BRIEF RESEARCH REPORT
published: 18 March 2022
doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.846604
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2022 | Volume 10 | Article 846604
Edited by:
Sandra C. Buttigieg,
University of Malta, Malta
Reviewed by:
Francis Zarb,
University of Malta, Malta
Guilherme Couto,
University of Malta, Malta
*Correspondence:
Tarja Tarkiainen
tarja.tarkiainen@ppshp.fi
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Radiation and Health,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Public Health
Received: 31 December 2021
Accepted: 22 February 2022
Published: 18 March 2022
Citation:
Tarkiainen T, Sneck S, Haapea M,
Turpeinen M and Niinimäki J (2022)
Detecting Patient Safety Errors by
Characterizing Incidents Reported by
Medical Imaging Staff.
Front. Public Health 10:846604.
doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.846604
Detecting Patient Safety Errors by
Characterizing Incidents Reported by
Medical Imaging Staff
Tarja Tarkiainen
1
*
, Sami Sneck
2
, Marianne Haapea
3
, Miia Turpeinen
4
and
Jaakko Niinimäki
1
1
Research Unit of Medical Imaging, Physics and Technology, Oulu University Hospital, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland,
2
Administrative Centre, Oulu University Hospital, Oulu, Finland,
3
Medical Research Centre, Oulu University Hospital,
University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland,
4
Administrative Centre, Research Unit of Biomedicine, Oulu University Hospital, University
of Oulu, Oulu, Finland
The objectives of the study were to characterize events related to patient safety reported
by medical imaging personnel in Finland in 2007–2017, the number and quality of
reported injuries, the risk assessment, and the planned improvement of operations.
The information was collected from a healthcare patient safety incident register system.
The data contained information on the nature of the patient safety errors, harms and
near-misses in medical imaging, the factors that lead to the events, the consequences
for the patient, the level of risks, and future measures. The number of patient safety
incident reports included in the study was 7,287. Of the incident reports, 75% concerned
injuries to patients and 25% were near-misses. The most common consequence of
adverse events and near-misses were minor harm (37.2%) related to contrast agent,
or no harm (27.9%) related to equipment malfunction. Supervisors estimated the risks
as low (47.7%) e.g., data management, insignificant (35%) e.g., verbal communication
or moderate (15.7%) e.g., the use of contrast agent. The most common suggestion for
learning from the incident was discussing it with the staff (58.1%), improving operations
(5.7%) and submitting it to a higher authority (5.4%). Improving patient safety requires
timely, accurate and clear reporting of various patient safety incidents. Based on
incident reports, supervisors can provide feedback to staff, develop plans to prevent
accidents, and monitor the impact of measures taken. Information on the development
of occupational safety should be disseminated to all healthcare professionals so that the
same mistakes are not repeated.
Keywords: incident reporting, medical imaging, errors, patient safety, risks
INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization (WHO) has constructed global priorities for research to collect
information on patient safety incidents. The focus is on the underlying processes and organizational
factors that lead to unsafe care a nd adverse events (
1, 2). The goal is to help organizations
prevent a nd reduce the occurrence of serious incidents (
3). Howe ver, it is well-known that
although information on incidents is collected, some are always underreported, under-analyzed,
and under-utilized (47).
Tarkiainen et al. Analyzing Patient Safety Errors
Countries use different methods to investigate and analyze
healthcare incidents. For example, the USA uses the root
case analysis method of the Joint Commission (8). At th e
beginning of 2000, the development of patient safety incident
reporting systems was initiated in 13 European countries:
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, France,
the Netherlands, Norway, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. These countries collect information
on patient safety incidents on three different levels: only sentinel
events (based on law), specific clinical domains, or healthcare
system-wide (including near-misses) (
9).
