Power Outage Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Plans

JANUARY 2017 PRE-DECISIONAL / FOR REVIEW / NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION i

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

Power Outage Incident Annex to the

Response and Recovery Federal

Interagency Operational Plans

Managing the Cascading Impacts from a Long-Term

Power Outage

Final - June 2017

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Handling Instructions

Distribution, transmission, and destruction of this annex is in accordance with Department of

Homeland Security Management Directive 11042.1.

Submit questions pertaining to the

distribution, transmission, or destruction of this annex to the Planning and Exercise Division,

National Planning Branch at response-planning@fema.dhs.gov.

Intended Audience

The primary audience for this annex is federal departments and agencies with a role in

emergency management. However, local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area officials, as

well as private sector and nongovernmental partners with roles and responsibilities for

responding to and/or recovering from long-term power outages will also benefit from the

material in this annex.

https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_110421_safeguarding_sensitive_but_unclassified_information.pdf

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Document Change Control

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Date

Summary of Changes

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Table of Contents

Handling Instructions ................................................................................................. 3

Intended Audience ..................................................................................................... 3

Document Change Control........................................................................................ ii

Table of Contents .......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Base Annex ................................................................................................................... 1

Situation ............................................................................................................................................ 1

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 1

Purpose .......................................................................................................................................................................... 3

S c o p e ............................................................................................................................................................................. 4

Background ................................................................................................................................................................... 4

Interdependencies......................................................................................................................................................... 6

Threat ............................................................................................................................................................................ 7

Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations ...................................................................................... 7

Mission ............................................................................................................................................. 14

Execution ......................................................................................................................................... 14

Concept of Operations ............................................................................................................................................... 15

Operational Coordination ......................................................................................................................................... 24

Operational Phases ..................................................................................................................................................... 35

Critical Requirements ................................................................................................................................................ 42

Essential Elements of Information ............................................................................................................................ 43

Administration, Resources, and Funding .................................................................................... 45

Administration ............................................................................................................................................................ 45

Resources .................................................................................................................................................................... 45

Funding ....................................................................................................................................................................... 45

Oversight, Coordination Instructions, and Communications .................................................... 47

Oversight ..................................................................................................................................................................... 48

Coordinating Instructions ......................................................................................................................................... 48

Logistics Architecture ................................................................................................................................................ 48

Private Sector Coordination ...................................................................................................................................... 48

Nongovernmental Organizations .............................................................................................................................. 50

Communications ......................................................................................................................................................... 50

Annex A: Electricity Delivery ................................................................................ 51

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Electricity Delivery ......................................................................................................................... 51

Generation .................................................................................................................................................................. 51

Transmission ............................................................................................................................................................... 51

Distribution ................................................................................................................................................................. 53

Appendix 1: Core Capability Decisions,

Requirements, and Tasks ................. 54

Core Capability Considerations, Requirements, and Actions ................................................... 54

Executive Decisions ........................................................................................................................ 61

Appendix 2: Critical Infrastructure Sector

Interdependencies ........................... 64

Lifeline Functions ........................................................................................................................... 64

C! Sector Impacts ........................................................................................................................... 65

DHS NPPD Infrastructure of Concern List ................................................................................. 73

C1 Sector Coordination and Information Management ............................................................ 73

Attachment 1 to Appendix 2: Critical Infrastructure

Sector Partners .......... 77

Appendix 3: Communications ................................................................................. 95

Situation .......................................................................................................................................... 95

Concept of Support ........................................................................................................................ 95

Public Messaging ............................................................................................................................ 96

Operational Coordination ............................................................................................................. 99

Communications Working Group ............................................................................................................................ 99

National Joint Information Center ......................................................................................................................... 100

Appendix 4: Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................... 101

Appendix 5: Power Outage Modeling Capabilities

and Tools ......................... 109

Modeling Tools ............................................................................................................................. 109

EAGLE-I ................................................................................................................................................................... 109

EAR S S ..................................................................................................................................................................... 110

HHS empower Mapping Tool ................................................................................................................................. 111

EPFAT ....................................................................................................................................................................... 112

EPRAM (National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center .................................................................... 113

EPRAM (USACE) .................................................................................................................................................... 113

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HAZUS-MH .............................................................................................................................................................. 114

MoDI ......................................................................................................................................................................... 114

Situational Awareness Reporting ............................................................................................... 116

EAD ........................................................................................................................................................................... 116

EARSS ....................................................................................................................................................................... 116

FCC DIRS ................................................................................................................................................................. 117

Form OE-417 ............................................................................................................................................................ 117

GeoHEALTH ............................................................................................................................................................ 117

Outage Control ......................................................................................................................................................... 118

U.S. Electric System Operating Data Tool ............................................................................................................. 118

Appendix 6: Authorities and References ............................................................. 120

Appendix 7: Glossary ............................................................................................. 128

Appendix 8: Acronyms .......................................................................................... 135

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Base Annex

Situation

Introduction

Response to a long-term power outage will involve two major concurrent operational efforts; the

restoration of power and lifesaving and life-sustaining efforts. Restoration of power will remain

within the purview of the utility companies. If a need for federal engagement for energy

restoration efforts arises, the Department of Energy (DOE), as the sector-specific agency (SSA)

as well as the lead federal agency for the energy sector, directs those efforts. However, the utility

companies will maintain operational control over restoration efforts.

Concurrently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA), will coordinate lifesaving and life-sustaining efforts. FEMA will

coordinate federal incident response and recovery activities consistent with the constructs

identified within the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Disaster Recovery

Framework (NDRF). The Federal Government integrates its efforts with those of local, state,

tribal, territorial, and insular area governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs).

The Nation’s energy sector consists of thousands of geographically dispersed and connected

electricity, oil, and natural gas assets. The sector provides for and relies on the Nation’s

transportation, water, information technology (IT), communications, finance, government, and

other critical infrastructures (CIs). Likewise, CI sectors reciprocally depend on energy—

especially electricity. The private sector owns and operates the majority of the Nation’s energy

infrastructure. For this reason, private sector energy asset owners and operators are responsible

for developing their own emergency plans and conducting training and exercises to validate and

test their procedures. In most cases, energy asset owners and operators are also responsible for

the stabilization, restoration, and reestablishment of normal operations at their facilities

following a disruption. Fortunately, electric companies in the United States have well-developed

protocols that address business continuity, and they are subject to mandatory federal reliability

standards that ensure operational reliability. Even though utilities operate under different

business models and ownership structures, asset owners and operators function in an integrated

manner.

Electricity is essential for daily life. Basic functions, including communication, transportation,

food, housing, water, and healthcare, are dependent upon it. As reliance on electricity continues

to grow, a significant disruption to the electric grid may put lives, the economy, and the

environment in danger. The incidents below illustrate how power outages have previously

affected critical services in other CI sectors, such as fuel production and transportation, water

and wastewater facilities, mass transit, and public health, and provide context for

interdependencies and cascading effects across CI sectors for a long-term power outage.

• August 1996 Blackout—Outages lasted from a few minutes to as long as nine hours and

affected over 7.5 million people in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Power was

restored in nearly all affected areas by the next day.

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• August 2003 Northeast Blackout—Over 50 million people were without power for up

to four days in the Midwest and Northeastern United States. Parts of the Province of

Ontario, Canada suffered rolling blackouts for more than a week before power was fully

restored.

• Hurricane Katrina, 2005— In August, Hurricane Katrina left an estimated 2.7 million

customers without power across Alabama (AL), Florida (FL), Louisiana (LA),

Mississippi (MS), and Texas (TX). Within two weeks, power was restored in AL, FL,

and MS, yet full restoration in LA took almost another month due to extensive flooding

and hurricane damage that required reconstruction of energy and other supporting

infrastructure.

• Hurricane Rita, 2005 – In September, Hurricane Rita left over two million customers

without power throughout AL, FL, LA, MS, and TX. The impact of Rita further impeded

ongoing restoration efforts, setting back the number of customers that had power restored

initially from Katrina. Most neighborhoods in New Orleans that could take service had

electric service restored by November, while the expected restoration timeframe for other

local neighborhoods ranged from an additional four weeks to “indefinitely.”

• Halloween Nor’easter, 2011 – Heavy snow in October 2011 brought down trees,

resulting in 3.2 million residents across 12 states losing power. The storm arrived just two

months after Hurricane Irene caused extensive power outages and property damage in the

Northeast, with the 2011 New England tornado outbreak also causing damage in Western

Massachusetts. In Connecticut, the outage lasted more than 11 days.

• 2012 Derecho – This June storm resulted in power outages for 4.2 million people in 11

states and the District of Columbia. Power was restored within one week. Restoration

took longer than anticipated because new follow-on storms affected the region during the

second day of restoration, causing additional outages, slowing restoration, and setting

back original estimates. Extreme temperatures that followed the 2012 Derecho may also

have complicated restoration efforts for many utilities, as the high heat posed a safety risk

to utility crews and lowered restoration efficiency.

• Hurricane Sandy, 2012 – In October 2012, 20 states plus the District of Columbia

experienced significant power outages because of Hurricane Sandy. Over 8.5 million

customers lost electric power, and significant damage occurred to the energy

infrastructure. Within two weeks of Sandy’s landfall, power was restored to 99 percent of

customers.

• Nor’easter 2012 – Following on the heels of Hurricane Sandy in November 2012, strong

winds, rain, snow, and coastal flooding resulted in an additional 150,276 power outages

on top of those that had already occurred due to Hurricane Sandy. Full restoration of

power was achieved in early December 2012.

As shown in the above examples, utilities are fully prepared to respond quickly to restore power

for the majority of disruptions that occur by using existing processes and agreements. However,

there is a potential for a large-scale damage to the power infrastructure that may cause a long-

term (+72 hours) interruption for a large swath of the country. Any prolonged interruption of the

supply of basic energy, particularly electricity, would do considerable harm to the U.S. economy

and the American people. A long-term outage that results in businesses, CI, and thousands of

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people without power for weeks or months could leave the population in need of life saving and

life-sustaining efforts.

When a power outage is of such significance and scope that it is beyond the ability of utility

companies to restore power in a timely manner, resulting in local, state, tribal, territorial, or

insular area capabilities being insufficient to support the population, the Federal Government

provides assistance to jurisdictional response and recovery capabilities. A situation that may

trigger a need for the local, state, tribal, territorial, or insular area to request federal assistance

discussed in this annex will likely possess some or all of the following characteristics:

• The outage covers multiple states/FEMA Regions and leaves millions of customers

without power for an extended period

• A significant portion of the population in the affected area warrants prolonged mass care

and emergency assistance support;

• A loss of critical lifeline functions (e.g., energy – electric, energy – gas/oil, water,

communication, and transportation) results in risks to health, personal safety, national

security, and economic viability.

• Impacts to other CI sectors result in significant loss of services or functions if the

duration of the power outage is for an extended period of time.

• Local, state, tribal, territorial, or insular area governments need sustained operational

coordination to respond to the effects from the power outage.

Purpose

The Power Outage Incident Annex: Managing the Cascading Impacts from a Long-Term Power

Outage (POIA) provides guidance for federal level responders to provide response and recovery

support to local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area efforts while ensuring the protection of

privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

This annex provides incident-specific supplemental

information to the basic concept of operations described in the Response and Recovery Federal

Interagency Operational Plans (FIOP), which will be further refined in regional POIAs.

The POIA includes the Federal Government’s concept of operations and unified coordination

structures required to execute survivor-centric response and recovery operations in the wake of a

long-term power outage. The POIA is not an electricity restoration plan although the Federal

Government may provide the appropriate supplemental federal assistance and resources to

enable the restoration process in a timely manner. It does outline the types of federal support

available to CI stakeholders in restoration activities and the responsibilities of industry

The electricity industry defines a customer as a metered structure (i.e., a metered building is a single customer), not as the

number of individuals within the structure.

Per the Response FIOP, the whole community includes individuals and communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-

based organizations, and all levels of government (local, regional/metropolitan, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal).

Whole community contributors include children; older adults; individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional

needs; those from religious, racial, and ethnically diverse backgrounds; people with limited English proficiency; and owners of

animals, including household pets and service animals.

As with all activities in support of the Response and Recovery FIOPs, activities in this annex must be consistent with all

pertinent statutes and policies involving privacy and civil and human rights, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Civil Rights Act of 1964.

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stakeholders. The document also identifies potential critical information requirements and unique

considerations that could hinder their ability to provide mission-essential services.

The POIA does not alter or impede the ability of any governmental department or agency to

execute its authorities or meet its responsibilities under applicable laws, executive orders, and

directives

S c op e

This annex applies to response and recovery capabilities of the Federal Government in the event

of a long-term power outage in which the cascading impacts are so severe that incident-specific

activities are required to supplement those in the Response and Recovery FIOPs. Actions listed

in this annex may be to provide support to local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area

governments or other federal agencies to address the ramifications of the incident.

This annex

will not focus on restoration efforts conducted by utility companies but will briefly address the

capabilities of the Federal Government to support the sector in their restoration efforts for

informational purposes.

Incident-specific response and recovery activities were determined based on the identified

interdependencies and cascading impacts a long-term power outage would have on CI sectors

and core capabilities and the relevant responsibilities and legal authorities of federal agencies.

Background

The electric power industry is the backbone of America’s economic sectors, generating the

energy that powers its people and businesses in global commerce. Transportation, water,

emergency services, healthcare, communications, and manufacturing represent only a few of the

power grid’s critical interdependencies. Reliance on the electric grid is a key interdependency

(and vulnerability) among all CI sectors and supporting infrastructures, making grid reliability

and resilience a fundamental need for national safety and security. Therefore, a basic

understanding of the roles of electricity providers is important for setting expectations of

potential federal support to address the cascading impacts of a long-term power outage. See

Annex A for more information on the electricity subsector and electricity delivery.

Over 3,200 electric companies in the United States generate, transmit, and distribute electricity

for sale to customers. There are two types of utilities—for-profit and not-for-profit, as identified

below.

For-Profit Utilities

• Investor-Owned Utilities (IOU) – IOUs are utilities operated as private, tax-paying

businesses whose management is not associated with any government agency. Private

citizens or private investment groups hold financial securities or assets, and the stock is

publicly traded. IOUs may have service territories in one or more states. State

commissions grant IOUs their licenses to operate in specific areas of the state under

certain terms and conditions. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)

While the intent is not to use this annex for every incident in which there is a power outage, elements of this annex may be

selectively used (e.g., critical information requirements) consistent with the principles in the NRF.

