PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6901

DARIUS VITKUS,

Petitioner – Appellant,

ANTONY BLINKEN, Secretary of State; MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney

General; NICK PROFFITT, U.S. Marshal for the Eastern District of Virginia;

SEAN CASEY, Warden William G Truesdale Adult Detention Center,

Respondents – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at

Alexandria. Michael Stefan Nachmanoff, District Judge. (1:22-cv-00845-MSN-WEF)

Argued: March 8, 2023 Decided: August 24, 2023

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the majority opinion, in

which Chief Judge Diaz joined. Judge Quattlebaum wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Fairuze Sofia, THE SOFIA LAW FIRM, PA, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for

Appellant. Rebecca Haciski, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney

General, Bruce C. Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Christopher S. Strauss,

Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richmond,

Virginia, Elizabeth A. Spavins, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees.

KING, Circuit Judge:

In this interlocutory appeal from the Eastern District of Virginia, petitioner Darius

Vitkus — a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania — challenges the district court’s denial of

his request for a preliminary injunction. See Vitkus v. Blinken, No. 1:22-cv-00845 (E.D.

Va. Aug. 5, 2022), ECF No. 13 (the “Injunction Denial”). By these proceedings, Vitkus

seeks — in connection with his petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

— to prevent the defendant government officials from carrying out his extradition to

Lithuania.

The district court denied Vitkus’s request for injunctive relief, deeming him unlikely

to succeed on the merits of his claim that his extradition to Lithuania would contravene the

extradition treaty between that country and the United States. More specifically, Vitkus

maintained that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request fails to comply with the treaty’s

mandate that Lithuania produce what is called “the charging document” (the “charging

document contention”). The Injunction Denial ruled, however, that the documents

produced by Lithuania comply with the extradition treaty, and that Vitkus is therefore not

entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.

As explained herein, we are satisfied that Vitkus is likely to succeed on the merits

of his claim that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request does not satisfy the charging

The defendant government officials are Antony Blinken, Secretary of State;

Merrick Garland, Attorney General; Nick Proffitt, U.S. Marshal for the Eastern District of

Virginia; and Sean Casey, Warden, William G Truesdale Adult Detention Center. They

are referred to herein as the “Secretary of State,” or simply the “Secretary.”

document mandate of the extradition treaty. Consistent with the foregoing, and because

Vitkus is otherwise entitled to injunctive relief, we reverse the Injunction Denial and

remand.

For background and context, we begin our recitation of facts by describing the

extradition treaty and Vitkus’s suspected criminal conduct — that is, his putative

extraditable conduct that underlies Lithuania’s extradition request. We then review the

extradition proceedings and related judicial proceedings heretofore conducted in the

Southern District of Florida and the Eastern District of Virginia.

In 2001, the United States of America entered into an extradition treaty with the

Republic of Lithuania. See Lith. – U.S., Oct. 23, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-4 (2002)

(the “Treaty”). The Treaty provides for the extradition — at the request of either signatory

— of “persons whom the authorities in the Requesting State have charged with . . . an

extraditable offense.” Id. art. 1. The Treaty identifies, inter alia, the offenses for which

The facts spelled out herein are drawn from the record on appeal — that is, the

various submissions and related exhibits filed in the habeas corpus proceedings conducted

in the Eastern District of Virginia.

such a person may be extradited, the time frames within which an extradition request must

be made, and the pertinent procedures for making such a request.

More specifically, in order to secure the extradition of a person who is sought for

prosecution, the Requesting State (here, Lithuania) is obliged to transmit an extradition

request to the Requested State (here, the United States). Article 8 § 3 of the Treaty provides

that

3. A request for extradition of a person who is sought for prosecution also

shall include:

(a) a copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge, court, or

other authority competent for [that] purpose;

(b) a copy of the charging document; and

that the person sought committed the offense for which extradition

is sought.

See Treaty art. 8 § 3 (emphasis added). Although each of the foregoing requirements must

be satisfied to fully support a request for extradition, the controlling issue with respect to

the Injunction Denial is whether Lithuania’s extradition request complied with Article 8

§ 3(b)’s requirement that it include “a copy of the charging document,” which we call the

“charging document mandate.”

Vitkus is a citizen of Lithuania. As a young man, he apparently supported and

donated to a political party sometimes referred to as “the Russia party.” See J.A. 9. In

2005, Vitkus began serving as a director of a real estate business in Lithuania called

Gvidonas, GAB, which eventually fell into bankruptcy proceedings. In March 2008, the

Lithuanian authorities initiated a criminal investigation into Vitkus’s conduct as a director

of that business (the “2008 investigation”). During the 2008 investigation, the Lithuanian

authorities explored whether Vitkus had fraudulently induced another person to sell him

an apartment. Id. at 126.

According to Vitkus, the Lithuanian police issued a summons to him in 2009

concerning a bank loan Vitkus had obtained in 2005 but failed to repay. Instead of

questioning Vitkus about the loan, however, Vitkus says that the Lithuanian police officers

tied him to a chair, beat him, deprived him of water, and burned him with cigarettes. The

officers further tortured Vitkus by placing a gas mask over his head, and intermittently

restricting his air intake. During the torture incident, Vitkus recalls that he was questioned

about his political activities. See J.A. 9.

In October 2009, the Lithuanian authorities initiated a second criminal investigation

into Vitkus (the “2009 investigation”). The 2009 investigation was to examine three

questions: (1) whether Vitkus had misappropriated funds from the real estate business

while he was a director thereof; (2) whether Vitkus had failed to properly report his taxable

income for 2008 and 2009; (3) and whether Vitkus had fraudulently sold an apartment that

belonged to the real estate business. See J.A. 103.

In December 2009, Vitkus — living in Lithuania — received a document entitled

“Notification of Suspicion,” which informed him that he was a suspect in the 2009

Citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by

the parties to this appeal.

investigation. See J.A. 87. The Notification of Suspicion for the 2009 investigation

identified the Lithuanian code provisions that Vitkus had allegedly violated, and it

summarized his suspected criminal conduct. In December 2010, Vitkus received another

Notification of Suspicion, this time advising him that he was a suspect in the 2008

investigation. Id. at 121. Vitkus later received an updated Notification of Suspicion

concerning the 2009 investigation, detailing additional suspected criminal conduct (his

third Notification of Suspicion). Id. at 89. Soon thereafter, Vitkus departed Lithuania,

arriving in the United States in late December 2010.

In 2011, two orders of arrest were issued in Lithuania for Vitkus — then living in

the United States — concerning the 2008 and 2009 investigations. See J.A. 117, 132.

