9
More than two years since the start of the pandemic, much of the world is still reeling
from its ongoing eects. While COVID-19 continues to disrupt lives and livelihoods,
compounding crises are intersecting and the consequences are drastic. Climate change,
forced displacement, and violent conict are increasingly urgent development challenges
for the global population. Evidence from current and past crises shows that women are
aected disproportionately (Akro, Mahama, and Nevo 2021).
During the pandemic, women dropped out of paid employment at higher rates than
men, took on responsibilities for increased care of children and the ill, and faced greater
risks of violence (Bundervoet, Davalos, and Garcia 2021; Center on Gender Equity and
Health 2020; Cucagna and Romero 2021; De Paz Nieves, Gaddis, and Muller 2021;
Kugler et al. 2021). Indeed, virus containment measures aected women’s labor market
outcomes more adversely than those of men. This eect is due, in part, to women’s
overrepresentation in high-contact sectors, such as hospitality (Alon et al. 2020; Kugler
et al. 2021). Moreover, the increased burden of care resulting from the closure of
schools and childcare centers during the pandemic fell more heavily on the shoulders of
working mothers (Collins et al. 2020; Del Boca et al. 2020). Even in economies wherea
disproportionate share of women did not drop out of the labor market, women were
often under additional stress trying to manage increased care responsibilities while
remaining at their jobs (Goldin 2021). Women—both employees and entrepreneurs—
were also aected more adversely than men with regard to business closure, reduced
demand for products or services, and nancial distress (Hyland et al. 2021; Torres et al.
2021). At the same time, women-led businesses were more likely to increase their use
of digital platforms (Torres at al. 2021).
While men accounted for a higher proportion of disease-related deaths, women’s
health and well-being were immensely aected in other ways. For example,
women’saccess to maternal health care and reproductive services suered,
1
and
Findings
CHAPTER 1
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
10
gender-based violence rose sharply (see, for example, Mittal and Singh 2020).
In particular, stay-at-home policies introduced to curb the spread of the virus
increased the risk of intimate partner violence (Agüero 2021; Bourgault, Peterman,
and O’Donnell 2021).
Crises like COVID-19 expose long-standing and widespread inequalities in
the distribution of rights and opportunities between women and men. Legal
inequalities, for example, could potentially exacerbate the gendered effects of
the crisis. If discrimination under the law keeps women out of formal sector
employment or forces women entrepreneurs to operate in the informal sector,
women may find it more difficult to access emergency support to buffer the
impacts of the pandemic.
2
Women’s economic rights need to be safeguarded
by law. Equal access to public support programs and digital technologies, such
as mobile phones, computers, and the internet, can also help them start new
businesses, discover new markets, and find better jobs. It is critical that solutions
to the crisis do not reverse any progress that has already been made toward
women’s full economic empowerment.
Dierences in expected lifetime earnings between men and women amount to an
estimated $172.3 trillion, equivalent to two times the world’s annual gross domestic
product (Wodon et al. 2020). Policies that improve women’s economic opportunities
are therefore critical. Whether facing a catastrophe or not, governments can address
this inequality by acting to ensure women’s empowerment. Reducing women’s time
spent on unpaid work and care responsibilities, increasing their access to assets, and
addressing market and institutional constraints, including the legal barriers that hinder
labor force participation and entrepreneurship, will protect not only their people but
also their economies. Indeed, as previous Women, Business and the Law analysis has
shown, safeguarding and incentivizing women’s inclusion bolsters economic growth,
narrowing the gender gap in development outcomes and labor force participation
(World Bank 2020, 2021).
Despite these eorts, discriminatory laws in all regions continue to exacerbate the
eects of an already dicult period and to weaken policy responses to the pandemic.
Worldwide, 2.4 billion women of working age (15–64 years) from 178 economies across
all regions still do not have the same legal rights as men. Women, Business and the Law
2022 identies where and in what areas this is the case, providing an important resource
for achieving women’s full and equal participation. The eighth in a series, this study
presents a data set and index highlighting opportunities for reform in 190 economies.
It also oers a new measurement of laws regulating the provision of childcare services
and presents a pilot exercise examining how Women, Business and the Law indicators
operate in practice.
For more than a decade, Women, Business and the Law has provided a framework
that governments can use to identify barriers to women’s success, remove them, and
boost labor force participation. Since 2020, an index structured around a woman’s
working life has guided the analysis, highlighting the progress made each year (box 1.1).
While it is too early to determine the eect of the pandemic on government eorts to
reduce legal inequalities between men and women, the Women, Business and the Law
data suggest that, even in these turbulent times, governments can and have enacted
reforms leading to greater equality.
FINDINGS
11
BOX 1.1 ABOUT WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW
Women, Business and the Law identies where and which laws and regulations restrict women’s economic inclusion, providing
an important resource for achieving their full and equal participation. To facilitate analysis and highlight opportunities for
reform, the project presents an index that aligns dierent areas of the law with the decisions that women make as they begin,
progress through, and end their careers (gure B1.1.1).
The eight Women, Business and the Law indicators coincide with the milestones that many women experience throughout
their adult lives. Questions included in the indicators were chosen based on evidence from the economic literature as well as
statistically signicant associations with outcomes related to women’s economic empowerment, such as employment and
business ownership. In addition, the international legal framework on women’s human rights, as set out in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and International Labour Organization conventions,
serves as the underlying justication for each question. The indicators measure explicit discrimination in the law as well as the
legal protection of rights and the provision of benets, areas in which reforms can bolster women’s economic participation.
The Women, Business and the Law index relies on binary indicators and a series of case study assumptions. For example, the
woman in question is assumed to reside in the main business city of her economy, to belong to the most populous group,
and to be employed in the formal sector. This approach ensures comparability across economies and focuses on the formal
sector, where laws are most relevant. However, it may not capture restrictions in rural areas or in states or provinces of federal
economies if they are not applicable to the main business city. Some of the many forms of discrimination that minority popula-
tions may face also may not be captured. Additionally, the data may not reect the reality of many women employed in the
informal sector. Finally, to remain actionable, the data set is constructed using only laws and regulations in force. It does not
measure the gap between laws on the books and actual practice.
In total, 35 questions are scored across the eight indicators. Overall scores are then calculated by taking the average of each
indicator, with 100 representing the highest possible score (see the data notes in appendix A for details). The nal score
presents the share of good-practice provisions in each economy. Thus, the index serves as an easily replicable way to gauge
the enabling environment for women as entrepreneurs and employees.
Women, Business and the Law acknowledges that the interplay of other factors, such as access to quality education, low
infrastructural and institutional capacity, and social and cultural norms may prevent women from entering the workforce.
Within this overall picture, the project recognizes the limitations of its assumptions and its focus on statutory law. Even though
such assumptions may come at the expense of specicity, they also ensure that the data are reliable and comparable.
To construct the index, Women, Business and the Law uses the feedback of more than 2,000 respondents with expertise
in family, labor, and criminal law, including lawyers, judges, academics, and members of civil society organizations working
locally on gender issues. The Women, Business and the Law team collects the texts of relevant laws and regulations and veri-
es responses to the questionnaire for accuracy. Responses are validated against codied sources of national law, including
constitutions, codes, laws, statutes, rules, regulations, and procedures in areas such as labor, social security, civil procedure,
violence against women, marriage and family, inheritance, nationality, and land. All of the data used to construct the index and
their sources are available on the Women, Business and the Law website (https://wbl.worldbank.org).
Pay
Measures laws and regulations
aecting women’s pay
Parenthood
Examines laws aecting women’s
work after having children
Entrepreneurship
Analyzes constraints on women’s
starting and running businesses
Assets
Considers gender dierences
in property and inheritance
Pension
Assesses laws aecting the
size of a woman’s pension
Mobility
Examines constraints
on freedom of movement
Workplace
Analyzes laws aecting
women’s decisions to work
Marriage
Assesses legal constraints
related to marriage
FIGURE B1.1.1
|
THE EIGHT WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW INDICATORS
Source: Women, Business and the Law team.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
12
Legal equality and women’s economic empowerment
Mounting evidence indicates that the laws captured by the Women, Business and the
Law index are associated with greater economic empowerment for women. Aside from
its fundamental desirability, greater legal equality is associated with a larger supply of
female labor, a smaller gender wage gap, higher levels of female entrepreneurship, and
a greater number of women in managerial positions.
3
New data from the World Bank’s
We-Data project also reveal that the greater the equality between men and women
in the law (as expressed by the Women, Business and the Law index), the higher the
share of female entrepreneurs (gure 1.1).
