Synergies between the Arms Trade Treaty and the Wassenaar

Synergies between the Arms Trade

Treaty and the Wassenaar Arrangement

Tobias Vestner

Strategic Securi Analysis



www.gcsp.ch

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

Key Points

• The Arms Trade Treaty and the Wassenaar Arrangement both seek to

address the challenge posed by unconstrained transfer of conventional

arms but differ in structure and approach.

• There are opportunities for synergies furthering the regimes’ common

purpose. States members to both regimes can accentuate and interweave

the strengths of the Arms Trade Treaty and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

• Transferring cutting-edge standards on export controls from the

Wassenaar Arrangement to the Arms Trade Treaty would bolster the

Arms Trade Treaty and foster global harmonization between exporting

and importing countries. Political momentum on certain issues

within the Arms Trade Treaty process may benet the Wassenaar

Arrangement’s further development.

• A derivative of the Wassenaar Arrangement’s regular ‘General

Information Exchange’ on regions, transfers, and risky actors could be

institutionalized within an Arms Trade Treaty working group. Sharing

within the Wassenaar Arrangement information, concerns and practical

challenges of states parties to the Arms Trade Treaty could make the

Wassenaar Arrangement’s work more effective.

• Coordinating both regimes’ outreach activities, mentioning each other’s

work and using each other’s documents for capacity building could

mainstream arms transfer controls, prevent perceptions of conicting

standards as well as enable efciencies regarding national efforts for

compliance with international standards.

About the Author

Tobias Vestner is Head of Security and Law Programme at the Geneva

Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). He was a member of the Swiss

delegations to the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations and meetings of the

Wassenaar Arrangement. The author thanks Alessandro Mario Amoroso,

John Erath, and Jean-Marc Rickli for comments on earlier drafts. The

views expressed in the publication are solely those of the author.

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

I. Introduction

Conventional weapons inict high death tolls in modern conicts yet

remain essential for the maintenance of national security and public

order. Most states procure conventional weapons through international

arms trade. The U.S. Congressional Research Service estimated in its

latest report that the global volume of international arms transfers in

2015 amounted to approximately 80 Billion U.S. dollars,

whereas the

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) observes an

upwards trend since the early 2000s.

Yet conventional weapons transfers

may pose a threat to countries, fuel conicts and lead to abusive violence

such as terrorism. Thus, both the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

and the

1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms

and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement, WA)

establish standards for the control of international arms transfers. While

the ATT and WA differ in structure and certain states would refuse formal

linkages between the two regimes, there exist opportunities for synergies

furthering their common purpose.

Both the Arms

Trade Trea and

the Wassenaar

Arrangement

establish standards

for the control of

international arms

transfers.

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

II. Dierent Characteristics

Despite their shared purpose to address the challenge posed by

unconstrained transfers of conventional arms, the WA and ATT differ

in design. The WA is a product of the 1990’s and aims to contribute to

international security and stability.

Based on the Coordinating Committee

for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which was established during

the Cold War by the United States of America and its allies to prevent the

proliferation of cutting-edge military goods and technologies to the Soviet

bloc, the WA is a politically binding export control regime encompassing

42 participating states – including most major exporting countries of

conventional weapons.

WA participating states agree on the basis of

consensus which weapons and related dual-use technologies are subject

to export controls,

adopt guidelines for the implementation of export

controls,

and share information on arms transfer authorizations as well

as general and region-specic risks regarding transfers.

The ATT is a legally binding treaty characteristic of 21st Century arms

control that aims to strengthen not only international security but

also human security.

Besides obliging states to establish national

control authorities,

the ATT enshrines prohibitions

on arms transfers

notably related to the commission of international crimes as well as

criteria

to be considered before granting export authorizations. These

criteria include the likelihood that exported weapons would be used for

committing or facilitating serious violations of international humanitarian

law, international human rights law, terrorist acts, or transnational

organized crime. The ATT also institutes reporting obligations.

Contrary

to the WA, the ATT has a global participation of currently 102 states,

including importing and transiting states.

Thirty-three additional states

have signed the ATT.

The regimes’ different designs result in different functioning. The WA’s

meetings and information exchange are condential among participating

states.

The ATT holds public meetings, allowing for the inclusion of civil

society and industry representatives.

It also encourages public reporting

of actual arms exports and imports or such authorizations.