Around that time, the Lithuanian authorities launched a third criminal investigation into

Vitkus’s conduct as a director of the real estate business (the “2011 investigation”). The

2011 investigation concerned whether Vitkus had forged bank documents in 2007 to

purchase an apartment. The 2011 investigation also related to whether Vitkus had forged

power of attorney documents to enable the purchase of a commercial building, and whether

he had used that property to fraudulently obtain a 2009 bank loan. Id. at 145.

Notably, the 2011 investigation resulted in the creation of a document by a

prosecutor entitled “Decision to Recognize D. Vitkus as a Suspect,” which we refer to as a

“Suspect Decision.” See J.A. 137. Therein, the Lithuanian prosecutor supervising the 2011

investigation certified that, based on the evidence gathered, it was proper to recognize

Vitkus as a suspect in that investigation. The Suspect Decision described Vitkus’s

suspected criminal conduct and identified the implicated provisions of the Lithuanian

criminal code. Meanwhile, and also in 2011, a second Suspect Decision — detailing

additional suspected illegal conduct by Vitkus in connection with the 2009 investigation

— was issued. Id. at 79. Finally, in January 2012, an order of arrest was issued for Vitkus

in Lithuania in connection with the 2011 investigation. Id. at 151.

In June 2012, Vitkus was placed into removal proceedings by the immigration

authorities in the United States. In connection therewith, he applied for asylum,

withholding of removal, and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (the

“CAT”). The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) found in 2014 that Vitkus’s

“credible testimony established that he was beaten, burned, and nearly asphyxiated by

[Lithuanian] police officers, who inquired into his contributions to a political party.” See

J.A. 28. Accordingly, the BIA ruled that Vitkus qualified for withholding of removal by

the Attorney General, pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”).

On May 7, 2015, the Lithuanian government formally requested — pursuant to the

Treaty — the extradition of Vitkus from the United States to Lithuania. In its extradition

request, Lithuania advised that Vitkus is suspected of criminal offenses and wanted for

prosecution in Lithuania in connection with the 2008, 2009, and 2011 criminal

investigations. More specifically, Lithuania — as the Requesting State — maintained that

Vitkus is suspected of misappropriating property, committing fraud, evading taxes, and

committing five acts of theft, plus four acts of forgery. In support thereof, Lithuania

produced documents that summarized evidence gathered during the three investigations,

along with copies of three orders for Vitkus’s arrest issued in connection with those

investigations. As relevant here, Lithuania also provided the following documents: two

Notifications of Suspicion issued in relation to the 2009 investigation; a Notification of

Suspicion issued as part of the 2008 investigation; and two Suspect Decisions issued in the

2009 and 2011 investigations.

On November 18, 2020, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184, the Secretary of State filed

an extradition complaint in the Southern District of Florida, where Vitkus was then

residing.

Extradition proceedings were thereafter conducted before a magistrate judge in

that district, sitting as an “extradition court.” The extradition complaint requested the court

to certify that Vitkus is extraditable under the Treaty and to transfer the matter to the

Secretary for a final determination concerning his extradition.

For his part, Vitkus presented the extradition court with three contentions in

opposition to the extradition complaint. One of those was the charging document

contention — i.e., that Lithuania had failed to produce “a copy of the charging document,”

as required by the charging document mandate. Vitkus also contended that, because the

BIA found that Vitkus had been tortured in Lithuania, his extradition would contravene the

Section 3184 of Title 18 provides, inter alia, that upon receipt of an extradition

complaint, a “judge of the United States, or any magistrate judge authorized so to do by a

court of the United States” may hear and consider evidence of criminality to determine

whether “he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the

proper treaty.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. If the judge finds the evidence sufficient, “he shall

certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary

of State.” Id. The judge may then also issue an arrest warrant.

INA and the CAT (the “immigration contention”). Third, Vitkus maintained that Lithuania

had not shown probable cause that he had committed any of the suspected offenses (the

“probable cause contention”).

In July 2021, after briefing by the parties, the extradition court conducted a hearing

on the extradition complaint. The magistrate judge thereafter assessed whether Vitkus’s

extradition to Lithuania would comply with the Treaty and the laws of the United States.

On November 4, 2021, by its Order Certifying Extraditability and Order of Commitment,

the court certified Vitkus’s extradition and directed that he be committed to the custody of

the United States Marshal. See In re Extradition of Darius Vitkus, No. 20-mc-62358 (S.D.

Fla. Nov. 4, 2021), ECF No. 36 (the “Certification Order”).

In rejecting Vitkus’s charging document contention, the extradition court evaluated

the competing legal positions of Vitkus and the Secretary of State. The Secretary argued

that the only purpose of the charging document mandate is to identify the charges for which

Lithuania seeks to extradite Vitkus, and that the mandate does not require the initiation of

any criminal charges. According to the Secretary, the charging document mandate is

satisfied by the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions. The Secretary supported

that position with an affidavit of an attorney at the Department of State (the “State

Department Affidavit”), and with a letter from a Lithuanian official called the Prosecutor

General (the “Prosecutor General Letter”). The State Department Affidavit averred that

the Notifications of Suspicion and the Suspect Decisions are sufficient to satisfy the

charging document mandate. And the Prosecutor General Letter maintained that the

Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions “would be the equivalent of the charging

documents referred to in” the charging document mandate. See J.A. 219. The Letter also

asserted that the proof required to identify a person as a suspect — and thus issue a

Notification of Suspicion or Suspect Decision — “should not be of the same level as

necessary to substantiate the judgment of conviction or bringing charges (this occurs at a

later stage of the criminal proceedings).” Id. (emphasis added).

Vitkus, for his part, maintained that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect

Decisions fail — as a matter of law — to satisfy the charging document mandate. Vitkus

supported that position with evidence from a Lithuanian attorney named Henrikas

Mackevicius, who testified that, under Lithuanian law, only one document — an

“indictment” — can be a “charging document” for purposes of the charging document

mandate.

According to Mackevicius, the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect

Decisions, on the other hand, only inform a person that he or she “is suspected” of

committing a criminal offense. See J.A. 246. As a result, Vitkus argued to the extradition

court that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions fail to satisfy the charging

document mandate.

Against this backdrop, the magistrate judge in Florida concluded in his November

2021 Certification Order that Lithuania had produced the documentation required to

support its 2015 extradition request. The Certification Order accepted the position of the

Mackevicius allowed that a criminal prosecution can be initiated without an

“indictment” in “the cases which are minor crimes and one person admits committing that

minor offense.” See J.A. 258. But he testified that only an indictment could initiate a

prosecution in Vitkus’s case. Id. at 258-59.