4
Equality is also associated with economy-
wide gains in productivity and welfare (Chiplunkar and Goldberg 2021). Women earn
only two-thirds of men’s expected lifetime income; therefore, reducing the inequalities
in economic opportunity that could close this gap could lead to enormous benets for
the world (Wodon et al. 2020).
Analyzing Women, Business and the Law data in conjunction with data from the World
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, Hyland and Islam (2021) show that a more discriminatory
legal environment is associated with a greater probability that businesses led by women
will commence operations in the informal sector. In economies where the aggregate
Women, Business and the Law index score is higher, businesses with women owners
are less likely to have begun operating in the informal sector. This negative correlation
is displayed in gure 1.2.
y = 0.17x + 11.2; t-stat = 2.82
a. Female limited liability ownersb. Female sole proprietors
0
10
20
30
40
% of female owners
20 40 60 80 100
WBL score (0–100)
y = 0.36x + 3.4; t-stat = 4.70
0
10
20
30
40
50
% of female sole proprietors
20 40 60 80 10
0
WBL score (0–100)
Europe and Central Asia
Middle East and North Africa
OECD high income
South Asia
East Asia and Pacic
Latin America and the Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa
FIGURE 1.1
|
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN STRONG LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND HIGHER
SHARE OF FEMALE ENTREPRENEURS
Sources: Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database and the World Bank Entrepreneurship Database (We-Data), https://www.worldbank.org
/en/programs/entrepreneurship/gender.
Note: The Entrepreneurship database collects data on female entrepreneurial activity. Limited liability company (LLC) owners are individuals who own
at least one share of a newly registered LLC. Sole proprietors are individuals who own and manage a business entity, are indistinguishable from the
business, and are personally liable. The gure depicts two correlations: between the share of female LLC owners and WBL score (panel a) and between
the share of female sole proprietors and WBL score (panel b). Fitted regression lines are also included. The relationships remain positive and statistically
signicant after controlling for income per capita. This statistical relationship should not be interpreted as causal. OECD = Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development.
FINDINGS
13
Moreover, rms that apply legal provisions restricting women’s rights—such as
provisions limiting the work-related tasks that a woman employee can perform—hire
fewer women and are less likely to have a woman among the rm’s top managers.
These discriminatory practices are associated with lower levels of sales and labor
productivity (Hyland, Islam, and Muzi 2020). As a result, reforms in the area of family
law are associated most strongly with lower informality, in line with studies showing a
positive association between legislation mandating equal access to credit, equalizing
business registration, improving women’s mobility, and expanding women’s business
ownership and access to nance (Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, and Singer 2013; Islam,
Muzi, and Amin 2019).
Yet new laws are not a silver bullet for women’s inclusion. Legal reform will improve
the situation of women only if these laws are implemented properly and if the wider
ecosphere is supportive of them. Laws do not achieve their intended eect if they are in
strong conict with prevailing social norms, and social norms change slowly (Acemoglu
and Jackson 2016; Gedzi 2012; Holden and Chaudhary 2013). Moreover, in some
contexts, equalizing rights between women and men can have negative consequences
for women on the ground.
5
Nevertheless, changing norms and laws can be mutually
reinforcing (Williamson and Kerekes 2011). Indeed, legal reforms can exert a “magnet
eect,” drawing social norms in the same direction as legal reform over time (Aldashev
et al. 2012).
y = −0.19x + 22.22; t-stat(x) = −2.67
0
10
20
30
40
50
% of women-owned rms that began
operating in the informal sector
20 40 5030 60 70 80
90
WBL score (0–100)
FIGURE 1.2
|
CORRELATION BETWEEN LEGAL EQUALITY AND THE PROPORTION
OF FIRMS WITH WOMEN OWNERS THAT BEGIN OPERATING IN THE
INFORMAL SECTOR
Sources: Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database; World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Note: The gure presents the correlation between the Women, Business and the Law score and the proportion of rms with women owners that
began operating in the informal sector, as a proportion of all rms with female owners. The index is measured in the rm’s year of birth. Each point
represents a single economy. A tted regression line is also included. Although the gure presents a simple correlation, the relationship remains negative
and statistically signicant after controlling for rm size and exporting status when it began operating as well as macro-level variables, including real
gross domestic product per capita provided in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (https://databank.worldbank.org/source
/ world-development-indicators) as well as time xed eects. This statistical relationship should not be interpreted as causal. The regression is based on
rm-level observations from rms in 146 economies, surveyed between 2006 and 2020.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
14
Building on evidence of this relationship, Women, Business and the Law emphasizes
the policy actions that can be taken to improve economic opportunity for women.
Despite the persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic, over the past year 23 economies
across the globe recognized these benets and introduced legal reforms increasing
women’s economic empowerment.
Data update
This edition of Women, Business and the Law captures reforms that occurred in the
period from October 2, 2020, to October 1, 2021. The average global score for 2021
is 76.5 out of 100—more than half a point higher than in 2020. Up from 10 in 2020,
12 economies—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden—score 100, meaning that women are on
an equal legal standing with men across all of the areas measured (table 1.1). Women,
Business and the Law data and scores are based purely on objective measures of the
law. Each data point must be backed up by a publicly documented legal basis.
6
For the
complete Women, Business and the Law data set, see the economy data in appendix B.
Of the 39 economies with scores higher than 90, 28 economies are in the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) high-income region, 7 are in
TABLE 1.1 WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022 INDEX
Economy Score Economy Score Economy Score Economy Score
Belgium 100.0 New Zealand 97.5 Albania 91.3 Moldova 87.5
Canada 100.0 United Kingdom 97.5 Taiwan, China 91.3 Guyana 86.9
Denmark 100.0 Australia 96.9 United States 91.3 Zimbabwe 86.9
France 100.0 Austria 96.9 Bulgaria 90.6 Cabo Verde 86.3
Greece ✔
100.0 Hungary 96.9 Romania 90.6 Costa Rica 86.3
Iceland 100.0 Norway 96.9 Ecuador 89.4 Dominican Republic 86.3
Ireland 100.0 Slovenia 96.9 Mauritius 89.4 Namibia 86.3
Latvia 100.0 Peru 95.0 Bolivia 88.8 Nicaragua 86.3
Luxembourg 100.0
Cyprus ✔
94.4 El Salvador 88.8 Timor-Leste 86.3
Portugal 100.0 Paraguay 94.4 Malta 88.8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 85.0
Spain ✔
100.0 Croatia 93.8 Mexico 88.8 Brazil 85.0
Sweden 100.0 Czech Republic 93.8 Uruguay 88.8 Korea, Rep. 85.0
Estonia 97.5 Lithuania 93.8
Georgia ✔
88.1 Mongolia 85.0
Finland 97.5 Poland 93.8 Lao PDR 88.1 Montenegro 85.0
Germany 97.5 Serbia 93.8 South Africa 88.1 North Macedonia 85.0
Italy 97.5
Hong Kong SAR, China ✔
91.9
Switzerland ✔
88.1 Slovak Republic 85.0
Netherlands 97.5 Kosovo 91.9
Armenia ✔
87.5
Ukraine ✔
85.0
(Table continues next page)
FINDINGS
15
TABLE 1.1 WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022 INDEX(continued)
Economy Score Economy Score Economy Score Economy Score
Venezuela, RB 85.0
Argentina ✔
79.4 Bhutan 71.9 Tonga 58.8
Vietnam ✔
85.0 Belize 79.4 Madagascar 71.9 Algeria 57.5
Colombia ✔
84.4 Panama 79.4 St. Kitts and Nevis 71.3 Niger 56.9
Puerto Rico (US) 83.8 Azerbaijan 78.8 Guatemala 70.6 Solomon Islands 56.9
Rwanda 83.8 Congo, Dem. Rep. 78.8 Uzbekistan 70.6 Palau 56.3
St. Lucia 83.8 Japan 78.8 Eritrea 69.4
Pakistan ✔✘
55.6
Côte d’Ivoire 83.1 Philippines 78.8 Gambia, The 69.4 Vanuatu 55.6
São Tomé and Príncipe 83.1 Tajikistan 78.8 Kazakhstan 69.4 Brunei Darussalam 53.1
Burkina Faso 82.5 Lesotho 78.1 Djibouti 68.1 Equatorial Guinea 51.9
Fiji 82.5 Thailand 78.1 Jamaica 68.1
Egypt, Arab Rep. ✔
50.6
Gabon ✔
82.5 Malawi 77.5 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 68.1 Libya 50.0
Mozambique 82.5 Central African Republic 76.9 South Sudan 67.5 Malaysia 50.0
Singapore 82.5 Ethiopia 76.9 Senegal 66.9 Bangladesh 49.4
Turkey 82.5 Kyrgyz Republic 76.9 Antigua and Barbuda 66.3 Congo, Rep. 49.4
United Arab Emirates 82.5
Burundi ✔
76.3 Chad 66.3 Mauritania 48.1
Togo ✘
81.9 Kiribati 76.3 Marshall Islands 65.6 Jordan 46.9
Bahamas, The 81.3 Seychelles 76.3 Sri Lanka 65.6 Somalia 46.9
Cambodia ✔
81.3 Belarus 75.6
Bahrain ✔
65.0 Eswatini 46.3
Liberia 81.3 China 75.6 Comoros 65.0 Iraq 45.0
Tanzania 81.3 Morocco 75.6 Indonesia 64.4 Guinea-Bissau 42.5
Zambia 81.3 Ghana 75.0 Tunisia 64.4 Syrian Arab Republic 40.0
Benin ✔
80.6 Honduras 75.0 Botswana 63.8
Oman ✔
38.8
Grenada 80.6 Samoa 75.0 Nigeria 63.1 Afghanistan 38.1
Israel 80.6 Trinidad and Tobago 75.0 Dominica 62.5
Kuwait ✔
35.0
Kenya 80.6 India 74.4 Haiti 61.3 Iran, Islamic Rep. 31.3
Nepal 80.6 Guinea 73.8 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 61.3 Qatar 29.4
Barbados 80.0 Maldives 73.8 Mali 60.6 Sudan 29.4
Chile 80.0 Suriname 73.8 Cameroon 60.0 Yemen, Rep. 26.9
San Marino 80.0 Russian Federation 73.1 Papua New Guinea 60.0 West Bank and Gaza 26.3
Saudi Arabia 80.0 Uganda 73.1
Lebanon ✔
58.8
Angola ✔
79.4
Sierra Leone ✔
72.5 Myanmar 58.8
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
Note: Economies with a green check (✔) saw an improvement in score due to reforms in one or more areas. Economies with a red X (✘) implemented at least one change reducing score.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
16
Europe and Central Asia, 2 are in East Asia and the Pacic, and 2 are in Latin America
and the Caribbean. No economy in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, or Sub-
Saharan Africa scores 90 or higher (map 1.1).