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regulates IOU interstate generation, transmission, and power sales. A state commission or

public utility commission regulates IOU distribution system and retail sales. While IOUs

comprise only a small portion of the total number of utility companies in the United

States, they serve more than two-thirds of the Nation’s population.

• Independent Power Producer – Often called non-utility generators, independent power

producers are entities that own or operate an electricity generating facility that is not

included in an electric utility’s rate base. They include, but are not limited to,

cogenerators, small power producers, and all other non-utility electricity producers (such

as exempt wholesale generators) who sell electricity.

Not-For-Profit Utilities

• Public Power Utilities – Public power utilities are not-for-profit utilities owned and

operated by state or local governments or by agencies, authorities, or instrumentalities of

such governments. City-owned utilities are also known as municipal utilities (munis).

Public power utilities are regulated and governed by locally elected or appointed officials

and are thus directly accountable to the communities they serve. Within the United States,

more than 2,000 community-owned electric companies serve more than 48 million

people, or about 14 percent of the Nation’s electric companies.

• Rural Electric Cooperatives (Co-Ops) – Electric co-ops are private, independent, not-

for-profit electric utilities owned by the customers they serve. They are incorporated

under the laws of the states in which they operate and are generally exempt from federal

income tax laws. Established to provide at-cost electric service, co-ops are governed by a

board of directors elected from the membership, which sets policies and procedures that

the co-op’s management implements. Distribution cooperatives deliver electricity to retail

customers, while generation and transmission cooperatives provide wholesale power to

distribution co-ops through their own generation or by purchasing power on behalf of the

distribution members. Co-ops tend to provide service in rural areas that are not served by

other utilities. Most electric cooperatives were initially financed by the Rural Utilities

Service (formerly known as the Rural Electrification Administration) within the United

States Department of Agriculture (USDA).

• Federal Power Program – This program includes the Tennessee Valley Authority

(TVA), the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power

Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the

Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). TVA is a corporate agency of the United

States that sells electricity to business customers and local power distributors serving nine

million people in parts of seven southeastern states. BPA, SEPA, SWPA, and WAPA are

Power Marketing Administrations (PMA). PMAs are federal agencies within DOE that

market hydropower, primarily from multiple-purpose water projects operated by the

Bureau of Reclamation, the USACE, and the International Boundary and Water

Commission.

American Public Power Association website. http://publicpower.org/.

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Interdependencies

Key interdependencies exist among the 16 CI sectors, as denoted in Table 1. The energy sector

provides essential power and fuels upon which all other CI sectors depend. In turn, the energy

sector depends upon other CI sectors, such as transportation, IT, communications, water, and

government facilities, to help provide its services. For example, the transportation sector relies

upon fuel for its operation, and the energy sector relies upon transportation for fuel delivery.

In addition to multiple cross-sector interdependencies, interdependencies also exist within the

energy sector itself, which can further complicate the restoration of power. For instance, the

increasing demand for natural gas to generate power has served to heighten the interdependence

between gas and electric systems. Natural gas is used heavily in electricity generation, and

electricity is necessary throughout the natural gas supply chain, including at production, pipeline,

processing, and distribution facilities. In addition, supervisory control and data acquisition

systems (SCADA) and energy management systems that supply data and monitor and control

equipment and processes essential to energy industry operation both require reliable power

supplies for their operations.

Since energy systems and networks also transcend national boundaries, cross-border

collaboration, information sharing, mutual assistance, and other agreements are necessary to

ensure reliable operations. For additional information on these relationships, impacts from a

power outage, critical information requirements, and potential decisions for each CI sector, refer

to Appendix 2: Critical Infrastructure Sector Interdependencies.

Table 1: CI Sector Interdependencies

Critical Infrastructure Sector

Energy Sector Reliance on CI

Sector

CI Sector Reliance on Energy

Sector

Chemical

Chemical products to extract coal or

perforate gas and oil wells;

petrochemicals

Chemical manufacturing

Communications

Voice and data services for

management, response, and

restoration activities

Facility power for voice and data

services and distributed in-line

network equipment

Commercial Facilities

Lodging and feeding of restoration

workers

Facility service

Critical Manufacturing

Manufacturing and control logistics;

transportation; supply chain integrity

Supply chain

Dams (hydroelectric)

Energy source

Station service

Defense Industrial Base

Manufacturing and control logistics;

transportation; supply chain integrity

Military bases and defense

production facilities

Emergency Services

Facility security and incident

management

Facility power; communications;

database use

Energy

Electricity generation fuel source;

backup generators; service vehicle

fuel; station service

Fuel production and transportation

(pumping); station service

Financial Services

Financial institutions, funds

transfers

Deposits; consumer credit; payment

systems products

Food and Agriculture

Retail food and food service

Agricultural production; food

manufacturing, processing,

distribution, storage, transportation,

retail, and food service

Government Facilities

Government functions

Facility service

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Critical Infrastructure Sector

Energy Sector Reliance on CI

Sector

CI Sector Reliance on Energy

Sector

Healthcare and Public Health

Facility and community-based

patient and staff well being

Facility service; community-based

individuals with power dependent

durable medical equipment or

devices.

Information Technology

Automated tools

Facility service

Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and

Waste

Electricity generation fuel sources

Station service, including

safety systems

Transportation Systems

Fuel sources; equipment

transportation

Communications; control systems;

operations

Water and Wastewater

Water treatment; pumping and

distribution

Threat

A power outage of this magnitude may be the result of a natural disaster, space weather, large

near-earth object, accident, terrorist act such as an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), or significant

cyber incident.

This annex is not concerned with the threat and focuses on lifesaving and life-

sustaining actions post power outage. However, response and recovery efforts listed in this

Annex may be implemented in conjunction with other incident annexes. Depending on the cause

of the power outage, other incident annexes or emergency plans (e.g., Nuclear Radiological

Incident Annex or Earthquake Incident Annex) may be concurrently implemented but are

supplementary to the overarching core coordinating structures, processes, and protocols detailed

in the NRF, NDRF, and Response and Recovery FIOPs. When appropriate, counterterrorism and

law enforcement operations are conducted in coordination with federal incident response and

recovery operations.

Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations

In addition to the threats posed to critical lifeline sectors in the event of a significant grid

disruption, it is also vital to consider how a prolonged power outage would affect those living in

and around the impacted areas. These issues must be factored into whole community planning

assumptions and critical considerations specific to a long-term power outage and are intended to

supplement those listed in the Response and Recovery FIOPs.

Facts

If a power outage effects the United States for an extended period, the following facts drive

planning:

• The private sector owns and operates the vast majority of the Nation’s CI.

• The implications of the duration of the power outage may not be immediately known.

Pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive – 41, United States Cyber Incident Coordination, a significant cyber incident is a

cyber incident that is (or group of related cyber incidents that together are) likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national

security interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health

and safety of the American people.

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FACT: A statement of information

known to be true, such as a

verified location of an incident.

ASSUMPTION: A supposition about

the current situation or future

course of events, assumed to be

true in the absence of facts.

• All utilities, regardless of ownership, size or structure, have emergency plans and

contingency plans for short-term power outages.

• Damage to energy generation capabilities will result

in a longer restoration timeframe than if there is just

damage to certain transmission or distribution

capabilities.

• Damage to components of the electric transmission

system could delay power restoration efforts and

cause longer estimated restoration timelines than a loss of a generation asset, especially if

the damaged component is limited in supply or requires time-consuming logistical

support and installation.

• The Federal Power Act provides regulatory jurisdiction over wholesale, bulk power

whereas states regulate the retail sale of power to customers at the distribution level.

• Lack of power will create challenges to providing consistent heat or air conditioning and

sufficient sanitation/hygiene in shelter or other mass care facilities.

• People with disabilities comprise about 20 percent of the national population, and people

with access and functional needs generally comprise about 30 to 50 percent of the

population.

• The availability or shortage of redundant, accessible, and diverse communications will

affect response and recovery operations.

• The Federal Government has a limited organic generator capability.

Planning Assumptions

In absence of fact, planning assumptions represent information presumed to be true and are

necessary to facilitate planning. Assumptions are a baseline for planning purposes, and they do

not replace specific activities or decision points that would occur during an incident. During

response and recovery operations, assumptions may become facts.

Certain assumptions pertaining to a long-term power outage are predicated on historical

experiences or modeling. They include, but are not limited to the following:

General Assumptions

• Due to the duration of the outage, normal resources and processes for support to impacted

populations is not sufficient.

• A large-scale or long-term power outage with significant consequences requiring

interagency coordination is likely to be caused from a Stafford Act incident.

• Millions of customers and/or multiple states or FEMA Regions may be impacted.

• If an additional incident occurs during a long-term power outage, it will compound the

effects of a power outage and the timeline for restoration of power.

• Federal response and recovery capabilities will be in limited supply, forcing resource

prioritization decisions.

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Assumed fuel and generator planning factors are based on the following information formulas for

daily generator fuel requirements, daily fuel transportation requirements, and the daily fuel

consumption by critical facility (see Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3).

Figure 1: Daily Generator Fuel Requirements

igure 2: Daily Fuel Transportation Requirement

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Figure 3: Daily Fuel Consumption by Critical Facilities

International Assumptions

• Due to the United States’ dependency on cross-border flows of energy resources to meet

its total energy requirements and global flows of information, knowledge, and investment

capital, a long-term power outage will have international implications.

Mass Care/Emergency Services Assumptions

• Transportation limitations and supply chain disruptions make it difficult to open shelters,

prepare food, distribute food and emergency supplies, and provide means for

reunification services.

• Relocation of populations may occur if the power outage lasts for a significant period.

• A portion of the population have access and functional needs and are power dependent on

medical equipment, devices and services outside hospital settings and must be supported

during outages.

• Extremely hot or cold weather conditions will greatly increase the number of survivors

unable to shelter at home during a prolonged outage.

Energy Sector-Specific Plan, 2015, pg. 22.

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Power Restoration Assumptions

• Physical damage to electricity infrastructure may not be the primary hindrance to the

restoration of power (e.g., power generation capabilities may be impaired due to a cyber

incident).

Public Health and Medical Assumptions

• Critical health care facilities, sites such as hospitals, may have difficulty maintaining

sufficient temporary emergency power and will face stress from a surge in care needs and

potential degradation of services.

Supply Chain Assumptions

• Supply chains will be disrupted, affecting availability of resources.

• The Defense Production Act (DPA) may be activated at the discretion of federal agencies

with the appropriate authority to expedite procurement and allocation of critical

materials, services, and facilities, as needed or appropriate to respond to or recover from

a power outage.

Critical Considerations (for Crisis Action Planning)

Critical considerations pertaining to the unique circumstances of a long-term power outage

include, but are not limited to the following:

General Considerations

• Power operations outside the outage areas may be limited or degraded.

• Impacts to tribal lands and access for restoration activities may present unique challenges

that require understanding of specialized authorities or approaches.

• The U.S. Government and states interconnected and affected by the power outages must

coordinate restoration efforts as well as the issuance of emergency orders to the electric

industry and utilities based on jurisdictional boundaries and limitations within the federal

and state laws.

• Mutual aid resources among investor-owned, public power, and cooperative utilities may

be overextended.

• Water and wastewater operations will be hindered and affect the delivery of some key

services.

• Lack of inclusion for people who depend on power to sustain life or to maintain quality

of life, health, safety, and independence unnecessarily places people who need assistance

in a higher category of risk and increases likely rescue and response requirements.

Agriculture and Natural Resources Considerations

• Animal and agriculture operations (including agriculture, aquaculture, zoos, aquariums,

animal research facilities, and animal breeding and sheltering facilities) rely on power for

the provision of food and water to animals and to ventilate, maintain inside temperature,

and remove waste products from animal housing areas.

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Continuity of Operations and Government

• Robust continuity programs and capabilities mitigate impacts to the performance of

essential functions, core capabilities, and critical services, as well as expedite the

recovery and full resumption of impacted operations.

• Public and private sector organizations impacted by long-term power outages will require

the activation of continuity plans to sustain essential functions and provide critical

services to the affected population, and to ensure continuity of government at all levels.

• Federal or local, state, tribal, territorial government essential functions performed from

primary or alternate locations will rely on backup power support, which may be limited.

• Decision-making and coordination processes among government official and with the

heads of public and private critical infrastructure sectors and other non-governmental

organizations are necessary to ensure support to response and recovery efforts. This

coordination will require resilient communications capabilities.

Economic Considerations

• Economic impacts may not be initially apparent, but may appear over a longer period and

last for months or years. As a result, the Federal Government may provide long-term

recovery assistance for months or years at an enormous cost. (Refer to the NDRF for

specific types of long-term recovery assistance that may be available.)

• Individuals affected by the incident and by evacuation orders will likely be cut off from

income and will need social services support.

Environmental Considerations

• Environmental issues that occur due to a long-term loss of power may include water

contamination and spoilage of food sources.

Fuel/Generator Considerations

• Fuel will need to be prioritized for distribution and use based on requirements, such as

the number of available generators, number of CI facilities requiring fuel or generators,

and fuel consumption.

• The provision of temporary emergency power to a CI facility is not the sole factor in

returning the facility to normal operating status (e.g., lack of supplies, time to restart

operations).

• Even with adequate fuel stocks, distribution and delivery shortfalls may still limit the

ability to refuel in place.

• The failure rate of backup generators will increase to approximately 15 percent after 24

hours of continuous use.

• Backup generators at some CI facilities may not be tested frequently or maintained

consistently, which may result in equipment failures

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• Diesel fuel stored for more than 12 months begins to form sediments and gums. Diesel

fuel used after it has exceeded its shelf life will increase the likelihood of damage to the

generator.

• Use of points of distribution (PODs) may not be a feasible approach for providing fuel to

critical CI facilities at fixed locations. As a result, a fuel delivery strategy will need to

take into account daily fuel transportation requirements.

Mass Care/Emergency Services Considerations

• Power support will be needed for selective delivery of emergency services to high-

density areas or populations of people who need assistance evacuating.

• The public may have difficulty reaching 9-1-1 emergency services if communications

backup battery power systems fail due to an extended loss of electricity.

• Large numbers of survivors in areas where power outages are projected to be long term

may relocate to areas where power and resources are available. Therefore, people whose

homes are not damaged may require housing assistance and coordination with the private

sector for innovative accessible housing solutions.

• A decision to evacuate large populations to an area out of the impact area could require

significant resources.

• Temporary housing assistance may be required for essential personnel in impacted areas

who cannot stay in their own homes.

Public Health and Medical Considerations

• Healthcare services typically operate on just-in-time inventory, which may affect patient

care.