Many countries have their own national and local error
reporting systems aiming to identify gaps in the system. If
events are only known to individuals, countermeasures cannot be
developed. The data, especially on medication-related incidents,
are collected from the Medication Error Reporting System
(MERS), which is used in the United Kingdom and the
United States (4, 9, 10). However, the role of medical imaging
in these incidents is not so well-known (2). Australia and New
Zealand use a database called the Radiology Events Re gister (The
RaER). Reporting incidents on the RaER is web-based, voluntary,
confidential, and anonymous. The system collects information
via narrative texts about events, their outcomes and contributing
factors, and how to prevent or reduce them. The RaER does not
replace state and hospital-based incident reporting, but it has
been de c lared a quality assurance resource (2, 11).
In 2005 in Finland, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
launched national-level coordination and strategic guidance for
patient safety measures. A steering group focused on three areas
of patient safety: education and culture, tools, and reporting
(
9). The Finnish healthcare system is based on municipal
primary care (about 190 units), specialized care (20 hospital
districts), occupational health services, and private services. It
is decentralized and has multiple funding resources (e.g., the
state, municipalities, households, voluntary private, and state
national health insurance organizations). Hospital districts guide
and control the de velopment of imaging services, and other
special services provided by municipal healthcare research,
development, and training activities of coordinated municipal
health information systems (9, 12, 13).
Finland utilizes an electronic Reporting System for Safety
Incidents (RSSI) in Health Care Organizations (HaiPro, Awanic
Ltd 2015c). The system was developed in 2006 and launched
in 2007. The aim of the RSSI is to increase the documentation
of incidents and to utilize this dat a to improve the quality and
safety of care (
14). Staff report medical and nursing treatment
incidents, including near-misses. A further aim of the system
is to report, analyze and learn of incidents, near-misses and
patient safety risks, and to improve patient care processes. The
RSSI is designed for internal use in h ealthcare units (university
and local hospitals, social units, and health centers) and it is
accessed online via the organization’s intranet. Use of the system
is voluntary, anonymity, and confidentiality are guaranteed, and
Abbreviations: FSPS, The Finnish Society for Patient Safety; MERS, Medical Error
Reporting System; RaER , t he Radiology Events Register; RSSI, Reporting Systems
for Safety Incidents.
no one is blamed. It provides information on the data reported,
how local organizations have learnt from their incidents, and how
the process of patient safety has been improved. The Finnish
Society for Patient Safety (FSPS) manages the research permit
practices related to the patient incident reports (
9, 15, 16).
Finnish healthcare professionals can report different kinds
of safety incidents, including medical imaging errors. The dat a
are collected using web-based forms that contain predefined
selection lists and spaces for free text (14, 16, 17). At present,
RSSI d ata are mainly collected on the local and organizational
level and are not analyzed or utilized on the regional or national
level (9, 1416).
The purpose of this study was to characterize the medical
imaging reports of incidents on the national level. To our
knowledge, this has not previously been studied in Finland. Our
aim was to obtain information on near misses and adverse events
of medical imaging. In addition, we wanted information on how
the recurrence of incidents were prevented.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data Collection
This study was an applied research that aims to highlight the
practical problems in patient safety and find solutions to them.
Awanic Ltd collected the dat a from a web-based national error-
reporting dat abase and sent it to the researcher (first writer). The
data comprised safety incidents (N = 7,409) related to medical
imaging that posed risks to patient safety in 2007–2017. The
study involved 125 radiology departments from 18 regional and
university hospital or other health service districts (Awanic L td).
The FSPS granted permission to use the medical imaging
error data in the present study. In Finland, a registry study does
not require ethical permission. The study followed t he basic
principles of research ethics (e.g., anonymity, confidentiality).
The RSSI database is not linked to other databases, such as
patient records. Disclosure of the data is subject to permission.
As participation was voluntary, the medical units had t h e option
of not participating in the study.
Data on Medical Imaging Incidents
Incident reports (N = 7,409) were collected from January 2007
to December 2017, and 7,287 reports were included. Reports
on nuclear medicine, radiotherapy, internal tests, duplicates, and
reports not associated with imaging (n = 122) were excluded. All
medical imaging-related notifications were included, even if the
informer was not imaging staff (e.g., nurse, physician, secreta ry,
or other). As some of the informers had not filled in every section
of the reports, some information was missing. However, forms
were included if the most rele vant sections had been completed.
