet the 50-percent requirement.
Another promising example is the success that Polish courts have found in protecting the
independence of the judiciary by referring cases to the CJEU concerning their independence
and status, relying on EU law and the understanding that Polish courts are European courts.
For example, Polish legislation that would have lowered the retirement age of judges of the
Supreme Court was brought before the CJEU in 2018 and found to be contrary to EU law.
348
The EU should also adopt rule of law conditionality for member states to receive struc-
tural funds. Conditionality should be imposed fairly across the EU, including in long-tenured
member states as well as those that joined in the 2004 and subsequent enlargements. An
alternative way to structure such measures to protect rule of law via the EU budget would be
European states are subject
to a uniquely dense web
of regional institutions
that aim to support
democracy with free and
fair elections, rule of law,
freedom of the press, and
human rights.
Democracy Playbook 65
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
to link overall levels of EU funds provided to a member state
to a rule of law index, whereby states that score higher on
the index have greater access to funds. This would employ
an incentive process rather than a punitive approach.
349
The
denitions and measurements of such a rule of law index
could be established according to rulings of the European
Court of Human Rights and with reference to the opinions of
the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission that has already
conducted reviews of numerous problematic policies in
Hungary and Poland.
350
C. ADVANCING INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES
European states are subject to a uniquely dense web of
regional institutions that aim to support democracy with
free and fair elections, rule of law, freedom of the press, and
human rights, including the Council of Europe (CoE), the
European Court of Human Rights, the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), and the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
These institutions produce reports and rulings that deter mis-
behavior by governments that fear reputational damage, but they lack strong enforcement
mechanisms.
351
This dynamic is evident in the fact that the OSCE includes governments
long considered to be more authoritarian than that of Turkey, including Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan (which has held the chairmanship of the organization),
352
Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
353
Additionally, Azerbaijan and Russia are also part
of the Council of Europe despite their shaky democratic records.
354
Nearly all European countries are members of the CoE and the OSCE. The OSCE contains
an Oce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) that deals with the “human
dimension” of security; conducts election monitoring; and works to strengthen democratic
governance, human rights, tolerance, and non-discrimination.
355
CoE members are subject
to the European Court of Human Rights
356
and the Venice Commission.
357
Despite their weak
enforcement mechanisms, these institutions can still work in a deterrent capacity, urging
member states to heed rulings out of concern for the blow they would suffer to their positional
inuence in the organization if they did not.
NATO Secretary-General
Jens Stoltenberg gives
a news conference in
Brussels, Belgium.
66 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
D. BOLSTERING U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC TOOLS
In the contemporary cases of democratic backsliding in Europe, the United States has a
mixed record of advancing democratic reforms. The Obama administration spoke out against
Hungary’s
358
backsliding, and in 2014, the State Department banned six Hungarian ocials
from entering the United States on suspicion of corruption.
359
Poland was a sharper challenge
as a larger country more central to U.S. security and defense strategy in Europe and the host
of NATO’s 2016 Warsaw summit. Obama gently expressed concerns about Warsaw’s actions
against the rule of law and the need to work to “sustain Poland’s democratic institutions” in
public remarks with President Andrzej Duda; Polish public television mistranslated Obama
to remove the criticism.
360
The Trump administration’s positions on illiberal governments have been less consistent
and at times enabling for regressing regimes. While President Obama’s speech on Warsaw’s
Castle Square in 2014 stressed democracy, this theme was conspicuously deemphasized
from President Trump’s speech there three years later in favor of Western civilization.
361
In
background remarks ahead of then Secretary Tillerson’s travel to Poland in January 2018,
a senior State Department ocial stated: “Poland is one of Europe’s oldest democracies.
Democracy is alive and well there. We leave questions of internal policy to the Poles and
trust that any reforms that they’re looking at are consistent with their constitution and the
will of their people.”
362
However, on-the-record statements by then-Department spokeswoman
Heather Nauert were more critical.
363
While Hungary was initially disappointed by a lack of
attention from Trump—whom Orbán had endorsed as a like-minded leader—Trump received
Orbán in the White House in May 2019 providing an endorsing effect in the run-up to the 2019
European Parliamentary Elections.
364
Congress has remained more critical, particularly over
the Higher Education Law, which targeted an American university, but the Trump administra-
tion’s policy of engagement is lending credibility to the ruling governments in Hungary and
Poland.
365
Moreover, the steady erosion of diplomatic capabilities within the U.S. Government
and the deprioritization of democracy and governance programming is clearly hurting U.S.
efforts. So too are President Trump’s attacks on the media, judges, political opposition, and
blatant use of racist rhetoric.
However, the United States still has important economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal
to advance democratic progress, if it has the political will. In terms of incentives, the U.S.,
along with other foreign governments, can leverage trade relations and potential economic
“carrots” including visa liberalization and customs union dialogues to encourage democratic
reforms. The inclusion of Poland in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (a long-running sore point
in the relationship as Poland is one of few EU and NATO members not included) could be
used to incentivize rule of law improvements, for example.
366
Democracy Playbook 67
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Among punitive measures, tracking corruption and issuing targeted sanctions is one effective
tool. Foreign governments should coordinate with intelligence and diplomatic efforts to call
out governments on illicit practices and identify, seize, and track ill-gotten wealth. Additional
options include asset freezes and restrictions on the ability of corrupt or illiberal elites to
travel, purchase luxury goods, and send their children to private schools overseas. Travel
bans should include spouses, families, and supporters of regime elites.
367
Sanctions, when applied appropriately, can be an effective tool. In current circumstances,
one option would be to expand sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act against specic
corrupt actors in Turkey, Hungary, and possibly Poland to communicate that corruption is
a transgression that Washington takes seriously. The sanctions should not be removed on
political grounds.
368
The private sector can also be effective in opening
space for democracy, and global nancial institutions cutting off credit
can drive a wedge between authoritarian governments and economic
elites. It is important to note, however, that unilateral sanctions or blanket
sanctions that punish entire sections of a society tend to be less effec-
tive, allowing regimes to project themselves as defenders of the people
against outside punishment.
In addition, transatlantic governments could consider imposing targeted
sanctions against foreign ocials, or ocially sponsored, purveyors of
disinformation. In 2018, the U.S. administration provided for sanctions
against individuals and entities involved in operations to interfere in the
U.S. elections. This included individuals and companies that were part of
the so-called “troll farm” in St. Petersburg that produced and distributed
disinformation during the 2016 presidential elections. The United States
should work in coordination with democratic allies to expose disinformation operations by
foreign governments and sanction the entities involved in such operations.
369
Finally, the U.S. government has the power to raise attention among domestic and international
audiences of transgressions against democracy and the rule of law. Congress, especially the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, should hold
regular hearings on the state of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The purpose of
such hearings should be to raise awareness of the economic, political, and defense concerns
posed by illiberal regimes to U.S. national security interests in Europe, and to press the exec-
utive branch on its policies for countering democratic decline in these countries.
370
The U.S.
Helsinki Commission—an independent government agency set up by Congress to monitor
European and Eurasian respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms—is another
channel to voice concerns. As money reects priorities, it is also critical that appropriations
committees work to maintain or increase foreign assistance.
Foreign governments
should coordinate
with intelligence and
diplomatic eorts to call
out governments on illicit
practices and identify,
seize, and track ill-gotten
wealth.
68 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
E. BETTER UTILIZING NATO PLATFORMS
NATO is another transatlantic venue that should be better utilized in responding to democratic
backsliding. While NATO as a military organization is not and should not be a leading actor in
addressing democracy challenges, it is an institution comprised of member states that have
committed to “strengthening their free institutions”
371
and should therefore stand by those
principles whenever possible. Member states, foremost among them Turkey, Hungary, and
Poland, are experiencing democratic backsliding that is hurting, particularly in the case of
Turkey, alliance trust and interoperability. Democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law are
founding principles of NATO. Democratic backsliding and corruption within member states not
only go against these principles, but also pose threats to shared security, and provide more
vulnerabilities for Russia and other adversaries to exploit. Allies therefore have a responsibility
to push back on such political developments.
Possible steps include creating a commission or special ombudsman’s oce within NATO
that would be responsible for identifying violations of alliance principles. A more stringent
step would be revising NATO’s consensus voting rule in favor of a procedure that requires a
qualied majority of states to agree in order to pass a proposal. This would prevent a bloc
of illiberal states within NATO from shielding one another from attempts by other member
states to use NATO mechanisms to apply pressure for anti-democratic practices. At a mini-
mum, NATO should continue to bolster its communiqué language regarding the importance
of democracy to the strength of the alliance and should not hold summits or meetings in
countries that have seen signicant regression on rule of law.
SECTION 2.4 KEY RESOURCES:
• Burrows, Matthew J. and Maria J. Stephan, Bolstering Democracy: Lessons Learned and the
Path Forward. Washington: The Atlantic Council, 2017.
• Polyakova, Alina et al. The Anatomy of Illiberal States. Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-anatomy-of-illiberal-states.
Democracy Playbook 69
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
5. Conclusion of section 2
This section examined the role foreign partners can play in supporting domestic pro-
democracy actors. We identify four best practices of engagement for national governments
and institutions, individual government officials, donor partners, and international institutions:
(1) partnering with domestic civil society and non-governmental organizations; (2) supporting
nonviolent movements; (3) ghting disinformation campaigns; and (4) providing institutional
support. Throughout, we advocate for an indirect approach to democracy support that prior-
itizes empowering domestic actors.