• Individuals who rely on durable medical equipment and implantable devices requiring

either electric power or battery recharging may lose their life-sustaining independence

and overwhelm healthcare facilities if the power is out for more than a few days.

• Dialysis centers generally do not have backup generators, but often operate within a

network and may shift patients to other local network facilities if they have power,

essential medical staff and patient public and accessible transportation services are

available and costs are not prohibitive.

• Health systems must plan for crisis standards of care and scarce resource utilization

during mass power outages.

• A segment of the population in the United States operates power-dependent durable

medical equipment and, as a result, is unable to self-relocate during a mass power outage.

Law Enforcement Considerations

• Actual criminal activities and rumored lawlessness will contribute to public safety fears,

which may affect response of recovery efforts.

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• The loss of power and impacts on communications, financial services, food, and water

will attract certain criminal activities (i.e., theft and looting). Law enforcement officers

will need to establish and visibly demonstrate a robust law enforcement presence.

Mission

The end state for response and recovery during a long-term power outage includes the following:

• Federal lifesaving and life-sustaining assistance to local, state, tribal, territorial, and

insular area entities is completed.

• Basic services, public safety, and community functionality are restored and long-term

recovery measures are in place to enable full restoration of power and the economy.

• Any displaced populations have returned home or been relocated to permanent accessible

housing.

• The logistics supply chain for mass care/emergency assistance and life-sustaining support

to survivors and infrastructure restoration missions can meet demand.

• Measures are in place to enable full revitalization of power systems, to include

sustainability and resilience enhancements, where feasible.

• Economic and business activities are returned to a healthy state.

• Health and social services systems are restored to promote the resilience, health

(including behavioral health), independence, and well-being of the whole community.

• Public safety and health protection assurances have been made.

• Environmental impacts are mitigated.

• National essential functions and all primary mission essential functions are restored.

• Resource requirements for sustainable asset owner CI operations have been sufficiently

met for reliable power delivery.

• Management of federal long-term recovery support shifts to the appropriate steady state

managers (e.g., regional, district, or similar local office).

Execution

When the overall coordination of federal incident response and recovery activities is required,

per Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the Secretary of Homeland Security

coordinates with federal entities to provide for federal unity of efforts for domestic incident

Per Presidential Policy Directive 40, National Continuity Policy, National Essential Functions (NEF) refer to the subset of

national functions that are necessary to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic emergency. Primary Mission Essential

Functions refer to those federal government functions that must be performed to support or implement the performance of NEFs

before, during, and in the aftermath of an emergency.

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management. The FEMA Administrator, as the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary

of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council regarding emergency management,

assists the Secretary in carrying out Stafford Act response and recovery operations. Other federal

departments and agencies carry out their responsibilities consistent with applicable policy and

statutory authorities. Actions within this annex supplement the concept of operations in the

Response and Recovery FIOPs.

Concept of Operations

Response and recovery support to mitigate the cascading effects from a long-term power outage

will require a coordinated effort involving the appropriate local, state, tribal, territorial, insular

area, and federal governments, NGOs, and private sector partners. federal coordination centers,

agency operations centers, and agency teams provide their own logistical support consistent with

agreed-upon interagency and agency-specific execution plans. State and local governments are

encouraged to coordinate with federal efforts yet maintain their own logistical support, when

possible, in accordance with applicable authorities and requirements. The concept of support is

consistent with Response and Recovery FIOP principles.

The premise for this annex is that a power outage affects multiple FEMA Regions or states and

leaves millions of customers without power for an extended period of time. Some areas are likely

to get power restored in a few weeks, but the overall outage will last much longer in other areas.

Therefore, federal support to local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments in a

long-term power outage will follow a triage approach, utilizing limited resources to achieve the

most positive impact for the largest number of people.

• Resources will maintain infrastructure in areas where power is expected to be restored in

two weeks or less. This will reduce the cascading impacts of power loss, maintain or

facilitate quicker restoration of essential services, and prepare regions to accept survivors

self-evacuating from areas suffering long-duration outages.

• In tandem with these activities, emergency resources and services will be selectively

delivered to areas with the longest projected duration of power loss that have a high

population density or a significant number of survivors who either choose not to self-

evacuate or need assistance with evacuating.

For a majority of incidents meeting the assumptions of this annex, Federal Government core

capabilities and resources will be initially prioritized to meet following objectives:

• Facilitate power restoration and maintain other CI within geographic regions where it is

anticipated that power will be restored in two weeks or less.

• Stabilize and sustain CI in geographic regions that suffer the next shortest duration of

power outages.

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• Provide mass care services and resources to support states and tribal nations conducting

the mass evacuation of survivors, including people with disabilities and those with access

and functional needs.

• Provide mass care/emergency assistance services to those self-evacuating.

• Selectively deliver emergency services to high-density areas or vulnerable populations

who are unable to evacuate.

• Provide law enforcement support to establish and maintain public safety and security to

ensure a safe environment for infrastructure restoration.

This approach prepares areas to accept evacuees, sustains CI to reduce the cascading impact of

power loss, allows for essential service restoration, and complies with the FEMA Catastrophic

Housing Annex to the Response FIOP.

As part of the crisis action planning process during an actual long-term power outage, this course

of action and these priority objectives will be reviewed and refined based on the particulars of

the incident.

Tiered Response

This annex is founded on the principle of tiered response or the understanding that most

incidents are handled at the lowest possible jurisdictional level. As resources and capabilities are

exceeded, additional SLTT, insular area, and federal assets are applied. In the case of the

electricity industry, restoration starts with the electric companies.

A key component of tiered response is mutual aid and assistance. Local communities and states

have mutual aid compacts in place to share critical resources across jurisdictional boundaries in a

timely manner. Likewise, companies in the electric industry have formal agreements with one

another to share resources as the capabilities are exceeded.

Private and Public-Sector Utility Assistance

Each segment of the electric industry is prepared to coordinate and provide assistance for

national-level catastrophic incidents. As such, the electric industry has a tiered response structure

that evolves from small, localized incidents, to larger incidents requiring support from

neighboring or regional utilities, to incidents that require national support and oversight. For

example, Edison Electric Institute (EEI), an association of investor-owned electric companies,

has developed a formal designation of National Response Event (NRE) to explain a natural or

manmade event that is forecasted to cause or that causes long-term power outages affecting a

significant population or several regions across the United States and requires resources from

multiple regional mutual assistance groups. The term NRE is unique to the members of EEI, but

the general principle of regional mutual aid and the elevation of incidents applies across the

various utility companies, municipally owned electric systems, and co-ops.

Top priorities for the electricity subsector include:

It is important for preparedness planning to account for inclusive accessible transportation for evacuation, to ensure individuals

with communications and physical access barriers are taken into consideration.

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1854-25045-3570/catastrophic_housing_annex.pdf

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• Identifying and leveraging mutual aid resources;

• Coordinating and deploying response resources in a safe, efficient, and equitable manner;

• Providing public messaging (in accessible and alternate formats, when possible); and

• Responding with unity of effort.

When there is an electrical outage that affects large portions of the Nation, the utility companies

use their internal coordination mechanisms to identify requirements and organize mutual aid.

Mutual assistance is an essential part of the electric power industry’s service restoration process

and contingency planning. Electric companies impacted by a major outage event are able to

increase the size of their workforce by “borrowing” restoration workers from other utilities.

Below are some examples of mutual aid assistance compacts and national programs to assist

energy sector owners and operators in sharing or procuring equipment and assistance in a

disaster.

• American Public Power Association (APPA) Mutual Aid Network – Formalized in

2013, APPA leads the Mutual Aid Network for public power utilities, state associations,

and joint action agencies. The Public Power Mutual Aid Playbook includes a national

mutual aid agreement signed by more than 2,000 public power utilities and rural electric

cooperatives, connecting utilities so they can help each other in times of need. Each of

the ten APPA regions, which match the ten FEMA Regions, has appointed a Public

Power Network Coordinator to each state who works with utilities in relevant regions on

coordinating any needed support. The network ensures a coordinated response with state

and federal government officials and outlines roles and responsibilities of utilities,

Network Coordinators, and National Coordinators. In steady state, APPA’s Mutual Aid

Working Group (MAWG) works to refine plans and procedures to enhance preparedness

response.

• Investor-Owned Electric Company Mutual Assistance – The Nation’s investor-owned

utilities, who are members of EEI, coordinate their mutual assistance efforts at a regional

level through seven Regional Mutual Assistance Groups (RMAG). Some RMAGs also

have municipal and cooperative utilities as members. When a member determines that it

needs restoration assistance, it initiates a request through a RMAG. When a RMAG is

unable to meet its resource needs, it can coordinate with adjacent RMAGs to obtain

additional mutual assistance restoration resources. Following a power outage that requires

a national response and upon request from an EEI chief executive officer, all RMAGs are

activated and all of the available resources will be allocated at the national level using

EEI’s NRE Framework.

A National Response Executive Committee, consisting of

senior-level member company executives from all regions of the country, will determine

if a NRE activation is warranted and will activate EEI’s National Mutual Assistance

Resource Team (NMART). The NMART evaluates mutual assistance requests and

assigns available resources to affected companies in coordination with the RMAGs.

http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/electricreliability/mutualassistance/Documents/MA_101FINAL.pdf

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• Electric Cooperative Mutual Assistance Network – Rural electric cooperatives adhere

to the principal of Cooperation Among Cooperatives.

The backbone of the Electric

Cooperative Mutual Assistance Network is the collective of statewide organizations that

operate in virtually all 47 states in which electric cooperatives serve. The statewide

organizations are the conduit through which individual electric cooperatives request and

receive help, as well as make offers of assistance to their fellow cooperatives. The

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA), the national organization

representing electric cooperatives on federal regulatory and legislative issues, developed

a Mutual Assistance Agreement in collaboration with APPA. This document forms the

basis for providing mutual assistance between and among electric cooperatives and

municipally owned electric systems. As needed, the statewide organizations activate the

Cooperative Mutual Assistance Network and conduct conference calls to discuss

requirements and mutual aid support.

• In 2006, the FERC approved the Spare Transformer Equipment Program (STEP), an

electric industry program that strengthens the sector’s ability to restore the Nation’s

transmission system more quickly in the event of a terrorist attack. Any electric utility

that owns transformers in the United States or Canada, including an investor-owned

utility, a government-owned utility, or a rural electric utility, is eligible to participate in

the program.

Under the program, each participating electric company is required to

maintain a specific number of transformers. STEP requires each participating utility to

sell its spare transformers to any other participating utility that suffers a “triggering

event” (an act of terrorism that destroys or disables one or more substations and results in

the declared state of emergency by the President of the United States). In addition to the

investor-owned STEP program, several other spares programs and many bilateral and

multilateral agreements are in place between utilities for spare transformer sharing and

leveraging.

• SpareConnect – The SpareConnect Program provides an additional mechanism for Bulk

Power System (BPS) asset owners and operators to network with other SpareConnect

participants concerning the possible sharing of transmission and generation step-up

transformers and related equipment, including bushings, fans, and auxiliary components.

SpareConnect establishes a confidential, unified platform for the entire electric industry

to communicate equipment needs in the event of an emergency or other non-routine

failure. SpareConnect complements existing programs, such as the STEP and voluntary

mutual assistance programs, by establishing an additional, trusted network of participants

who are uniquely capable of providing assistance concerning equipment availability and

technical resources. This program does not create or manage a central database of spare

equipment. Instead, SpareConnect provides decentralized access to points of contact at

power companies so that, in the event of an emergency, its participants are able to

connect quickly with other participants in affected voltage classes.

The Seven Cooperative Principals are Voluntary and Open Membership; Democratic Member Control; Members’ Economic

Participation; Autonomy and Independence; Education, Training, and Information; Cooperation Among Cooperatives; and

Concern for Community.

Order on Application for Blanket Authorization for Transfers of Jurisdictional Facilities and Petition for Declaratory Order,

September 22, 2006. https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/092106/E-13.pdf

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• GridAssurance™ is an independent organization formed by six energy companies that

provides subscribers with a readily available inventory of equipment at secure,

strategically located warehouses in the United States. The company also offers logistics

support to facilitate expedited delivery of the equipment to affected sites following a

qualifying event. Subscription to GridAssurance’s inventory and services is open to all

transmission owners.

State-to-State Assistance

State and local governments have a unique role in energy assurance because they represent the

front lines of protection and the face of public services to citizens during an emergency. They

also have a primary responsibility to coordinate with and make recommendations or requests to

industry on prioritizing restoration of electric service to critical facilities. Public power utilities

have local, state, and regional contracts and agreements in place to render mutual aid. In the

event that additional state-level resources are required, the state will generally request assistance

from other states by using interstate mutual aid and assistance agreements such as the Emergency

Management Assistance Compact. The governor of any state impacted directly or indirectly by

the consequences of a long-term power outage may activate elements of the National Guard to

support state domestic civil support functions and activities.

Requesting Federal Assistance

When an incident overwhelms or is anticipated to overwhelm state resources, the governor or

chief tribal executive may request federal assistance from the President. In such cases, the

affected local, state, tribal, territorial, or insular area and the Federal Government will

collaborate to provide the necessary assistance. The Federal Government may provide assistance

in the form of funding, resources, and critical services.

Federal Support

Federal support for the impacts from a long-term power outage depends on a variety of factors

including, but not limited to, the following:

• Whether a major disaster or emergency declaration has been issued by the President;

• The capability and resources of public and private utilities, as well as SLTT or insular

area governments in the affected areas;

• Federal agency operational agreements with states;

• Availability of organic federal resources and private sector resources which the federal

government relies upon;

• Statutory authorities and parameters consistent with the adjudication process (case-by-

case basis);

• Magnitude and duration of the outage (e.g., number of persons affected combined with

length of time without power; number and type of CI affected; projected length of

outage); and

• Specific federal department and agency roles and statutory authorities.

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When a long-term power outage occurs and exceeds (or is anticipated to exceed) local, state,

tribal, territorial, or insular area capabilities, it is anticipated that governors or chief tribal

executives will seek federal assistance under the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act authorizes the

President to provide financial and other disaster and emergency assistance to local, state, tribal,

territorial, and insular area governments; certain private not-for-profit organizations; and

individuals to support response, recovery, and mitigation efforts following a Presidential

emergency or major disaster declaration. The specific types of assistance under the Stafford Act

that the Federal Government may provide depend on a variety of factors, to include whether

utilities are publicly or privately owned within the impacted communities.