The information on the web-based forms and in the free-
text descriptions that was related to medical imaging incidents
were analyzed. Figure 1 presents the patient incident reporting
process. The following information was reported: date, time,
place (e.g., medical imaging) of the incident, and the unit of
the person reporting. It was also possible to report the nature
of the incident (adverse event, near miss) and the incident
type, and to more specifically describe the event and how it
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2022 | Vo lume 10 | Article 846604
Tarkiainen et al. Analyzing Patient Safety Errors
FIGURE 1 | The sequence of the patient incident reporting process.
occurred, t he consequences for the patient and the unit, the
conditions at the time of the incident, and other contributing
factors. The staff also classified the causes of the inci dents into
eight main categories; drug or contrast agent, information flow or
information management, other treatment or follow-up, imaging
(not further specified), device or its use, accident/injury/damage,
an invasive procedure, or diagnosis related.
The supervisor, usually the radiographer in charge or senior
radiologist reviews the incident report and assigns a level of risk
according to pre-defined categories: insignificant, low, moderate,
high, and extreme. The supervisor also includes the contributing
factors of the incident and des cribes measures to be taken to
prevent the event reoccurring: (1) no measures, (2) informing of
the event, (3) submitting it to a higher aut h ority for a decision, or
(4) designing improvement measures (14, 15).
The data were processed statistically using Microsoft 365
Excel (2016) and IBM SPSS statistics 25 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL,
USA) for Windows. The results were reported using frequencies,
percentages and cross-t abulation. The qualitative data will be
analyzed in more detail in a subsequent article.
RESULTS
Identification of Adverse Procedural
Incidents Associated With Medical Imaging
This study included 7,287 adverse incidents that affected the
safety of patients undergoing radiological procedures. The
number of adverse incidents reported by staff rose (from 2007)
by 10 per annum to 1,438 per annum over 10 years, making
an average annual increase of 21.2%. Of the incidents reported,
75% concerned injuries to patients and 25% were near misses.
Most of the patient injuries (28.9%) and near-misses (35%)
were associated with the wrong patient, study or procedure.
The other reasons for near miss reporting were for instance:
data flow and data management (30%), malfunction of device
(10%), error of radiology report or diagnosis (6%), and referral
error (3%). The other reasons concerning patient injuries were:
related to medication or contrast agent (17%), data flow and
data management (15%), malfunction of device (14%), error of
radiology report or diagnosis (10%), and referral errors (2%).
The most common consequences of the near-misses and
adverse events were minor harm (37.2%) or no harm (27.9%).
The most serious effects on patients were moderate harm, at 7 .7%
(563 cases), and serious harm, at 0.8% (61 cases). In 10.5% of the
events, the consequences were unknown (e.g., a patient moved
to another ward) and 15.8% were not assessed at all (missing).
During 2007–2011, t he consequences of events were assessed
only occasionally, but from 201 2, more regularly. The most
common injuries to the patients were unnecessary or excessive
radiation (wrong patient, side, or site), allergic re action, burn,
infection, falling, fainting , pain, aches, extra dose of contrast, and
contrast media to tissue.
After the staff has assessed th e consequences, supervisors
assess the risk posed by the incident. The risk analysis matrix
allows a supervisor to select the risk category. A supervisor selects
the likelihood of an event: rare, unlikely, possible, likely, and
almost certain; and its typical consequences: very minor, minor,
moderate, major, or severe. These are divided into different risk
types: insignificant (e.g., data flow or data management) low
(e.g., equipment malfunction), moderate (use of contrast agent or
accident), high (unexpe ct ed reaction of the patient), and extreme
risk (serious injury to the patient). A supervisor may assess
the incident as rare and its consequences very minor, in which
case its risk type is insignificant or the probability of incident
almost certain with severe consequences in which case the risk
is extreme.