European Union leaders attend
a roundtable meeting at the
European Union leaders summit
in Brussels, Belgium.
70 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
To restore and strengthen
democracy’s vibrancy and
resiliency, democratic
actors must be prepared
to compete more
eectively with would
be authoritarians by
demonstrating that
democracies best meet the
needs of their citizens.
A map of European countries
is pictured during the election
campaign of Arne Lietz, candi-
date of the Social Democratic
Party (SPD) for the upcoming
European Parliament elections.
Conclusion
T
he battle for democracy is a long game, one that has been contested for centuries.
The word itself (from demos, “common people” and kratos, “strength”) provides us the
starting point for a playbook that aims to equip diverse groups and individuals with
strategies and tactics to strengthen democratic resilience, reverse regression, and fend off
authoritarian resurgence.
In his initial address to the nation as the rst post-communist president of
Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel captured the essence of why democracy is
a participatory game, one with responsibilities for a broad array of stake-
holders: “the best government in the world, the best parliament and the
best president, cannot achieve much on their own. And it would be wrong
to expect a general remedy from them alone. Freedom and democracy
include participation and therefore responsibility from us all.”
372
We opened with a call for democratic actors to see this competition
between democracy and illiberalism as an urgent and unrelenting chal-
lenge, but a winnable one. To restore and strengthen democracy’s vibrancy
and resiliency, democratic actors must be prepared to compete more
effectively with would be authoritarians by demonstrating that democ-
racies best meet the needs of their citizens. The Democracy Playbook
distills strategic insights, drawn from social science research and case
Democracy Playbook 71
studies on the United States and Europe, and provides a broad set of methods and tactics
that can help democratic actors outmaneuver illiberal forces and strengthen the pillars of
liberal democracy.
This playbook was divided into two main sections. The rst focused on assessing the chal-
lenges and proposing a set of strategies for the direct “players,” four major domestic actors
with the capacity to promote democracy within their own nations: the incumbent political
establishment; the political opposition; civil society and independent media; and private enter-
prise. Mere capacity for action is insucient. It is the strength and willingness of the people to
wield their power to hold leaders accountable and exercise all existing rights that can make a
difference. We argued that ghting for democracy is a worthy goal, and that not all strategies
are created equal; some are generally more effective than others.
Democratic nations of course exist in a contested global environment. To oversimplify the
challenge: we now have a global eld of competition that pits the community of democratic
states against the opposing illiberal model pushed by powerful states such as Russia and
China. External support from pro-democracy actors is thus critical, but must be comple-
mentary to internal democratic reform. In section 2 we provide a set of strategies and best
practices for external actors to support pro-democracy actors on the
ground. Lines of effort include: empowering and partnering with domes-
tic organizations; assisting nonviolent and civil resistance movements;
countering disinformation; leveraging institutional and ocial diplomatic
and economic tools in order to incentivize democratic reforms; exposing
the fraudulent and corrupt tactics of authoritarians; and, enhancing the
capacity and training of pro-democracy actors.
Because there are varying amounts of free space to operate in backsliding
democracies, cross-cutting imperatives for both domestic and external
actors should be proactive, dene clear goals, and begin to map out the
“plays” as early as possible. Ultimately, greater success will come from
the concerted and interconnected efforts of diverse actors to push back
on illiberal activity before it becomes entrenched.
Appearances matter to authoritarians. They seek to operate under a veneer of legality,
perverting their own justice system in incremental and underhanded ways. Similarly, they
seek to erode the credibility and capacity of international institutions to act as a bulwark
against domestic backsliding. Defending the rule of law is fundamental and should be a rst
line of defense.
A shared reality for domestic and international actors is that technology has forever changed
the game of democracy. Elections are now increasingly complex and vulnerable to manipu-
lation—and the threats shift faster than we can identify them. We are only able to scratch the
surface of this topic; it merits its own playbook, ongoing research, and a far greater dedication
Mere capacity for action
is insucient. It is the
strength and willingness
of the people to wield their
power to hold leaders
accountable and exercise
all existing rights that can
make a dierence.
72 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
of resources. But, in order to trust elections and their outcomes, they rst and foremost must
be protected from interference. Technology enables incredible advances in democracy and
can improve its eciency, but an ongoing challenge will be to protect the pillars of democracy
from internal and external manipulation. Technology is not a stand-alone component; it is
the connective tissue that can inform, connect, and mobilize voters. It can also misinform,
alienate, and undermine trust in democracy. Managing this tension and understanding how
to harness social media and technology to defend democracy will be part of the battleeld
for generations.
Another important area that deserves its own playbook—and has been a recurrent theme for
this report—is the issue of messaging; speaking to citizens in a way that earns their trust,
understands emotional needs, makes an evidence-based case for the benets of democracy,
exposes the dangerous encroachments of authoritarians, and makes people feel respected.
Illiberals have been successful at using technology to better effect, channeling outrage and
stoking fear—in part because social media is designed to reward those messaging tactics.
Merely to blame social media is lazy—pro-democracy actors need to be self-critical, under-
stand where they have not delivered, and how they can do better. It may be that the liberal
actors have a more dicult challenge because long-term success depends on taking the
high road by being truthful and inclusive in their messaging. But to resort to the toolkit of the
illiberals will only undermine pro-democracy efforts in the long run.
As we crafted this report, we consulted with leading experts in countries where democracy
is being threatened, and where there is an urgent need for dynamic strategies to resist the
illiberal toolkit. We unpacked strategies employed by domestic and international actors and
sought to discern when and where they might work best. Democracy is not perfect, but
it is the only political system that can legitimately hold governments accountable and, in
turn, provide a more peaceful and prosperous world. Moreover, people are at the heart of
democratic improvement. When it comes to defending democracies, each person matters,
as do the strategic decisions they make. Let each of us take our turn—the stakes have
seldom been higher.
Democracy Playbook 73
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Endnotes
1 The Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) denes “autocratization” as any substantial and
signicant worsening on the scale of liberal democracy. This umbrella term covers both erosion
in democratic countries (democratic backsliding), breakdown of democracy, and worsening of
conditions in electoral authoritarian countries. See Anna Lührmann et al., Democracy Facing
Global Challenges. V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019 (Gothenburg: V-Dem, May 2019),
https://www.v-dem.net/media/ler_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-
dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf.
2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2019), 4, https://
freedomhouse.org/sites/default/les/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf.
3 Larry Diamond, “The Global Crisis of Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2019, https://www.
wsj.com/articles/the-global-crisis-of-democracy-11558105463.
4 Lührmann et al., Democracy Facing Global Challenges.
5 There is a robust debate among scholars over the extent and severity of the global democratic
recession. The current wave of autocratization is occurring within a relatively democratic era.
More than half of all countries in the world are considered democratic, and democratic progress
across parts of Asia and Africa means that globally, more people now live in democracies than
at any point in history. For a useful overview of this debate, see Anna Lührmann and Staffan I.
Lindberg, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About it?” Democratization 26,
no. 7 (2019): 1096–1098.
6 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here.”
7 Ibid.
8 Alina Polyakova, Torrey Taussig, Ted Reinert, Kemal Kirişci, Amanda Sloat, Melissa Hooper,
Norman Eisen, and Andrew Kenealy, The Anatomy of Illiberal States: Assessing and Responding
to Democratic Decline in Turkey and Central Europe, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
February 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/illiberal-states-web.pdf.
9 Jon Stone, “Spain Elections: Right-Wing Populists and Eurosceptics Now Represented in 23 out
of 28 EU Member States,” Independent, April 29, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/spain-elections-far-right-party-eu-member-states-vox-parliament-a8891706.html.
10
For an assessment of the importance of contextual factors, see J. Preston Whitt et al.,
“Leveraging Transparency, Accountability, and Participation to Build Effective Anti-Corruption
Strategies in the Natural Resource Space,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
forthcoming).
11
See, e.g., Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Alina Polyakova, “Populism and the Coming Era of Political
Paralysis in Europe,” Washington Post, May 24, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/05/24/populism-coming-era-political-paralysis-europe.
12
See, e.g., Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015).
13
For scholarship on the importance of structural variables (and, in particular, authoritarian strength)
in explaining regime type see, e.g., Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism:
Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
74 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
14 Christopher Carothers, “The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of
Democracy 29, no. 4 (October 2018): 129–135.
15
On the importance of incumbent political elites’ decisions, see, e.g., Steven Levitsky and Daniel
Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018), and Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-
Liñan, Democracies and Dictatorship in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2013); on political opposition see, e.g., Valerie Bunce and Sharon
Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), and Laura Gamboa, “Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the
Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela,” Comparative Politics 49, no. 4 (July 2017):
457–477; on civil society and civil resistance, see, e.g., Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman,
Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2016); Marshall Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy
in the California Farm Worker Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), and Erica
Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); and on the average citizen see, e.g.,
Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York: Crown,
2017). There is also evolving literature describing the structural causes of democratic backslid-
ing. See, e.g., David Andersen, “Comparative Democratization and Democratic Backsliding: The
Case for a Historical-Institutional Approach,” Comparative Politics 51, no. 4 (2019): 645–663.
However, the solutions to these structural determinants are debatable and beyond the more
immediate and actionable focus of this playbook.