• Investor-Owned or For-Profit Utilities – The private sector owner and operator is the

primary entity responsible for all power restoration requirements. The Federal

Government does not provide support to investor-owned for-profit utilities under the

Stafford Act. However, in rare instances and on a case-by-case basis, the Federal

Government may provide certain support to investor-owned for-profit entities for an

exceptionally limited period for life-saving or life-sustaining missions, at the request of a

local, state, tribal, or territorial government. The Federal Government may consider

regulatory relief for private institutions and should synchronize its operations to enable,

support, and otherwise not contradict private sector restoration operations.

• Municipal, Cooperative or Not-For-Profit Utilities – In addition to federal support to

survivors and their communities, the Federal Government may provide assistance to the

public utility through the applicable state, tribal, territorial, or insular area to enable its

power generation and distribution requirements and support restoration operations. These

utilities are eligible for public assistance under the Stafford Act. Figure 4 provides

examples of the types of support potentially available to public utility companies.

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Figure 4: Order on Application for Blanket Authorization for Transfers

of Jurisdictional Facilities and Petition for Declaratory

While restoration of power is the responsibility of electric companies, the Federal Government

may be requested to provide services to enable the power restoration process, as well as the

delivery of essential services, through the facilitation of policy decisions and resource

prioritization. Examples of federal support that may be provided include, but is not limited to, the

following:

• Enforcement of road closures, public safety, and security at access points;

• Debris removal (if warranted) to enable utility companies to more quickly access

damaged equipment;

• Coordination with all of the CI sectors to understand the interdependencies with the

electricity subsector and resulting cascading effects on other sectors and businesses; or

• Logistical support for mass care and emergency assistance services and power generation

equipment to enable continuity of essential services.

• Employment of the DPA, as required.

Coordination of Federal Support

The principles in the NRF and NDRF, and the actions in the Response and Recovery FIOPs, are

the primary mechanisms to coordinate the Federal Government’s response and recovery to

terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. As such, they form the basis of federal

support to the impacts from a power outage. Nothing in these documents alters or impedes the

ability of government departments and agencies to carry out their specific authorities or perform

their responsibilities under all applicable laws, executive orders, and directives. Individual

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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federal departments and agencies have responsibilities for various aspects of a coordinated

federal response to a power outage.

• Department of Homeland Security – The Secretary of Homeland Security is the

principal federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland

Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating federal operations

within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recovery from terrorist attacks,

major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary coordinates with federal entities to

provide for federal unity of efforts for domestic incident management.

The FEMA Administrator is the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of

Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council regarding emergency

management. The FEMA Administrator’s duties include assisting the President, through

the Secretary, in carrying out the Stafford Act; operating the National Response

Coordination Center (NRCC); effectively supporting all Emergency Support Functions

(ESF) and Recovery Support Functions (RSF); and, more generally, preparing for,

protecting against, responding to, and recovering from all-hazards incidents.

• Within DHS, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) serves as the

federal coordinator of SSAs and CI.

• Department of Energy – DOE is the SSA and lead federal agency for the energy sector.

DOE is also responsible for coordinating the energy sector’s emergency preparedness

requirements. Under the authority of the Secretary of Energy, DOE directs ESF #12 –

Energy activities for the energy sector under the NRF. Additionally, DOE is responsible

for leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated

activities of the energy sector in the all-hazards environment and coordinating the

preparation and implementation of the Energy Sector-Specific Plan as an annex to the

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The Secretary of Energy is responsible

for helping to acquire equipment and trained personnel for the energy sector from other

nations as appropriate and for sector coordination with North American partners in

Canada and Mexico. Under the 2015 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST)

Act (P.L. 114-94), the Secretary of Energy is authorized to order emergency measures to

protect or restore the reliability of critical electrical infrastructure or of defense critical

electric infrastructure upon a Presidential finding of a Grid Security Emergency. This

authority allows DOE to support the energy sector for and responding to cyber,

electromagnetic pulse, geomagnetic disturbance, and physical attack threats.

• Department of State (DOS) – DOS is responsible for all communication and

coordination between the United States Government and other nations regarding the

response to a domestic crisis. Consistent with the International Coordination Support

Annex to the NRF, DOS may also be required to assist private industry during a domestic

incident by expediting specifically requested equipment, goods, or trained personnel to

enter the United States and assist with non-energy related assistance.

• Department of Defense (DOD) – DOD is responsible for providing military forces and

certain intelligence capabilities to deter war and to protect the security and national

interests of the United States. The Secretary of Defense may assist in the support of

domestic infrastructure and essential government services or, at the direction of the

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President and in coordination with the Attorney General, the maintenance of civil order

or law enforcement, in accordance with applicable law. The Secretary of Defense will

retain command of Title X military forces providing support.

• Other Federal Departments and Agencies – Various federal departments or agencies

play primary, coordinating, or support roles in delivering response and recovery core

capabilities. Some departments also serve as SSAs for a CI sector. In some

circumstances, other federal agencies may have a lead or support role in coordinating

operations, or elements of operations, consistent with applicable legal authorities. For all

incidents, to include a long-term power outage, federal department and agency heads

serve as advisors for the Executive Branch relative to their areas of responsibility.

• Several federal departments and agencies have authorities to respond to and declare

specific types of disasters or emergencies. These authorities may be exercised

independently of, concurrently with, or become part of a federal response coordinated by

the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Appendix 4: Roles and Responsibilities provides a detailed list of unique power-related

responsibilities for all members of the whole community.

International Support

The energy sector relies on the import of critical technologies and equipment, such as large

power transformers (LPTs), as well as many key raw materials that are essential to the

manufacturing of certain electrical infrastructure. As such, a long-term power outage will have

international implications that may include, but are not limited to, travel restrictions into and out

of the United States, processing of visas or other immigration documents, customs and border

security, and support to United States citizens living abroad.

DOS is responsible for communication and coordination between the Federal Government and

other nations regarding the response to a domestic crisis. Consistent with the NRF and Response

FIOP, DOS coordinates with foreign governments concerning travel restrictions or issues,

facilitates offers of assistance from foreign governments through the International Assistance

System, and coordinates assistance to cross-border communities. DOS also maintains

communication with the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), the

North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), DOE’s Office of Intelligence and

Counterintelligence and Office of International Affairs, and the National Council of ISACs to

share cyber and physical threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents for the electricity subsector which

involve international dimensions or elements.

Agencies other than DOS do have authorities pertaining to international partners. For example,

DOE, FERC, NERC, and North America’s Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), have

authorities and responsibilities outside of the United States involving energy infrastructure and

resources with Canada and Mexico. When there is a domestic crisis resulting in international

energy-related impacts, these entities coordinate and consult with DOS to ensure consistent

messaging.

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Operational Coordination

Several support and operational coordination elements facilitate operational coordination and

information sharing during a power outage incident. Depending on the cause of the outage, this

construct is scalable and flexible. As a result, scenario-specific coordinating structures may be

utilized in addition to the entities listed below. For example, if the outage is a result of a

significant cyber incident, the Federal Government organizes coordinating structures three

ways—national policy-level coordination through a cyber response group, operational

coordination through the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center

(NCCIC) and Federal Cyber Centers, and sector coordination through the DHS NPPD Office of

Infrastructure Protections and SSAs. In these situations, additional coordination structures are

integrated into a unified coordination construct as necessary.

Unified Coordination

A long-term power outage may involve many states or FEMA Regions and require coordination

and prioritization of national-level resources. This annex applies the concept of unified

coordination at the NRCC and among federal departments and agencies to coordinate federal

support to multiple Unified Coordination Groups (UCG) at Joint Field Offices (JFO) established

for this incident. The unified coordination approach helps various levels of government and the

private sector supporting the incident to work together to establish a common set of priorities,

objectives, and strategies. Unified coordination provides a vital means of coordinating the

allocation or reallocation of scarce resources across the entire incident according to a common

set of priorities. It also enables effective coordination across restoration activities led by DOE

and incident response activities led by FEMA, as depicted in Figure 5.

A significant power outage will affect all CI sectors, requiring public-private partnerships with

their respective owners and operators to prioritize and enable the restoration process, manage

cascading impacts, and mitigate future risks. The appropriate ESF and RSF shall facilitate

coordination with each sector, often through the relevant SSA, and utilizing existing public-

private partnerships to the greatest extent possible.

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igure 5: Unified Coordination Between Power Restoration and

Incident Response and Recovery Mission Area

Power Restoration Coordination

Federal Power Restoration Coordination

DOE uses established processes and structures unique to the energy sector, as the lead for

restoration. Restoration is the primary responsibility of the utility industry. However,

coordination between the restoration and incident response and recovery components is critical

to enable their success. For information on the restoration process, refer to DOE’s United States

Electricity Industry Primer.

Department of Energy Emergency Management Structure – Similar to the UCG concept in

the NRF, DOE uses a department-wide coordination structure to address major, energy incidents

across all of its programs and stakeholders. The DOE emergency management structure directs

operational activities across the department to ensure DOE utilizes existing resources, expertise,

and authorities and that directives are carried out to the fullest extent possible. Should a resource

or restoration prioritization issue need to be resolved, the Secretary of Energy will make that

decision in close coordination with the NRCC and in consultation with the electricity industry.

The DOE emergency management structure also provides situational awareness to energy sector

owner/operators; local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments; DOE leadership;

the federal interagency; and the White House.

Energy Incident Management Council – The Secretary of Energy directs the establishment of

the Energy Incident Management Council to increase cooperation and coordination across the

Department to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from major disruptions to energy

systems (including infrastructure, supply, and services). The council utilizes the authorities and

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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expertise from across the department to anticipate impacted and future requirements, provide a

rapid, integrated DOE assessment of an incident, adjudicate conflicting views or information,

enable an effective response by the sector, develop mitigation options for decision makers, and

provide a unified, comprehensive voice and set of actions for the Department.

The Council will serve as the primary DOE coordination mechanism for senior department

leadership during an energy emergency. Energy emergencies include any potential or actual

disruption to energy infrastructure by a natural disaster, an industrial accident, a threat actor

(cyber or physical), or an energy crisis or shortage.

Figure 6: DOE Internal Unified Coordination Structure

National-Level Industry Power Restoration Coordination

Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council

The Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC) facilitates and supports the coordination

of sub-sector wide, policy-related activities and initiatives to improve the reliability and

resilience of the electricity sub-sector, including physical and cyber security infrastructure and

emergency preparedness. It serves as the principal liaison with the Government Coordinating

Council (GCC) for energy and its member federal agencies (including DOE as the SSA for the

energy sector) and federal utilities on issues pertaining to joint planning, preparedness,

resilience, and recovery related to incidents that may affect the secure and resilient supply and

delivery of electricity. The ESCC’s role during its “crisis state” is to provide the mechanism for

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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executive coordination and communication between the electric power industry and government

during the response to and recovery from an event of regional or national significance.

The ESCC Secretariat communicates with the ESCC leadership, the ESCC Steering Committee,

and the E-ISAC, as well as with government liaisons, to request activation of a Federal

Government-industry coordination group.

Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center

The E-ISAC, operated by the NERC, establishes situational awareness, incident management,

coordination, and communication capabilities within the electricity sector through timely,

reliable, and secure information exchange. The E-ISAC, in collaboration with the DOE and the

ESCC, serves as the primary security communications channel for the electricity sector and

enhances the sector’s ability to prepare for and respond to cyber and physical threats,

vulnerabilities, and incidents. The E-ISAC coordinates with the Electric Subsector Coordinating

Council made up of industry trade associations such as EEI, APPA, and NRECA, as well as

other industry groups.

During a long-term power outage, the E-ISAC—

• Closely aligns with the ESCC to keep it informed and help implement sector response

and coordination intent with unity of effort and message.

• Provides representatives to the NRCC and UCG.

• Receives incident data from private and public entities.

• Coordinates with member companies.

• Identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates the protection of critical power services,

infrastructure service, and key resources.

• Assists DOE, the FERC, and DHS in analyzing event data to determine threat,

vulnerabilities, trends, and impacts for the sector, as well as interdependencies with other

CI entities.

• Analyzes incident data and prepares reports based on subject matter expertise in security

and the BPS and grid system.

• Shares threat alerts, warnings, advisories, notices, and vulnerability assessments with the

industry subject to prior notification to FERC, as appropriate.

• Coordinates with other ISACs, as well as local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area,

federal, and international partners on incident-specific issues.

• Develops and maintains an awareness of private and governmental infrastructure

interdependencies.

The ESCC defines a crisis state when an incident possesses the following three characteristics. (1) National engagement by the

industry and federal government is needed to respond to (2) an event of regional or national significance that (3) exceeds established

private or public subsector capabilities (e.g., resources, communication, coordination).

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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• Provides an electronic, secure capability for E-ISAC participants to exchange and share

information.

• Provide technical sector coordination support aligned to ESCC intent.

Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators

Established in 1996, the Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEAC) Program is a

cooperative effort among DOE, the National Association of State Energy Officials, the National

Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National Emergency Management

Association, and the National Governors Association. The program facilitates coordination and

communication between states, industry, and DOE and provides states and local communities

access to information on energy supply, demand, pricing, and infrastructure (e.g., petroleum,

electricity, natural gas, and heating oil). Administered by DOE, the EEAC establishes a secure

communications environment that consists of a restricted access website, database, and

distribution list for state government personnel. During a power disruption, the EEAC provides

points of contact to share energy-related information. In addition, states can also use the EEAC

regional distribution list to send information to their counterparts within the region (or different

regions) to exchange information and share best practices, as well as request information.

Regional/Local-Level Industry Power Restoration Coordination

As noted in Private and Public-Sector Utility Assistance section, public and private utility

associations have established regional mutual aid groups and compacts. The regional footprint of

each of these groups is unique based on their stakeholders. Appendix 4: Roles and

Responsibilities provides more information on these associations. As the energy sector SSA,

DOE communicates with individual utilities and associations through various mechanisms and

provides utility assessments and the status of their activities and resources to the Regional

Response Coordination Center (RRCC), NRCC, and NICC, as appropriate, and through DOE

Situation Reports.

Headquarters-Level Operational Coordination

The responsibilities of various government agencies under the NRF are an important element of

intra-governmental cooperation during an energy emergency or other significant event. The

coordination of federal incident response and recovery support to local, state, tribal, territorial,

and insular area officials, is led by FEMA during Stafford Act incidents.

Interagency Response and Recovery Coordination

This section describes the coordinating structures that the Federal Government uses to provide

response and recovery support to SLTT and insular area officials to deal with the consequences

of a long-term power outage.

National Response Coordination Center

The NRCC at FEMA Headquarters serves as the national incident response and recovery

coordination center, collecting and reviewing all source information across all threats and all

hazards information during a long-term power outage. The National Response Coordination Staff

(NRCS) is the headquarters-level entity through which federal response and recovery support is

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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cinated and through which national-level response and recovery resource decisions are made.