State Department that “there is no requirement . . . that the charging document take any

particular form.” See Certification Order 7. And after observing that “ambiguities in the

extradition context should be resolved in favor of extradition,” the magistrate judge

reasoned that deference was warranted to the Treaty interpretation of the Secretary of State

and supported by Lithuania. Id. Pursuant to that interpretation, the magistrate judge ruled

that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions “are sufficient to meet the

requirements of” the charging document mandate. Id. at 9.

In December 2021, less than a month after the Certification Order was issued,

Vitkus filed a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Southern

District of Florida.

In that petition, Vitkus alleged his probable cause contention and his

immigration contention — not raising the charging document contention. On March 22,

The Certification Order also resolved Vitkus’s probable cause and immigration

contentions against him. Addressing the probable cause contention, the Order determined

that Lithuania had provided sufficient information to establish probable cause that Vitkus

had committed the offenses specified in the 2015 extradition request. Rejecting the

immigration contention, the Certification Order concluded that the decisions of the BIA

were not binding on the extradition court, and thus could not be interposed as a bar to the

certification of Vitkus’s extraditability. The judge observed, however, that Vitkus could

raise his torture argument with the Department of State.

Section 2241 of Title 28 extends the right to pursue relief by way of habeas corpus

to a prisoner who is “in custody in violation of the . . . treaties of the United States.” See

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Yoo v. United States, 43 F.4th 64, 71 (2d Cir. 2022), cert.

denied, 143 S. Ct. 576 (2023).

2022, following briefing and argument, the Florida district court rejected Vitkus’s habeas

corpus claim.

On July 5, 2022, the Secretary of State authorized Vitkus’s extradition to Lithuania.

One week later, on July 12, Vitkus requested the Florida district court to reopen his petition

for habeas corpus relief to reconsider the immigration contention. On July 19, that request

was denied. Vitkus, who had been in custody in Florida since November 2021, was then

transferred to a federal detention facility in Virginia and his extradition to Lithuania was

scheduled for August 11, 2022.

After the Florida proceedings had been completed in July 2022, Vitkus received two

letters from Lithuanian prosecutors that bear on and support his charging document

contention. On July 20, 2022, Vitkus received — through his Lithuanian lawyer — a letter

from the Lithuanian prosecutor overseeing the 2009 investigation, advising that “there is

no procedural decision to close the case with an indictment in the pre-trial [2009

investigation].” See J.A. 291. Six days later, on July 26, Vitkus received a second letter

from the Lithuanian prosecutor supervising the 2008 investigation, advising that “no

indictment has been drawn up in the pre-trial [2008 investigation].” Id. at 460.

That very day, on July 26, 2022, Vitkus filed his pending petition for habeas corpus

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 — also seeking declaratory and injunctive relief — in the

Eastern District of Virginia. Vitkus maintained therein that he is entitled to habeas corpus

relief on three grounds — the charging document contention, the immigration contention,

and the probable cause contention.

The following day, July 27, 2022, Vitkus moved the Virginia district court for a

temporary restraining order (a “TRO”) barring his extradition. In his TRO request, Vitkus

pursued two grounds — the charging document contention and the immigration contention.

A hearing was conducted in the Virginia district court on August 5. At that time, Vitkus

also moved for his TRO request to be converted to a motion for a preliminary injunction.

By the Injunction Denial — filed immediately after the August 5 hearing — the Virginia

district court granted Vitkus’s motion to convert his TRO request into a motion for a

preliminary injunction. The court also denied Vitkus’s request for preliminary injunctive

relief.

The Injunction Denial ruled that Vitkus was unlikely to succeed on the merits of

either his charging document contention or his immigration contention. In rejecting the

charging document contention, the court assessed a voluminous group of documents that

had been filed by Vitkus to support his habeas corpus petition, including a transcript of the

proceedings before the extradition court (in particular, the Mackevicius testimony);

portions of the Lithuanian criminal code; the Prosecutor General Letter; the State

Department Affidavit; plus the two letters received by Vitkus’s Lithuanian lawyer from

separate Lithuanian prosecutors in late July 2022 (confirming that Vitkus had not been

indicted in Lithuania in connection with the 2008 and 2009 investigations).

In explaining its rejection of the charging document contention, the Injunction

Denial recited that it gave “great weight” to the Treaty interpretation presented by the

Secretary of State — that the charging document mandate does not require a charging

document that is analogous to an indictment under American law. See Injunction Denial

6. That interpretation, the Injunction Denial explained, was supported by the State

Department Affidavit and the Prosecutor General Letter. The Injunction Denial agreed

with the Secretary of State that the charging document mandate does not require any

specific form of charging document, and that the mandate can be satisfied by a document

identifying “the violations of Lithuanian law that form the basis of Mr. Vitkus’s extradition,

and . . . describ[ing] the facts underlying those alleged violations.” Id. Accordingly, the

Injunction Denial ruled that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions provided

and relied on by Lithuania are sufficient to satisfy the charging document mandate of the

Treaty. As a result, the district court concluded that Vitkus was unlikely to succeed on the

merits of the charging document contention alleged in his habeas corpus petition.

Vitkus’s

request for injunctive relief was therefore denied.

On August 9, 2022, Vitkus noticed this interlocutory appeal. And we possess

jurisdiction therein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (authorizing interlocutory appeal

from decision of district court refusing to issue an injunction). Two days later, on August

In rejecting the immigration contention, the Injunction Denial recognized that

asylum and extradition are rooted in distinct sources of law. It then concluded that “nothing

under the [INA] prevents the Secretary of State from authorizing Mr. Vitkus’s removal.”

See Injunction Denial 7. The district court also resolved that the BIA’s determination that

Vitkus qualified for withholding of removal in the immigration context is not binding in a

judicial review of an extradition certification. The court thus ruled that Vitkus had failed

to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his immigration contention, also

precluding preliminary injunctive relief on that basis.

11, Vitkus’s extradition to Lithuania was stayed by our Court, pending resolution of this

appeal.

II.

On appeal, Vitkus contends that he is entitled to an award of preliminary injunctive

relief and that such relief was erroneously denied by the district court. More specifically,

Vitkus maintains that he is likely to succeed on the merits of the charging document

contention and that he can otherwise satisfy the factors required for such an award, as

outlined by the Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S.

7, 20 (2008) (specifying factors plaintiff must satisfy to obtain preliminary injunctive

relief). In support of his assertion that the charging document contention is likely to

succeed on its merits, Vitkus maintains that the charging document mandate — set forth in

Article 8 § 3(b) of the Treaty — plainly and unambiguously requires Lithuania to produce

a copy of the document that has initiated criminal charges against him in that country.