Supervisors assessed 69.4% (5,011 in total) of the patient risks,
although 30.6% (about 200 per year) were not evaluated. In
2010–2017, 1.3% (66) of all risks were assessed as high and 0.2%
(10) as extreme. Risks were generally estimated as low (47.7%),
insignificant (35%), or moderate (15.7%). Figure 2 presents the
annual distribution of the reported incidents by risk leve l and
the number of reports during 2010–2017. In 2007–2009, th e risk
assessment was limited (14 reports) and are thus not taken into
account in this figure.
The highest number of patient harm-related reports
concerned computer tomography CT (27%); the second,
problems with computers and telecommunicat ions (25.6%);
and the third, plain radiography (16.9%). Figure 3 shows
how the consequences for patients were distributed among
different modalities, communications, and other causes. Most
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2022 | Vo lume 10 | Article 846604
Tarkiainen et al. Analyzing Patient Safety Errors
FIGURE 2 | Annual reports and risk assessments in medical imaging in Finland 2010–2017. *In 2007–2008, the risks were not assessed, and in 2009 only 14 were
assessed, so these years are not included in the figure. **High and extreme risks are combined (n = 17).
of the severe and moderate harm cases occurred in fluoroscopy
(2.8%) and mammography (2.1%). Approximately 73% of CT
scan-related injuries were no or minor harm, and 15% were
moderate or severe.
Incident Reporting by Staff
Most incidents were reported by radiographers (62.1%), other
nursing staff (e.g., practical nurse) (21%), other s taff (e.g.,
office worker) (7.9%), and radiologists or other physicians
(7.4%). Event types were evaluated in 7,083 reports (97.2%).
Staff assessed near-misses and adverse events using the RSSI
form’s predetermined categories. About 26% of the patient
consequences were not assessed at all or were reported as
unknown. This is probably due to th e fact that the informer is
not working on radiology unit or the patient moves to another
ward so the late effects of the event remain unknown. The most
frequently reported type was associated with imaging (40%),
but this was not further specified. A total of 20 .1% events were
related to information flow or information management, 13.9%
concerned devices, and 13.4% were related to contrast media.
Staff reported fewer events relat ed to patient care or follow-up
(4.6%), accidents or injuries (4%), diagnostic events (2.3%), and
invasive procedures (1.8%).
Staff did not assess the extent of t he risk. Supervisors estimated
risks on the basis of the narrative content of the report and the
risk matrix. Assessments by nursing supervisors showed that the
patient was most likely to be at a low (40.7–50.3%) or insignificant
risk (27.6–36.3%). The share of moderate risk was from 14.3 to
26.3%, high risk under 2% (0.9–1.9%), and extreme risk under
1% (0–0.1%). Medical super v isors estimated that the patient was
at a high risk in 3.5% and at an extreme risk in 1.6% of the cases.
Supervisors’ Proposals for Measures
A measure to prevent incidents was proposed by 89.4% of the
supervisors. Generally (58.1%) supervisors suggested discussing
in staff meetings. In under 6% (5.7%) of incidents improvement
in working methods were recommended and in 5.4% of cases
reports were delegated to a higher authority. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of these measures in relation to the patient’s incident
assessment. In all categories, the most common recommendation
by the supervisors was to inform the parties that were involved
(patient, ward, attending physician) and to discuss about the
incident with staff (52.6%). In the severe harm category, 22.8%
were submitted to a higher aut h ority and 19.3% to plan an
improvement measure. The most general solution with minor
harm category was “no action” (30%) and for preventing
a recurrence of the event recommended, “informing of and
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 4 March 2022 | Vo lume 10 | Article 846604
Tarkiainen et al. Analyzing Patient Safety Errors
FIGURE 3 | Patient injuries assessed by supervisors in different modalities and other contexts in Finland 2010–2017. *Missing or unknown 26.3% (n = 1,916).
discussing” (67%). When the patient injury was assessed as minor
(e.g., extravasation during intravenous injection), it was classified
as “no action” category.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we a nalyzed what kind of medical imaging errors
were reported in Finland, how these incidents and consequences
affected risks, and what measures supervisors took to improve
patient safety. The strength of the study is that th e data were
large and comprehensive, covering 11 years. The average annual
number of radiology examinations in Finland is 2.5 million,
which is 1,084 examinations per thousand inhabitants. The
percentage of reported patient adverse events i s low, only 0.06%
of radiology examinations per year. It is likely that only a part of
the incidents were reported also in this study, as previous studies
have found t hat some cases always remain unreported (
2, 18).