Figure 7 portrays the coordination within the NRCC.

• Emergency Support Functions/Recovery Support Functions – The Federal vernment

organizes response resources capabilities under the ESF construct denoted in the NRF

and Response FIOP. The ESFs are the primary, but not exclusive, federal coordinating

structures for building, sustaining, and delivering the response core capabilities.

Consistent with the NDRF and the Recovery FIOP, the Federal Government uses RSFs to

coordinate key functional areas of recovery support. The synchronization of federal

response and recovery support operations and facilitation of restoration efforts with the

private sector is facilitated through each of the 16 CI sectors, in coordination with the

relevant ESF or RSF, as required.

Figure 7: Coordination within the NRCC for Cascading Impacts from a Long-Term Power Outage

• Future Planning Cell – The FEMA Administrator may establish a planning cell within

the NRCS’s Planning Support Section to forecast incident support functions needed to

handle cascading impacts to survivors resulting from the outage. Planning cells serve as a

decision support entity to senior policy makers or to the leadership of the NRCC by

developing future courses of action or recommendations on strategic emergency

management issues. The cell is ideally comprise subject matter experts (SMEs)

representing key core capabilities and agencies that can advise and develop consensus

recommendations on federal response and recovery efforts based on the regional and

national impacts from the long-term power outage on health, safety and security. Given

the resource demands on many entities during a large-scale incident, if SMEs themselves

are not available, staff with the ability to reach back to appropriate SMEs within their

organizations may be asked to participate. The cell does not have an operational role

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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during power outage response/recovery operations and will not be in direct contact with

on-the-ground personnel in the incident command. It also does not direct or provide

guidance for energy restoration efforts. The cell augments ESF and RSF capabilities by

providing an integration and decision-support function for leadership to help synchronize

federal response and recovery operations to support sector restoration efforts and

lifesaving and life-sustaining actions.

The planning cell’s membership will vary depending upon the location, scope, and

complexity of the event and may occur virtually. The members may include

representatives from the following entities:

o Department of Commerce (DOC)

o DOD

o National Guard

o DOE

o DHS

 FEMA

 NPPD

o Department of the Interior (DOI)

o Department of Labor (DOL)

o DOS

o Department of Transportation (DOT)

o HHS

o Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

o FERC

o Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

o General Services Administration (GSA)

Based on the specificities of the incident, requests for agency representatives will be based on the

expertise required and will be appropriately communicated to the agencies (e.g., full-time or

o USDA.

part-time; subject matter areas; desired level of expertise or seniority). National-level electric

industry association representatives (e.g., APPA, EEI, ESCC, and NRECA) or representatives

from PMAs may be asked to participate in the cell on an ad hoc basis depending on their

availability and upon the Secretary of Energy’s determination that their assistance is required.

Critical Infrastructure Planning Cell

The NRCC, is the mechanism through which federal response and recovery activities are

coordinated. Among the mechanisms are dedicated planning cells that may or may not stand up

based on the complexity and scope of the power outage.

The NRCC may choose to stand up a critical infrastructure planning cell. The critical

infrastructure planning cell would serve as a decision support entity to senior policy makers or to

the leadership of the NRCC by developing future courses of action or recommendations to

mitigate the ongoing cascading effects of the incident to other CI sectors. The critical

infrastructure planning cell may include representatives from each of the SSAs as well as other

subject matter experts.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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National Business Emergency Operations Center – Within the NRCC, the National Business

Emergency Operations Center (NBEOC) coordinates with national companies and private sector

organizations to obtain situational awareness of the impacts of a long-term power outage on

these businesses. Consisting of over 500 private sector companies of national scale, the NBEOC

serves as the central clearinghouse of situational awareness for the private sector at large and

complements the efforts of the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) and SSAs.

Additionally, the NBEOC coordinates with state BEOCs and other operational private sector

coordinating functions at the state or regional levels. The NBEOC conducts scheduled

conference calls during a long-term power outage and invites state public utility commissions,

appropriate ESFs/RSFs, FEMA Regions, NICC, DOE, and the DHS NPPD Office of

Infrastructure Protection (IP) liaison to the NRCC. During these calls, the private sector obtains

an understanding of the response and recovery priorities and needs of survivors, as well as

provides the government with an understanding of the private sector’s impacts, needs, and

available capabilities and resources to support business continuity. This ensures that the Federal

Government is aware of the cascading impacts on businesses and works collaboratively with the

private sector at large.

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center

The DHS NPPD NICC provides situational and operational

awareness across the CI sectors and serves as a central point

for requests for information and action for the CI sectors.

During an incident, the NICC coordinates with Government

Coordinating Councils (GCCs), SSAs, ISACs, other federal

departments and agencies, and private CI owners and

operators to monitor potential and developing threats to and

the current operational status of the Nation’s CI sectors. It

provides this information to the NRCC, JFO, and other

operations centers, as required. Table 2 describes the

relationships between the coordination elements within each CI

sector as well as its relationship to various ESFs and RSFs. Attachment 1 to Appendix 2: Critical

Infrastructure Sector Partners includes a detailed list of GCC and Sector Coordinating Councils

(SCC) members for each CI sector.

CI Sector Coordination

Coordination across the CI

sectors and with ESFs and RSFs

provides a mechanism to:

• Understand cascading impacts

of a long-term power outage;

• Identify opportunities for

federal response and recovery

operations to enable

restoration of CI; and

• Synchronize operational

priorities and targets.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Table 2: CI Sector Coordination Relationships

CI Sector

SSA Coordinating

Entity

SCC GCC ISAC ESFs RSFs

Chemical DHS NPPD IP X

Critical Infrastructure Cross Sector Council

Federal Senior Leadership Council

State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordination Council

Chemical ISAC

None

Infrastructure

Systems

Commercial

Facilities

DHS NPPD IP X X Real Estate ISAC

#5,

Infrastructure

Systems

Communications

DHS NPPD Office

of Cybersecurity

and

Communications

(DHS NPPD

CS&C)

X X

Communications

ISAC

Critical

Manufacturing

DHS NPPD IP X X None

None

Dams DHS NPPD IP X X None #3

Defense

Industrial Base

DOD X X

Defense Industrial

Base (DIB)

Collaborative

Information Sharing

Environment (DCISE)

None

Emergency

Services

DHS NPPD IP X X

Emergency

Management and

Response ISAC

#3,

#4,

#5,

#13

Energy

DOE Office of

Electricity Delivery

and Energy

Reliability/

Infrastructure

Security and

Energy Restoration

X X

Electricity Sector

ISAC, Oil and Natural

Gas ISAC,

Downstream Natural

Gas ISAC, NERC

#3,

#12

Financial

Services

Department of the

Treasury (TREAS)

Office of Critical

Infrastructure

Protection and

Compliance Policy

Financial Services

ISAC

None

Infrastructure

Systems/

Food &

Agriculture

USDA Office of

Homeland Security

and Emergency

Coordination; Food

and Drug

Administration,

Center for Food

Safety and Applied

Nutrition, Office of

Analytics and

Outreach

X X None

#8,

#11

Infrastructure

Systems

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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CI Sector

SSA Coordinating

Entity

SCC GCC ISAC ESFs RSFs

Government

Facilities

GSA Office of

Mission Assurance,

Security and

Special Programs

Division/ DHS

Federal Protective

Service

None #7

Infrastructure

Systems

Healthcare &

Public Health

DHHS Office of the

Assistant Secretary

for Preparedness

and Response

(ASPR)

National Healthcare

ISAC and Healthcare

Ready

#6,

Infrastructure

Systems/

Health &

Social

Services

Information

Technology

DHS NPPD CS&C X

Information

Technology ISAC

None

Infrastructure

Systems

Nuclear

Reactors,

Materials, and

Waste

DHS NPPD IP X None #12

Transportation

Systems

DHS

(Transportation

Security

Administration

[TSA] Office of

Security Policy and

Industry

Engagement and

United States

Coast Guard

[USCG] Office of

Port & Facility

Compliance); DOT

Office of

Intelligence,

Security and

Emergency

Response

Surface

Transportation ISAC,

Public Transportation

ISAC, Aviation ISAC,

Maritime ISAC, Oil &

Natural Gas ISAC

Water and

Wastewater

Systems

EPA Water

Security Division

X Water ISAC

#3,

#8,

#10

Infrastructure

Systems/

Health &

Social

Services

• CI Crisis Action Team (CI-CAT) – During incidents resulting in significant impacts to

CI, DHS NPPD IP activates a CI-CAT that provides incident support for situational

awareness and planning. The NICC continues to monitor CI at the national level. The CI-

CAT responds to incident specific requests and collects, coordinates, and disseminates CI

incident information and analysis to DHS, NPPD, and IP leadership, as well as CI

partners. The CI-CAT and NBEOC identify requests for information (RFIs), incident

priority trends, and coordinate engagement across the 16 sectors to ensure private sector

priorities, resource gaps, and needs are included in the incident action plan.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Other National-Level Response and Recovery Coordination

In addition, agencies may also activate their own operations centers such as the National Military

Command Center, the Strategic Information and Operations Center, or the HHS Secretary’s

Operations Center. Depending on the international impact, DOS’s Executive Secretariat and its

Operations Center may establish a DOS Task Force for a power outage if there are major

international implications.

Regional- Level Operational Coordination

Responsibilities of a RRCC are consistent with the NRF, NDRF, and Response and Recovery

FIOP. The RRCC coordinates assignments, actions, and other support until a JFO is established

and mission-execution responsibilities are transferred to the appropriate team leaders. While the

assumption is that a long-term power outage would result in a Stafford Act declaration, in a

circumstance where it does not, federal incident management activities will be coordinated out of

the applicable RRCC.

NERC Regional Entities

NERC, as the ERO for

North America, assures the

reliability of the BPS.

NERC delegates its

authority to monitor and

enforce compliance to

eight regional entities

whose members come

from all segments of the

electric industry: investor-

owned utilities; federal

power agencies; co-ops;

Figure 8: NERC Regions

lorida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC)

Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO)

Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC)

Reliability First Corporation (RFC)

SERC Reliability Corporation (SERC)

Southwest Power Pool, RE (SPP)

Texas Reliability Entity (TRE)

Western E

lectricity Coordinating Council

(WECC)

state, municipal, and provincial utilities; independent power producers; power marketers; and

end-use customers. These entities account for virtually all the electricity supplied in the United

States, Canada, and Mexico. The NERC coordinates with federal agency leadership, including

DOE, FERC, DHS, and others as appropriate.

Field-Level Operational Coordination

Joint Field Office or Regional Response Coordination Center

The UCG in a JFO/RRCC is flexible and scalable, depending on the specific incident. For a

power outage, representatives from affected utilities or the regional utility association may

participate as members of the UCG to assist in decision making to prioritize resources.

The JFO/RRCC coordinates with state and local emergency operations centers (EOCs), as well

as with industry-specific EOCs that are supporting the response and recovery of a power outage.

It incorporates appropriate ESF and RSF structures. As the federal focus shifts towards long-term

recovery, a plan between the Federal Coordinating Officer and Federal Disaster Recovery

Coordinator will be developed to ensure a seamless transition.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Joint Operations Center

If the cause of the power outage is an actual or suspected terrorist attack, the Attorney General,

acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, leads and coordinates the

operational law enforcement response, on-scene law enforcement, and related investigative and

appropriate intelligence activities related to terrorist threats and incidents. As noted in the

Response FIOP, the FBI may establish an FBI Command Post or Joint Operations Center (JOC)

for the purpose of managing the investigation, leading and coordinating the law enforcement

response to resolve terrorist threats or incidents. If established, the JOC coordinates with the

JFO.

State/Local Emergency Operations Centers

As necessary, the state and local EOCs incorporate representatives from impacted utilities and

other CI sectors to ensure that the appropriate SMEs are involved in decision making for state

support. Working with the state EOCs, representatives from state public utility commissions or

other electricity/utility SMEs advise and assist in decision making to prioritize state resources for

the restoration process (e.g., public safety officers to assist with access points, fuel, and

logistics).

In the case of tribal lands, tribal governments have a special relationship with the United States

Government, and local, state, and federal governments may have limited or no authority on tribal

lands. The NRF’s Tribal Relations Support Annex provides further guidance. Many states

involve their tribal counterparts in their EOCs.

• Protective Security Advisors – Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) are field-deployed

DHS NPPD IP experts who serve as liaisons in state and local EOCs and coordinate the

provision of situational awareness and analytical support. During incidents, the PSAs

report to the Infrastructure Liaison in the JFO.

Operational Phases

The operational phases for providing coordinated federal support to local, state, tribal, territorial,

and insular area governments are identified in the Response and Recovery FIOPs. While

individual partners may not use the same phasing for their internal operations, for the purpose of

a coordinated federal response, the following phasing applies. Response and recovery operations

run concurrently, and the actions will overlap to an extent.

Figure 9 depicts the synergy between the response and recovery operational phases. The actions

associated with this annex are focused on Phase 2c (Sustained Response) and Phase 3a

(Recovery) in the response phases and Intermediate and Long-Term phases in the recovery

phases.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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igure 9: Operational Phases

Incident

Federal Government Response Phases—Defined

Phase 1a

Normal operations

Phase 1b

Elevated threat and the development of situational awareness

Phase 1c

Credible threat of a known hazard; selected teams are alerted and resources may be pre-

positioned in anticipation of support needed by the state

Phase 2a

Immediate response at the state/local level (some initial response from federal entities),

gaining situational awareness, and activation of operations centers

Phase 2b

Response at the federal level, maintain situational awareness, deployment/employment of

resources to incident support bases, federal staging areas, and identified delivery sites, and

the movement of resources to incident support bases

Phase 2c

Sustained response, employment of resources at the incident site, saving lives, sheltering

survivors and restoring critical systems such as power and communications

Phase 3a

Recovery activities that occur as part of the response mission area to facilitate the transition

and support to the recovery mission area

Federal Government Recovery Phases—Defined

Immediate/Short-

Term (Days)

Addresses the health and safety needs beyond rescue, the assessment of the scope of

damages and needs, the restoration of basic infrastructure, and the mobilization of recovery

organizations and resources, including restarting and/or restoring essential services (e.g.,

gas, water, electricity) for recovery decision making

Intermediate

(Weeks–Months)

Involves returning individuals, families, CI, and essential government or commercial services

to a functional, if not pre-disaster, state; such activities are often characterized by temporary

actions that provide a bridge to permanent measures

Long-Term

(Months–Years)

Addresses complete redevelopment and revitalization of the impacted area; rebuilding or

relocating damaged or destroyed social, economic, natural, and built environments; and a

move to self-sufficiency, sustainability, and resilience

The concept of operations of this annex focuses on power outages with long-term impacts. While

many incidents such as severe weather result in some type of short-term power outage, the

actions in this annex assume that initial response and power restoration activities (e.g., activation

of operations centers, deployment of response teams) to support immediate life-saving actions

have occurred. The actions in this annex focus on only unique activities for a long-term power

outage and those activities undertaken by those entities responsible for the energy sector.