16
Larry Diamond, In Search of Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2016), 3.
17
Consider voter suppression policies in the United States, such as heightened voter-ID
requirements, automatic voter roll purging, and frequent changes to polling locations that all
disproportionately affect people of color and students. These policies tend to disfavor one of
the major political parties over the other.
18
Andrew Kenealy, Norman Eisen, and Darrell West, “A Perilous Election Looms,”
The Brookings Institution, October 22, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
xgov/2018/10/22/a-perilous-election-looms.
19
Michael Birnbaum and Craig Timberg, “E.U.: Russians Interfered in Our Elections, Too,”
Washington Post, June 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/14/
eu-russians-interfered-our-elections-too.
20
Kenealy, Eisen, and West, “A Perilous Election.”
21 Alina Polyakova and Spencer P. Boyer, The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, the West, and the
Coming Age of Global Digital Competition (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fp_20180316_future_political_war-
fare.pdf.
22
E.g., Kedron Bardwell, “Campaign Finance Laws and the Competition for Spending in
Gubernatorial Elections,” Social Science Quarterly 84, no. 4 (2003): 811–825; Kihong Eom and
Donald A. Gross, “Contribution Limits and Disparity in Contributions Between Gubernatorial
Candidates,” Political Research Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2006): 99–110; Donald Gross and Robert
K. Goidel, “The Impact of State Campaign Finance Laws,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 1,
no. 2 (2001): 180–195; Robert E. Hogan, “The Costs of Representation in State Legislatures:
Explaining Variations in Campaign Spending,” Social Science Quarterly 81, no. 5 (2000):
941–956; and Patrick Flavin, “Campaign Finance Laws, Policy Outcomes, and Political Equality
in the American States,” Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 1 (2015): 77–88.
Democracy Playbook 75
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
23 Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 48–49. For instance, at the Democratic National
Convention of 1968, Hubert Humphrey won the presidential nomination despite not par-
ticipating in any primaries, due to the preference and power of party insiders. Humphrey’s
controversial nomination led to protests outside the convention, and his presidential loss led to
reforms for a more democratic nomination system.
24
Frances McCall Rosenbluth and Ian Shapiro, Responsible Parties: Saving Democracy from Itself
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 123-124; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair
Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics (New York:
Public Affairs, 2011), 66.
25
Fabio Wolkenstein, “Deliberative Democracy Within Parties” (PhD diss., London School of
Economics and Political Science, 2016), 3.
26
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 106–117.
27
Ibid., 106–111.
28 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
29
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 112–113.
30
Mark Tushnet, “Constitutional Hardball,” The John Marshall Law Review 37 (2004): 523–553.
31
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 109–111. In jurisdictions where constitutionally per-
missible, further legal mechanisms may be used to respond to extreme behavior by sanctioning
or disqualifying candidates or parties from elections without deeming them illegal or uncon-
stitutional. Such sanctions can be used to allow illiberal political parties to continue operating
while still limiting their political participation. The specics of these mechanisms vary depend-
ing on the context, but can be effective given an enabling environment. See Svetlana Tylkina,
Militant Democracy: Undemocratic Political Parties and Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2015).
32
Hana de Goeij and Marc Santora, “In the Largest Protests in Decades, Czechs Demand
Resignation of Prime Minister,” New York Times, June 23, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/06/23/world/europe/czech-republic-protests-andrej-babis.html.
33
Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States.
34
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 102.
35
Ibid., 104.
36 Much scholarship has focused on the “inclusion-moderation” thesis, which holds that inclusion
in political processes can serve to moderate radical or extremist groups. Recent work, particu-
larly in the wake of the Arab Spring, suggests that this approach depends on contextual factors,
and there is little consensus regarding which strategies are effective. This subject requires
further study before best practices are articulated. See, e.g., Jillian Schwedler, “Can Islamists
Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Nexus,” World Politics 63, no. 2 (April
2011): 347–376.
37
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 11–32. We acknowledge that there are exceptions to
this rule, such as the populist Progress Party’s place in the coalition government in Norway. We
nevertheless offer the following typology for identifying prospective authoritarians as a guide
for when and how to exclude extremist leaders.
38
Elisabeth Zerofsky, “Viktor Orbán’s Far Right Vision for Europe,” The New Yorker
online, January 14, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/14/
viktor-orbans-far-right-vision-for-europe.
76 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
39 James Kirchick, “Hungary,” in Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States, 13–15.
40
Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
41
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 23–24.
42
Ibid., 24–26.
43 Political parties and leaders also have a responsibility to educate their constituencies and the
electorate about the dangers of authoritarianism and ag the early indicators of authoritar-
ian-leaning politicians. Their efforts should further be complemented by a public education
campaign conducted by civil society. Cf. Richard D. Kahlenberg and Clifford Janey, “Putting
Democracy Back in Public Education,” The Century Foundation, November 16, 2016, https://tcf.
org/content/report/putting-democracy-back-public-education/?session=1.
44
Zack Beauchamp, “Macron vs. Le Pen: The French Presidential Election, Explained,” Vox, May 6,
2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/5/5/15543294/french-election-macron-le-pen.
45
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Paul Taggart, “Dealing with Populists in Government: A
Framework for Analysis,” Democratization 23, no. 2 (2016): 201–220.
46
Christopher M. Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and
Conceptual Analysis,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 44, no. 4 (Autumn 1996):
605–626.
47
Richard Stacey and Sujit Choudhry, “International Standards for the Independence of the
Judiciary,” The Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law and Democracy Reporting
International Brieng Papers, September 2013, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3025990.
48
Kim Lane Scheppele, “The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do
Not Work,” Governance 26, no. 4 (2013): 559–562.
49
Kim Lane Scheppele, “Autocratic Legalism,” The University of Chicago Law Review 85, no. 2
(2018): 545–583.
50
Geoffrey Vos, “Protecting the Independence of Individual Judges and Ensuring their Impartiality,”
Strengthening Judicial Independence and Impartiality as a Pre-Condition for the Rule of Law
in Council of Europe Member States: Opening and Concluding Remarks, Key Speeches and
General Rapporteur‘s Report, April 21-22, 2016, 27, https://rm.coe.int/proceedings-of-the-confer-
ence-on-strengthening-judicial-independence-s/16808b64d4, 27.
51
Ibid.
52 Bojan Bugarič and Tom Ginsburg, “The Assault on Postcommunist Courts,” Journal of
Democracy 27, no. 3 (2016): 74.
53
“Justice Purged: Poland Politicizes its Judiciary,” Human Rights First, June 2018, https://www.
humanrightsrst.org/resource/justice-purged-poland-politicizes-its-judiciary.
54
Bugarič and Ginsburg, “The Assault on Postcommunist Courts,” 73.
55 Ibid.
56 “Justice Purged: Poland Politicizes its Judiciary,” 2; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016: Poland
Country Report (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016), 8, https://www.bti-project.org/lead-
min/les/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Poland.pdf.
Democracy Playbook 77
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
57 Hungary is another place where the judiciary faces attacks on independence. The Fidesz party
has “drastically revised the Hungarian constitutional and political order by systematically dis-
mantling checks and balances” (Bugarič and Ginsburg, “The Assault on Postcommunist Courts,”
73). The revisions have systematically targeted institutional independence and turned the
judiciary into a political tool. From 2010 to 2015, for example, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and
his administration pushed to change nomination rules, restricted jurisdiction over scal matters,
lled the court with hand-picked loyalists, and passed an amendment to prevent judges from
invoking past precedents in new cases (Ibid.). More recently, Orbán’s government created a sep-
arate administrative court to handle cases touching on elections, asylum, right to assembly, and
police violence (Lydia Gall, “Hungary’s Latest Assault on the Judiciary,” Human Rights Watch,
December 14, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/14/hungarys-latest-assault-judiciary).
The Minister of Justice will control hiring and promotion of judges on the new court “without
any effective judicial oversight.” Critics of the law have warned of its “enormous potential to
control the workings of judges and the courts” (Ibid.).
58
“Council of Europe Plan of Action on Strengthening Judicial Independence and Impartiality,”
Council of Europe, April 13, 2016, https://rm.coe.int/1680700125.
59
Ibid., 19–24.
60 E.g., Catharina Lindstedt and Daniel Naurin, “Transparency is Not Enough: Making Transparency
Effective in Reducing Corruption,” International Political Science Review 31, no. 3 (June 2010):
301–322.
61
Stephen Grimmelikhuisjen and Albert Klijn, “The Effects of Judicial Transparency on Public
Trust: Evidence from a Field Experiment,” Public Administration 93, no. 4 (2015): 995–1011.
62
Daniel Chen, Tobias J. Moskowitz, and Kelly Shue, “Decision-Making Under the Gambler’s
Fallacy: Evidence from Asylum Judges, Loan Ocers, and Baseball Umpires,” National Bureau of
Economic Research, February 2016, https://www.nber.org/papers/w22026; Matt Dunn, Levent
Sagun, Hale Sirin, and Daniel Chen, “Early Predictability of Asylum Court Decisions,” Proceedings
of the 16th Edition of the International Conference on Articial Intelligence and Law, June 2017,
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3086537.
63
Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States.
64
On the importance of political parties in Europe to democratization, see Giovanni Capoccia and
Daniel Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for
Europe and Beyond,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 8–9 (August 2010): 931–968.