Their outputs differ as well. The WA produces technologically up-to-

date and state-of-the-art documents for the implementation of export

controls. The WA’s very specic Munitions List and Dual-Use List dene

which items are subject to national controls,

thereby ensuring coherent

cross-regional control of goods among participating states. The WA

guidelines, elements and procedures provide very elaborate guidance

for certain activities, such as the exportation of small arms and light

weapons

and end-user controls.

Furthermore, the meetings of the WA

Expert Group and the WA General Working Group enable technical and

focused discussions.

The ATT’s greatest asset is that its obligations, including the prohibitions

and export criteria, are legally binding.

Thus, national compliance with

the treaty’s standards can be enforced by judicial measures, mainly at

the domestic level. This was achieved in the negotiations process by

allowing some ambiguity in the treaty’s obligations, notably regarding

their implementation, which is inherent to many international legal

agreements. Originating from a United Nations process, the discussions

in the framework of the ATT are more political and include a more diverse

set of states than the WA.

e Arms Trade

Trea is a legally

binding trea

characteristic of

21st Century arms

control that aims

to strengthen not

only international

securi but also

human securi.

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

WA Participating States

Canada

India

Russia

Turkey

Ukraine

United States

of America

ATT States Parties and

WA Participating States

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Rep.

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Latvia

Lituania

Luxembourg

Malta

Mexico

Netherlands

New

Zealand

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Rep. of Korea

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

S.Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

United

Kingdom

States Membership of the Arms Trade Trea

and the Wassenaar Arrangement

ATT States Parties

Albania

Antigua and

Barbuda

Bahamas

Barbados

Belize

Benin

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Brazil

Burkina Faso

Cabo Verde

Cameroon

C. African Rep.

Chad

Chile

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Cyprus

Dominica

Dominican

Republic

El Salvador

Georgia

Ghana

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Honduras

Iceland

Jamaica

Kazakhstan

Lebanon

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Macedonia

Madagascar

Mali

Mauritania

Mauritius

Moldova

Monaco

Montenegro

Mozambique

Niger

Nigeria

Palau

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Samoa

San Marino

Saint Kitts and

Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent

Senegal

Serbia

Sierra Leone

Seychelles

State of

Palestine

Suriname

Togo

Trinidad and

Tobago

Tuvalu

Uruguay

Zambia

States Membership of the Arms Trade Trea and the

Wassenaar Arrangement

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

III. Complementari

With different characteristics yet a shared raison d’être, the WA and

the ATT are complementary. Indeed, the chief justication for the ATT’s

creation was the absence of any legally binding international standard

on the regulation of transnational arms transfers. Many WA participating

states, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden, were drivers

in the negotiations of the ATT. These states used experiences gained in

the WA’s framework to strengthen the treaty.

Since the adoption of the ATT, states participating in both the WA and

ATT have assisted ATT state parties in creating and improving national

control authorities based on insights from the WA.

WA ofcials have

also made themselves available to share experiences, which has included

the presentation of the WA Munitions List to the ATT Working Group

on Effective Treaty Implementation on 30 May 2018.

Additionally, the

WA publishes its guiding documents on its webpage to further public

understanding of export controls and attends ATT meetings as observer.

Nevertheless, the ATT’s four years of existence have not led to formal

cooperation between the two regimes. WA participating states that have

not adhered to the ATT are likely to block any attempt at formal alignment

or collaboration between the two institutions, in attempts to avoid losing

inuence over the WA agenda. Importing countries within the ATT may

also disapprove of any attempt at collaboration. Traditionally subject to

discretional decisions by exporting states, some importing states have

perceived the WA as an illegitimate ‘exporters’ club’ which withholds

modern military technology from developing countries.

Hence, the

complementarity between the WA and ATT can be harnessed only through

informal cooperation.

With dierent

characteristics

yet a shared

raison d’être,

the Wassenaar

Arrangement

and the Arms

Trade Trea are

complementary.

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

IV. From Coexistence to Synergies

Relying on the strengths of each regime’s processes may bolster both and

in turn foster their common purpose. Those states that participate in both

the WA and ATT can forge synergies and avoid duplications through their

actions within both fora. Many such states have a single ofce that deals

with both the WA and ATT and, in some cases, the same set of personnel.

Ideas transfers from one regime to the other,

de facto

coordination of their

policies and activities, and efcient management so as to preserve state

resources are therefore not only feasible but in the interest of such states.