Economies at all income levels made progress toward legal gender equality in the past
year; however, progress varied (gure 1.3). Upper-middle-income economies improved
26.3
100
NO DATA
INDEX
IBRD 46392 | FEBRUARY 2022
MAP 1.1
|
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022 INDEX
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
65.4
65.5
69.8
70.3
77.1
77.9
85.8
86.3
020
10 4030 6050 8070 90 10
0
Low income
Lower middle income
Upper middle incom
e
High income
WBL score (0–100)
WBL2022 score WBL2021 score
FIGURE 1.3
|
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW SCORE, BY INCOME LEVEL
Source: Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database.
FINDINGS
17
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 10
0
88.826.3
38.1 80.6
89.429.4
95.061.3
69.4 94.4
10078.8
91.950.0
OECD high income
East Asia and
Pacic
Sub-Saharan Afric
a
South Asia
Middle East and
North Africa
Europe and
Central Asia
Latin America and
the Caribbean
53.0
63.7
71.5
80.4
84.1
95.2
71.9
Minimum Average Maximum
WBL score (0–100)
FIGURE 1.4
|
DISPERSION OF WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW SCORES, BY REGION
Source: Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database.
Note: Each vertical line shows the score of one economy per region.
their average score the most, with six countries enacting 15 legal changes. Seven lower-
middle income economies also instituted reforms, raising the average score for the
group from 69.8 to 70.3. High-income economies made some progress as well, raising
their score by 0.5 point due to reforms in eight countries. Low-income economies made
few improvements in the past year, with the average score increasing only 0.1 point,
from 65.4 to 65.5, meaning that the average low-income economy has about two-
thirds of the good-practice legislation identied by the indicators. The gap in average
score between high-income and low-income economies is 20.8 points, corresponding to
about 45 laws that treat women dierently than men.
The highest- and lowest-scoring regions remain the same as last year, with
economies in the OECD high-income region, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin
America and the Caribbean scoring above the global average (gure 1.4). The
Middle East and North Africa and South Asia have the lowest regional averages.
However, scores diverge signicantly within regions, particularly in the Middle
East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the dierence between the
highest and lowest scores ranging between 62.5 and 60.0 points, respectively. The
smallest dierence—21.2 points—between the highest and lowest scores is in the
OECD high-income region, which also has the narrowest dispersion of scores across
economies.
The Mobility, Workplace, Marriage, Entrepreneurship, and Assets indicators have
an average global score above 80, meaning that most economies have removed
restrictions or introduced the relevant legal rights and protections measured by these
indicators (annex 1A). Average scores are lower for the Pay, Parenthood, and Pension
indicators(gure 1.5). Parenthood, with an average score of 55.6, has the most room
to improve, followed by the Pay indicator.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
18
Average scores obscure the great variation in the distribution of scores across the
Women, Business and the Law indicators (table 1.2). For example, the Parenthood
and Pay indicators, which have the lowest scores on average, also have the largest
dispersion between scores, with almost an even distribution of economies in each of
the possible groups of scores. Nineteen economies score 0 on Parenthood, meaning
that they do not have any of the good practices measured by this indicator (leave for
mothers of at least 14 weeks, which is fully administered by the government, leave for
fathers, parental leave, and prohibition of dismissal of pregnant women). Only 31 out of
190 economies score 100.
88.6
84.3
81.2
80.5
80.1
73.4
68.7
55.6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Mobility
Entrepreneurshi
p
Assets
Workplace
Marriage
Pension
Pay
Parenthood
WBL score (0–100)
Global average 76.5
FIGURE 1.5
|
AVERAGE WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW SCORES, BY INDICATOR
Source: Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database.
TABLE 1.2 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES IN EACH SCORE GROUP, BY INDICATOR
WBL score (0–100)
Indicator 0 20 25 40 50 60 75 80 100
Mobility 2 6 13 35 134
Workplace 4 21 24 21 120
Pay 9 23 42 49 67
Marriage 5 12 12 20 40 101
Parenthood 19 28 33 37 42 31
Entrepreneurship 2 1 7 94 86
Assets 4 2 31 19 20 114
Pension 1 24 30 66 69
Source: Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database.
Note: Shading means that the score is not possible for that indicator, given the number of questions posed.
FINDINGS
19
Where are laws changing?
Since October 2020, 23 economies implemented reforms improving 39 laws to achieve
greater equality of opportunity across the eight indicators measured (annex 1B). At the
same time, two economies implemented changes that reduced equality in the law: Togo
enacted a new labor code that no longer broadly prohibits the dismissal of pregnant
workers, while Pakistan failed to convert into law a decree that would permanently
equalize men’s and women’s ability to register a business.
Legal changes enacted in the Middle East and North Africa resulted in 10 positive
data changes, more than any other region. Despite its low scores, the region advanced
the most because of its reform eorts, with 25 percent of economies implementing
at least one reform. Economies in Europe and Central Asia also implemented reforms,
despite having scores above the global average, with 17 percent changing at least
one law to improve legal equality for women. Progress in the rest of the world was
slower.
Six out of the seven regions improved their scores and reduced the gaps in legal
rights and opportunities for women, at least on the books (gure 1.6). The Middle
East and North Africa had the largest improvement (1.5 points), followed by Sub-
Saharan Africa (0.8 point), Europe and Central Asia (0.6 point), and East Asia and the
Pacic (0.5point). South Asia’s average score remains unchanged from the previous
year.
Fewer economies in Sub-Saharan Africa instituted reforms, but those that were
implemented had a large impact. Many reforms occurred in Western and Central
Africa, where reform is needed the most. Among them, Gabon stands out, with
comprehensive reforms to its civil code and the enactment of a law on the elimination
1.5
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
Middle East and
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Europe and
Central Asia
East Asia and
Pacic
OECD high
income
Latin America and
the Caribbean
South Asia
Improvement in WBL
score (percentage point)
Average improvement in WBL index
FIGURE 1.6
|
IMPROVEMENT IN WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW SCORE, BY REGION
Source: Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
20
of violence against women. These changes aected 9 of the 15 data points for which
Gabon previously recorded a “no” answer across ve indicators: Mobility, Workplace,
Marriage, Entrepreneurship, and Assets. A government taskforce, Gabon Equality, was
instrumental in reforming the discriminatory provisions of the civil code, as was the
work of civil society organizations, including the Foundation Sylvia Bongo Ondimba. As
a result of this comprehensive set of reforms, Gabon’s score on the Women, Business
and the Law index rose from 57.5 in 2020 to 82.5 in 2021.