The Secretary of State responds that Lithuania has complied with the charging

document mandate. Similar to Vitkus, the Secretary maintains that the language of the

charging document mandate is plain and unambiguous. The Secretary maintains, however,

that the charging document mandate does not require production of any particular type of

charging document, and that it does not demand production of an indictment or something

similar. According to the Secretary, the charging document mandate only requires the

Requesting State to produce documents that sufficiently detail the alleged criminal

violations and conduct, such as the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions. The

Secretary argues that the federal courts have consistently interpreted other treaties made by

the United States to allow for extradition of persons who have not actually been criminally

charged. Finally, the Secretary insists that, if the relevant text of the Treaty is ambiguous,

his proposed construction thereof — that the charging document mandate requires only a

document detailing suspected criminal conduct — adheres to the Treaty’s requirements

and is entitled to deference.

As explained herein, we agree with Vitkus that the Treaty’s charging document

mandate plainly and unambiguously requires Lithuania to support an extradition request

with an indictment — or some comparable legal instrument — that has initiated criminal

charges against Vitkus in that country. Because the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect

Decisions fail in that respect, they cannot be “the charging document” required by the

charging document mandate. Accordingly, Vitkus is likely to succeed on the merits of the

charging document contention.

As relevant here, the Supreme Court has recognized that a preliminary injunction is

“an extraordinary remedy [that is] never awarded as of right.” See Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.

To prevail on a request for preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate

“[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm

in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and

[4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20.

Notably, a district court is entitled to deny preliminary injunctive relief on the failure

of any single Winter factor, without fully evaluating the remaining factors. See Henderson

ex rel. NLRB v. Bluefield Hosp. Co., 902 F.3d 432, 439 (4th Cir. 2018). In such a situation,

however, a court of appeals reviewing that denial should “perform [its] own assessment of

the factors not addressed by the district court.” See In re Search Warrant Issued June 13,

2019, 942 F.3d 159, 171 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723

F.3d 1114, 1145 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc)); see also Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle

Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (evaluating and resolving unaddressed

preliminary injunction factors in first instance after ruling that district court erroneously

denied preliminary injunction on likelihood-of-success element).

When a district court has denied a request for preliminary injunctive relief, we

review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See Roe v. Dep’t of Def., 947 F.3d 207,

219 (4th Cir. 2020). In conducting such a review, we assess the court’s legal conclusions

de novo. See Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2019). Important here, a court

“abuses its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief when it . . . misapprehend[s]

the law with respect to underlying issues in litigation.” See In re Search Warrant, 942 F.3d

at 171 (quoting Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013)).

In evaluating the Virginia district court’s Injunction Denial, we are mindful that the

Florida magistrate court’s Certification Order is “presumptively valid.” See Skaftourous

v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2011). Because a certification order is not

a final appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, an extraditee (such as Vitkus) can only

challenge such an order in federal court by pursuing habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241. See Aguasvivas v. Pompeo, 984 F.3d 1047, 1058 (1st Cir. 2021). To succeed on

a § 2241 habeas corpus petition, the extraditee must demonstrate that “he is in custody in

violation of . . . the applicable extradition treaty.” See Yoo v. United States, 43 F.4th 64,

71 (2d Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 576 (2023).

To aid our analysis of whether Vitkus is likely to show that he is being held in

violation of the Treaty, we will spell out some principles of treaty interpretation. On that

score, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he interpretation of a treaty, like the

interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506

(2008); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992) (“In construing a

treaty . . . we first look to its terms to determine its meaning.”). More specifically, a treaty

must be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to

its terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose.” See Aguasvivas, 984 F.3d

at 1058. To that end, “[w]hen the parties to a treaty both agree as to the meaning of a treaty

provision, and that interpretation follows from the clear treaty language, we must . . . defer

to that interpretation.” See Sumimoto Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185

(1982) (emphasis added). On the other hand, as our colleagues in the First Circuit recently

ruled, the converse is also true. That is, “if the [treaty’s] textual meaning is plain and

cannot reasonably bear the government’s construction, then we must reject that

construction.” See Aguasvivas, 984 F.3d at 1058.

Against this backdrop of legal principles, we will assess whether the Virginia district

court abused its discretion in concluding that Vitkus is not likely to succeed on the merits

of the charging document contention. In so ruling, the court adopted the construction of

the phrase “the charging document” sponsored by the Secretary of State and supported by

Lithuania — that is, any document that “identif[ies] the violations of Lithuanian law that

form the basis of Mr. Vitkus’s extradition, [and that] describes the facts underlying those

alleged violations.” See Injunction Denial 6. Because the Secretary’s construction of the

charging document mandate does not “follow[] from the clear [T]reaty language,” we are

satisfied that the district court erred as a matter of law in adopting it. See Sumimoto, 457

U.S. at 185.

We begin our evaluation with the plain language of the Treaty, which, under the

Constitution, is part of “the supreme Law of the Land.” See U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2. Article

1 of the Treaty specifies that “persons whom the authorities in the Requesting State have

charged with” a qualifying crime are eligible to be extradited. See Treaty art. 1. Before an

extradition of a person “sought for prosecution” can proceed, however, Article 8 § 3 of the

Treaty requires production by the Requesting State of:

(a) a copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge, court, or

other authority competent for [that] purpose;

(b) a copy of the charging document; and

the person sought committed the offense for which extradition is

sought.

Id. art. 8 § 3 (emphasis added). Those requirements identify “the proof required under the

Treaty to establish that an individual has been ‘charged’ with a crime.” See Sacirbey v.

Guccione, 589 F.3d 52, 67 (2d Cir. 2009). Thus, under the Treaty, Lithuania can only

establish that Vitkus has been “charged” with a crime if it can satisfy each requirement of

Article 8 § 3. As relevant here, the Secretary of State is not entitled to extradite Vitkus

unless Lithuania first produces — in support of its extradition request and consistent with

Article 8 § 3(b) of the Treaty — a copy of “the charging document.”

By requiring “the charging document,” it is evident that the charging document

mandate of the Treaty requires a discrete document that initiates criminal charges. See Niz-

Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1482-83 (2021). As the Supreme Court emphasized

in Niz-Chavez, when “an article [is] coupled with a singular noun,” that “combination . . .

suggest[s] a discrete document.” Id. Applying that rule here, the definite article (“the”)

coupled with a singular noun (“charging document”) indicates that “the charging

document” refers to the document that has initiated criminal charges against a person.

Accordingly, the charging document mandate is plain and unambiguous, and it cannot be

fulfilled by some document (or set of documents) that fails to perform the charging function

— even if it or they contain similar information to “the charging document.” See Sacirbey,

Vitkus does not contest that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request complies with

the other two requirements of Article 8 § 3 of the Treaty. Our analysis thus focuses solely

on whether the charging document mandate of Article 8 § 3(b) is satisfied.