A. Specic Issues

Synergies may arise rst and foremost regarding the specic issues dealt

by both regimes. The WA’s sophisticated documents could be introduced

to the ATT process. Notably the WA documents on export control

enforcement,

transit/transshipment,

and legislation on arms brokering,

are useful as the ATT is ambiguous regarding these issues and ATT state

parties may not have suitable mechanisms to address these problems. In

addition, the WA ‘Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice concerning

Potentially Destabilizing Accumulations of Conventional Arms’

can help

clarify the implementation of the largely ambiguous ATT-criteria on

weapon transfers’ effects on peace and security.

The technical updates of the WA Munitions List could also be regularly

explained to the ATT community so that states with limited bureaucratic

resources may keep up with technological developments. While the WA

already publishes summaries of changes to its control lists,

brieng

ATT states parties on the changes would increase the awareness and

understanding of the technical updates. In addition, such briengs could

foster technical discussions with the ATT framework.

Transferring cutting-edge standards of export control from the WA to the

ATT would make the ATT more effective. This would also foster greater

global harmonization between exporting and importing countries that

the WA cannot achieve due to its limited membership. Although the

adoption of WA documents or adaptations thereof by the ATT Conference

of State Parties would be ideal,

an informal coordination of national

commitments for their implementation would also be a step in the right

direction. This would also allow for a partial integration of WA standards

and for their simplication in cases where ATT states do not need

highly complex control systems. ATT states parties that generally do not

export conventional weapons do not need elaborate measures on export

assessments, for instance.

Political momentum on certain issues within the ATT process may also

benet the WA’s further development. The ATT’s inclusiveness may lead to

the emergence of matters – such as the link between arms transfers and

the respect of international humanitarian law

or prevention of gender-

based violence

– which might not arise within the more restricted and

closed WA. Taking issues of concern from the ATT to the WA process

would therefore allow the WA to keep itself updated regarding the

specic export control issues it addresses. On the other hand, given the

WA’s technical expertise, the WA may likely be better placed than the ATT

to develop elaborate and practical solutions to issue-specic challenges

that arise in the ATT framework. The smaller size of the WA, including that

of its technical working meetings, may also allow quicker progress.

ose states that

participate in both

the Wassenaar

Arrangement

and Arms Trade

Trea can forge

synergies and

avoid duplications

through their

actions within

both fora.

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

B. Information Exchange

States may also reap synergies regarding information exchange. It is

unlikely that ATT states parties would commit to a similarly extensive

information exchange on arms deliveries as conducted within the WA

as ‘Specic Information Exchange’.

However, a derivative of the WA’s

regular ‘General Information Exchange’ could be institutionalized within

the ATT. This information exchange foresees sharing information among

WA participating states on risks associated with transfers of conventional

arms to consider coordinating national control policies to combat these

risks. States also exchange information on regions they consider relevant

to the purposes of the WA.

The ATT Conference of States Parties and

informal preparatory meetings could dedicate working sessions to similar

information exchange among ATT states parties on regions, transfers and

actors of concern. This would allow higher awareness of specic risks

associated with international arms transfers.

Information, concerns and practical challenges regarding (re-)export,

import, transit/transshipment, brokering and diversion of ATT states

parties that are not members of the WA can also make the WA’s work

more effective. Making informed export decisions is crucial notably for

preventing the abuse of weapons and their diversion to unauthorized

end-users. Third-party states from a particular region of concern or

states involved in particular transfer routes are often privy to information

that exporting WA participating states do not have. In addition to open

communication channels between importing and exporting states, the ATT

also offers information from civil society and research institutions. These

sorts of information could be greatly benecial to the WA, if introduced.

Similarly, although WA information exchange is condential, information

on risks highlighted within the WA that can be reconstituted on the basis

of public sources may be shared with the ATT community.

C. Outreach

Further synergies may arise regarding the ATT’s and WA’s outreach activities.

Both regimes’ secretariats, supportive member states, and other aligned

actors raise awareness of international arms transfers and their control,

disseminate the results of the institutions’ work, and encourage states to join

or adhere to their standards. Coordinating the WA’s outreach programme with

the ATT’s efforts towards universalization could be possible through informal

collaboration between the respective secretariats and member states.

More importantly, the WA’s regular policy and technical briengs to non-

WA states, bilateral dialogues and participation at events with a regional

or thematic focus could incorporate the ATT’s standards to align the

sharing of experience and expertise with the requirements of the ATT.

In this way, the awareness of the ATT can be increased, the perception

of conicting standards can be avoided, and national efforts towards

compliance with one institution can serve the other as well.