The Parenthood indicator recorded the highest number of reforms, with positive
changes in eight data points in eight economies (table 1.3). Most reforms focused on
paid paternity or shared parental leave. Progress in the Parenthood indicator is followed
by the Workplace and Pay indicators, with each recording reforms aecting seven data
points. These reforms focused on protecting against sexual harassment in employment
and prohibiting gender discrimination. Fewer reforms occurred in the Marriage,
Entrepreneurship, Assets, and Pension indicators.
Although the Pay and Parenthood indicators remain the lowest scoring in 2021,
with average scores of 68.7 and 55.6, respectively, they inched closer to gender parity,
rising 0.9 and 0.7 percentage point, respectively (gure 1.7). The Workplace indicator
increased 0.9 percentage point from the 2020 level. Despite recording fewer reforms,
the Workplace indicator improved more than the Parenthood indicator due to a negative
change in the Parenthood indicator in Togo.
TABLE 1.3 REFORMS TO IMPROVE GENDER EQUALITY IN 2020–21, BY INDICATOR
Indicator Number of data
points reformed
Examples of reforms adopted
Mobility 3 In Cyprus and Oman, passport application procedures are now equal for men and women. Gabon gave women the
same rights as men to choose where to live.
Workplace 7 Angola and Lebanon both enacted laws protecting women from sexual harassment in employment, including criminal
penalties for such conduct. Gabon enacted legislation allowing women to get jobs without permission from their
husbands. Kuwait prohibited gender discrimination in employment and adopted legislation on sexual harassment in
employment.
Pay 7 Bahrain and Burundi mandated equal remuneration for work of equal value. In Benin and Vietnam, women can now
work in industrial jobs in the same way as men. Pakistan lifted restrictions on women’s ability to work at night.
Marriage 4 Egypt, Arab Rep., enacted legislation protecting women from domestic violence. Gabon no longer requires a married
woman to obey her husband and allows women to be head of household in the same way as men. Gabon also
enacted legislation protecting women from domestic violence.
Parenthood 8 Armenia, Switzerland, and Ukraine introduced paid paternity leave. Colombia, Georgia, Greece, and Spain introduced
paid parental leave. Hong Kong SAR, China, increased the duration of paid maternity leave to at least 14 weeks.
Entrepreneurship 4 Egypt, Arab Rep., Gabon, and Sierra Leone prohibited gender-based discrimination in nancial services, making it
easier for women to access credit. Gabon also gave women the same rights to open a bank account as men.
Assets 2 Gabon granted spouses equal rights to immovable property and equal administrative authority over assets
duringmarriage.
Pension 4 Argentina explicitly accounted for periods of absence due to childcare in pension benets. Cambodia and Ukraine
equalized the ages at which men and women can retire with full pension benets.
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
FINDINGS
21
Mobility
The Mobility indicator examines constraints on women’s agency and freedom of
movement, including the rules governing the legal rights of men and women to obtain a
passport, choose where to live, leave home at will, and travel outside the home. Recent
research conrms that lack of mobility and social isolation have potentially large impacts
on women’s opportunities. Conversely, enabling women to have social networks outside
the home can improve their access to health and family planning services (Anukriti etal.
2020, 2021).
Often, social norms that restrict women’s freedom of movement are not only
reected in, but also inuenced by, legal norms. In 56 economies, the law treats men
and women dierently when it comes to freedom of movement (table 1.4). For example,
in eight economies, a woman cannot travel outside the country in the same way as a
man, and in 14 economies, a woman cannot leave her home at will. In 34 economies, a
woman cannot choose where to live in the same way as a man. Gabon reformed in this
area by amending the civil code, which previously obliged a married woman to live in a
0.9 0.9
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.40.4
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Pay
Workplace
Parenthood
Pension
Marriage
Mobility
Entrepreneurship
Assets
Improvement in WBL score
(percentage point)
FIGURE 1.7
|
IMPROVEMENT IN WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW SCORE,
BY INDICATOR
Source: Women, Business and the Law (WBL) database.
TABLE 1.4 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES THAT DO NOT HAVE LAWS GUARANTEEING WOMEN’S FREEDOM
OFMOVEMENT
Question Number of economies
with a “no” response
Number of economies with at least
one “no” response
1. Can a woman choose where to live in the same way as a man? 34
56
2. Can a woman travel outside her home in the same way as a man? 14
3. Can a woman apply for a passport in the same way as a man? 31
4. Can a woman travel outside the country in the same way as a man? 8
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
22
family residence chosen by her husband. The law now allows both spouses to choose
the marital home and establish separate domiciles.
Constraints on women’s mobility also persist in laws and regulations making access
to formal identication more dicult. In 31 economies, a married woman cannot obtain
a passport in the same way as a married man. However, reforms are happening. In 2020,
Cyprus reformed its civil registry law that previously imposed additional requirements
on married women and widows when applying for a passport. The revised law contains
gender-neutral language and requires any person applying to have the spouse’s name
entered on a passport to provide a certicate of marriage or civil cohabitation. In Oman,
passport application procedures now are equal for men and women. A 2010 reform of
the passport law removed a legal provision requiring a married woman to obtain her
husband’s written consent when applying for a passport. However, passport application
documents still required a woman to be accompanied by her husband or guardian when
applying. This language was removed from the application document in 2021, making
the process equal for men and women.
Workplace
The Workplace indicator analyzes laws aecting women’s decision to enter the labor
market, including their legal capacity and ability to work as well as protections against
discrimination and sexual harassment.
In 120 economies, women are free to choose where they work, and the law protects
them from discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace, including appropriate
criminal penalties or civil remedies (table 1.5). In the remaining 70 economies, there is
room to improve in one of the four areas measured by the Workplace indicator. In
18 economies, a husband can legally prevent his wife from working. In 2021, Gabon
amended a discriminatory provision in the family code that allowed a husband to ask a
court to prohibit his wife from working if it was in the interest of the family. Now, both
spouses may exercise a profession of their choice.
Of the 30 economies that do not legally prohibit gender discrimination in employment,
9 are located in East Asia and Pacic, 7 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 6 in the
Middle East and North Africa, and 8 in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. In contrast, all
of the economies in the OECD high-income region and in Europe and Central Asia have
laws prohibiting discrimination in employment.
TABLE 1.5 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES THAT DO NOT HAVE LAWS PROTECTING WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE
Question Number of economies with
a“no” response
Number of economies with at
least one “no” response
1. Can a woman get a job in the same way as a man? 18
70
2. Does the law prohibit discrimination in employment based on gender? 30
3. Is there legislation on sexual harassment in employment? 46
4. Are there criminal penalties or civil remedies for sexual harassment in employment? 54
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
FINDINGS
23
Kuwait addressed discrimination in employment by prohibiting employers from
discriminating on the basis of sex, age, pregnancy, or social status in all aspects of work.
The ministerial decree was issued after a collaborative and participatory process that
included the secretary general of the Supreme Council of Planning and Development,
the Committee of Women and Work Aairs, the Higher Consultative Committee for
Labour Aairs, and other ocial bodies. In the past, Kuwait’s constitution had a broad
clause prohibiting dierentiation between people due to gender. The enactment of the
new decree represents a step further in the protection of women in the workplace.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is still pervasive. While there is a lack of global
and regional data on the prevalence of sexual harassment, country studies show that
workplace sexual harassment imposes an economic cost that is shared by individuals,
employers, governments, and society (Hejase 2021). Addressing sexual harassment in
the workplace benets both workers and businesses.
Globally, 46 economies still do not have legislation on sexual harassment
in employment. Of the 144 economies that do, 8 do not have civil remedies or
criminal penalties available for such cases. Over the last year, Angola, Kuwait,
and Lebanon enacted specic legislation on sexual harassment in employment
for the rst time. In Kuwait, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued an
administrative decision on September 28, 2021, prohibiting all forms and means of
sexual harassment in the workplace, including cyber sexual harassment. However,
this law does not explicitly prescribe either criminal penalties or civil remedies for
acts of sexual harassment. Of the 144 economies that have enacted legislation on
sexual harassment in the workplace, only 97 have established criminal penalties for
such acts. Civil remedies, such as compensation for victims of sexual harassment,
are available in 107 economies.
Angola and Lebanon recently established criminal penalties for workplace sexual
harassment. Angola adopted a new penal code on November 11, 2020, making
sexual harassment in the workplace punishable by imprisonment for up to three
years. Lebanon’s law criminalizing sexual harassment and providing rehabilitationfor
victims came into force in January 2021. Under this law, sexual harassment in
employment is a criminal oense punishable by imprisonment for six months to four
years and a ne.