589 F.3d at 69 (ruling that extradition could not proceed because Requesting State had —

instead of providing “the arrest warrant” — produced merely a letter asserting intent to

prosecute); Aguasvivas, 984 F.3d at 1058-59 (concluding that arrest warrant fails to satisfy

requirement for “the document setting forth the charges,” because it does not indicate that

criminal charges were initiated).

Our determination that “the charging document” is plainly and unambiguously an

instrument which initiates a criminal charge against a person is also consistent with federal

law. Indeed, the term “charging document” is defined in the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure as “an indictment, information, or complaint.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(b)(1).

Although those documents can take a different form, it is clear from the applicable Rules

that each form of charge initiates a criminal prosecution against a defendant. See, e.g., Fed.

R. Crim. P. 7(a)(1), 58(b)(1).

Here, “the charging document,” as specified in Article 8

§ 3(b) of the Treaty, necessarily refers to the document that performs the same function as

an indictment, information, or complaint in this Country. Cf. Aguasvivas, 984 F.3d at 1059

(finding separate requirements for a warrant and “a copy of the document setting forth the

An “indictment” or “information” is defined by Rule 7(c)(1) of the Criminal Rules

as a “plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the

offense charged.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) (emphasis added). Meanwhile, a

“complaint” is similarly defined as “a written statement of the essential facts constituting

the offense charged.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 3 (emphasis added). Pursuant to both

definitions, those documents initiate criminal charges.

charges” consistent with the customary practice in the United States and the Dominican

Republic to “employ warrants to arrest and separate documents to charge”).

ii.

The Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions relied on by the Secretary of

State are much more akin to what the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) calls “subject

letters” and “target letters,” which are consistently used by federal prosecutors in the

United States. Those letters are routinely utilized by the DOJ to advise putative defendants

that they are either a “subject” or a “target” of a federal criminal investigation. But subject

and target letters do not perform any charging function. See, e.g., United States v. Ealy,

363 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2004) (defining “target letter” as a writing “advising [a target]

that an investigation had uncovered evidence linking him to the commission of a federal

crime”).

The controlling policies of the Department of Justice — which represents the

Secretary of State in these court proceedings — confirm the foregoing and strongly support

Vitkus in this appeal. A “subject” is defined therein as “a person whose conduct is within

the scope of the grand jury’s investigation.” See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual, § 9-

11.151 (2020).

Meanwhile, a “target” is “a person as to whom the prosecutor . . . has

substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime and who . .

. is a

It is worth emphasizing that, although the Justice Manual “does not . . . create any

rights, substantive or procedural,” it identifies “publicly available Department of

Justice . . . policies and procedures,” and “provides internal . . . guidance” to federal

prosecutors of all stripes. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual, §§ 1-1.100, 1.200

(2020).

putative defendant.” Id. Critically, those identified as federal “subjects” and “targets” of

criminal investigations have not been charged — unless and until they become defendants

by virtue of an indictment, an information, or a complaint. The Notifications of Suspicion

and Suspect Decisions relied on by the Secretary of State did not initiate criminal charges

against Vitkus. They simply characterize him as a suspect, and thus do not satisfy the plain

and unambiguous language of the Treaty’s charging document mandate.

Consistent with the foregoing, the Prosecutor General Letter (produced here by the

Secretary of State) verifies that the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions are

not supported by the level of proof “necessary [for] . . . bringing charges.” See J.A. 219.

And, as lawyer Mackevicius confirmed to the extradition court, such Notifications and

Decisions are commonly issued during pre-trial investigations to alert persons that they are

suspected in criminal investigations and to inform them of suspected illegal conduct.

It is also revealing that the three Lithuanian investigations concerning Vitkus remain

in a pretrial investigation stage — and that no document provided by Lithuania has initiated

any criminal charges. The Prosecutor General Letter confirms that “[t]he [three] criminal

matters in which the request for extradition of Darius Vitkus is made, are currently in the

first stage of criminal procedure . . . [which] is referred to as pre-trial investigation.” See

J.A. 219.

That same letter distinguishes between the sufficiency of evidence needed to

Notably, the Prosecutor General Letter explains that, during the pretrial

investigation stage, Vitkus is “referred to as a suspect,” which it defines as “a participant

in the pre-trial investigation.” See J.A. 219. The Prosecutor General Letter concedes that,

(Continued)

confer the status of “suspect” and that needed to “bring[] charges,” which “occurs at a later

stage of the criminal proceedings.” Id. Finally, two recent letters from Lithuanian

prosecutors further explain that “no indictment has been drawn up [as to Vitkus] in the

[2008] pre-trial investigation,” id. at 460, and that “there is no procedural decision to close

the [Vitkus] case with an indictment in the [2009] pre-trial investigation,” id. at 291. In

these circumstances, the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions fail to satisfy

the charging document mandate.

Resisting the plain language of the charging document mandate, the Secretary of

State first turns to Article 1 of the Treaty, which provides for the extradition of “persons

whom the authorities in the Requesting State have charged with . . . an extraditable

offense.” See Treaty art. 1 (emphasis added). According to the Secretary, the “charged

with” language of Article 1 — which appears in several other extradition treaties — has

been interpreted by courts to support the extradition of persons who have not yet been

criminally charged. The Secretary thus contends that we should adhere to those

interpretations of the term “charged with,” and approve the extradition of Vitkus, even

though he has not been criminally charged. The charging document mandate in this Treaty

precludes us from accepting that interpretation, however, and it must be rejected.

if Vitkus’s case proceeds to the trial stage, he will acquire “the procedural status of an

accused.” Id.

To be sure, we take no issue with the Secretary of State’s contention that he has,

pursuant to other treaties, extradited persons not yet criminally charged. See, e.g., In re

Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980) (extradition to Sweden without criminal charges);

Emami v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. Calif., 834 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1987) (extradition to

Germany without criminal charges); In re Extradition of Saranello, 142 F. Supp. 3d 1182

(W.D. Okla. 2015) (extradition to Mexico without criminal charges); In re Extradition of

Handanovic, 829 F. Supp. 2d 979 (D. Or. 2011) (extradition to Bosnia and Herzegovina

without criminal charges). Several of those cases, however, involved treaties that did not

contain a charging document mandate. As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in its Assarsson

decision, “[s]ince the parties chose not to require production of the charge document, we

can easily infer that they did not require the ‘substance’ of a charge either.” See Assarsson,

635 F.2d at 1243; see also Emami, 834 F.2d at 1448 (concluding no criminal charges

required because no treaty requirement for charging document); Saranello, 142 F. Supp.

3d at 1186 n.2 (same); Handanovic, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (same).