In about a quarter of the cases, the injuries to the patient
had not been assessed. This result support those of international
studies that have identified difficulties in reporting beca use the
impact on the patient is unknown or the informer is from
another unit, in which case the information obtained from the
event is inaccurate (1923). In the initial years, 2007–2011, forms
were only filled in occasionally, but this clearly increased in
later years. The probable reason for this is the greater national
attention paid to patient safety in Finland due to the Patient
Safety Implementation Plan (341/2011). This has increased the
identification and reporting of incidents, and more hospitals
joining the RSSI (
24). Our research shows that when staff
were encouraged to fill in adverse incident forms, the number
of patient safety incident reports increased by 20% annually.
Therefore, we cannot directly conclude that the number of
complications increased every year.
In 2015, 624 radiologists and 3,262 radiographers were
working in Finland. In this study, most of the reporters were
radiographers and other nursing staff. O ther physicians and
radiologists reported only 7.5%. In other Finnish studies the
number of incident reports made by physicians have been 2.5–
10% (
9, 17). Our result is comparable to those of previous
international studies that have found that physicians make fewer
incident reports (25, 26) and most patient incident reports are
made by nursing stuff (19, 30). The physicians feel more obliged
to deal with serious cases than reporting near misses (19, 20, 30)
whereas nurses are more diligent and follow t he instructions (26).
Supervisors are provided with guidelines on how to handle
notifications. These guidelines offer advice on selecting from the
different options the correct type of event, the consequences for
the patient, the unit, the correct risk category, and suggested
development measures. The event should be evaluated according
to general practice, not on the basis of the individual patient.
This means that the risk assessment must take into account the
wider context of the individual case, which can be challenging.
Therefore, supervisors may assess risks as insignificant or minor,
even if the patient was harmed. Radiologists reported more
serious harm (2.2%) than radiographers in charge (0.7%) did,
and their estimated risk levels were higher than those of the
other staff. This result is consistent with that of previous studies
(
23, 25, 26) that have found that physicians usually report the
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 5 March 2022 | Vo lume 10 | Article 846604
Tarkiainen et al. Analyzing Patient Safety Errors
FIGURE 4 | Reported patient harms with proposed measures in 2007–2017 in Finland.
most serious patient injuries (se vere injury or infection, death).
In Finland this is probably due to the fact that the most severe
cases are referred to a radiology supervisor.
During the initial years, both physicians’ and radiographers
information technology (IT)-related notifications were relatively
high in number. The number decreased each year as IT problems
were solved. There are usually problems when starting a new
operation, and knowing this risk, having a contingency plan to
investigate operational faults, and striving to remedy them as
soon as possible are essential.
On average, 10.5% (5.6–13.6%) of patient injuries related
to modalities were unclassified be cause the person filing the
report did not know what had occurred to the patient after the
examination. Our previous study of patient injury reports due
to imaging (
27) provides more information on these incidents.
Usually for example, in interventions, patient injury is noticed
immediately, but in other modalities, the effect of the event may
become apparent later.
In CT, 24.3% of incidents were related to contrast agents, due
to leakage of the contrast media into the surrounding soft tissues
instead of the normal intravascular compartment, failed injection
(the cannula came off or contrast agent was injected into tissues
or the contrast agent syringe did not work), or patients allergic
reactions. Contrast media extravasation (CMEV) is a well-known
complication in CT scanning. Most extravasations cause minimal
swelling or erythema, but skin necrosis may also occur (28).
Therefore, efforts should be made to reduce the migration of
the contrast medium into t h e tissue: particularly in CT scanning,
where th e injection rate and volume of contrast medium is high.