Pay
The Pay indicator examines whether laws are in place to ensure equal remuneration
between men and women for work of equal value as well as to allow women to work in
the same way as men at night, in industrial jobs, and in jobs deemed dangerous. Laws
in 123 economies could be improved in one of these aspects to reduce the gender pay
gap (table 1.6).
Only half (95) of all economies mandate equal remuneration for men and women who
perform work of equal value. A study of the economic eect of equal pay in the United
States nds that if women’s remuneration were brought to the same level as men’s, the
poverty rate for all working women in the country would be reduced by almost half (Milli
et al. 2017). Countries that have an opportunity gap between men and women are less
likely to thrive or to solve challenges peacefully (UN and World Bank 2018).
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
24
Eighty-six economies impose at least one legal restriction on women’s employment,
and nine impose all three, shutting them out of many high-paying jobs. Women cannot
work the same night hours as men in 21 economies. They cannot work in industrial jobs
in the same way as men in 69 economies or in jobs deemed dangerous in 53 economies.
Five countries introduced reforms in the Pay indicator: Bahrain, Benin, Burundi,
Pakistan, and Vietnam. Bahrain and Burundi mandated equal remuneration for work
of equal value. Bahrain and Vietnam eliminated all legal restrictions on women’s
employment, while Benin struck down restrictions on women’s ability to work in
industrial jobs, and Pakistan removed restrictions on women’s ability to work at night.
Bahrain made the greatest improvement in the Pay indicator, raising its score in this
area from 0 to 100 in the past two years. In 2021, Bahrain repealed provisions in the
labor law that restricted women from working at night and in certain industries and
introduced amendments mandating equal remuneration for work of equal value. One
catalyst for this reform was the eort of the Bahraini Supreme Council for Women,
an advisory council formed in 2001. The council adopted a second National Plan for
the Advancement of Bahraini Women for 2013–2022, which aims to support women’s
entrepreneurship, career opportunities, and nancial independence, among other goals.
Vietnam also took signicant steps by eliminating restrictions on women’s
employment while maintaining measures to ensure the occupational health and safety
of both men and women. Whereas women who are not pregnant or nursing were
previously banned from performing more than 70 specic jobs, ranging from drilling oil
wells to repairing high-voltage power lines, they can now work in all the same jobs as
men. Notably, the law requires that employers ensure occupational safety and health
and inform both men and women of the risks that performing certain jobs pose to their
reproductive health.
Marriage
Legal constraints related to marriage and divorce persist throughout the world,
weakening women’s agency and decision-making powers within the family and
threatening their safety. One in three women—or approximately 736 million—is
subjected to physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner or sexual violence by a
nonpartner. According to the United Nations Population Fund, domestic violence cases
have risen 20 percent globally since the beginning of the pandemic, with 243 million
women and girls between 15 and 49 years of age reported to have been a victim of
TABLE 1.6 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES THAT DO NOT HAVE LAWS ADDRESSING THE PAY GAP
Pay Number of economies with a
“no” response
Number of economies with at
least one “no” response
1. Does the law mandate equal remuneration for work of equal value? 95
123
2. Can a woman work at night in the same way as a man? 21
3. Can a woman work in a job deemed dangerous in the same way as a man? 53
4. Can a woman work in an industrial job in the same way as a man? 69
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
FINDINGS
25
intimate partner violence in 2020 (UN Women 2020). These ndings are notable given
the magnitude of excess female mortality and the documented rise in domestic violence
since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Agüero 2021).
In 17economies, a married woman is required by law to obey her husband, and in
28 economies, the husband is legally designated as head of household. Additionally,
30 out of 190 economies captured by Women, Business and the Law do not currently
have legislation addressing domestic violence. In the remaining economies, many do
not have provisions prohibiting economic and nancial abuse (gure 1.8). Economic
and nancial abuse rarely happens in isolation from other forms of violence; it can be
extremely harmful because it threatens a woman’s economic security and potential for
self-suciency, forcing her dependence on the perpetrator. The abuse can take many
forms, including limiting someone’s access to savings and assets, damaging property,
refraining from making rent or mortgage payments, or sabotaging employment.
Equal divorce rights are also important for women’s health and nancial security.
Research has consistently shown that unequal or limited access to divorce is associated
with the incidence of intimate-partner violence against women (García-Ramos 2021).
In 89 economies around the world, legal reforms are needed to strengthen women’s
agency and decision-making within marriage (table 1.7).
Since October 2020, no country has instituted reforms to address women’s rights
to divorce and remarry. As such, 46 economies throughout the world still restrict a
woman’s right to obtain a divorce,and 68 economies do not give women equal rights to
remarry. Remarriage rights are restricted when waiting periods varying from 90 to 365
days before contracting a new marriage are imposed on women but not on men. Two
economies still do not permit legal divorce (Eswatini, the Philippines).
Gabon instituted reforms in three areas of the Marriage indicator. Gabon’s reform of
the civil code removed a provision designating the husband as head of family with the
right to make decisions concerning the household’s family life and nances. According
to the revised civil code, “The family is managed jointly by the spouses in the interest
157
134
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
158
Physical Psychological Sexual
113
Economic
Number of economies
Type of violence
FIGURE 1.8
|
NUMBER OF ECONOMIES WITH LAWS PROTECTING WOMEN FROM
VIOLENCE, BY TYPE
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
26
of the household and the children.” The provision requiring a husband to protect his
wife and a wife to obey him was also amended: a married woman is no longer legally
required to obey her husband in Gabon.
Following a period of advocacy work guided by the government’s objective of
addressing gender-based violence—and domestic violence in particular—Gabon
enacted its rst national law on the elimination of violence against women in
September 2021. This new law targets physical, sexual, psychological, and economic
forms of abuse. It provides criminal penalties for violent crimes committed against
women and enumerates harsher punishment for domestic violence. The law also
requires protection orders for victims of violence to be delivered within two days
after receipt of a complaint. A protection order prohibits an abusive partner from
committing further acts of family violence and is intended to deter repeat incidents of
physical and psychological abuse. Although most countries allow victims of domestic
violence to obtain a protection order, only 30 economies allow survivors to obtain one
immediately or within 24 hours. In 25 economies, it takes between two and seven
days, in 19 economies it takes more than seven days, and in all other economies (116),
no clear time frame is specied.
The Arab Republic of Egypt also enacted legislation on domestic violence for the
rst time. Egypt’s National Strategy for Empowering Egyptian Women 2030 drives
the country’s policies on women’s empowerment and equality. In 2021, this strategy
resulted in the prime minister issuing Decree No. 827/2021 to establish a one-stop
shop for protecting women victims of violence. Such legislation will surely save lives: a
recent analysis of 159 economies nds that domestic violence laws are associated with
a women-to-men mortality ratio that is 2.3 percent lower than the mean value (Amin,
Islam, and Lopez-Claros 2021).
Parenthood
The Parenthood indicator examines laws aecting women’s work during and after
pregnancy (table 1.8), including paid leave and laws prohibiting rms from dismissing
workers because they are pregnant.
A study of 159 countries nds that female labor force participation is positively
correlated with the length of maternity leave, if under 30 weeks (Del Rey, Kyriacou, and
Silva 2021). Paid leave—whether maternity, paternity, or parental leave—encourages
fathers to contribute more equitably to household responsibilities from the start of
TABLE 1.7 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES WITH LEGAL CONSTRAINTS RELATED TO MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Question Number of economies with a
“no” response
Number of economies with at least
one “no” response
1. Is there no legal provision that requires a married woman to obey her husband? 17
89
2. Can a woman be head of household in the same way as a man? 28
3. Is there legislation specically addressing domestic violence? 30
4. Can a woman obtain a judgment of divorce in the same way as a man? 46
5. Does a woman have the same rights to remarry as a man? 68
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
FINDINGS
27
parenthood and is a key policy change that could result in greater use of women’s talent
(Yavorsky, Qian, and Sargent 2021). However, while the number of leave days granted
to mothers increased substantially between 1970 and 2021 in all regions, the granting
of paternity leave increased only minimally. This lag is particularly notable in the Middle
East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average leave granted to
fathers was 2.0 days and 2.7 days, respectively, in 2021 (table 1.9).
7
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated gender inequalities in caregiving at the
expense of women’s employment, making the sharing of responsibilities for childcare
especially important (box 1.2). Only ve economies in the world do not have any form of
paid maternity leave, all located in the East Asia and Pacic region (Marshall Islands, the
Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga). However, most
economies (118) guarantee 14 weeks of paid maternity leave for the birth of a child,
the minimum standard recommended by International Labour Organization Convention
No. 183 and the threshold used by Women, Business and the Law. The total duration of
paid leave available to mothers—including maternity leave, shared parental leave, and
specic entitlement to parental leave for mothers—ranges from two weeks to about
three years, with a median duration of 98 days in the economies that have it. Hong
Kong SAR, China—which previously provided 10 weeks of paid maternity leave—is the
only economy to reform by introducing a 14-week minimum duration of paid leave for
mothers since October 2021.