In addition to treaties characterized by the absence of a charging document mandate,

some treaties reference a charging document but do so in a way that provides greater

flexibility. Certain extradition treaties, for example, include a provision for the production

of “a copy of the charging document, if any.” See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, Austria – U.S.

art. 10, § 3, Jan. 8, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12916 (emphasis added). Other extradition treaties

have apparently demanded “a document setting forth the charges.” See Extradition Treaty,

Chile – U.S., art. 8, §3(b), June 5, 2013, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1214 (emphasis added). In those

situations, the plain treaty language permits the extradition of a person without production

of the discrete document initiating criminal charges.

We acknowledge that one of our sister circuits recently held that the Secretary of

State could extradite the former president of Peru, who had not been formally charged. See

Manrique v. Kolc, 65 F.4th 1037 (9th Cir. 2023). The extradition treaty between the United

States and Peru contains the same charging document mandate as the Treaty here. See

Extradition Treaty, Peru – U.S., art. VI, § 3(b), July 26, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 03-825

(requiring “a copy of the charging document”). But for the reasons discussed, we simply

do not agree with the Ninth Circuit’s assessment that the inclusion of the charging

document mandate “makes no difference.” See Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1042.

As the Seventh Circuit observed in Assarsson, “[i]f the parties had wished to include

the additional requirement that a formal charging document . . . be produced, they could

have so provided.” See 635 F.2d at 1243. Put succinctly, the parties to this Treaty did just

The drafting history of the treaty between the United States and Peru—signed by

the parties thereto in July of 2001—contains a Technical Analysis. The Analysis explains

that the parties

intended that ‘charged’ persons include those who are sought for prosecution

for an extraditable offense based on an outstanding warrant of arrest,

regardless of whether such warrant was issued pursuant to an indictment,

complaint, information, affidavit, or other lawful means for initiating an

arrest for prosecution under the laws in Peru or the United States.

See Manrique, 65 F.4th at 1043. The Ninth Circuit characterized this explanation as

“strong evidence that ‘charged with’ refers generally to any accusation.” Id. No such

statement exists, however, in the drafting history of the Treaty at issue here, which was

signed by the United States and Lithuania only three months later, in October of 2001.

that. And undeniably, the Treaty language agreed to by the parties must be adhered to and

carry the day. See Aguasvivas, 984 F.3d at 1060 (“When, subsequent to Assarsson and

Emami, the Dominican Republic and the United States added to the list of required

documents ‘the document setting forth the charges,’ a strong inference arose supporting

the conclusion that this treaty requires more than an arrest warrant describing a suspected

but yet-to-be charged crime.” (emphasis added)). Despite “charged with” being contained

in Article I of this Treaty, the charging document mandate of Article 8 § 3(b) plainly and

unambiguously “eliminates the permission to proceed without [production of] such a

document.” See Aguasvivas, 984 F.3d at 1061. And because a Requesting State (here,

Lithuania) cannot produce “the charging document” when no criminal charges have been

filed, the Treaty does not permit the extradition of a person not yet criminally charged. At

bottom, there is “no better evidence of a ‘substantive’ requirement of a charge . . . than a

copy of the ‘charge’ itself.” See Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1243.

Finally, the Secretary of State maintains that we are obliged to defer to his

interpretation of the Treaty, even if we would not adopt that construction de novo. Of

course, “[i]f the treaty’s text is ambiguous and reasonably accommodates the United States’

construction,” we should defer to the Secretary’s interpretation. See Aguasvivas, 984 F.3d

We have no authority to rewrite Treaty terms agreed to by the parties. If the

Treaty parties wanted to extradite suspects and targets of criminal investigations, the Treaty

could have so provided. Put simply, Lithuania agreed to — and is therefore required to —

produce “a copy of the charging document.”

at 1058. But that is not the situation with respect to the charging document mandate. The

charging document mandate is “plain and cannot reasonably bear the [Secretary’s]

construction.” Id. In that instance, we do not owe deference to the Secretary. The district

court thus erred as a matter of law in adopting the Secretary’s interpretation of the charging

document mandate of the Treaty.

* * *

To summarize, the charging document mandate spelled out in Article 8 § 3(b) of the

Treaty requires the production of a discrete charging document — that is, the instrument

(comparable to an indictment, information, or complaint) that has initiated criminal charges

against Vitkus. And, in these circumstances, the Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect

Decisions have not initiated criminal charges against Vitkus. As a result, those documents

are not “the charging document” required by Article 8 § 3(b), and Vitkus is likely to

succeed on the merits of the charging document contention.

Having concluded that the Virginia district court’s determination on the first

preliminary injunction factor — that is, likelihood of success on the merits — was a legal

error that constitutes an abuse of discretion, we turn to the unaddressed Winter factors. See

In re Search Warrant, 942 F.3d at 171 (recognizing that court of appeals should “perform

[its] own assessment of the factors not addressed by the district court”). More specifically,

Because Vitkus is likely to prevail on the charging document contention, we need

not and thus do not evaluate the immigration contention addressed and rejected by the

Virginia district court.

we will evaluate whether Vitkus has shown “[2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm

in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and

[4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

First, on the irreparable harm factor, Vitkus’s extradition to Lithuania would be

irreversible and moot his petition for habeas corpus relief. As one of our sister circuits has

recognized, “the possibility of irreparable injury . . . is evident: [the] appeal will become

moot and will be dismissed since the extradition will have been carried out.” See Artukovic

v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). Because Lithuania’s extradition request is

not in compliance with the Treaty, Vitkus’s extradition during ongoing litigation would

effectively deny him any ability to obtain permanent relief. And such a denial would

constitute irreparable harm to Vitkus.

As to the third and fourth Winter factors — the balance of the equities and the public

interest — we are obliged to assess those factors in tandem when the government (i.e., the

Secretary of State) is the opposing party. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 26 (considering balance

of equities and public interest together). To that end, the public undeniably has an interest

in the Secretary’s ability to secure the extradition of suspected or charged criminals to this

Country, which could be threatened by his “[f]ailure to comply with foreign nations’ proper

extradition requests.” See Venckiene v. United States, 929 F.3d 843, 865 (7th Cir. 2019).

And we recognize that the Secretary’s compliance with valid extradition requests

“promotes relations between . . . countries, and enhances efforts to establish an

international rule of law and order.” See Artukovic, 784 F.2d at 1356. On the other hand,

the public “undoubtedly has an interest in seeing its governmental institutions follow the

law.” See Roe, 947 F.3d at 230-31.