65
Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders. For an analysis of the two levels of compe-
tition between authoritarians and the pro-democratic political opposition, see Andreas Schedler,
The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013).
66
Marc Morjé Howard and Philip Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive
Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (April 2006): 365–381.
67
Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders, 215–246.
68
Ibid., 247–277.
69 Howard and Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.”
70 Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders, 252.
78 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
71 Jennifer Gandhi and Ora John Reuter, “The Incentives for Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Non-
Democratic Elections,” Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 137–159.
72
Jan-Werner Müller, “Can Direct Democracy Defeat Populism?,” Project Syndicate,
September 18, 2019, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
direct-democracy-weapon-against-populism-by-jan-werner-mueller-2019-09.
73
For more on how authoritarians tamper with elections, see Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas,
How to Rig an Election (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).
74
Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders, 256.
75
Ibid., 46.
76 Erica Frantz, “Voter Turnout and Opposition Performance in Competitive Authoritarian
Elections,” Electoral Studies 54 (August 2018): 218, 225.
77
See, e.g., Jan-Werner Müller, “Populism and the People,” London Review of Books, May 23, 2019,
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n10/jan-werner-muller/populism-and-the-people; and Luigi Zingales,
“The Right Way to Resist Trump,” New York Times, November 18, 2016, https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/11/18/opinion/the-right-way-to-resist-trump.html.
78
Nathaniel Persily, “Can Democracy Survive the Internet?” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 2 (2017):
71–72.
79
Ibid., 72.
80 Ibid.
81 Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “The #Macron Leaks Operation,” Atlantic Council,
June 20, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/
the-macron-leaks-operation-a-post-mortem.
82
Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders, 257.
83
Ibid.
84 Carothers, “The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism.”
85 Ashlea Rundlett and Milan Svolik, “Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in
Electoral Fraud,” American Political Science Review 110, no. 1 (February 2016): 180–197.
86
Valentin Baryshnikov and Robert Coalson, “Numbers Don’t Lie: Statistics Point to Massive Fraud
in Russia’s Duma Vote,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 20, 2016, https://www.rferl.
org/a/statistics-point-to-massive-fraud-russia-state-duma-elections/28002750.html; Kim Lane
Scheppele, “Hungary and the End of Politics,” The Nation, May 6, 2014, https://www.thenation.
com/article/hungary-and-end-politics.
87
For more on these processes, see Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States.
88
This framework of political opposition strategies derives from Laura Gamboa, “Opposition at the
Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela,” Comparative
Politics 49, no. 4 (July 2017): 457–477.
89
Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 215–220.
90
For more on these distinctions, see, e.g., Peter Fabienne, “Political Legitimacy,” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2017 edition), https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/legitimacy/#FunPolLeg.
Democracy Playbook 79
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
91 Christian von Soest and Julia Grauvogel, “Identity, Procedures, and their Performance: How
Authoritarian Regimes Legitimize Their Rule,” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 3 (May 2017):
287–305.
92
Scheppele, “The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate”; and Scheppele, “Autocratic Legalism.”
93 While Gamboa (2017) categorizes protests as extra-institutional radical measures, we believe
that the relationship between nonviolent resistance and democracy is strong, and so dis-
tinguish nonviolent resistance from such extreme extra-institutional measures as coups
or guerilla warfare. See, e.g., Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, How Freedom is Won:
From Civil Resistance to Durable Democracy (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2005), https://
freedomhouse.org/sites/default/les/How%20Freedom%20is%20Won.pdf; Chenoweth and
Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works; Markus Bayer, Felix S. Bethke, and Daniel Lamback, “The
Democratic Dividend of Nonviolent Resistance,” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 6 (2016):
758–771; and Felix S. Bethke and Jonathan Pinckney, “Non-Violent Resistance and the Quality
of Democracy,” Conict Management and Peace Science (2019).
94
Henry Olsen, “Turkey’s Elections in Istanbul Show that Democracy is Tough to Subvert,”
Washington Post, June 24, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/24/
turkeys-elections-istanbul-shows-that-democracy-is-tough-subvert.
95
Lisel Hintz, “How a Hashtag and Memes are Uniting Turkey’s Opposition,” Washington Post,
May 22, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/11/how-
a-hashtag-and-memes-are-uniting-turkeys-opposition; Murat Somer, “Turkish Democracy
is Still Alive,” Foreign Policy, June 19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/19/
turkish-democracy-is-still-alive.
96
Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat, “What is Civil Society and Who Represents Civil
Society in the EU?—Results of an Online Survey Among Civil Society Experts,” Policy & Society
28, no. 1 (2009): 14.
97
See, e.g., Robert Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nonetti, Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Mark Warren,
“Civil Society and Democracy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society, ed. Michael Edwards
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 377–390; and Robert Fishman, “How Civil Society
Matters in Democratization: Setting the Boundaries of Post-Transition Political Inclusion,”
Comparative Politics 49, no. 3 (April 2017): 391–409.
98
Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš, “Civic Action and Democratic Power Shifts: On
Strategies and Resources,” in Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change
in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš (Washington,
DC: German Marshall Fund, 2007), 176, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/
reclaiming-democracy-civil-society-and-electoral-change-central-and-eastern-europe.
99
Hardy Merriman, “A Movement-Centered Support Model: Considerations for Human Rights
Funders and Organizations, Part II,” International Center on Nonviolent Conict, May 21, 2018,
https://www.nonviolent-conict.org/blog_post/part-2-movement-centered-support-model-con-
siderations-funders-organizations. The denition is adapted from Gene Sharp’s denition of
nonviolent action.
100
Ibid.
101 For more on Charter 77, see, e.g., Jonathan Bolton, Worlds of Dissent: Charter 77, The Plastic
People of the Universe, and Czech Culture Under Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2014).
80 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
102 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (New York:
The New Press, 2012), 26–36.
103
Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, A Theory of Fields (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 75.
104
For more on “pillars” of authoritarian power, see Robert Helvey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conict:
Thinking About the Fundamentals (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), 9–18.
105
Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works.
106
Ibid.
107 Ibid., 3–61.
108 Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, 65–69.
109
Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works. Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and
Democrats, agrees that group strategy is an important factor.
110
Additional recommendations can be found in the work of the International Center on
Nonviolent Conict. See, e.g., Hardy Merriman, “Democracy Insurance,” International Center
on Nonviolent Conict, September 7, 2017, https://www.nonviolent-conict.org/blog_post/
democracy-insurance; Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman, “The Checklist for Ending Tyranny,”
in Is Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?, eds. Mathew Burrows and Maria J. Stephan
(Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, 2015), 63–80.
111
Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 8, 10–21, and passim.
112
Ibid., 14–19.
113 Ibid., 17.
114 Ibid.
115 Catherine Corrigall-Brown, Patterns of Protest: Trajectories of Participation in Social Movements
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 61–62.
116
Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 17.
117
Ibid., 19.
118 Srdja Popovic, Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other
Nonviolent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the
World (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015), 151.
119
Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 40.
120
Ibid., 39–61.
121 Ibid., 10.
122 Popovic, Blueprint for Revolution, 39.
123
Ibid., 159–167.
124 Nadja Mosimann, Line Rennwald, and Adrian Zimmermann, “The Radical Right, the Labour
Movement and the Competition for the Workers’ Vote,” Economics and Industrial Democracy 40,
no. 1 (2019): 81.
Democracy Playbook 81
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
125 Peter Ackers, “Trade Unions as Professional Associations,” in Finding a Voice at Work: New
Perspectives on Employment Relations, eds. Stewart Johnstone and Peter Ackers (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 95–126.
126
Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick and Richard Hyman, “Democracy in Trade Unions, Democracy
Through Trade Unions?” Economics and Industrial Democracy 40, no. 1 (2019): 91–110; Lucio
Baccaro, Chiara Benassi, and Guglielmo Meardi, “Theoretical and Empirical Links Between Trade
Unions and Democracy,” Economic and Industrial Democracy 40, no. 1 (2019): 3–19.
127
Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 69–73. The authors nd three exceptions
to this principle—regime change, anti-occupation, and secession—that are beyond the scope of
this report.
128
Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 6–7.
129
“Prosazujeme protikorupční zákony,” Rekonstrukce Státu, https://www.rekonstrukcestatu.cz/
cs/co-delame/prosazujeme-protikorupcni-zakony. One of the report’s authors, Norman Eisen,
engaged with this group while serving as U.S. Ambassador to the Czech Republic from 2011
to 2014.
130
Popovic, Blueprint for Revolution, 169–171.
131
Grigorji Meseznikov and Ol’ga Gyarfasova, “Explaining Eastern Europe: Slovakia’s Conicting
Camps,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (July 2018): 78–90.
132
“Alumni Prole: Juraj Seliga,” John Jay Institute, June 25, 2019 interview, https://www.johnjay-
fellows.com/news/2019/06/25/alum-prole-juraj-seliga; Marc Santora, “Young Slovaks Buck
a Trend, Protesting to Save Their Democracy,” New York Times, March 17, 2018, https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/03/17/world/europe/slovakia-protests-robert-co-jan-kuciak.html. The suc-
cess of A Decent Slovakia also demonstrates the importance of recognizing opportunities for
mass mobilization. As such moments—in this case, the murder of a journalist—can be impos-
sible to foresee, civil resistance leaders must be nimble and adaptive enough to seize on them
when they arise.
133
“Alumni Prole: Juraj Seliga.”