Phase 1a – Normal Operations

The Federal Government coordinates with all stakeholders to develop and validate plans to deal

with long-term power outages and continues situational awareness monitoring. Refer to the

Response FIOP for a list of all-hazards preparedness actions for the Federal Government in this

phase.

DOE, as the SSA and lead federal agency for the energy sector, coordinates the following

preparedness actions within the energy sector:

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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• Coordinates with the public/private energy sector, the Electricity and the Oil and Natural

Gas SCCs, the ERO, and various associations that represent portions of the energy sector,

as well as with SLTT, insular areas, and federal entities.

• Assists the states in preparing state energy assurance plans to improve the reliability and

resiliency of the Nation’s energy systems, and maintains the EEAC Program, contact list,

and database.

• Conducts national security emergency preparedness planning, including capabilities

development, administering operational programs for all energy resources, and

conducting energy emergency exercises with the energy industry; federal partners; and

local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments.

• Develops, tests, trains, and exercises continuity programs and plans coordinating with

whole community partners and stakeholders.

DOE coordinates the following activities with SLTT and insular area governments:

• Conducts preparedness activities that support response and recovery to power outages,

such as exercises, training, and plan development, consistent with their emergency

operations and continuity plans.

• Involves local disability stakeholders in emergency planning to accurately and adequately

incorporate considerations of people with disabilities during a long-term power outage.

• Develops inclusive engagement strategies with the public and private utility companies in

their state or jurisdiction.

• Ensures local and state emergency operations plans include fuel action plans that identify

priority users, staging areas, and daily fuel consumption by type of critical facility.

In preparation for power outages, utilities participate in preparedness activities such as—

• Contingency and continuity planning and exercises for restoration.

• Educating state EOC personnel on energy restoration and importance of right-of-way

programs.

• Validating contact information for local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area partners.

• Hardening of infrastructure, inspections, and assessments.

• Ensuring that they have standing contracts with diesel fuel suppliers.

• Developing restoration priorities.

• Developing smart grids and micro grids.

• Developing contracts (e.g., for fuel).

• Improving resiliency.

• Developing mutual assistance agreements.

Jurisdictions with emergency operations plans that are inclusive of people with disabilities and others with access and

functional needs are better prepared to meet or quickly identify and mitigate mass care needs of all whole community members.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Phase 1b and 1c – Elevated and Credible Threats

Long-term power outages cannot always be predicted; however, certain threats such as severe

weather are a common cause. Certain scenarios such as winter storms or hurricanes often cause

power outages. The intelligence community may identify and communicate potential or credible

threats to the electric grid. In situations with an elevated or credible threat of disruption to the

energy sector, government agencies and utility owners and operators will take certain

preventative actions.

The Federal Government—

• Analyzes and models the potential impacts to the electric power, oil, natural gas, and coal

infrastructures; analyzes the market impacts to the economy; and determines the effect

the disruption has on other CI sectors.

• Through DOE, conducts coordination calls and initiates situational reporting with electric

industry representatives, regions, and states.

• Through the NCCIC and E-ISAC, provides threat information and alert products.

• Coordinate with their public utility commissions.

Local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments—

• Identify potential waivers that may be required to expedite disaster response.

• Review local and state plans for energy restoration and prioritization.

Utility owners and operators also take preventative actions depending on the credibility and

likelihood of a threat to the electric grid. They—

• Appoint coordinators or leads for various functions (e.g., live wires down, restoration,

vegetation management, communications) if not already identified as part of their

emergency plans.

• Review and reassess their critical asset list and rank assets for restoration priority.

• Initiate communications with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, or federal

officials and members of mutual assistance groups.

• Share information with industry and government through ISACs.

• Identify and position resources to respond to an outage, and implement a plan to

prioritize response actions (i.e., those that have immediate threat to life or property loss

such as downed live wires, and restoration of emergency and hospital services).

• As needed, communicate with their customers on preventative measures and expectations

of consequences.

• Commence industry-government coordination through the ESCC and aligned E-ISAC

support.

• Alert regional mutual assistance programs.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Phase 2a and 2b – Immediate Response and Deployment

Immediate response includes actions taken within 72 hours of a notice or no-notice incident

resulting in a power outage. Actions focus on saving lives; protecting properties and the

environment; rapidly meeting basic human needs; preserving the social, economic, and political

structure of the jurisdiction; and supporting the transition to recovery.

During this phase, the Federal Government and utilities undertake certain actions such as

activating and deploying specialized teams and assets (if not already done in Phase 1),

conducting damage assessments, and sharing information on outages.

Specific federal actions are detailed in the ESF and RSF annexes, as well as in the Response and

Recovery FIOPs. The following section focuses on power-specific activities of the electric

industry.

Local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments—

• Through the public utility commissions or other appropriate state agencies, require the

reporting of outages and other events that disrupt power systems.

• Activate the State Energy Operation Center, if one exists.

• Conduct damage assessments.

• If required, develop governor directives authorizing counties to use available in-state fuel

supplies to perform initial life safety missions.

• Coordinate with the Federal Government on any waivers that are necessary to expedite

lifesaving or life-sustaining missions.

• Coordinate delivery of in-state bulk fuel supplies into impacted areas.

• Review pre-designated state staging areas and fuel PODs.

• Develop prioritized lists of CI for temporary emergency power.

• Initiate actions consistent with company emergency plans and the ESCC Playbook and in

coordination with the E-ISAC to provide support, information, and advice to the Federal

Government and sector stakeholders on incident response.

During these sub-phases, public and private electric companies—

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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• Coordinate mutual aid through their regional energy-

specific associations and inform federal agencies and

other organizations of mutual aid status; if warranted, they

activate their national-level frameworks.

• Request assistance from local or state governments, health

and human services, including disability, stakeholders

who can provide immediate real-time information and

situational awareness about people with disabilities and

others with access and functional needs who may depend

on power for life maintenance and/or to mitigate personal

health and safety issues (such as those living

independently and or group or some facility settings).

• Maintain open communication channels with customers to

inform them of safety measures, impact assessments, and restoration estimates.

• Prioritize plans and actions to restore energy during response and recovery operations.

• Assess, isolate, and restore undamaged areas of the BPS.

• Assess the state of the power grid to determine restoration priorities and strategies.

• Employ “black start” generators to restore generating stations if power is unavailable

from the transmission network.

• Synchronize re-energized sections of the BPS.

Many of the actions performed by electric companies will continue through various phases and

until restoration is complete.

Phase 2c – Sustained Response

Phase 2c of the power outage covers a period of 2 weeks to 30 days following the incident, when

response operations will transition from Initial Operating Facilities to JFOs (if not already

established). In addition to the actions identified in the Response FIOP, the Federal

Government—

• Coordinates with utilities and CI sectors and identifies cascading impacts from the

outage.

• Supports interdependencies with other sectors and identifies actions needed to enable the

restoration process in other sectors.

• Communicates critical information to the public, including estimated time of restoration;

as provided by industry.

• Identifies and communicates opportunities to mitigate or safeguard against risks.

• Confirm that pre-designated state staging areas and fuel PODs align with state lifeline

routes.

Restoration Priorities

Typically, utilities adhere

to the following repair and

restoration sequencing:

• Power Plants

• Startup Power

• Large Transmission

Lines/Sub-Stations

• Distribution Substations

and Feeder Lines

• Restoration to CI

Facilities

• Residential Areas

Local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments—

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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• Ensure that pre-designated fuel points align with local priority routes with adequate

storage and dispensing capabilities.

Public and private electric companies—

• Assess and isolate damaged areas of the bulk power grid and determine remediation

plans.

• Activate their mutual aid networks through their respective electricity associations (if not

done so in earlier phases).

• Monitor requests for mutual aid and responses through their respective mutual assistance

programs.

• If warranted, activate transmission equipment sharing programs (e.g., STEP,

SpareConnect) to help restore the BPS.

• Continue to execute emergency operating procedures such as—

o Cancelling or recalling prior-scheduled transmission and generation outages.

o Managing the generating resources to address fuel supply and inventory concerns.

o Requesting waivers or other regulatory relief from environmental requirements as

appropriate.

o Using curtailable load and demand response.

o Loading management procedures including rotating blackouts, as needed.

An increasing number of short-term and intermediate recovery and mitigation activities will

occur during this sub-phase.

Phase 3 – Recovery

Recovery planning and coordination for all phases of recovery (short-term, intermediate, and

long-term) begin with the event and response. Short-term recovery actions occur within the

response mission space (Phase 3a) to address health and safety needs beyond rescue, assess the

scope of damages and needs, restore basic infrastructure, and fully mobilize recovery

organizations and resources. Intermediate and long-term recovery activities can extend much

longer when there is a continued need for federal assistance by impacted states.

Each community, state, tribe, or territory defines successful recovery outcomes differently based

on its circumstances, challenges, recovery vision, and priorities. In general, the goal of recovery

following a long-term power outage includes ensuring the return of individuals and families and

to reestablish essential government and/or commercial services to support the physical,

emotional, and financial well-being of impacted community members. Recovery activities also

include incorporating health and social services and strengthening key systems and resource

assets that are critical to the economic stability, vitality, and long-term sustainability of the

communities themselves. Actions during this phase are likely to include:

• Support the social services disaster recovery efforts of local, state, tribal, territorial, and

insular area jurisdictions.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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• Continue identifying and facilitating federal mechanisms to expedite CI restoration (e.g.,

DPA to prioritize contracts, regulatory relief, restoration logistics support).

• Develop a Recovery Support Strategy that includes an anticipated timeline for engaging

with disaster-impacted communities and the levels, types, and durations of federal

support to each affected jurisdiction.

• Advise on incorporating mitigation, sustainability, and resilience-building measures into

recovery plans and implementation.

• Demobilize any deployed recovery assets.

• Ensure long-term management is in place to sustain any needed federal support to

ongoing local, state, tribal, territorial, or insular area recovery efforts.

Critical Requirements

Critical information requirements (CIRs) facilitate timely command, control, and coordination of

decisions during disaster operations. They provide insight into important details and essential

elements of information that response personnel need to effectively make decisions and execute

their operations.

CIRs may vary based on the specifics of the power outage. The UCG will define what

information is required, and the CIRs are incorporated into the JFO’s Information Collection

Plan. The following CIRs are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and Recovery

FIOPs and are linked to key decisions where appropriate.

Incident Characterization

• Identification of damage zones or outage zones.

• Demographic information of the affected population, including vulnerable positions on

utility registries that may need assistance.

• Population density maps with overlay of power outage areas.

Utility and Restoration Information (Coordinated through DOE)

• Power outage statistics organized by state, county or parish.

• Customers impacted/without power.

• Damage assessment and estimates of duration of power outages, and status of restoration.

• State of utility systems, current limitations and capabilities, resource requirements, and

recovery strategy.

• Status of all types of fuel, status of generation, substation, line facilities.

• Limiting factors/barriers (e.g., transportation, housing) for utility restoration efforts.

Resource Availability

• Availability of backup power and restoration assets within the impacted area that will

affect response and recovery options.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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• Fuel status for public consumption.

• Fuel status for public safety and security services.

• Generator/fuel status for critical assets across each of the 16 CI sectors and any additional

interagency needs to support essential functions and services.

Sheltering, Feeding, and Distribution of Emergency Supplies

• Status of evacuations and locations of evacuees or shelters.

• Location of actual or potential impacts to CI sectors other than the energy sector.

• Name and status of healthcare facilities (including nursing homes, dialysis facilities) in

the impacted area for restoration prioritization.

• Forecasted and cascading impacts to CI, which may affect mobility within the area for an

extended period of time (e.g., bridges, roads, major highways, railways, and airports).

• Water treatment plants’ operational status.

• Wastewater treatment plants’ operational status.

State and Local Plans/Agreements

• State-identified priorities for restoration.

Essential Elements of Information

Essential elements of information support the CIRs by providing more detail for situational

awareness and decision-making. Essential elements of information must be verified and include

specific details. Examples of potential essential elements include, but are not limited to the

following items.

Essential Elements of Information for Government

• Maps/information on CI specific to the incident area.

• Identification of frequency and command structure for operational communications.

• Name of power utilities impacted.

• Updates on restoration progress.

• Critical needs of materials, transportation, and physical access restrictions per sector.

• Status of state and local response and recovery resources.

• Number of potential evacuees, and locations of host communities with concentrations of

evacuees, whether in state or out of state.

• Location and status of critical healthcare facilities and services (hospitals, nursing homes,

dialysis) and information on at-risk populations with access and functional needs and

their medical and social service needs.

• Long-term evacuee/displaced persons’ status tracking data (e.g., employment, temporary

housing, preferences for permanent relocation versus return, if applicable).

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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• Location and accessibility of open or planned shelters, fixed and mobile feeding sites,

and sites for distribution of emergency supplies (e.g., PODs).

• Limiting factors or obstacles for each sector’s restoration of functions (sequencing of

activities).

• Requirements for federal assistance (if any) to enable sector continuity or restoration

efforts.

• Status of sector mutual assistance, major restoration efforts underway, and estimated

times for restoration.

• Private association/nonprofit association requests for assistance.

• Contaminated waste management and potential sites for temporary debris/waste storage.

• Host community agreements to support displaced populations.

Essential Elements of Information for the Electricity Subsector

• Situational awareness:

o Reports provided through DOE.

o Information and intelligence on incident characterization.

o Status on emergency declarations.

o Command structure.

• Prioritization for restoration and resource allocation:

o List of critical facilities to use in prioritizing restoration.

o Priorities for SLTT, insular area, or federal governments.

o Identification of critical needs to aid in prioritizing restoration efforts (e.g., water,

emergency services, hospitals, shelters).

o Deployment and location status of federal assets.

o Lists of designated staging sites.

o Status of generator packs in relation to affected utilities, and estimates on arrival

times.

o Status and availability of airport, seaport, and other transportation infrastructure

and access route status.

o Status of United States border crossing processes with Canada and Mexico, to

ensure expedited crossing to support restoration.