The modalities most involved in patient incidents were CT,
radiography, and MRI. Our results are consistent with those of
other studies (
2, 27, 29), with t h e exception that in this study, MRI
incidents were more common than ultrasound incidents. This is
probably because in Finland, more contrast-enhanced MRI scans
are performed than contrast-enhanced ultrasounds. The higher
rates of moderate harms in fluoroscopy and mammography were
related to information flow, incomplete or unclear information
and equipment problems. Severe harms, such as serious infection
or accident, were related to invasive procedures.
This study has some limitations. First, the classification of
adverse events and near-misses was based on the incident
description, which was occasionally limited and not all sections
of the form had always been completed. Therefore, the “not
known” and “missing” category made up 20–30% of incidents.
Second, as only a small proportion of incidents are reported,
and even less near-misses (
47), our data most likely represents
only a part of th e actual problems in incident reporting. Third,
because the RSSI form does not contain own category for imaging
staff, the exact number of incidents cannot be measured. Fourth,
the results can only be generalized to a certain extent, as they
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2022 | Vo lume 10 | Article 846604
Tarkiainen et al. Analyzing Patient Safety Errors
were collected in one country. And fifth unfortunately, the
supervisors development proposals for resolving the incident
that had occurred were in written form, and due to the large
amount of data, could not be discussed in more detail in
this artic le.
In our study, the number of reported near-misses was lower
(26.3%) than the number of incidents (72.6%). This ma y be
because incidents are easier to identify and staff consider it
more important to report events that have consequences for the
patient. It is important to note that when we invest in patient
safety by collecting data on near-misses, we can also use them
in effe ct on damage prevention (30, 31).
Supervisors planned some sort of measure to prevent t he
recurrence of incidents in almost 90% of c ases. The most
common solution, at over 50%, was discussion with the staff.
Conversation is a quick and easily organized solution, but in our
opinion not necessarily the most effective. It is good practice
and can solve the problem, but if the incident is repeated, it
would be better to investigate adverse event’s root causes. It is
important to notice that even when the patient was not harmed
some supervisors planned a development of operational safety. It
is good that all cases are taken seriously.
The more severe the damage, the hig her the proportion of
improvement measures and notifications at a higher level. It
is common that when the harm is assessed as severe (serious
injury or death of the patient, resource shortage or IT problems)
the proportion of improvement measures and notifications are
submitted to a higher authority (
30). This is probably due to the
desire to receive support and at th e same time inform the senior
management of the most serious events. Senior management
should also answer questions about resourcing and communicate
with equipment and other suppliers.
CONCLUSION
Improving patient safety requires timely, accurate and clear
reporting of various patient safety deviations. Therefore, it is
important that national data on patient safety incidents are
collected and analyzed. Based on the incident reports, supervisors
should provide feedback to staff, develop a plan to prevent
accidents, and monitor the impact of the measures taken.
Information on the development of operational safety should be
disseminated widely to all healthcare professionals so that others
can avoid making the same mistakes and improve their own
patient safety by le a rning from others.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
To prevent incidents, near misses should be reported
more frequently.
Information on measures tak en to improve operations needs
to be more widely disseminated.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The datasets presented in this article are not readily available
because, the data that support the findings of this study
are available from the Finnish Society for Patient Safety but
restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were
used under license for the current study, and so are not publicly
available. Data are however available from the authors upon
reasonable request and with permission of the Finnish Society for
Patient Safety. Requests to access the datasets should be directed
to https://tarja.tarkiainen@ppshp.fi.
ETHICS STATEMENT
Ethical review and approval was not required for the
study on human participants in accordance with the
local legislation and institutional requirements. Written
informed consent for participation was not required for this
study i n accordance with the national legislation and the
institutional requirements.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
TT analyzed and interpreted the data together with JN. MT
and SS verified and assessed the accuracy of the text. MH as
a professional bio statistician verified the table and figures. All
authors read and approved the final manuscript.
REFERENCES
1. World Health Organization. Global Priorities for Research in Patient Safety.
(2008). Available online at: https://www.who.int/patientsafety/research/
priorities/global_priorities_patient_safety_research.pdf (accessed December
27, 2021).