134 Marc Santora, “Slovakia’s First Female President, Zuzana Caputova, Takes Oce in a Divided
Country,” New York Times, June 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/world/europe/
zuzana-caputova-slovakia-president.html.
135
James Curran and Toril Aalberg, How Media Inform Democracy: A Comparative Approach (New
York: Routledge, 2012).
136
Ibid., 3.
137 Ibid.
138 Irwin Stotzky, “Democratic Theory, the Courts and the Press,” Democratization 11, no. 3 (2004):
121 (quoted in part from Benjamin Cardozo).
139
“Democracy at Risk: Threats and Attacks Against Media Freedom
in Europe,” Council of Europe, February 2019, 5, https://rm.coe.int/
annual-report-2018-democracy-in-danger-threats-and-attacks-media-freed/1680926453.
140
Ibid.
82 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
141 Zselyke Csaky, “A New Toolbox for Co-opting the Media” in Freedom and the Media: A Downward
Spiral, ed. Sarah Repucci (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2019): 16–23, https://freedom-
house.org/sites/default/les/FINAL07162019_Freedom_And_The_Media_2019_Report.pdf.
142
“Democracy at Risk,” 24–25.
143 Ibid., 5.
144 “Freedom of the Press 2017: Turkey,” Freedom House, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-press/2017/turkey.
145
Susan Corke, Andrew Finkel, David J. Kramer, Carla Anne Robbins, and Nate Schenkkan,
Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey (Washington, DC: Freedom House,
2014), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/les/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf.
146
Ibid.
147 “2019 World Press Freedom Index,” Reporters Without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/turkey.
148
“Freedom of the Press 2017: Hungary,” Freedom House, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-press/2017/hungary.
149
Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis, 25.
150
Ibid., 26.
151 Ibid., 25–26.
152 Benjamin Novak, “Radio Free Europe is Poised to Return to a Less Free Hungary,” New York
Times, September 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/world/europe/radio-free-eu-
rope-hungary-orban.html.
153
Ibid.
154 Epp Lauk and Halliko Harro-Loit, “Journalistic Autonomy as a Professional Value and Element
of Journalism Culture: The European Perspective,” International Journal of Communication 11
(2016): 1968.
155
Ibid.
156 Ibid., 1956–1974.
157 “European Commission Guidelines for EU Support to Media Freedom and
Media Integrity in Enlargement Countries, 2014–2020,” European Commission,
February 21, 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/
european-commission-guidelines-eu-support-media-freedom-and-media-integrity-enlargement.
158
Lauk and Harro-Loit, “Journalistic Autonomy,” 1968.
159 “European Commission Guidelines,” 3.
160 Csaky, “A New Toolbox,” 17–18, 20.
161 Kornelia R. Kiss, “Can Innovative Funding Models Help East European
Media Avoid State Capture?,” European Journalism Observatory, March
25, 2019, https://en.ejo.ch/media-economics/business-models/
can-innovative-funding-models-help-east-european-media-avoid-state-capture.
162
Repucci, Freedom and the Media.
Democracy Playbook 83
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
163 Matthew Alan Placek, “#Democracy: Social Media Use and Democratic Legitimacy in Central
and Eastern Europe,” Democratization 24, no. 4 (2017): 632–650.
164
Ibid., 644.
165 Diamond, In Search of Democracy, 133.
166
Ibid., 134.
167 “A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation,” European Commission,
March 2018, 3, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/
nal-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation.
168
Ibid., 11.
169 For the importance of the role of labor and trade unions in promoting democracy, see section 3C.
170 Greg Urban, ed., Corporations and Citizenship (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2014); Lynn Sharp Paine, “Corporate Power and the Public Good,” in Corporations and
Citizenship, 31, 32.
171
Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, “Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility,” Harvard Business Review 84, no. 12 (December
2006): 83; Aron Cramer, Salah Husseini, Michelle Nadboy, and Bennett Freeman, “Human Rights
Policy Engagement: The Role of Companies,” Business for Social Responsibility (June 2019): 3.
172
Bennett Freeman with Sif Thorgeirsson, Adele Barzelay, and Brooks Reed, “Shared Space
Under Pressure: Business Support for Civic Freedoms and Human Rights Defenders: Guidance
for Companies,” Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, August 29, 2018, https://www.
business-humanrights.org/en/new-guidance-for-companies-encourages-action-to-support-civ-
ic-freedoms-human-rights-defenders-explores-opportunities-for-engagement.
173
Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov, “Pragmatic Paternalism: The Russian Public and Private
Sector,” Carnegie Moscow Center, January 18, 2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78155.
174
Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin’s
Crackdown Holds Russia Back,”Foreign Affairs87, no. 1 (2008): 68–84.
175
Mark McNamee, “Navigating the Complexities of Doing Business in
Russia,” Harvard Business Review, May 29, 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/05/
navigating-the-complexities-of-doing-business-in-russia.
176
Dimitar Eftimoski, Antonija Josifovska, and Dushko Josheski, “Does Democracy and
Government Policy Affect Labor Market Outcomes in CEE Countries?” Journal of Sustainable
Development 5, no 12 (2015): 4–22.
177
Brandon Boze, Margarita Krivitski, David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, and Eva Zlotnicka, “The
Business Case for ESG,” Stanford Closer Look Series, May 23, 2019, https://www.gsb.stanford.
edu/sites/gsb/les/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-77-business-case-esg.pdf.
178
Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day:
State Capture and Inuence in Transition Economies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31,
no. 4: 751–773.
179
Ibid.
180 World Bank Group, World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law (Washington, DC:
World Bank Group, 2017), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017.
84 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
181 Walt Bogdanich and Michael Forsythe, “How McKinsey Has Helped Raise the Stature of
Authoritarian Governments,” New York Times, December 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/12/15/world/asia/mckinsey-china-russia.html; “Call for ‘Desperately Needed’ Probe
into McKinsey’s ‘Wrongdoing,’” Fin24, October 5, 2017, https://www.n24.com/Companies/
Financial-Services/call-for-desperately-needed-probe-into-mckinseys-wrongdoing-20171005.
182
Bogdanich and Forsythe, “How McKinsey Has Helped.”
183 Walt Bogdanich and Michael Forsythe, “How McKinsey Lost its Way in South Africa,” New York
Times, June 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/world/africa/mckinsey-south-afri-
ca-eskom.html.
184
“Call for ‘Desperately Needed’ Probe.”
185 “Civil Society Joins Forces Calling McKinsey to Account,” Corruption Watch, October
5, 2017, https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/civil-society-joins-forces-calling-mck-
insey-account; Joe Brock, “McKinsey Overhauls South Africa Oce After Graft Scandal,”
Reuters Africa, July 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mckinsey-safrica/
mckinseys-new-boss-apologises-to-south-africans-over-corruption-scandal-idUSKBN1JY0ZM.
186
Human Rights First, A Campaign Against Dissent: Selective Enforcement of Antipiracy Laws
in Russia (New York: Human Rights First, 2011), 4, https://humanrightsrst.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdf/HRF-Msoft-Russia-report.pdf.
187
Florian Wettstein, “Silence as Complicity: Elements of a Corporate Duty to Speak Out Against
the Violation of Human Rights.”Business Ethics Quarterly22, no. 1 (2012): 45–46.
188
Clifford J. Levy, “Russia Uses Microsoft to Suppress Dissent,” New York Times, September 11,
2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/europe/12raids.html.
189
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Russia (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2011), 39, https://2009-2017.state.
gov/documents/organization/160474.pdf.
190
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Roya Hakakian, “In Post-Khashoggi Saudi Arabia, Business Leaders
Have a Chance to Fill a Moral Void,” Yale Insights, October 24, 2018, https://insights.som.yale.
edu/insights/in-post-khashoggi-saudi-arabia-business-leaders-have-chance-to-ll-moral-void;
Aaron K Chatterji and Michael W. Toffel, “Assessing the Impact of CEO Activism,” Organization &
Environment32, no. 2 (June 2019): 159–185.
191
Aaron K. Chatterji and Michael W. Toffel, “The New CEO Activists,”Harvard Business Review96,
no. 1 (January 2018): 81.
192
Chatterji and Toffel, “Assessing the Impact.”
193 Salah Husseini, Aron Cramer, Bennett Freeman, and Michelle Naboy, Human Rights Policy
Engagement: The Role of Companies (New York: Business for Social Responsibility, 2019), 9,
https://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_HumanRightsPolicyEngagement_RoleOfCompanies.pdf.
194
“Nike Community Impact Fund,” Nike, https://communityimpact.nike.com/ncif.
195
United Nations Global Compact, Business for the Rule of Law Framework (New York: United
Nations Global Compact, 2016), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/rule_of_
law/B4ROL_Framework.pdf.
196
Thorsten Benner, “The German Car Industry Has to Stop Allowing Itself to be Used by Viktor
Orbán,” Global Public Policy Institute, April 5, 2018, https://www.gppi.net/2018/04/05/
the-german-car-industry-has-to-stop-allowing-itself-to-be-used-by-viktor-orban.
Democracy Playbook 85
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
197 “What is CSR?” United Nations Industrial Development Organization, https://www.unido.org/our-focus/
advancing-economic-competitiveness/competitive-trade-capacities-and-corporate-responsibility/
corporate-social-responsibility-market-integration/what-csr.
198
Moses L. Pava, “Why Corporations Should Not Abandon Social Responsibility,”Journal of
Business Ethics83, no. 4 (2008): 812.