• Coordination and communication with government (through DOE):

o Communication of waivers to utilities, including the status and a central point of

contact) for information on waivers.

o List(s) of applicable key decisions involving utility resources and/or assets.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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o Information on security concerns, access-controlled area(s), and credentialing

requirements.

• Accessible public information:

o Federal support and assistance programs to which members of the public can be

directed.

o Support and assistance from FEMA and other federal agencies made available to

assist affected subsector employees.

Administration, Resources, and Funding

Administration

Federal agencies are responsible for managing their own financial activities during all

operational phases and across all mission areas within their established processes and resources.

The Financial Management Support Annex to the NRF provides basic guidance for all federal

agencies that provide support for incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

Resources

Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Response and Recovery FIOPs,

federal departments and agencies are responsible for augmenting personnel to support operations

under this annex. Each federal agency possesses individual policies to augment personnel based

on its authorities, policies, memoranda of understanding, and mutual aid agreements. Federal

agencies must ensure that their employees who are engaged in incident response and recovery

activities are able to perform in accordance with operational requirements.

Federal agencies are expected to provide full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support, as

appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities for national security, to the Secretary

of Homeland Security in the exercise of their leadership responsibilities and missions for

domestic incident management.

Funding

One of the assumptions of this annex is that a large-scale or long-term power outage with

significant consequences requiring interagency coordination is likely to be caused from a

Stafford Act Incident with associated funding through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF).

Stafford Act

The Stafford Act authorizes the President to issue a major disaster or emergency declaration

upon the request of a governor or chief tribal executive when an incident overwhelms local,

state, tribal, territorial, or insular area governments. A Stafford Act declaration enables the

Federal Government to provide financial and direct assistance to individuals and families, certain

private not-for-profit organizations, and public entities. The funding source for Stafford Act

declarations is the DRF. The DRF is not available for non-Stafford Act operations nor activities

authorized under another federal agency’s independent authority.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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The Stafford Act addresses two types of disaster declarations—major disaster declarations and

emergency declarations. Both authorize the President to provide supplemental federal assistance

to local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments. In addition, certain not-for-profit

organizations that own or operate a facility providing essential governmental type services may

be eligible for assistance under FEMA’s public assistance program. The type and amount of

assistance differs depending on whether the Stafford Act Declaration is a major disaster or an

emergency.

• Major Disaster Declaration—The President can issue a major disaster declaration for

any natural catastrophe or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of

the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient

severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement

the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief

organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering that has ensued.

major disaster declaration provides a wide range of federal assistance programs for

individuals and public infrastructure, including funds for both emergency and permanent

work. Not being a natural catastrophe, a cyber incident or any other outage not inducted

by natural events, generally would not qualify for a major disaster declaration, but would

likely qualify under the broader definition of an emergency declaration. A fire, flood, or

explosion caused by a cyber incident may qualify for a major disaster declaration. A

space weather or EMP incident may result in a major disaster declaration if it is

determined to be a natural incident.

• Emergency Declaration—The President can issue an emergency declaration for any

occasion or instance when the President determines federal assistance is needed to

supplement local, state, tribal, territorial, or insular area government efforts and

capabilities to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or

avert the threat of a catastrophe in the United States. A power outage may qualify as an

emergency under the Stafford Act. Such an incident resulting in a long-term power

outage may qualify for an emergency declaration, as may space weather and EMP

incidents not resulting in an explosion.

In extremely rare circumstances, a private for-profit entity may be the beneficiary of federal

assistance when it is determined that such assistance is necessary to enable that private

organization to continue to provide a critical service to the community at large. The service must

involve an activity to save lives, protect property or public health and safety, and be beyond the

capability of the local, state, tribal, territorial, or insular area government. If authorized, this

assistance would be for an exceptionally limited period of time and only for so long as to allow

the private sector entity an opportunity to take the necessary steps to meet its own unmet needs.

Because of the exceptionally limited circumstances under which private sector assistance would

be warranted, matters are reviewed on a fact-specific case-by-case basis and require the prior

approval of FEMA senior leadership and the Chief Counsel. The Stafford Act does not authorize

assistance to the private sector for economic recovery.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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In absence of a Stafford Act declaration and DRF funding, other funding sources may be

available.

Federal-to-Federal Support – Non-Stafford Act

For non-Stafford Act responses, federal departments and agencies with their own response

authorities may also have associated appropriations to fund their response, as well as

mechanisms to fund supporting federal agencies. Federal agencies with authority to respond but

lacking funds may need to request emergency supplemental funding from Congress. Federal-to-

federal support is executed through inter/intra-agency reimbursable agreements, in accordance

with applicable authorities. Federal departments and agencies providing mutual aid support may

request reimbursement from the requesting federal agency for eligible expenditures, consistent

with provisions of the Economy Act. Refer to the Financial Management Support Annex to the

NRF for more detail.

Other Funding Options

For long-term recovery support, both private and public utilities, as well as other private

businesses and CI entity

es, may be able to apply for certain loans to help restore their functions. The United States

Small Business Administration (SBA), through its Office of Disaster Assistance, provides

financial assistance in the form of low-interest long-term loans to businesses of all sizes, most

private nonprofit organizations, small agricultural cooperatives, and small businesses engaged

in aquaculture, following a declared disaster. In addition, SBA provides eligible small

businesses with the necessary working capital to help overcome the economic injury of a

declared disaster. SBA has the authority to issue two types of disaster loans:

• Physical Disaster Loans – Businesses of any size and most private nonprofit

organizations may apply to borrow up to $2 million for a physical disaster loan, which

may be used for the repair or replacement of real property, machinery and equipment,

fixtures, inventory and leasehold improvements.

• Economic Injury Disaster Loans – Small businesses, small agricultural cooperatives,

small businesses engaged in aquaculture, or most private, not-for-profit organizations

located in a disaster area that suffered substantial economic injury may be eligible for up

to $2 million Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL), regardless of whether the entities

suffered physical property damage.

Small businesses can apply for a maximum loan

(physical and EIDL) of $2 million.

Other federal recovery programs may be available to states, tribes, territories, and insular areas,

but they are dependent on supplemental appropriations. All federal funding options for long-term

recovery will be explored during recovery planning for the specific incident.

Oversight, Coordination Instructions, and

Communications

https://www.sba.gov/loans-grants/see-what-sba-offers/sba-loan-programs/disaster-loans/types-disaster-loans.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Oversight

FEMA, in close coordination with the DOE, is the executive agent for this annex and is

responsible for its management and maintenance. FEMA will update this annex periodically, as

required, to incorporate new presidential directives, legislative changes, and procedural changes

based on lessons learned from exercises and actual incidents.

Coordinating Instructions

To facilitate the rapid, coordinated, and seamless integration of federal and federally accessible

resources into a localized response effort, local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area

governments are encouraged to incorporate the concepts of this annex into their respective plans

to support the delivery of federal assistance. Successful incident management operations depend

on the involvement of multiple jurisdictions as well as personnel and equipment from federal

agencies. Federal agencies should assume that jurisdictional capabilities will be insufficient, or

have been exceeded, as soon as they recognize that multiple jurisdictions/regions have lost

power.

Logistics Architecture

A long-term power-constrained environment will require significant logistical support from the

whole community to support mass care and emergency assistance services, enable the power

restoration process, support evacuation if necessary, and promote continuity of critical missions.

An interagency supply chain system known as the National Logistics System coordinates federal

logistical support consistent with the logistics concept of support in the Response FIOP.

Under

this system, FEMA and other federal interagency partners operate under their statutory

authorities, in coordination with the whole community, to stage personnel and resources in

locations favorable to providing timely and efficient access to the impacted area(s). Within the

NRCC, federal logistical resource requirements are reviewed and prioritized based on the

specifics of the power outage and the approved course of action.

In a long-term power outage, federal temporary emergency power generation assets (e.g.,

generators and fuel) to maintain mission essential functions and provide lifesaving and life-

sustaining support will be in high demand. Federal temporary power generation equipment and

technical support may be provided by FEMA, USACE, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), or

GSA. Prioritization for generators and fuel will be particularly important since the Federal

Government has limited organic generator capability. As a result, the logistics architecture will

be adapted as necessary (e.g., tailoring unique delivery and dispensing plans of commodities to

address the unique circumstances for an incident).

Private Sector Coordination

• DHS NPPD IP, including through the NICC, coordinates with private sector partners

directly (for sectors which IP serves as SSA) and with cross sector partners (as the

national coordinator of CI protection) to accomplish the following:

For more information on the National Logistics System, refer to NRF ESF #7 Logistics Support Annex or the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Logistics Operations Manual (FEMA publication 9380.1-PR, August 2010).

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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o Coordinate with NBEOC to vet CI private sector RFIs.

o Support requirements to ensure rapid stabilization and access to impacted private

sector CI.

o Collect, share, and disseminate status updates on CI operations, impact,

consequences, and analysis and recommendations for restoring CI in coordination

with the relevant SSAs.

• DHS NCCIC, through the National Coordinating Center (NCC) joint government and

communications industry partnership, serves as the Communications Information and

Sharing Analysis Center to—

o Coordinate with wireline, cellular, wireless, broadcast, satellite, and cable,

operators; equipment manufacturers; and communications associations.

o Provide situational awareness of communications services.

o Provide communications analytic products of impacts to support planning,

response prioritization, and decision-making.

• DOE:

o Coordinates with electricity owner/operators, suppliers, regulatory entities, and

industry associations and conducts regularly scheduled conference calls with

impacted utilities and their associations, as incidents require.

o Coordinates with owners, operators and members of trade associations

representing the oil and natural gas sub-sector as necessary and appropriate.

• FERC coordinates with NERC and the E-ISAC regarding cyber and physical alerts to be

issued to regulated entities.

• The National Council of ISACs conducts calls with cross-sector stakeholders during a

long-term power outage to share information and obtain status updates on emerging issues

from various CI sectors.

• The NBEOC, an element within the NRCC, connects private sector stakeholders to

resources or information at the local, state, regional, or federal levels for specific issues or

capabilities pertaining to a long-term power outage.

• DHS NPPD Liaison:

o Serves as the primary conduit between FEMA and DHS NPPD to assist the

NRCC in future planning and to provide situational awareness as it relates to CI

risk analyses.

o Coordinates with DHS NPPD analysts who develop CI-specific products, identify

infrastructure of concern (IOC) lists, and identify available resources to support

response and recovery operations. The IOC List is based on incident-specific

analyses of the threat to, vulnerabilities of, and potential consequences from the

disruption of CI in the impacted area; it is developed by DHS NPPD analysts and

updated based on a request from DHS leadership. DHS NPPD IP Liaisons in the

field distribute the IOC list to other stakeholders in regional or incident-level

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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coordinating structures as appropriate. Appendix 2: Critical Infrastructure Sector

Interdependencies provides more information on the IOC List.

o Provides the NRCC with access to analytical products such as infrastructure

impact assessments. The IOC list and infrastructure assessments are decision

support tools that are available to NRCC leadership to inform resource allocation

and prioritization.

Nongovernmental Organizations

• Provide critical situational awareness and field data on the survivor needs to the NRCC,

DOE, and infrastructure and other teams to support power restoration, evacuation and

other planning efforts.

• Through Voluntary Agency Liaisons, share information on requirements and capabilities

of voluntary, faith-, and community-based organizations with the Federal Government.

• Assess needs generated by the incident and support the state’s coordination of the

provision of timely and efficient services.

• Coordinate with state agencies to determine the need for any federal resource requests for

needed mass care/emergency assistance items and help facilitate their deployment and

arrival.

• Determine federal support for state and local response and recovery efforts, to include

referrals for housing, unmet needs, case management, and referral services.

Communications

Immediate action should be taken to identify communication systems for public messaging to

provide clear, factual, accessible, linguistically appropriate and timely guidance to the public

(see Appendix 3). Communication systems for local, state, and federal agencies should

coordinate to maintain situational awareness and permit timely assessments of the status of

critical services, resources, and infrastructure. The primary reporting method for interagency

information flow is the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and WebEOC™. In the

event that WebEOC is inaccessible due to the power outage, backup communications and

information sharing protocols will be identified on a case-by-case basis. In addition, to

WebEOC, federal recovery partners use the Office of Management and Budget’s MAX program

for a broad scope of daily information sharing and collaboration, both pre- and post-incident.

http://max.omb.gov.

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Annex A: Electricity Delivery

Electricity Delivery

Three functions categorize the structure of electricity delivery within the United States—

generation, transmission, and distribution—that are linked through key assets, including

substations. Overall, the power infrastructure is highly redundant and resilient, but some

components of the systems are vulnerable to natural hazards, acts of terrorism, space weather,

geomagnetically induced currents, EMP, and sabotage.

As a result, outages can and do occur

because of system disruptions.

Generation

A diverse fuel mix generates the power supply in the United States, including coal, natural gas,

petroleum liquids, nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewables. A power plant can have one or more

generators, and some generators have the ability to use more than one type of fuel. Generation

capacity varies regionally and depends upon the availability of the fuel resource. For example,

coal and natural gas power plants are more common in the Midwest and Southeast, whereas the

West Coast depends upon high-capacity hydroelectric power and natural gas–fired power plants.

Power generation fuels also have their own supply chain. Vast infrastructure networks of

railroads, pipelines, waterways, highways, and processing plants support the delivery of

resources to generating facilities, and many such networks rely on electric power.

Transmission

The combined transmission and distribution network is referred to as the “power grid” or simply

“the grid.” The power generation and high-voltage transmission lines that deliver power to

distribution facilities make up the BPS, which actually comprises four lesser alternating current

power grids or “interconnections.” Each interconnection operates independently of one another,

with the exception of a few direct current conversion links in between. Figure 10 shows the

boundaries of four of these interconnections. The two major subordinate grids, which are also the

largest, are the Eastern Interconnection and the Western Interconnection. The Eastern

Interconnection reaches from Central Canada eastward to the Atlantic coast (excluding Québec),

south to Florida, and west to the foot of the Rockies (excluding most of Texas). The Western

Interconnection stretches from Western Canada south to Baja California, Mexico, reaching

eastward over the Rockies to the Great Plains. The two minor alternating current power grids are

the Texas Interconnection, which covers most of the State of Texas and represents approximately

90 percent of the state’s electrical load, and the Quebec Interconnection, which covers all of the

Province of Quebec. The Hawaii and Alaska grid systems (not shown in the figure) are not

connected to the grids of the lower 48 states.

Extreme space weather, especially geomagnetic storms that can cause long-term power outages, are low probability, potentially

high-impact incidents. The United States has experienced extreme space weather events during the past 150 years, most notably

the Carrington Event of 1859 and the great geomagnetic storm of 1921.