TABLE 1.8 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES THAT DO NOT HAVE LAWS INCENTIVIZING WOMEN’S WORK AFTER
HAVING CHILDREN
Question Number of economies with
a“no”response
Number of economies with
atleast one “no” response
1. Is paid leave of at least 14 weeks available to mothers? 72
159
2. Does the government administer 100% of maternity leave benets? 92
3. Is paid leave available to fathers? 76
4. Is there paid parental leave? 140
5. Is dismissal of pregnant workers prohibited? 42
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
TABLE 1.9 REGIONAL AVERAGE NUMBER OF LEAVE DAYS, 1970–2021
Region Leave days formothers Leave days forfathers
1970 2021 Increase 1970 2021 Increase
East Asia and Pacic 25.5 126.4 100.9 0.0 11.2 11.2
Europe and Central Asia 88.8 506.0 417.2 0.0 11.5 11.5
OECD high income 102.5 327.5 225.0 0.2 83.7 83.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 53.2 96.2 43.0 0.0 4.0 3.9
Middle East and North Africa 38.8 81.2 42.3 0.3 2.0 1.7
South Asia 36.8 99.3 62.5 0.0 5.6 5.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 48.9 90.7 41.8 0.3 2.7 2.4
Global average 59.7 190.6 130.9 0.1 19.7 19.5
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
28
Slightly less than half (92) of the economies covered administer cash benets for paid
maternity leave exclusively through the government. A study of OECD economies nds
that having the government administer maternity benets through a compulsory social
insurance scheme or public fund makes it less likely that employers will discriminate
against women of childbearing age (Thévenon and Solaz 2013). Indeed, the cost of
hiring women of childbearing age is higher for employers in economies in which laws
mandate that they fund maternity benets. This could lead to disparities in both hiring
and salaries to compensate for administering women’s leave.
In 2021, 114 economies guaranteed paid leave for fathers for the birth of a child. The
total duration of paid leave available to fathers—including paid paternity leave and any
parental leave specically for fathers—ranges from one day to about one year, with a
median duration of one week. As little as two weeks of paid paternity leave can increase
a mother’s probability of reemployment shortly after childbirth (Farré and Gonzalez
2017). Armenia, Switzerland, and Ukraine introduced paid paternity leave in 2020/21.
BOX 1.2 MOST POLICY RESPONSES TO THE PANDEMIC CHILDCARE CRISIS
HAVEEXPIRED
Over the course of the pandemic, many women suered decreased working hours, a decline
in income, and, in some cases, permanent job loss (Dang and Nguyen 2021). Indeed, more
than two years since its onset, women’s employment rates continue to recover more slowly
than men’s. While men’s employment dropped 3.9 percent globally in 2020, women’s em-
ployment dropped by 5.0 percent, with almost 90 percent of these women remaining out of
the labor force (ILO 2021). Many women bear the brunt of increased childcare, often having
to choose between their jobs and their families (Alon et al. 2021).
Last year, Women, Business and the Law found that responses to the childcare crisis were
few and far between. Fewer than 40 economies introduced leave or benet policies to sup-
port working parents shouldering greater childcare duties. Some 10 economies provided other
forms of childcare assistance, such as free childcare or compensation designated specically
for childcare. More than 20 economies provided childcare measures for essential workers.
Despite ongoing need, most of these measures have since expired. However, some remained
active in 2021: in Canada, for example, maternity and parental cash benets were extended
through November 20, and nancial support was provided to parents working fewer hours
due to childcare. In the United Kingdom until October 1, parents could claim childcare costs
through tax credits if their working hours fell below the required number of hours due to
COVID-19, with additional extensions for parents whose hours had not returned to prepan-
demic levels.
The pandemic also aected parental leave policies. For example, just months before COVID-19
became a global pandemic, Ireland introduced two weeks of paid parental leave for each
parent. To recognize the challenges facing working parents during the crisis, the govern-
ment later announced that new parents would get three extra weeks of parental leave each,
amounting to ve weeks total per parent, eective April 1, 2021. In contrast, Fiji temporarily
lowered paid paternity leave from ve days to two days in 2020 and then to one day in 2021,
citing job instability during the pandemic.
Overall, measures that address the childcare crisis, and in particular long-term strategies, are
rare. Economies must build robust childcare infrastructure, as well as design family-friendly
leave and workplace policies, both to incentivize women’s return to the workplace and to
strengthen economic recovery.
FINDINGS
29
Of the 50 economies worldwide with paid parental leave, none is in South Asia or
Sub-Saharan Africa. While maternity and paternity leave refers to leave made available
specically to mothers and to fathers, respectively, parental leave is available to either
parent. In many economies, however, a certain share of parental leave is reserved for
the specic use of the mother or the father. In the past year, Colombia, Georgia, Greece,
and Spain introduced paid parental leave. Colombia became the rst economy in Latin
America and the Caribbean to introduce paid parental leave. In August 2019, several
parliamentarians drafted legislation that aimed to reduce the incentives for employers to
discriminate against women of reproductive age. After consultations with government
representatives and civil society groups, political parties joined forces, and the initiative
was passed into law in July 2021. In addition to paid parental leave, the new legislation
included antidiscrimination measures such as prohibiting employers from requiring a
pregnancy test as a condition of employment or asking employees about their plans
to have children. Paternity leave was also expanded from eight days to two weeks.
Just three economies—Iceland, Spain, and the United States—provide equal amounts
of paid leave for mothers and fathers.
8
Spain completed its progressive increase of paid
paternity leave, seeking to equalize maternity and paternity leave. Now, mothers and
fathers are each guaranteed 16 weeks of paid leave for the birth a child.
However, the relationship between family leave policies and women’s labor market
outcomes is not clear-cut. Indeed, while a certain amount of leave granted to mothers
upon the birth of a child is associated with positive labor market outcomes, excessively
long durations of leave may have a negative eect on an individual’s career progression
and wages (Akgunduz and Plantenga 2013; Del Boca, Pasqua, and Pronzato 2009; Ruhm
1998). A comprehensive review of family leave policies in high-income countries nds
no clear consensus on the impact of parental leave on women’s labor market outcomes
(Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). Any positive impacts on wages and employment are
limited to low-skill workers, with potentially negative eects for high-skill workers.
Likewise, there is no clear evidence of an association between paternity leave and long-
term changes in employment and wages (Cools, Fiva, and Kirkebøen 2015; Ekberg,
Eriksson, and Friebel 2013). It is important to consider parental leave policies with other
policies aecting women’s ability to enter and remain in the workforce, such as the
provision of quality childcare (the subject of chapter 2).
Finally, 42 economies do not prohibit the dismissal of pregnant workers. Discrimination
against pregnant workers may indirectly harm mothers’ mental and physical health and
lead to premature birth (Hackney et al. 2021). Unfortunately, this number is one more
than last year. Togo’s new labor code no longer explicitly prohibits the dismissal of
pregnant workers, leading to a decrease in its score. No reforms took place in the Middle
East and North Africa or South Asia, the regions with the lowest average scores for the
Parenthood indicator.
Entrepreneurship
The Entrepreneurship indicator examines barriers to women’s ability to start and
run a business. Despite the relatively high score that economies achieve on the
Entrepreneurship indicator, women worldwide still face signicant practical and
regulatory barriers to becoming successful entrepreneurs. Access to nance is a
major hurdle, leaving women with an estimated $1.7 trillion of unmet demand for
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
30
credit (IFC2017). Collateral constraints and social norms are major reasons for this
gender credit gap. For example, due to gender bias by lenders, women-led enterprises
in Vietnam have a 34 percent higher likelihood that their loans will be denied than
men-led rms (Le and Stefańczyk 2018). However, increasing women’s control
over nances by combining access to bank accounts with skills training can shift
conservative social norms and increase women’s work (Field et al. 2021).
The Entrepreneurship indicator measures restrictions on women’s legal capacity
as well as laws prescribing equal access to credit. Many economies (104) still lack a
legal provision that expressly prohibits gender-based discrimination in access to credit
(table 1.10). Women can sign a contract in the same way as men in all but 2 of the
190 economies measured. Seven economies legally restrict women from registering a
business in the same way as men. And in six economies, women cannot open a bank
account in the same way as men.