199
Devin Thorpe, “Why CSR? The Benets of Corporate Social Responsibility Will Move You
To Act,” Forbes, May 18, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/devinthorpe/2013/05/18/
why-csr-the-benets-of-corporate-social-responsibility-will-move-you-to-act/#6611aea765a3.
200
Husseini et al., “Human Rights Policy Engagement,” 6.
201 Anthony Bebbington, “Extractive Industries and Stunted States: Conict, Responsibility, and
Institutional Change in the Andes,” in Corporate Social Responsibility: Comparative Critiques, eds.
K. Ravi Raman and Ronnie D. Lipschutz (London: Palgrave MacMillan UK, 2010), 97–115.
202
Susan Ariel Aaronson, “Corporate Strategy and Inadequate Governance: The Pitfalls of CSR,”
World Bank Institute Business & Development Discussion Paper, Summer 2009, http://sitere-
sources.worldbank.org/CGCSRLP/Resources/pitfallsofcsr.pdf.
203
Michael Bossetta, “The Weaponization of Social Media: Spear Phishing and Cyberattacks on
Democracy,”Journal of International Affairs71, no. 1.5 (2018): 98.
204
Anamitra Deb, Stacy Donohue, and Tom Glaisyer, “Is Social Media a Threat to Democracy?”
The Omidyar Group, October 1, 2017, https://www.omidyargroup.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/Social-Media-and-Democracy-October-5-2017.pdf.
205
Samantha Bradshaw and Philip Howard, “Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory
of Organized Social Media Manipulation,” University of Oxford Computational Propaganda
Research Project Working Paper, July 2017, http://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/politicalbots/wp-content/
uploads/sites/89/2017/07/Troops-Trolls-and-Troublemakers.pdf.
206
Ibid.
207 Deb, Donohue, and Glaisyer, “Is Social Media a Threat to Democracy?”
208 Paul M. Barrett, Tackling Domestic Disinformation: What the Social Media
Companies Need to Do (New York: NYU Stern Center for Business and Human
Rights, 2019), https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/
nyu_domestic_disinformation_digital?e=31640827/68184927.
209
Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Andrew Radin, Elina Treyger, Countering Russian Social
Media Inuence (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2740/RAND_RR2740.pdf.
210
Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 “Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online,” European Commission, May 2016,
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=31811.
213
Barrett, Tackling Domestic Disinformation, 2.
214
Ibid.
86 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
215 E.g., Mahatma Gandhi, Hind Swaraj and Other Writings (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997); Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story
(New York: Harper & Row, 1958); Václav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” in The Power
of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe, ed. John Keane (New
York: Routledge, 2015), 23–96; Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy; Sharp, The Politics of
Nonviolent Action (Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 1973); Frances Fox Piven and Richard
A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage
Books, 1979); Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals (New
York: Vintage Books, 1989); Mark Engler and Paul Engler, This is an Uprising: How Nonviolent
Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century (New York: Nation Books, 2016); and Civil Resistance
and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, edited by
Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011).
216
Snyder, On Tyranny.
217
Ibid., 22.
218 Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential
(Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005), 412.
219
Diamond, In Search of Democracy, 427–430. See also Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil
Resistance Works, 180–191. For an example of the ineffectiveness of international actors in
pressuring the Burmese regime to acquiesce to the pro-democracy movement’s demands in the
1980s, likely due to the “insularity of the Burmese economy and its reliance on illicit trade and
tracking” (190).
220
Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 116–117.
221
“NGOs and CSOs: A Note on Terminology,” United Nations Development Programme, https://
www.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH03%20Annexes.pdf. According
to terminology used by the UN Development Programme, CSOs refer to “voluntary organiza-
tions with governance and direction coming from citizens or constituency members, without
signicant government-controlled participation or representation.” CSOs can include faith-based
groups, trade unions, professional associations, internationally aliated organizations with
branches in other countries, etc. NGOs are often considered a subset of CSOs and are gener-
ally dened as nonprot and independent entities. Their activities include but are not limited to
social, advocacy, and human rights work.
222
Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 200–205, 208.
223
Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 163–185.
224
Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999).
225
Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 207.
226
Sabine Lang, “The NGOization of Feminism,” in Transitions, Environments, Translations:
Feminisms in International Politics, eds. Joan W. Scott, Cora Kaplan and Deborah Keates
(London: Routledge, 1997), 101–120.
227
United Nations, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World
(New York: UN, 2002), 102, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/les/reports/263/hdr_2002_en_
complete.pdf.
Democracy Playbook 87
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
228 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 215–216, 259–267; Sarah L. Henderson,Building
Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2003).
229
Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 264–265.
230
Sarah E. Mendelson, From Assistance to Engagement: A Model for a New Era in U.S.-Russian
Civil Society Relations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 4,
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_les/les/publication/090924_
Mendelson_FromAssistEngage_Web.pdf.
231
Kristoffer Liden, Nona Mikhelidze, Elena B. Stavrevska, and Birte Vogel, “EU Support to Civil
Society Organizations in Conict-Ridden Countries: A Governance Perspective from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cyprus and Georgia,” International Peacekeeping, 23, no. 2 (2016): 284.
232
Ibid., 284–285.
233 Sarah Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not
Confront Dictators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).
234
Ibid., 284.
235 Ibid., 285.
236 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 227–231.
237
Ibid., 265–267.
238 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 211; Carew Boulding, NGOs, Political Protest, and Civil
Society (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 34–37.
239
Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 259–274.
240
Adam Fagan, “Democracy Promotion in Kosovo: Mapping the Substance of Donor Assistance
and a Comparative of Strategies,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015).
241
Ibid., 128.
242 Ibid.
243 Saskia Brechenmacher, Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt,
and Ethiopia (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 1, https://
carnegieendowment.org/les/Civil_Society_Under_Assault_Final.pdf.
244
Thomas Carothers, “Closing Space for International Democracy and Human Rights Support,”
Journal of Human Rights Practice 8 (2016): 359.
245
Ibid., 363.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid., 364–365.
248 Kendra Dupuy, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash, “Hands Off My Regime! Governments’
Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organization in Poor and Middle-Income
Countries,” World Development 84 (2016): 300.
249
Carothers, “Closing Space for International Democracy and Human Rights Support,” 359.
250 Dupuy et al., “Hands Off My Regime!” 300.
88 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
251 USAID, 2017 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and
Eurasia (Washington, DC: USAID, 2018), 3, https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/les/media/
documents/resource-civil-society-organization-2017-regional-report.PDF.
252
Ibid., 4.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid., 133.
255 Amanda Sloat, “Diplomacy Triumphs: Greece and Macedonia Resolve Name Dispute,”
The Brookings Institution, June 12, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2018/06/12/diplomacy-triumphs-greece-and-macedonia-resolve-name-dispute.
256
Carothers, “Closing Space for International Democracy and Human Rights Support,” 361.
257 Carothers, “Closing Space for International Democracy and Human Rights Support”;
Brechenmacher, Civil Society Under Assault.
258
Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 55, 225.
259
Community of Democracies, 2018–2023 Community of Democracies’ Strategic Plan (Warsaw:
Community of Democracies Permanent Secretariat, 2018), https://community-democracies.
org/app/uploads/2018/06/CoD-Strategic-Plan-FINAL.pdf.
260
Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 338–339.
261
Jeremy Kinsman and Kurt Bassuener, A Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development
Support, (Waterloo: Center for International Governance Innovation, 2013), 80–82, http://www.
democratizationpolicy.org/diplomats-handbook.
262
Fagan, “Democracy Promotion in Kosovo,” 119.
263 Ibid.
264 Phil Lynch, Tess McEvoy, Ben Leather and Amanda Lilliefeldt, How to Create and Maintain the
Space for Civil Society: What Works? (New York: International Service for Human Rights, 2015),
24, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/CivilSociety/ReportHC/16_ISHR021015.pdf.
265
See Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities: From a Responsibility
to Protect (RtoP) to a Right to Assist (RtoA) Campaigns of Civil Resistance (Washington, DC:
International Center on Nonviolent Conict Special Report Series Vol. 3, 2019), https://www.
nonviolent-conict.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Right-to-Assist.pdf;
Michael J. Glennon and Peter Ackerman, “The Right Side of the Law,” The American
Interest, September 1, 2007, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2007/09/01/
the-right-side-of-the-law.
266
Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States, 31.
267
Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities.
268
Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 54–55.
269
Gene Sharp, How Nonviolent Struggle Works (Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2013), xv–xvi.
270
Jaime Jackson, “The Role of External Support in Violent and Nonviolent Civil Conict
Outcomes,” Paper presented at the Western Political Science Association Annual Conference,
April 4, 2015, 5.
Democracy Playbook 89
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
271 For case studies, see Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, and Kinsman and
Bassuener, A Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support.
272
Hardy Merriman, “Democracy Insurance,” International Center on Nonviolent Conict,
September 7, 2017, https://www.nonviolent-conict.org/blog_post/democracy-insurance;
Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 11–17; Hardy Merriman, “Supporting
Civil Resistance Movements: Considerations for Human Rights Funders and Organizations,”
International Center on Nonviolent Conict, September 11, 2018, https://www
.nonviolent-con-
ict.org/blog_post/supporting-civil-resistance-movements.
273
Kinsman and Bassuener, A Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy, 25, 45–47, 73–76.