2. Jones DN, Hannaford N , Thomas MJ, Mandel CJ, Grimm J, Schultz
TJ, et al. Where failures occur in the imaging care cycle: lessons
from the radiology events register. J Am Coll Radiol. (2010) 7:593–
602. doi: 10.1016/j.jacr.2010.03.013
3. Kruskal JB, Siewert B, Anderson SW, Eisenberg RL, Sosna J. Managing
an acute adverse event in a radiology department. RadioGraphics. (2008)
5:1237–50. doi: 10.1148/rg.285085064
4. Noble DJ, Pronovost PJ. Underreporting of patient safety incidents reduces
health cares ability to quantify and accurately measure harm reduction. J
Patient Saf. (2010) 4:247–50. doi: 10.1097/PT S.0 b0 13 e3 18 1f d169 7
5. Rafter N, Hickey A, Condell S, Conroy R, O’Connor P, Vaughan D, et al.
Adverse events in healthcare: learning from mistakes. QJM. (2015) 4:273–
7. doi: 10.1093/qjmed/hcu145
6. Murff HJ, Patel VL, Hripcsak G, Bates DW. Detecting adverse events for
patient safety research: a review of current methodologies. J Biomed Inform.
(2003) 36:131–43. doi: 10.1016/j.jbi.2003.08.003
7. Classen DC, Resar R, Griffin F, Federico F, Frankel T, Kimmel N, et
al. ‘Global trigger tool’ shows that adverse events in hospitals may be
ten times greater than previously measured. Health Aff. (2011) 4:581–
9. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0190
8. Parker J. Root Cau se Analysis in Health Care Tools and Techniques. The Joint
Commission Resources (2017).
9. Doupi P. Nation al Reporting Systems for Patient Safety Incidents: A Review
of the Situation in Europe. Jyväskylä: National Institute for Health and
Welfare (2009). Available online at: https://www.julkari.fi/handle/10024/
80105 (accessed March 4, 2022).
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 7 March 2022 | Vo lume 10 | Article 846604
Tarkiainen et al. Analyzing Patient Safety Errors
10. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer
Health System. Washington, DC: Institute of Medicine (US) Committee
on Quality of He alth Care in America Washington; National Academies
Press (2000).
11. Hannaford N, Mandel C, Crock C, Buckley K, Magrabi F, Ong M, et
al. Learning from incident reports in the Australian medical imaging
setting: handover and communication errors. Br J Radiol. (2013)
86:1022. doi: 10.1259/bjr.20120336
12. Tynkkynen LK, Chydenius M, Saloranta A, Keskimäki I. Expanding choice
of primary care in Finland: much debate but little change so far. Healthpol.
(2016) 3:277–234. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.01.015
13. Ministry of Social Affairs and Help. Social Welfare and Health Care System
in Finland. (2021). In English Areas of expertise. Available online at: https://
stm.fi/en/social-and-health-services/responsible-agencies (accessed March 4,
2022).
14. Knuuttila J, Ruuhilehto K, Wallenius J. Terveydenhuollon vaaratapahtumien
raportointi. In English; Health Incident Reporting National Agency for
Medicines. Lääkelaitoksen julkaisusarja. Helsinki (2007). Available
online at: https://www.valvira.fi/documents/14444/50159/LH-2007-1_
vaaratapahtumien_raportointi.pdf (accessed March 4, 2022).
15. Awanic Ltd. Reporting System for Safety Incidents in Health Care
Organizations. Available online at: https://awanic.fi/haipro/eng/ (accessed
December 27, 2021).
16. Holmström AR, Airaksinen M, Weiss M, Wuliji T, Chan XH,
Laaksonen R. National and local medication error reporting
systems: a survey of practices in 16 countries. J Patient Saf. (2012)
4:165–76. doi: 10.1097/PTS.0b013e3182676cf3
17. Härkänen M, Turunen H, Saano S, Vehviläinen-Julkunen K. Detecting
medication errors: analysis based on a hospital’s incident reports. Int J Nurs
Pract. (2015) 2:141–6. doi: 10.1111/ijn.12227
18. Zygmont ME, Itri JN, Rosenkrantz AB, Duong PAT, Gettle LM, Mendiratta-
Lala M, et al. Radiology research in quality and safety: current trends
and future needs. Acad Radiol. (2017) 3:263–72. doi: 10.1016/j.acra.2016.