Universalization and capacity-building efforts within the framework of

the ATT,

on the other hand, can use the WA’s experience and standards

as valuable input. A side effect of such endeavours is that controls of

international arms transfers are being mainstreamed. As a result, the WA

and its participating states benet from the legitimacy the ATT gives to

stringent export controls and thus broader acceptance among importing

states. As a rst step, states members to both regimes as well as the EU,

which offers signicant international assistance,

could ensure that their

capacity-building projects serve both the ATT and WA.

Making informed

export decisions

is crucial notably

for preventing the

abuse of weapons

and their diversion

to unauthorized

end-users.

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

V. Conclusion

The global regulation of international arms transfers has signicantly

evolved since the end of the Cold War. The WA has established high

standards on export controls among the major exporting states. The

ATT has led to legally binding standards and the creation of new control

authorities around the globe. Challenges persist: the awareness of

uncontrolled arms transfers’ negative impacts needs to be raised

continuously, global commitment to responsible arms transfers needs to

be expanded, and capacity building remains a major challenge in many

regions. Nevertheless, the WA and ATT have achieved much so far.

Synergies between the ATT and WA may now lead to enhanced

effectiveness. No formal cooperation is realistic, no convergence

necessary. States members to both regimes, however, could informally

work to accentuate and interweave the strengths of the ATT and WA.

Besides initiatives regarding specic issues, information exchange and

outreach, states members to both could nominate one and the same

point of contact (POC) for both regimes, if not done already. States could

also support exchanges between the ATT and WA secretariats as well as

ATT Presidents of Conference of States Parties and WA Plenary Chairs.

A state member to both regimes presiding the ATT and chairing the WA

in the same year would also be a good occasion to further explore and

implement options for synergies. Indeed, there are many opportunities

for synergies – opportunities that would strengthen both institutions and

foster their common purpose.

ere are many

opportunities

for synergies –

opportunities that

would strengthen

both institutions

and foster their

common purpose.

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

 Catherine A. eohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-

2015, Congressional Research Service, 19 December 2016, p. 3.

 Pieter D. Wezeman, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Nan Tian and Siemon T.

Wezeman, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018, SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, March 2019, p.1.

 Arms Trade Trea; adopted at the UN General Assembly in New York, 2

April 2013; entered into force, 24 December 2014. For a general overview and

regularly updated information, see the ATT’s webpage, retrievable at: hps://

thearmstradetrea.org/

 See, notably: e Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional

Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Initial Elements, adopted at the

Plenary of 11-12 July 1996, amended at the Plenaries of 1999, 2001 and 2002. See:

Wassenaar Arrangement, Public Documents, Volume I, Founding Documents,

Compiled by the WA Secretariat, February 2017. For a general overview and

regularly updated information, see the Wassenaar Arrangement’s webpage,

retrievable at: hps://www.wassenaar.org/

 e WA has been established to contribute to regional and international securi

and stabili, by promoting transparency and greater responsibili in transfers

of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing

destabilising accumulations. e aim is also to prevent the acquisition of these

items by terrorists. See: WA Initial Elements, op. cit., n. 4, s. I; and hps://www.

wassenaar.org/about-us/

 For the list of all WA participating states, see the graph on page 5.

 e conventional weapons and related dual-use goods and technologies covered

by the WA are listed in the WA ‘Munitions List’ and ‘List of Dual-Use Goods and

Technologies’. While the Munitions List contains 22 categories, the Dual-Use

List contains nine categories of dual-use goods and technologies. ese lists are

regularly updated and publicly available. See: Wassenaar Arrangement, Public

Documents, Volume II, List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions

List, Compiled by the WA Secretariat, December 2018.

 e WA has adopted 23 best practices and guidelines as of May 2019, according

to the following categories: Documents of General Use, Arms Transfers,

Transit/Trans-shipment, Demilitarised Military Equipment, Dual-Use Goods

and Technologies, Industry and Academia, End Use and End User Controls, and

Applicant Countries. See: Wassenaar Arrangement, Public Documents, Volume

III, Compendium of Best Practice Documents, Compiled by the WA Secretariat,

December 2018.

 WA Initial Elements, op. cit., n. 4, s. IV-VI; and Appendix 1-3.

 e ATT’s object is to establish common international standards for regulating

and improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms as

well as prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in arms and prevent their diversion.