In these circumstances, Vitkus has demonstrated that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition

request to return him to that country does not satisfy the Treaty’s requirements. And the

public’s interest in the Secretary of State recognizing and fulfilling Treaty obligations

outweighs any detrimental impact that the denial of an improper extradition request could

have. We are thus satisfied that the balance of the equities and the public interest both

weigh in favor of Vitkus.

III.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the Injunction Denial of the Virginia district

court and remand for such other and further proceedings as may be appropriate.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

This appeal boils down to whether the district court abused its discretion in denying

Darius Vitkus’ motion to enjoin the Secretary of State from extraditing him to Lithuania.

Under its treaty with the United States, Lithuania seeks to extradite Vitkus for various

financial crimes he allegedly committed before he left that country for the United States.

To do so, the treaty requires Lithuania to, among other things, provide “the charging

document” to the United States. Although Vitkus had not been formally charged with

criminal violations, Lithuania produced documentation that it contends satisfies the treaty’s

charging document requirement. The Secretary agreed and determined that Vitkus should

be extradited. So it petitioned an extradition court for an order allowing it to do so.

At the extradition hearing, Vitkus and the Secretary presented evidence and

arguments about the meaning of “the charging document.” Vitkus insisted “the charging

document” required a formal charge, like an indictment. The Secretary countered that a

formal charge was not required and that the documents Lithuania provided were sufficient.

Ultimately, the extradition court found the Secretary’s evidence and arguments more

persuasive. The extradition court thus certified Vitkus for extradition.

Vitkus then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in district court, challenging the

extradition court’s certification order. The court denied the petition.

After the Secretary of State authorized Vitkus’ surrender to Lithuanian authorities,

Vitkus petitioned again for habeas relief and moved for a preliminary injunction

enjoining

the Secretary from extraditing him to Lithuania. Considering basically the same evidence

and arguments the extradition court and first habeas court considered, the district court

denied the motion. The court found Vitkus had not established a likelihood of success on

his claim that Lithuania failed to comply with the treaty.

The majority reverses that decision, concluding that Vitkus is likely to succeed on

the merits of his claim that Lithuania’s request does not satisfy the charging document

requirement. This means, as the majority sees it, the Secretary’s interpretation of “the

charging document”—which had been adopted by the extradition court and two district

courts—was not even plausible. As a result, the majority imposes the extraordinary relief

of enjoining the Secretary of State from carrying out its obligation under the treaty to

extradite Vitkus to Lithuania.

In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Vitkus identified the preliminary

injunction standard in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).

J.A. 303; id. at 20 (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is

likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.”). Since his requested relief was a stay of extradition, he also asserted

that the court was required to consider “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong

showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure

the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” J.A.

303 (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). As the Supreme Court has

recognized, there is “substantial overlap between these factors and the factors governing

preliminary injunctions.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 24).

I disagree. The district court’s interpretation of the treaty charging document

requirement was plausible. So even if Vitkus’ reading of it was as well, the district court

did not abuse its discretion. And the district court’s decision to side with the Secretary’s

interpretation over Vitkus’ faithfully applies Supreme Court precedent requiring deference

to the Secretary. I would affirm the district court’s denial of Vitkus’ motion for a

preliminary injunction.

The critical portion of the treaty is Article 8. It sets forth the procedural

requirements for extradition and contains a list of required documents the “Requesting

State” must produce when submitting a “request for extradition of a person who is sought

for prosecution.” J.A. 47–48. Article 8(3) of the treaty required Lithuania, as the

Requesting State, to produce, “(a) a copy of the warrant or order for arrest issued by a

judge, court, or other authority competent for this purpose; (b) a copy of the charging

document; and (c) such information as would provide a reasonable basis to believe that the

person sought committed the offense for which extradition is sought.” J.A. 48.

Consistent with the treaty, Lithuania requested the United States Department of

State’s assistance in extraditing Vitkus for prosecution related to seven separate schemes

involving theft, fraud and tax evasion in violation of the Criminal Code of Lithuania.

In support of its extradition request, Lithuania produced three “Notifications of

Suspicion” and two “Decisions” to recognize Vitkus as a suspect. J.A. 77–91, 120–21,

134–40. The Notifications of Suspicion are issued by an investigator and the Decisions are

issued by a prosecutor. Under Lithuania’s Criminal Procedure Code, an individual

suspected of violating the law must be served with a Notification of Suspicion or the

prosecutor’s Decision to recognize him or her as a suspect before the individual may be

interrogated. Each of these documents includes the alleged “criminal offense (place, time

and other circumstances) and criminal law providing for the criminal offense, as well as

the suspect’s rights.” J.A. 219.

But Vitkus maintains that Lithuania has failed to produce the required “charging

document” because “[he] has never been charged with any of the crimes for which

extradition is sought” and that the case against him “remain[s] in the investigation phase.”

Op. Br. 9, 14. At the extradition hearing, Vitkus presented testimony from Henrikas

Mackevicius, a criminal lawyer in Lithuania. Mackevicius testified that the “Notifications

of Suspicion” provided by the Lithuanian government do not satisfy the requirements of

Article 8. J.A. 269. He further testified that the cases against Vitkus are in the investigation

phase and, therefore, no charging document could have been issued.

The problem with this position, however, is that the treaty does not define “the

charging document.” And while those familiar with the United States legal system might

naturally think of a charging document as something formal like a criminal complaint or

an indictment, the Secretary produced evidence supporting a broader interpretation of that

phrase in the context of an international extradition treaty.

Lithuania also produced arrest warrants for Vitkus.

In the proceedings below, the Secretary provided a letter from the Lithuanian Chief

Prosecutor explaining Lithuanian criminal procedure, which stated that the extradition

request contains the necessary charging documents under the treaty. In the letter, the Chief

Prosecutor points out that notifications of suspicion recognize a person as a suspect,

identify the violations of Lithuanian law for which Vitkus’ extradition is sought and

describe the facts related to the suspected legal violations. And the letter adds that “a

notification of suspicion or a decision of a prosecutor to recognize a person as a suspect

would be the equivalent of the charging document referred to in Article 8(3)(b) of the

[Treaty and Annex] under the criminal procedure law of the Republic of Lithuania.” J.A.

219.

The Secretary also submitted the affidavit of Tom Heinemann, an attorney advisor

for the Department of State. In re Extradition of Vitkus, No. 20-62358-MC-PMH, Dkt. No.

32-2 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2021) (Heinemann Aff.).

In the affidavit, Heinemann attests that

he works for the Office of Enforcement and Extradition, the office responsible for

extradition, “including the negotiation and implementation of extradition treaties.” Id. at 1.

Heinemann explained that the Treaty describes “two broad categories” of people who may

be extradited—those that have been “charged with or convicted of an extraditable offense”

(Article 1) and those that are “sought for prosecution” (Article 8). Id. And the “sought for

In its response brief, the government explains that “[d]ue to the emergency nature

of the proceedings below and the fact that Vitkus did not contest the State Department’s

position on the treaty, the full declaration was not submitted as an exhibit” before this court.