274
Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 20.
275
Cf. Kinsman and Bassuener, A Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support.
Though it should be noted that one caveat to successful diplomatic engagement is that diplo-
mats often rely on political contact of their predecessors, or even the same contacts as others
in the embassy. This can create an echo chamber, when one contact’s perspective is shared or
promoted multiple times.
276
Kinsman and Bassuener, A Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support, 64–69.
277
Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 20–22.
278
Markus Bayer, Felix X. Bethke, and Matteo Dressler, “How Nonviolent Resistance Helps
to Consolidate Gains for Civil Society after Democratization,” International Center on
Nonviolent Conict, December 12, 2017, https://www.nonviolent-conict.org/blog_post/
how-nonviolent-resistance-helps-consolidate-gains-democratization.
279
Diamond, In Search of Democracy, 439–441; Jonathan Pinckney, When Civil Resistance
Succeeds: Building Democracy After Popular Nonviolent Uprisings (Washington, DC: International
Center on Nonviolent Conict, 2018), https://www.nonviolent-conict.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/10/When-Civil-Resistance-Succeeds-Pinckney-monograph.pdf.
280
Hardy Merriman, “Movement Building and Civil Resistance: Key Resources for Movement
Organizers,” Josef Korbel School of International Studies, December 2016, https://www.du.edu/
korbel/sie/media/documents/quickfacts-and-policy-briefs/qf-resourcesformovementleaders.pdf.
281
Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 339.
282
Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 54.
283
Ibid., 55.
284 Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the
Soviet Union (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (fall 2003): 205.
285
Kristina Spohr Readman, “Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitik Calculations: Western
Diplomacy and the Baltic Independence Struggle in the Cold War Endgame,” Cold War History 6,
no. 1 (2006): 6–10.
286
Nils R. Muizneks, “The Inuence of the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process of Soviet
Disintegration,” Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 1 (1995): 3–25.
287
Muizneks, “The Inuence of the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process of Soviet
Disintegration,” 12; Indra Ekmanis, “30 Years Later, the Human Chain that ‘Unshackled’ the
Baltic Nations Still Matters,” Public Radio International, August 22, 2019, https://www.pri.org/
stories/2019-08-22/30-years-later-human-chain-unshackled-baltic-nations-still-matters.
90 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
288 Maria Stephan and Matthew Burrows, Bolstering Democracy: Lessons Learned and the Path
Forward (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018), 220–221.
289
Joshua Paulson, “Case Study: Serbia, 1996–2000,” in Gene Sharp, Sharp’s Dictionary of Power
and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conicts (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012).
290
Ibid., 15. Both Otpor and Sharp are further discussed in sections 3A and 3C of this report.
291 Ivan Vejdova, “Civil Society versus Slobodan Milosevic: Serbia, 1991–2000,” in Civil Resistance
and Power Politics, eds. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 306.
292
Ibid., 311.
293 Ibid.
294 Stephen Jones, “Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ of 2003: A Forceful Peace,” in Civil Resistance and
Power Politics, 324.
295
Ibid., 329–330.
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid., 331; Lincoln A. Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose
Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 162.
298
Maria J. Stephan, “Checklist for External Assistance to Nonviolent Movements” in Is
Authoritarianism Staging a Comeback?, 214.
299
Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004: The Paradoxes of Negotiation” in Civil
Resistance and Power Politics, 335.
300
Ibid., 347–348.
301 Ibid., 348.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
304 Kinsman and Bassuener, A Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support, 316, 319.
305
Ibid., 321–322.
306 Ibid., 318.
307 Alina Polyakova, “US Efforts to Counter Russian Disinformation and Malign
Inuence,” The Brookings Institution, July 10, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/
testimonies/u-s-efforts-to-counter-russian-disinformation-and-malign-inuence.
308
Alina Polyakova, “How Russia Meddled in its Own Elections,” Atlantic, March
18, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/
russia-putin-election-disinformation-troll/555878.
309
Ibid.
310 Andrew Meier, “A Death in Moscow,” New York Times, July 1, 2007, https://www.nytimes.
com/2007/07/01/books/review/Meier-t.html.
Democracy Playbook 91
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
311 Vladimir Kara-Murza, “It’s Been Four Years Since the Murder of Boris Nemtsov. Russians Haven’t
Forgotten,” Washington Post, March 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2019/03/06/its-been-four-years-since-murder-boris-nemtsov-russians-havent-forgotten.
312
Alfred Kueppers, “Russian Protesters Arrested in Moscow Rally,” Reuters, December 31, 2011,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-protests-idUSTRE7BU0EV20111231.
313
Andrew Higgins, “Hundreds Arrested in Moscow as Criminal Case is Brought Against Opposition
Leader,” New York Times, August 3, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/world/europe/
moscow-protest-navalny-corruption.html.
314
Marc Bennetts, “Russian Police Carry Out Mass Raids Against Opposition Activists,”
Guardian, September 12, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/12/
russian-police-raid-homes-and-oces-of-opposition-activists.
315
Alina Polyakova, “The Kremlin’s Latest Crackdown on Independent Media,” Foreign Affairs,
December 5, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-12-05/
kremlins-latest-crackdown-independent-media.
316
Ibid.
317 “Putin Signs Russian Law to Shut ‘Undesirable’ Organizations,” Associated Press, May 24, 2015,
https://www.apnews.com/a8c2d4f8ec7c41539beefe985e4b3d9b.
318
Polyakova, “The Kremlin’s Latest Crackdown.”
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
321 Steve Rosenberg, “Russia Expels USAID Development Agency,” BBC News, September 12, 2012,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19644897.
322
Polyakova, “The Kremlin’s Latest Crackdown.”
323 Brechenmacher, Civil Society Under Assault, 25–28.
324
Polyakova, “How Russia Meddled in its Own Elections.”
325 Bill Bostock, “The Russian Government Demanded Access to Everybody’s Tinder User Data in
Case its Spies Want to Take a Look,” Business Insider, June 3, 2019, https://www.businessin-
sider.com/russia-demands-access-tinder-fsb-2019-6.
326
James Andrew Lewis, “Reference Note on Russian Communications Surveillance,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, April 18, 2014, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
reference-note-russian-communications-surveillance.
327
Freedom House, Freedom of the Net 2018: Russia (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2018),
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/russia.
328
J. M. Berger, “Here’s What Russia’s Propaganda Network Wants You to Read,”
Politico, August 23, 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/23/
russia-propaganda-network-kremlin-bots-215520.
329
Gergely Szakacs and Jan Strupczewski, “EU Commission Rebukes Hungary’s New Media
Campaign as ’Fake News,’” Reuters, February 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-hungary-eu-election-campaign/eu-commission-rebukes-hungarys-new-media-campaign-
as-fake-news-idUSKCN1Q81I0.
92 BROOKINGS
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
330 Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried, Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2.0 (Washington,
DC: Atlantic Council, 2019), 3, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/
democratic-defense-against-disinformation-2-0.
331
Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States.
332
Stephan and Burrows, Bolstering Democracy, viii.
333
E.g., Ronald Janse, “The Evolution of the Political Criteria for Accession to the European
Community, 1957–1973,” European Law Journal 24, no. 1 (January 2018): 57–76.
334
“Treaty on European Union, Belgium-Denmark-Germany-Greece-Spain-France-Ireland-Italy-
Luxembourg-Netherlands-Portugal-United Kingdom,” February 7, 1992, 4, https://europa.eu/
european-union/sites/europaeu/les/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.
335
Anna M. Meyerrose, “Democratic Backsliding in the European Union: The Unintended
Consequences of European Integration for Democracy,” working paper.
336
“Accession Criteria,” European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/
policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.
337
Kevin Deegan-Krause, Elected Anities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the
Czech Republic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 122.
338
Maria Fletcher, “Article 7 Sanctions: A Legal Expert Explains the EU’s
‘Nuclear Option,’” Conversation, July 28, 2019, http://theconversation.com/
article-7-sanctions-a-legal-expert-explains-the-eus-nuclear-option-81724.
339
Melissa Hooper, “Poland,” in Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States.
340
Joanna Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk, “The Specter Haunting Europe: Populism and Protest in
Poland,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 (October 2016): 58.
341
Hooper, “Poland,” in Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States.
342
“European Commission Presents a Framework to Safeguard the Rule of Law in the
European Union,” European Commission, March 11, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-14-237_en.htm.
343
“Rule of Law: European Commission Acts to Defend Judicial Independence in Poland,” European
Commission, December 20, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm.
344
“Commission Refers Hungary to the European Court of Justice of the EU over the Higher
Education Law,” European Commission, December 7, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-17-5004_en.htm.
345
Patrick Kingsley, “As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What’s Possible,”
New York Times, February 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world/europe/
hungary-orban-democracy-far-right.html.
346
Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic
Backsliding in Hungary and Romania after Accession,” Journal of Common Market Studies 52,
no. 1 (2014): 113.
347
Ingi Iusmen, “EU Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case
of Romania,” Journal of Common Market Studies 53, no. 3 (2015): 600–601.
Democracy Playbook 93
The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
348 Court of Justice of the European Union, “The Polish Legislation Concerning the Lowering of
the Retirement Age of Judges of the Supreme Court is Contrary to EU Law,” press release no.
81/19, June 24, 2019, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-06/
cp190081en.pdf.