Gabon reformed two data points measured under this indicator. A reform of the civil
code equalized access to bank accounts for women by abolishing the legal provision that
a husband be notied when his wife opens a bank account. In addition, a reform of the
penal code made access to nance easier for women by prohibiting sex discrimination
in access to banking services. Egypt also made credit more accessible for women by
prohibiting gender-based discrimination in nancial services. On April 22, 2021, the
Central Bank of Egypt issued a circular on “enhancing gender equality in all nancial
transactions, including loans and credit facilities.” It was enacted shortly after the
president of Egypt directed the government to support programs on women’s access
to loans and nancial literacy. This eort to prohibit gender discrimination in access
to credit through central bank regulation continues a regional trend captured by the
Women, Business and the Law reports for 2020 (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) and
2021 (Bahrain, Jordan). Similarly, Sierra Leone’s central bank issued a directive in August
2021 mandating that nancial services be provided without discrimination based on sex.
However, the majority of economies prohibit discrimination in access to nancial
services through specic nondiscrimination or gender equality laws (gure 1.9).
Astatutory law usually takes longer to enact than a subsidiary legal instrument like
a nancial sector regulation, as it has to go through the full parliamentary legislative
process. This period enables a wider variety of stakeholders to provide input, increasing
transparency and safeguards for women’s interests. Whatever the regulatory approach,
the nondiscrimination provision should be included in a binding legal document that is
widely publicized to nancial service providers and consumers alike. It should provide
eective remedies for and monitoring of violations of the nondiscrimination principle.
TABLE 1.10 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES THAT HAVE NOT REMOVED BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Question Number of economies with
a“no” response
Number of economies with at
least one “no” response
1. Does the law prohibit discrimination in access to credit based on gender? 104
104
2. Can a woman sign a contract in the same way as a man? 2
3. Can a woman register a business in the same way as a man? 7
4. Can a woman open a bank account in the same way as a man? 6
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
FINDINGS
31
In contrast to these positive changes, Pakistan restricted a woman’s ability to
register a business. Despite an amendment in August 2020, the Companies Act still
restricts a woman’s ability to register a business, leaving discriminatory provisions
in Articles 31 and 37 intact that require a married woman to provide details about
her husband when signing the company memorandum and articles of association.
A presidential ordinance of May 2019 had repealed these discriminatory articles;
however, the ordinance expired after 120 days, having failed to be ratied by
Pakistan’s senate and national assembly.
Assets
The Assets indicator examines gender dierences in property and inheritance law.
Giving women the ability to control assets can enhance their bargaining power within
the household, boost their agency, and possibly alter household investment patterns
(Agarwal 2003; Ali, Deininger, and Goldstein 2014; Daley, Dore-Weeks, and Umuhoza
2010; Santos et al. 2014). It may also improve access to nance (Persha, Greif, and
Huntington 2017).
Evidence from 41 low- and middle-income economies nds signicant gaps in
property ownership between men and women, which are particularly pronounced in
rural areas and areas with high poverty rates (Gaddis, Lahoti, and Swaminathan 2020).
Gender gaps in property ownership may be due to discriminatory norms and, most
important, a discriminatory legislative framework—encompassing laws on inheritance,
property ownership, and marital regimes. Property ownership is associated with higher
levels of well-being for women, and the positive impacts of reforming discriminatory
property laws may be even greater for daughters of the women directly aected,
suggesting that the positive eects of reform are long lasting (Deininger, Goyal, and
Nagarajan 2013).
Of the 190 economies studied, 76 (40 percent) limit women’s property rights
(table1.11). The pace of reform under this indicator has been particularly slow.
61
10
9
6
0205101525303545505
565
40 60
Nondiscrimination or gender equality law
Penal code
Financial sector law or regulation
Consumer protection law
Number of economies
FIGURE 1.9
|
NUMBER OF ECONOMIES THAT PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION IN ACCESS
TO FINANCIAL SERVICES THROUGH DIFFERENT TYPES OF LEGISLATION
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
32
In 19 economies, women do not have equal ownership rights to immovable property.
Studies have shown that granting women equal rights to property is crucial to improving
their economic empowerment. Such rights include access to assets upon dissolution of
marriage and, in particular, recognition of nonmonetary contributions to the household,
such as unpaid care for children, which is performed disproportionately by women. There
is much room for improvement in this area, as 57 economies do not recognize such
nonmonetary contributions. Arguments supporting the equal distribution of property
can be based on analysis of comparative good practices, such as common law principles,
and an economic reexamination of the monetary value of women’s contributions to the
household (Efe and Eberechi 2020). In nine economies, the husband has the right to
control assets that are owned jointly by both spouses.
Since 2011, when Mali equalized rights for both sons and daughters and male and
female surviving spouses, no reforms have been recorded in the area of inheritance.
This means that, worldwide, 43 economies still do not grant equal inheritance rights to
male and female surviving spouses and 42 economies prevent daughters from inheriting
in the same way as sons.
Gabon is the only economy to have reformed such laws since 2019. With the reform
of the civil code, Gabon gave women equal administrative authority over assets during
marriage and equal ownership rights over immovable property. The revised civil code
also abolished discriminatory provisions that previously made the husband the sole
administrator of marital property.
Pension
The Pension indicator assesses laws aecting women’s economic security after
retirement. Eleven economies have yet to implement an old-age pension system
for private sector workers, placing both women and men at greater risk of poverty
in old age. Dierences in women’s working lives relative to those of men can result
in unequal economic outcomes in retirement (Joubert and Todd 2020). Laws that set
lower retirement ages for women than for men exacerbate these unequal outcomes by
reducing the amount of time that women contribute to their pensions and save for old
age. In 121 economies, there is room to improve laws to achieve gender equality with
regard to women’s pensions (table 1.12).
TABLE 1.11 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES THAT DO NOT HAVE LAWS GRANTING WOMEN EQUAL RIGHTS TO
PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE
Question Number of economies with
“no” response
Number of economies with at
least one “no” response
1. Do men and women have equal ownership rights to immovable property? 19
76
2. Do sons and daughters have equal rights to inherit assets from their parents? 42
3. Do male and female surviving spouses have equal rights to inherit assets? 43
4. Does the law grant spouses equal administrative authority over assets during marriage? 18
5. Does the law provide for the valuation of nonmonetary contributions? 57
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
FINDINGS
33
Sixty-ve economies set dierent ages for men and women to retire with full pension
benets, with women being able to retire about 10 months (as in Lithuania) to 10 years
(as in China) earlier than men. While an earlier retirement age aects women’s pension
benets and shortens their professional careers, it may also deter employers from
investing in skills development and slow economic growth (Böheim 2019). However, the
average gap in retirement ages for men and women is narrowing over time, as schemes
to increase and equalize retirement ages gradually approach completion.
Thirty-seven economies establish dierent ages for women and men to retire with
partial pension benets. In these economies, women can retire with partial pension
benets between four months and ve years earlier than men. Of the 66 economies
that establish mandatory retirement ages, 15 economies across all regions except South
Asia set dierent retirement ages for men and women.
More than half of all economies covered count periods of absence from work due to
childcare when determining pension benets. Of the economies that do not account for
these periods, 54 percent are located in East Asia and Pacic and in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Australia and the United States are the only two high-income countries from the OECD
region that do not take these periods into account.
Three economies—Argentina, Cambodia, and Ukraine—introduced reforms in the
Pension indicator in the past year. Recognizing that women face greater diculties in
entering the formal labor market, Argentina introduced a decree calling for pension
benets to count periods of childcare for mothers and pregnant women. Cambodia
introduced an old-age pension system that sets equal ages at which women and men
can retire with full pension benets. Ukraine completed a scheme introduced in 2011
to raise the retirement age for women gradually from 55 to 60 (the retirement age for
men) by 2021.
What’s next?
Women, Business and the Law remains committed to advancing the discussion of
how legal equality contributes to women’s economic empowerment and growth.
Policy makers, international organizations, civil society organizations, gender equality
advocates, investors, and researchers can use its ndings in many ways. The data
can help to identify both good practices and gaps in the regulatory environment that
inuence women’s prospects as employees and entrepreneurs. The ndings can be used
to inform legislative changes, make decisions on policy reform and private investment,
TABLE 1.12 NUMBER OF ECONOMIES THAT DO NOT HAVE LAWS ENSURING WOMEN’S ECONOMIC SECURITY
INOLD AGE
Question Number of economies with a
“no” response
Number of economies with
at least one “no” response
1. Is the age at which men and women can retire with full pension benets the same? 65
121
2. Is the age at which men and women can retire with partial pension benets the same? 37
3. Is the mandatory retirement age for men and women the same? 15
4. Are periods of absence due to childcare accounted for in pension benets? 85
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
34
and support civil society in advocating for reform (box 1.3). Data can also be used by
the private sector; in many economies, rms have pioneered the eective policies that
later become law, including and especially in the areas of nondiscrimination at work,
sexual harassment, and paid leave. Women, Business and the Law will complement its
globalstudy and data set with regional and country-specic analysis (regional proles,
global indicators policy briefs) to inform local policies and highlight the work that remains.