Resp. Br. 13 n.5.

prosecution” category applies to “persons wanted for prosecution by Lithuania, such as

Vitkus, who are wanted to stand trial for specific crimes, but for whom a formal charging

document akin to the ones used in the United States may not have been issued.” Id.

According to Heinemann, this language appears in many other bilateral extradition

treaties. He explained that the language is necessary because “some of the United States

treaty partners are unable as a legal matter to formally charge a suspect until that suspect

appears in that country for some form of legal proceeding.” Id. In fact, at oral argument,

the Secretary of State explained that a formal indictment cannot be sought under Lithuanian

law until the prosecution receives Vitkus’ position on the notification of suspicion

documents. Consistent with that, Heinemann stated that “the United States has regularly

extradited fugitives when they are suspected of having committed a crime or crimes, and

are wanted for prosecution in the other country, even though they have not been formally

charged as that term is understood in U.S. criminal law.” Id. Thus, the Secretary insists that

the documents submitted by the Lithuanian government satisfy the treaty’s requirements

under Article 8.

After considering the parties’ competing interpretations of the charging document

requirement and Supreme Court precedent requiring deference to the Secretary’s position,

the district court denied Vitkus’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It concluded that

Vitkus had not shown that it was likely that he could succeed on his claim that Lithuania

failed to satisfy the treaty’s requirements.

II.

On appeal, Vitkus continues to argue that the treaty requires a formal charging

document like an indictment. And I agree that Vitkus’ interpretation of “the charging

document” is plausible. But it is not the only plausible reading of that phrase. The treaty

does not define “the charging document” or provide any language to limit its meaning. For

example, while subsection (3)(a) of Article 8 explains that “the warrant or order” must be

“issued by a judge, court or other authority competent for this purpose,” subsection (3)(b)

contains no such limiting language for “the charging document.” Also, other parts of the

treaty describe individuals who may be extradited in different ways. Specifically, Article

1 refers to individuals “charged with or convicted of an extraditable offense.” J.A. 45.

Article 8, the section setting forth the required documentation that must accompany an

extradition request, refers to individuals “sought for prosecution.” J.A. 48. So, while I agree

that “charged with” may suggest a formal charge, “sought for prosecution” is broader. It

could also be plausibly read—as the extradition court, the first habeas court and then

district court did—to include “persons wanted for prosecution by Lithuania, such as Vitkus,

who are wanted to stand trial for specific crimes, but for whom a formal charging document

akin to the ones used in the United States may not have been issued.” Heinemann Aff. at

1. See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (“[T]reaties are to be interpreted upon

the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts . . . [and] that all parts of a treaty

are to receive a reasonable construction with a view to giving a fair operation to the

whole.”). In other words, the Secretary’s reading is, at the very least, plausible.

And when a treaty’s language can be plausibly read in more than one way, it should

be resolved in favor of extradition. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293–94

(1933) (“[I]f a treaty fairly admits to two constructions, one restricting the rights which

may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be

preferred.”). Also, the government’s interpretation of the meaning that should be given to

particular provisions in a treaty is entitled to deference. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15

(2010) (“It is well settled that the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty is entitled

to great weight.”); see also Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85

(1982) (“Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the

Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great

weight.”); Baturin v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 31 F.4th 170, 175 n.6 (4th Cir. 2022)

(“We usually do defer to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty.”); Yoo v. United

States, 43 F.4th 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[W]hile the matter of treaty interpretation is

ultimately a question of law for the courts, given the nature of the document and the unique

relationships it implicates, the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty is entitled to

great weight.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And that is particularly

true when both parties to the treaty agree on its meaning. See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16 (“In

interpreting any treaty, ‘the opinion of our sister signatories . . . are entitled to considerable

weight.’”) (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176

(1999)).

Applying these principles of deference, the district court’s denial of Vitkus’ motion

for a preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion. While the treaty could be read

to require a formal charging document, it was plausible to read it the way the Secretary

urges us to do. And for that reason, Vitkus has failed to meet his burden that he is likely to

succeed on the merits at trial. As a result, the district court did not err in denying Vitkus’

motion for a preliminary injunction.

The Ninth Circuit recently came to the same conclusion. See Manrique v. Kolc, 65

F.4th 1037 (9th Cir. 2023). In Manrique, Peru sought to extradite its former President “to

face criminal charges for allegedly accepting millions of dollars in bribes during his

presidency.” Id. at 1039. In support of its extradition request, Peru submitted “two

Prosecutor’s Decisions, documents that summarize the ongoing investigation, and an

Acusación Fiscal, a document produced at the end of an investigation that lays out the

crimes allegedly committed and supporting evidence.” Id. at 1040. On appeal, the

petitioner argued that he could not be extradited because Peru had not submitted a “copy

of the charging document.” Id. at 1043. He insisted, much like Vitkus, that only the formal

charging document, an Orden de Enjuiciamiento, would suffice. Id. But the Ninth Circuit

disagreed. It first recognized that the plain language of the treaty did not “mention formal

charges or the Orden de Enjuiciamiento.” Id. In addition, the court noted that documents

submitted by Peru sufficiently identified the crimes that the petitioner was accused of and

summarized the supporting evidence. Id. Finally, it recognized that Supreme Court

guidance required the treaty to be broadly construed to give effect to the parties’ intent and

that courts should defer to the Executive Branch’s interpretation. Id. Accordingly, the Ninth

Circuit denied the petitioner’s motion to stay his extradition.

The Ninth Circuit analyzed language in the extradition treaty between the United

States and Peru that is identical to the language we confront today. And it rejected the same

argument Vitkus presses before us. In other words, it adopted the Secretary’s interpretation

of “the charging document.” Of course, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is not binding on us.

But when combined with the prior decisions of the extradition court, the first habeas court

and the district court, the Ninth Circuit’s decision reinforces my view that the Secretary’s

interpretation is plausible. I would follow the Ninth Circuit’s sound reasoning here.

III.

In conclusion, the Secretary’s view that documents submitted by Lithuania satisfy

the treaty’s charging document requirement is, at the very least, plausible.

When that is

the case, we must defer to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of treaties that it has been

charged with negotiating and enforcing. Thus, Vitkus has not met his burden of establishing

that he is likely to succeed at trial. And for that reason, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Vitkus’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

Respectfully, I dissent.

Because I conclude that Vitkus has failed to show a likelihood of success on the

merits, I need not decide whether he has shown that “he is likely to suffer irreparable harm

in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that

an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008).