07.021
19. Howell AM, Burns EM, Bouras G, Donaldson L J, Athanasiou T,
Darzi A. Can patient safety incident reports be used to compare
hospital safety? Results from a quantative analysis of the English
National Reporting and Learning System Data. PLoS ONE. (2015)
12:e0144107. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0144107
20. Pfeiffer Y, Manser T, Wehner T. Conceptualising barriers to incident
reporting: a psychological framework. Qual Saf Health Care. (2010)
6:e60. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2008.030445
21. Vincent CA. Analysis of clinical incidents: a window on the
system not a search for root. Qual Saf Health Care. (2004)
4:242–3. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2004.010454
22. Wakefield DS, Wakefield BJ, Uden-Holman T, Borders T, Blegen M, Vaughn
T. Understanding why medication administration errors may not be reported.
Am J Med Qual. (1999) 2:81–8. doi: 10.1177/106286069901400203
23. Evans SM, Berry JG, Smith BJ, Esterman A, Selim P, O’Shaughnessy J,
et al. Attitudes and barriers to incident reporting: a collaborative hospit al
study. Qual Saf Health Care. (2006) 1:3 9– 43 . doi: 10.1136/qshc.2004.
012559
24. Finlex 2011/Asetus 341. Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön
asetuslaadunhallinnasta ja potilasturvallisuuden täytäntöönpanosta
laadittavasta suunnitelmasta. Statute of the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health. A plan for quality management and implementation of patient safety
(in English). Available online at: https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2011/
20110341 (accessed March 4, 2022).
25. Lawton R, Parker D. Barriers to incident reporting in a healthcare system.
Qual Saf Health Care. (2002) 1:15–8. doi: 10.1136/qhc.11.1.15
26. Kingston MJ, Evans SM, Smith BJ, Berry JG. Attitudes of doctors and nurses
towards incident reporting: a qualitative analysis. Med J Aust. (2004) 1:36–
9. doi: 10.5694/j.1326-5377.2004.tb06158.x
27. Tarkiainen T, Turpeinen M, Haapea M, Liukkonen E, Niinimäki J.
Investigating errors in medical imaging: medical malpractice cases in Finland.
Insights Imaging. (2021) 12:86. doi: 10.1186/s13244-021-01011-8
28. Belzunegui T, Louis CJ, Torrededia L, Oteiza J. Extravasation of radiographic
contrast material and compartment syndrome in the hand: a case report.
Scand J Trauma Resusc Emerg Med. (2011) 19:42. doi: 10.1186/1757-7241-19-9
29. Mansouri M, Aran S, Shaqdan KW, Abujudeh HH. How often are patients
harmed when they visit the computed tomography suite? A multi-year
experience, in incident reporting, in a large academic medical center. Eur
Radiol. (2016) 7:2064–72. doi: 10.1007/s003 30 -0 1 5- 40 6 1- 0
30. Rauhala A, Kinnunen M, Kuosmanen A, Liukka M, Olin K, Sahlström M,
et al. Mitä vapaaehtoiset vaaratapahtumailmoitukset kertovat? What does
voluntary reporting system of patient safety incidents tell? (in English).
Suomen Lääkärilehti. Finnish Medical J. (in English). (2018). Available online
at: https://www.laakarilehti.fi/pdf/2018/SLL462018-2716.pdf (accessed March
4, 2022).
31. Macrae C. The problem with incident reporting. BMJ Qual Saf. (2015)
2:71–5. doi: 10.1136/bmjqs-2015-004732
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Publisher’s Note: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of
the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in
this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or
endorsed by the publisher.
Copyright © 2022 Tarkiainen, Sneck, Haapea, Tu rpeinen and Niinimäki. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 8 March 2022 | Vo lume 10 | Article 846604