Women, Business and the Law continues to pursue its substantial research agenda.
Building on the evidence presented in last year’s edition, this year’s report analyzes
BOX 1.3 ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
Disseminating ndings is instrumental to raising awareness about the importance of legal reform to address gender
disparitiesand build capacity to promote women’s rights through gender-equal reforms and policies. Since 2016, the Women,
Business and the Law team has organized in-country workshops with civil society organizations in 17 Sub-Saharan African
economies (gure B1.3.1). The workshops bring together civil society organizations, policy makers, and development actors
to discuss barriers to women’s economic opportunities and how to use data and evidence to amplify core messages about the
economic consequences of gender equality reforms.
Angola; Burkina Faso;
Cabo Verde; Gabon;
Guinea-Bissau;
Mozambique;
São Tomé and Príncipe;
Togo
Côte d'Ivoire;
Mozambique;
Sierra Leone
Cabo Verde;
Côte d'Ivoire;
Equatorial Guinea;
Gabon; Ghana;
Guinea-Bisau; Kenya;
Mauritania; Senegal
2017
Angola; Brazil;
Cabo Verde;
Guinea-Bissau;
Mozambique;
São Tomé and Príncipe;
Tanzania; Uganda
2019
Congo, Dem. Rep.;
Ethiopia; India;
Kenya; São Tomé
and Príncipe;
South Africa;
Togo
20212016 2018
Gabon
2020
FIGURE B1.3.1
|
IN-COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA, 2016–21
Source: Women, Business and the Law team.
In late 2019, the team also organized a South-South Knowledge Exchange workshop in Brasilia, Brazil, to discuss best practices
regarding legislation, public policies, and initiatives for women’s empowerment and to address gender-based violence. The
workshop brought together representatives from Brazil and ve African members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking
Countries, namely Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
In early 2020, the World Bank organized a peer-to-peer learning event in Libreville, Gabon, to discuss the impact of discrimina-
tory laws and practices on women’s empowerment and good-practice laws that enhance women’s economic opportunities.
The event brought together ministers of women’s aairs, senior leaders, and policy makers from 14 West and Central African
economies, including the rst ladies of Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon.
Understanding the process behind the enactment of legislative reforms is useful for countries interested in adopting the laws
most relevant to closing the gender gap. To this end, the Women, Business and the Law team has initiated a series of case
studies to learn about the motivations for legal reforms that countries have undertaken over the last 50 years. The rst coun-
tries selected for this research are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, São Tomé and Príncipe, South
Africa, and Togo. As part of this work, the team has interviewed in-country actors to understand the political economy of
how successful reforms have been carried out and to provide an example for countries wanting to undertake similar reforms.
FINDINGS
35
preliminary data on childcare and on implementation of the law in chapters 2 and
3,respectively. Research at the pilot stage shows that the availability and regulation
of dierent types of childcare services vary widely across regions. Economies also vary
widely on the parameters for quality of childcare provision, with no clear regional pattern.
Therefore, evidence of what determines parental uptake of services is inconclusive
at this stage. This research will continue, with plans to rene and expand the pilot
exercise in subsequent editions, especially as new research continues to inform the
measurements.
The implementation pilot explores ways to measure Women, Business and the
Law indicators in practice. First, supportive frameworks related to each of the eight
indicators were examined, including the sequencing of legislation, women’s access to
justice and other government programs, and the eciency of legal operations. A second
approach measured the opinions of experts on the ground regarding progress toward
gender equality. The ndings show clear gaps in the implementation of laws in all
indicators, with Pay and Pension standing out as areas in need of improvementacross
both measurements.While the data provide valuable insight into how the law functions,
the research techniques will continue to be adjusted to present a more accurate picture
of implementation in subsequent editions.
Finally, new research areas are developing. As part of the World Bank Group’s
10Commitments on Disability-Inclusive Development, Women, Business and the Law
is producing data and analysis on legal protections for women with disabilities to
understand how laws can protect women from intersectional discrimination (box 1.4).
Other potential research questions relate to the link between legal gender equality and
informality, use of scal policy and budget systems to close gender gaps, access to
digital technology, and longer-term challenges associated with climate change. Women,
Business and the Law is committed to producing data and evidence that can inform
policies to advance women’s economic opportunities around the world.
BOX 1.4 HOW CAN LAWS PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES?
Since 2019, Women, Business and the Law has collected and analyzed data to understand how laws can protect women with
disabilities from intersectional discrimination. Employment rates of women with disabilities are lower than those of both men
with disabilities and men and women with no disabilities (WHO and World Bank 2011). Young women with disabilities endure
up to 10 times more gender-based violence than those with no disability (UNFPA 2018).
The research is based on internationally agreed standards as established by the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities and, in particular, Article 6, which recognizes that legal and policy measures need to be taken
so that women with disabilities can enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms fully and equally. Mapping the regulatory
framework can help to identify good practices and guide economies in the enactment of much-needed laws and policies on
the socioeconomic inclusion of women with disabilities.
Legislative approaches to promote the rights of women with disabilities dier widely. Initial analysis of constitutions and statu-
tory laws in 176 economies revealed that, while 71 economies guarantee equal rights for persons with disabilities in the con-
stitution, none of the constitutions analyzed mentions women with disabilities. With regard to statutory laws, the preliminary
research found that, while 138 economies have a law that addresses the rights of persons with disabilities, only one-fourth
of the economies analyzed (35) explicitly recognize and protect the rights of women with disabilities (gure B1.4.1). Many
disability rights laws use gender-neutral language and fail to account suciently for the needs of women with disabilities, who
face additional and multiple discrimination.
(Box continues next page)
WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2022
36
However, some economies do address the needs of women with disabilities. For example, Indonesia’s law recognizes the
importance of protecting women with disabilities from violence by providing information services and requiring shelters to be
easily accessible. Kuwait’s law aords additional maternity leave benets to women with disabilities. Moldova requires medical
service providers to take “special needs … into account, including gynecological treatment and counselling on family planning
and reproductive health” (Article 42 [12]).
Overall, preliminary ndings conrm, “Laws and policies on disability have historically neglected aspects related to women
and girls with disabilities. In turn, laws and policies addressing women have traditionally ignored disability” (Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2016). A gap in knowledge about global good practices is evident in the existing data.
To address this gap, Women, Business and the Law collected additional data on the rights of women with disabilities in the
areas of employment law, family law, nondiscrimination legislation, and gender-based violence. A publication of the results is
planned for the spring of 2022.
Source: Women, Business and the Law team.
BOX 1.4 HOW CAN LAWS PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES? (continued)
71
35
0
138
0
Constitution guarantees equal rights for persons with disabilities
Constitution recognizes and protects the rights of women with disabilities
A law, other than the constitution, addresses the rights of persons with disabilities
The law recognizes and protects the rights of women with disabilities
20 40 60 80
Number of economies
100 12
01
40
FIGURE B1.4.1
|
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELATED TO WOMEN
WITH DISABILITIES
Source: Women, Business and the Law database.
Notes
1. Through a meta-analysis, Chmielewska et al. (2021) conrm that maternal and fetal health outcomes
have worsened since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. Tu et al. (2021) document changes in short-term
sexual and reproductive health and behaviors, noting the need for further research into the long-term
eects.
2. Lakshmi Ratan et al. (2021) discuss the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on women working in the
informal sector.
3. This research includes Amin and Islam (2015); Htun, Jensenius,and Nelson-Nuñez (2019); Islam, Muzi,
and Amin (2019); and Zabalza and Tzannatos (1985). Roy (2019) provides an overview of the evidence
linking legal gender equality and women’s economic outcomes.
4. See the World Bank Entrepreneurship Database, https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs
/entrepreneurship/inforgraphics.
5. Research by Bhalotra, Brulé, and Roy (2020) shows that equalizing inheritance rights between sons and
daughters in India increased son preference and female feticide.
FINDINGS
37
6. For complete data and legal bases, see https://wbl.worldbank.org/en/wbl-data.
7. In 2021, alongside the aggregate index and 35 underlying data points, Women, Business and the Law
published a detailed breakdown of the number of maternity, paternity, and parental leave days available
to parents. These data will inform empirical investigations of the link between these policies and women’s
labor market outcomes as well as other relevant issues such as fertility and population growth.
8. The data for the United States refer to New York State legislation.
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