It aims to contribute to international and regional peace, securi and stabili

as well as reduce human suering. Furthermore, it aims to promote cooperation,

transparency and responsible action by its states parties, thereby building

conﬁdence. See: Article 1 of the ATT.

 Article 5 of the ATT.

Article 6 of the ATT.

Article 7 of the ATT.

Article 13 of the ATT.

For the list of all ATT states parties, see the graph on page 5.

 U.S. President Donald Trump announced on 26 April 2019, however, that the U.S.

government would revoke its signature of the ATT. See: Roberta Rampton, Trump

pulling U.S. out of U.N. arms trea, heeding NRA, Reuters, 26 April 2019, retrievable

at: hps://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-nra-trump/trump-expected-

to-withdraw-u-s-from-arms-trade-trea-idUSKCN1S21RD

 WA Initial Elements, op. cit., n. 4, s. IX.

 While the ATT itself does not speci if meetings are to be held publicly

or closed, Article 13 of the ATT’s rules of procedures establishes that the

Conferences of States Parties (CSP) and their informal preparation meetings

- which include three thematic working groups - are public unless otherwise

decided. Discussions in 2018 resulted in the decision to continue public meetings

yet retain the option of closed meetings. See: Rules of Procedure, Arms Trade

Trea, ATT/CSP1/CONF/1, 25 August 2015; and (Non-Paper) Summary of the

informal consultation on the provisions of the terms of reference of the ATT

Working Groups regarding the holding of closed meetings, ATT/CSP4/2018/

PRES/362/Conf.ClosedMeet, 27 July 2018.

 In accordance with Article 13(3) of the ATT, the large majori of ATT states

parties make their annual reports on exports and imports of conventional arms

under Article 2(1) of the ATT publicly available.

WA List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, op. cit., n. 7.

 Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW),

agreed at the 2002 Plenary, amended at the 2007 Plenary; Best Practices to

Prevent Destabilising Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

through Air Transport, agreed at the 2007 Plenary; and Elements for Export

Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), agreed at the 2003

Plenary, amended at the 2007 Plenary. See: WA Compendium of Best Practice

Documents, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 17-26.

 Introduction to End User / End Use Controls for Exports of Military-List

Equipment, agreed at the 2014 Plenary; Statement of Understanding on

Implementation of End-Use Controls for Dual-Use Items, agreed at the 2007

Plenary; and End-User Assurances Commonly Used Consolidated Indicative List,

agreed at the 1999 Plenary, amended at the 2005 Plenary. See: WA Compendium

of Best Practice Documents, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 75-86.

 While the WA Plenary is the decision-making body of the Arrangement, the

main subsidiary bodies are the General Working Group (GWG) dealing with

policy-related maers, and the Experts Group (EG) addressing issues related to

the lists of controlled items. See: WA Initial Elements, op. cit., n. 4, s. VII; and

hps://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/

 States parties to the ATT are bound under international law to implement

and comply with the Trea’s provisions; a failure to do so triers states’

international responsibili.

 Notably the ATT’s preamble reﬂects the many political considerations and

implications of the ATT and its application. Discussions at the ATT Conference

of States Parties as well as their informal preparatory meetings are oentimes

subject to these political and diplomatic dimensions.

 See, in this regard, the Statement by the Wassenaar Arrangement on the Arms

Trade Trea (ATT), 3 June 2013. See: Wassenaar Arrangement, Public Documents,

Volume IV, Background Documents and Plenary-related and Other Statements,

Compiled by the WA Secretariat, December 2017, p. 65.

 ATT Working Group on Eective Trea Implementation, Chair’s Dra Report to

CSP4, ATT/CSP4.WGETI/2018/CHAIR/355/Conf.Rep, 20 July 2018, p. 7.

 Fourth Conference of States Parties Final Report, ATT/CSP4/2018/SEC/369/

Conf.FinRep.Rev1, 24 August 2018, p. 3.

 Such views had been issued during the ATT negotiations. e entry into force

of the ATT as well as international assistance and support oered by WA

participating states and WA ocials may have well altered this view, however.

 Best Practices for Eective Export Control Enforcement, agreed at the 2000

Plenary, amended at the 2016 Plenary. See: WA Compendium of Best Practice

Documents, op. cit., n. 8.

 Best Practice Guidelines for Transit or Trans-shipment, agreed at the 2015 Plenary.

See: WA Compendium of Best Practice Documents, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 39-40.