349
“Communication from the Commission: Further Strengthening the Rule of Law Within
the Union,” COM/2019/163, European Commission, April 3, 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0163; Gábor Halmai, “The Possibility and
Desirability of Economic Sanction: Rule of Law Conditionality Requirements Against Illiberal EU
Member States,” European University Institute Working Papers, June 2018, http://hdl.handle.
net/1814/51644.
350
E.g., “Hungary - Joint Opinion on the Provisions of the so-called “Stop Soros” draft Legislative
Package which directly affect NGOs (in particular Draft Article 353A of the Criminal Code on
Facilitating Illegal Migration), adopted by the Venice Commission at its 115th Plenary Session
(Venice, 22-23 June 2018),” European Commission for Democracy Through Law, https://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2018)013-e; “Poland - Opinion on the
Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act amend-
ing the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the
Organisation of Ordinary Courts, adopted by the Commission at its 113th Plenary Session
(Venice, 8-9 December 2017),” European Commission for Democracy Through Law,
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)031-e.
351
Janne Haaland Matláry, Intervention for Human Rights in Europe (New York: Palgrave, 2002),
127–134, 138–151.
352
“Kazakhstan Takes Over OSCE Chair, Seeks to Strengthen Organization and Advance Dialogue
on Future European Security Architecture,” OSCE Secretariat, January 1, 2010, https://www.osce.
org/cio/51810.
353
“Participating States,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, https://www.osce.
org/participating-states.
354
“Kazakhstan Takes Over OSCE Chair.”
355 “OSCE Oce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,” Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, https://www.osce.org/odihr.
356
“The European Convention on Human Rights,” Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/
human-rights-convention.
357
“For Democracy Through Law: The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe,” Council of
Europe, https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN.
358
E.g., Mark C. Toner, “Hungary Media Freedom,” U.S. Department of State, October 20, 2016,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/263362.htm.
359
“Donald Trump’s Administration is Promoting Democracy and Human Rights,” Economist,
December 6, 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21732074-fortunate-
ly-he-has-yet-notice-donald-trumps-administration-promoting-democracy-and.
360
Michael Birnbaum, “Obama Slammed Polish Democracy on Friday.
Here’s How Polish TV Proved Him Right,” Washington Post, July 9, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/09/
obama-slammed-polish-democracy-on-friday-heres-how-polish-tv-proved-him-right.
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361 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at 25th Anniversary of Freedom Day,” The White
House, June 4, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-oce/2014/06/04/
remarks-president-obama-25th-anniversary-freedom-day; Donald Trump, “Remarks by President
Trump to the People of Poland,” The White House, July 6, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briengs-statements/remarks-president-trump-people-poland.
362
“Senior State Department Ocial Previewing the Secretary’s Trip to Europe via Teleconference,”
U.S. State Department, January 19, 2018, https://translations.state.gov/2018/01/19/
senior-state-department-ocial-previewing-the-secretarys-trip-to-europe-via-teleconference.
363
See Heather Nauert, “Poland: Independence of the Judiciary,” U.S. State Department, July 21,
2017, https://www.state.gov/poland-independence-of-the-judiciary/; Heather Nauert, “Poland:
National Broadcasting Council’s Fine on TVN24,” U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Poland,
December 12, 2017, https://pl.usembassy.gov/tvn.
364
James Kirchick, “Trump Should be Isolating Viktor Orbán, Not
Feting Him at the White House,” Brookings Institution, May 13, 2019,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/13/
trump-should-be-isolating-viktor-orban-not-feting-him-at-the-white-house.
365
Patrick Kingsley, “Hungary’s Leader Was Shunned by Obama, but Has a Friend in Trump,” New
York Times, August 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/world/europe/hunga-
ry-us-orban-trump.html.
366
Polyakova et al, The Anatomy of Illiberal States, 35.
367
Stephan and Burrows, Bolstering Democracy, 156–157.
368
Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States, 31.
369
Polyakova and Fried, Democratic Defense against Disinformation 2.0, 18.
370
Polyakova et al., The Anatomy of Illiberal States, 31.
371
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” NATO, April 4, 1949, https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ocial_texts_17120.htm.
372
Václav Havel, “New Year’s Address to the Nation,” (speech, Prague, January 1, 1990), http://
chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/les/havel-speech-1-1-90_0c7cd97e58.pdf.
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About the Authors
Ambassador (ret.) Norman Eisen is a senior fellow in Governance Studies at Brookings and
the founder and former chair of the government watchdog group Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics in Washington (CREW). Eisen previously served in the White House as Special
Assistant and Special Counsel to President Obama and as U.S. Ambassador to the Czech
Republic. Eisen’s writing has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, USA Today,
and many other publications, and he has been a commentator for CNN. He has been proled
in the Washington Post, New York Magazine, Politico, the Wall Street Journal, and Tablet. Eisen
was named to the Politico 50 list of thinkers shaping American politics, and to the Forward
50 list of leading American Jews. Eisen’s book, The Last Palace: Europe’s Turbulent Century
in Five Lives and One Legendary House, was published by Crown in 2018.
Andrew Kenealy is a PhD candidate in political science at Duke University, where he focuses
on issues of security, peace, and conict. From 2016 to 2019, Kenealy worked as a research
analyst in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He holds a bachelor’s degree in
government from Dartmouth College.
Susan Corke is a senior fellow and director of the bipartisan Transatlantic Democracy Working
Group (TDWG) with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) based in the
Washington, DC, oce. In this role, she is building a bipartisan and transatlantic platform for
discourse and coordination to address democratic backsliding in Europe. Corke has been a
skilled expert and practitioner for 15 years in protecting human rights, promoting tolerance,
and supporting democratic reform on the ground in Europe and Eurasia. Prior to joining GMF,
she was director of Countering Antisemitism and Extremism at Human Rights First, where she
worked to ensure that the United States led internationally on combating antisemitism and
extremism in partnership with European allies. She joined Human Rights First after ve years
at Freedom House, where she was director of programs for Europe, Eurasia, and Southeast
Asia. She has been a regular commentator in American and European media and has testied
on Capitol Hill several times to bear witness to urgent human rights issues. Before joining
Freedom House, Corke held senior positions at the U.S. Department of State in Washington,
DC, for which she received Superior and Meritorious Honor awards; most recently, she was
the deputy director for European Affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor (DRL). She also served in stints at U.S. Embassy Moscow, U.S. Embassy Prague, the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, and in the Bureau of Public Affairs as a Presidential
Management Fellow. Prior to joining the State Department, Corke helped found and manage
the U.S. Foreign Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International of Affairs at George
Washington University. Corke has a Masters degree in International Affairs from George
Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and a bachelor’s degree from
the College of William & Mary.
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The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding
Torrey Taussig is a research director in the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship
at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She
is also a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and
Europe and the head of strategy and operations for the North American Group of the Trilateral
Commission. Taussig works on U.S.-EU relations, great power competition, and authoritarian
challenges to democratic states and institutions. From 2018–2019, she was a Robert Bosch
Foundation fellow based in Berlin, Germany. She has held pre-doctoral and post-doctoral fel-
lowships at the Brookings Institution, where she led the Brookings Foreign Policy Program’s
Democracy Working Group and the “Democracy and Disorder” publication series launched
in 2018. She also held a post-doctoral fellowship at the Harvard Kennedy School. Taussig
received a master’s and doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University and a bachelor’s degree from Williams College.
Alina Polyakova is the founding director of the Project on Global Democracy and Emerging
Technology and a fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings
Institution, where she leads the Foreign Policy Program’s Democracy Working Group. She
is also adjunct professor of European studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. Polyakova’s writing and research
is regularly featured in major outlets, such as the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and
Washington Post, among others. Her book, The Dark Side of European Integration, examines
the rise of far-right political parties in Europe. Prior to joining Brookings, Polyakova served as
director of research and senior fellow for Europe and Eurasia at the Atlantic Council. Polyakova
holds a doctorate from the University of California, Berkeley.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank:
• Daniel Berger and other donors for the generous support that made this project possible.
• Theodore Becker-Jacob, Agneska Bloch, Adrienne Epstein, David Fishman, Colby
Galliher, Narrelle Gilchrist, Naz Gocek, Olivia Krawitt, Kelsey Landau, Olivia Leiwant,
Filippos Letsas, Mark McKibbin, Ted Reinert, Kiersten Rhodes, Abigail Rochman, and
Meilin Scanish for their research assistance.
• Hardy Merriman and Jan-Werner Müller for lending their expertise and experience in
democracy support to conducting substantive reviews of this report.
• Our colleagues at the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group for providing helpful
feedback throughout the drafting process.
• Alena Kudzko, Zuzana Navrátilová, and all attendees of the Brookings-Transatlantic
Democracy Working Group workshop held at GLOBSEC in Bratislava in June 2019.
Patrycja Chomika, Kararzyna Pisarska, Dominika Adamaszek and all attendees of the
workshop held at the Warsaw Security Forum in October 2019.
• Our Brookings colleagues Jessica Harris, Louis Serino, and Leti Davalos for their work
on the production and promotion of this report.
• Our Brookings colleagues Brigitte Brown, Sarah Chilton, Courtney Dunakin,
Bruce Jones, Laura Mooney, Darrell West, and Thomas Wright for supporting this
project in a myriad of ways.
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DISCLOSURE
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the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.
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Institution.Thendings,interpretations,andconclusionspostedinthispiecearenot
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