 Best Practices for Eective Legislation on Arms Brokering, agreed at the 2003

Plenary, amended at the 2016 Plenary. See: WA Compendium of Best Practice

Documents, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 31-33.

 Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially

Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons, adopted at the 1998

Plenary, amended at the 2004 and 2011 Plenary. See: WA Compendium of Best

Practice Documents, op. cit., n. 8, pp. 1-5.

References

STRATEGIC SECURITY ANALYSIS

SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT

 For a discussion of the criteria on arms’ potential contribution or undermining

of peace and securi in Article 7(1)(a), see: Tobias Vestner, Prohibitions and Export

Assessment: Tracking Implementation of the Arms Trade Trea, Geneva Paper 19/23,

Geneva Centre for Securi Policy, March 2019, p. 16; and Stuart Casey-Maslen,

Andrew Clapham, Gilles Giacca, and Sarah Parker, e Arms Trade Trea: A

Commentary, New York: Oxford Universi Press, pp. 254-255.

 See, e.g.: Summary of Changes of Dual-Use Goods & Technologies and Munitions List

as of 6 December 2018, retrievable at: hps://www.wassenaar.org/control-lists/

 e ATT Conference of States Parties has adopted few tools and guidelines so

far. Regarding implementation of Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT, for instance, the

Fourth Conference of States Parties (CSP4) adopted in August 2018 the ‘Possible

voluntary guiding and supporting elements in implementing the obligations

under Article 6(1)’ and the ‘List of possible reference documents to be considered

by States Parties in conducting a risk assessment under Article 7’. See: Fourth

Conference of States Parties Final Report, ATT/CSP4/2018/SEC/369/Conf.

FinRep.Rev1, 24 August 2018, p. 5.

  e International Commiee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published a guide to

foster implementation and discussions related to the respect of international

humanitarian law. See: International Commiee of the Red Cross, Arms Transfer

Decisions: Applying International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights

Law Criteria – A Practical Guide, 2016.

 e Presidency of the Fih Conference of States Parties (CSP5) dedicated special

aention to gender-based violence. Notably the Working Group on Eective

Trea Implementation focussed on the topic. See, e.g.: List of Elements for

Possible Adoption by CSP5, Presented by the President of the Fih Conference

of State Parties to the ATT, Gender and Gender-Based Violence, ATT/

CSP5/2019/PRES/447/PM2.GenderGBV, 19 March 2019.

 Regarding arms transfer decisions, this information exchange requires WA

participating states to exchange information every six months on deliveries to

non-participating states of conventional arms covered by Appendix 3 of the WA

Initial Elements, derived from the categories of the UN Register of Conventional

Arms. e information includes the quanti, the name of the recipient state,

and - except for missiles and missile launchers - details of model and pe of

weapons. See: WA Initial Elements, op. cit., n. 4, s. VI.

 WA Initial Elements, op. cit., n. 4, s. IV. Appendix 1 to the WA Initial Elements

lists possible elements of the general information exchange.

 e WA organizes two regular collective outreach events in Vienna for interested

partners, namely the Post-Plenary Brieﬁngs and Enhanced Technical Brieﬁngs.

Periodically, the WA organises outreach seminars and workshops or other

events. e WA also conducts outreach dialogue with individual countries

and may undertake bilateral outreach visits. e WA Secretariat also interacts

on a regular basis with a varie of international and regional organisations

and maintains contacts with other export control regimes. See: hps://www.

wassenaar.org/outreach/

 e ATT Conference of States Parties generally dedicates a working session

to universalization and established within its informal preparatory meetings

the Working Group on Trea Universalization. Notably the Presidencies of the

Conference of States Parties undertake activities to strengthen universalization.

See, e.g.: Fourth Conference of States Parties Final Report, ATT/CSP4/2018/

SEC/369/Conf.FinRep.Rev1, 24 August 2018, p. 6.

 See, e.g.: Council Decision 2013/768/CFSP of 16 December 2013 on EU activities

in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Trea, in the framework of

the European Securi Strategy, OJ L 341, 18.12.2013, pp. 56-67.

 For an overview of ATT-relevant cooperation and assistance activities in

the framework of the ATT, see the Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute’s (SIPRI) Mapping ATT-relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities

Project, retrievable at: hp://www.a-assistance.org/

Where knowledge meets experience

The GCSP Strategic Security Analysis series are short papers that address a current security

issue. They provide background information about the theme, identify the main issues and

challenges, and propose policy recommendations.

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