United States Electricity Industry Primer, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, United States Department of

Energy, DOE/OE-0017, August 2016 Revised Edition.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Figure 10: Map of Four North American Power Grid Interconnections

The United States’ bulk electric system (BES) consists of more than 360,000 miles of

transmission lines, including approximately 180,000 miles of high-voltage lines, connecting to

about 7,000 power plants.

Power transmission lines facilitate the bulk transfer of electricity

from a generating station to a local distribution network. These networks are designed to

transport energy over long distances with minimal power losses, made possible by boosting

voltages at specific points along the electricity supply chain.

Transmission lines consist of structural frames, conductor lines, cables, transformers, circuit

breakers, switches, and substations.

Substations provide crucial links for generation and serve as key nodes for linking transmission

and distribution networks to end-use customers. A substation generally contains transformers,

protective equipment (relays and circuit breakers), switches for controlling high-voltage

connections, electronic instrumentation to monitor system performance and record data, and

firefighting equipment in the event of an emergency. There are over 55,000 substations in North

America.

Transformers are critical equipment in delivering electricity to customers, but many are located

in isolated areas. The loss of transformers at substations may represent a significant concern for

energy security in the electricity supply chain due to the long lead time to design and build

transformers, increased global demand in grid-developing countries, and limited domestic

manufacturing capabilities. Transformers and their components are unique due to their

specificity in design and application. Substations are highly specific to the systems they serve,

which also limits the interchangeability of transformers. Replacing, for example, is associated

with a long delivery lead-time, as they are generally difficult and costly to transport due to their

considerable size and weight. Failure of even a single unit could result in temporary service

interruption. The production of an LPT ranges from approximately 12–24 months and involves

North American Reliability Corporation.

United States Electricity Industry Primer.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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contract procurement, design, manufacturing, testing, delivery, and installation as illustrated in

Figure 11.

Figure 11: 2011 Large Power Transformer Procurement Process and Estimated Optimal Lead Time

As a resiliency measure, some utilities keep backup transformers, or “spare transformers,” for

use during emergencies. Since high-voltage transformers can cost millions of dollars, utilities

may opt to purchase a spare transformer or build redundancy into the system (e.g., being able to

reroute power should a transformer fail) as part of their overall risk mitigation strategy.

Distribution

The power distribution system is the final stage in the delivery of electric power, carrying

electricity out of the transmission system to individual customers. Distribution networks

distribute electric power and consist of following main parts:

• Distribution substations

• Primary distribution feeders

• Distribution transformers

• Distributors

• Service mains

United States Electricity Industry Primer.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Appendix 1: Core Capability Decisions,

Requirements, and

Tasks

Core Capability Considerations, Requirements,

and Actions

Incidents such as a long-term power outage require a broader set of atypical partners to

accomplish the capability targets for the Response and Recovery Core Capabilities identified in

the National Preparedness Goal.

The following table discusses scenario-specific critical considerations, resource requirements,

and actions for Core Capabilities beyond their all-hazards actions described in the Response and

Recovery FIOPs.

Table 3: Core Capability Considerations, Requirements, and Actions

Core Capability

POIA-Specific Critical

Considerations

POIA-Specific Resource

Requirements

POIA-Specific Critical Actions

(ESF with Primary

Responsibility)

Cross-cutting Core Capabilities

Operational

Coordination

• There will likely be multiple

JFOs

• There will be a need to

integrate with the private

sector

• Representatives to

participate in any future

planning activities

• Determine the need for a

future planning cell (ESF #5)

• Coordinate with the NBEOC

(ESF #5)

• Invite utility association

representatives to participate

in NRCC activities (ESF #5)

Planning

• FEMA Regional POIAs are

being developed in certain

regions

• Awareness of resource

allocation and

prioritization decisions

• Awareness of energy

restoration and

prioritization spanning a

large geographical area

• Develop a national support

plan based on the concept of

operations in the applicable

Regional POIA (ESF #5)

• Determine the need for a

future planning cell (ESF #5)

• Monitor private sector

coordination in collaboration

with DHS NPPD IP (ESF #5)

Public

Information and

Warning

•

Traditional means of

providing information to

the public will not be

available without power

(e.g., social media, TV,

radios, text alerts,

computer messages)

• All disaster notifications

and information must be

made available to all

people, including those

with access and functional

needs, simultaneously;

therefore, preparedness

planning with disability

SMEs provides guidance

on formats, platforms, and

methods so that

•

Assessment of timeline

for power and

communications

restoration

• Awareness of ESF field

activities that could be

leveraged for message

distribution

• Awareness of resource

allocation and

prioritization decisions

• Access to other federal

agencies’

communication

methods, including

technology and

grassroots channels

•

Identify alternative means for

communicating information to

the public (ESF #2, ESF #15)

• Determine and address critical

communication needs of

vulnerable populations (ESF

#6, ESF #8, ESF #15)

• Assess agency MOUs to

identify added capabilities,

private sector capabilities, and

FEMA National Radio System

(ESF #2, ESF #15)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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Core Capability

POIA-Specific Critical

Considerations

POIA-Specific Resource

Requirements

POIA-Specific Critical Actions

(ESF with Primary

Responsibility)

messaging is accessible to

everyone

Infrastructure

Systems

• Multiple CI systems will be

impacted by a power

outage requiring significant

coordination with the CI

sectors

• All levels of government

will determine prioritization

of sector specific CI

restoration

• There will be a need to

determine what the

priorities are for funding

energy restoration and

eligibility requirements for

the public/private sector to

receive funding

• CI damage/impact

assessments from

SSAs, ISACs, or DHS

NPPD

• Crews (e.g.,

transmission

specialists) and

necessary mechanical

parts to restore CI

• Generators and the

expertise to assess,

install, and maintain

them

• Teams and expertise to

assess temporary

emergency power

requirements and

install, operate, and

maintain generators at

critical facilities

• Activate USACE power

generation teams (ESF #3)

• Assess and prioritize

healthcare facilities’ reliance

on power for sustaining

ongoing operations (ESF #8)

• Assess the energy impact of

the incident, provide analysis

of the extent and duration of

energy shortfalls, and identify

requirements to repair energy

systems (ESF #12)

• Coordinate with

intergovernmental and private

sector partners to identify

requirements for temporary

emergency power (ESF #3)

• Coordinate with critical SSAs

to ensure consistency of

information provided through

the Secretary of Energy, the

National Security Council,

SCCs, and/or committees or

other high-level coordinating

structures as directed (ESF

#12)

• Establish a process for public

and private sector utilities to

gain access to the incident

site(s) (ESF #2, ESF #12),

• May liaise with states and

locals on law enforcement

support to establish and

maintain a safe environment

for infrastructure

restoration(ESF #13)

• Coordinate between

government and the

communications industry to

assess communications needs

required to coordinate

restoration of power (ESF #2)

Response Core Capabilities

Critical

Transportation

• Prioritization of key

resources and

transportation requests

such as fuel and interstate

travel restriction waivers

• Ensuring continuity of flow

of resources through

airports, ports, highways

and the rail system

• Accessibility of

transportation routes, rest

• Access to fuel supply

and fuel distribution

points

• Necessary waivers and

permits to move

resources in to the

affected area quickly

and efficiently

• Transportation assets

to help restore CI

• Employ the DPA, as required,

to support restoration priorities,

generator productions, and

deployment. (ESF #5, ESF #7)

• Identify priority route access

requirements for restoration

workers (ESF #1)

• Facilitate the implementation

of regulatory relief

mechanisms across the critical

transportation sector (ESF #1)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Core Capability

POIA-Specific Critical

Considerations

POIA-Specific Resource

Requirements

POIA-Specific Critical Actions

(ESF with Primary

Responsibility)

areas, etc. for people with

disabilities

• Coordinate requests for fuel

waivers (ESF #12)

• Facilitate coordination with

groups for interstate travel and

mutual aid (ESF #1)

• Ensure reporting of

transportation infrastructure

degradation (ESF #1)

Environmental

Response/

Health and

Safety

•

Public messaging must

include safety issues

pertaining to power outage

•

Status of emerging or

anticipated

environmental impacts

•

Address and promulgate

information about power

outage safety issues, including

food safety (from lack of food

refrigeration) and carbon

monoxide poisoning (from

extended use of power

generators) (ESF #5, ESF #8,

ESF #11)

Fatality

Management

Services

• Morgue or mortuary

services rely on air

conditioning and removal

to maintain optimum

condition of the deceased

• Fuel to support the

movement of bodies

• Power to support

morgue services (i.e.,

refrigeration)

• Identify alternate fuel services

to support mortuary services

(ES #8, ESF #7)

Fire

Management and

Suppression

•

Ensure prioritization for

restoration of emergency

services infrastructure,

including fire stations,

9-1-1 and dispatch

centers, critical

communication sites, and

refueling facilities for fire

apparatus, water systems

components critical for fire

suppression

• Maintain critical access

routes to affected utility

locations

• Deactivate appropriate

systems at affected

locations to allow

appropriate application of

fire suppression

techniques

•

Situational awareness

on affected utility

locations to prioritize

response efforts

• Status on whether

appropriate systems

are deactivated at the

affected locations

• Fuel for responders to

reach impact area

•

DOE and utility coordination

for prioritizing and initiating fire

suppression efforts (ESF #4,

ESF #12)

• Ensure communications

infrastructure reporting of 9-1-

1, dispatch, and first responder

communications impacts (ESF

#2)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Core Caplity

POIA-Specific Critical

Considerations

POIA-Specific Resource

Requirements

POIA-Specific Critical Actions

(ESF with Primary

Responsibility)

• Distribution of generators

may or may not follow

prioritization order for a

short-term power outage

(i.e., life-saving facilities,

life-sustaining facilities,

and other municipal

facilities)

across state lines (e.g.,

need for waivers)

• Minimum/maximum

requirements for diesel

fuel to support CI per

location type and

generator size

• Estimated daily fuel

requirements for critical

transportation

• Fuel burn rates from

each impacted state’s

emergency operations

plan

fuel resources, including

Secretary of Energy decisions

associated with the drawdown

of the Strategic Petroleum

Reserve (SPR), Northeast

Home Heating Oil Reserve,

and Northeast Gasoline

Supply Reserve) (ESF #12,

ESF #7)

Mass Care and

Emergency

Assistance

Services

• Decision on whether to

evacuate populations will

inform appropriate mass

care and emergency

services actions

• Backup power resources

should be considered a

high priority to support

congregate care and non-

congregate care facilities

• Waivers may be needed

for expeditious movement

of people and allocation of

scares medical resources

across state lines

• A framework for allocation

should be considered due

to a scarcity of human and

material support

resources.

• Backup power and fuel

should be prioritized for

fixed and mobile feeding

sites and sites for

distribution of emergency

supplies

• The ability to provide

food, water and shelter

with a reliable power

source and access to

food and potable water

supply (potentially)

outside the affected

area

• Fuel for shelters and

feeding stations

• Fuel for volunteers to

reach the impacted

public and assess their

needs

• Identify additional fuel and

transportation requirements

and other resources needed to

support the distribution of food,

water, and emergency

supplies for survivors (ESF #7)

• Coordinate with DOE and

logistics to determine the most

effective use of and locations

for accessible mass care

resources (facilities,

equipment, and supplies)

based on restoration priorities

(ESF #6)

• Assess the viability of applying

a zone approach to prioritize

limited resources in areas with

short-term power outages, for

evacuations and in

communities hosting survivors

from areas where there are

long-term outages (ESF #12,

ESF #6)

• Coordinate with ESF #8 and

Healthcare Coalitions, where

appropriate for enhanced

support to manage higher

levels of needs in mass care

facilities due to factors such as

depopulation of medical

facilities and influx of survivors

who rely upon electricity-

dependent medical and

assistive equipment and

technology (ESF #6)

• Identify options and implement

programs for providing housing

assistance for survivors whose

homes have no long-term

power but are not damaged or

inaccessible (ESF #6)

Mass Search and

Rescue

• None identified • None identified • Implement actions consistent

with emPOWER and local

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Core Capability

POIA-Specific Critical

Considerations

POIA-Specific Resource

Requirements

POIA-Specific Critical Actions

(ESF with Primary

Responsibility)

databases to identify and

support life checks for the

elderly, people with disabilities,

and others on life-sustaining

medical equipment (ESF#9

On-Scene

Security and

Protection

•

Access points may require

enforcement mechanisms

to ensure authorized

personnel and resources

can proceed through

• Intra-state coordination

may be required to ensure

neighboring states avoid

restricting entry by closing

access points, thus

restricting the flow of

resources,

response/recovery

personnel and evacuees

• Jails and detention centers

may require relocation

• Civil disturbance (rioting,

looting, etc.) may require

additional law enforcement

resources.

•

Fuel for security

vehicles

• Backup

communications

systems to maintain

operational

coordination

• Resources to transport

prisoners to new

locations

• Law enforcement

resources to respond to

civil disturbances.

•

Liaise with local, state, tribal,

territorial, and insular area

authorities to ensure a safe

environment for infrastructure

restoration (ESF #13)

• Identify fuel needs for

equipment and transportation

to support operations (ESF #7)

• Coordinate with local, state,

tribal, territorial, and federal

government agencies

responsible for jails, detention

centers and prisons to ensure

that any necessary prisoner

relocation efforts are

conducted (ESF #13)

• Coordinate with local, state,

tribal, territorial, and insular

area authorities to ensure

sufficient law enforcement

resources are available to

respond to civil disturbances.

Operational

Communications

•

Consideration of key

communications resources

to support continuity of

government at all levels,

effective command and

control of response and

recovery capabilities, and

public messaging in a

degraded communications

environment

•

Fuel for government

fixed and mobile

communications

capabilities

• Coordination of fuel,

access, and security for

private sector

capabilities critical to

lifesaving and life-

sustaining operations

and to public alerts and

warnings

•

Provide timely legal counsel to

federal decision-makers for

use of federal communications

resources in support of private

sector entities (ESF #2)

• Facilitate transition from

government-provided

temporary restoration to

commercial long-term

restoration (ESF #2)

Public Health,

Healthcare, and

Emergency

Medical Services

• Hospitals depend on daily

shipments of goods and

fuel

• Hospitals depend on the

availability of potable water

and sanitary wastewater

treatment

• Diversion plans for

hospitals will not work;

other nearby hospitals will

also be impacted

• Hospitals and healthcare

facilities may require

patient evacuation to

centers with electricity; this

could be hours away

depending on the breadth

of the outage

• Alternate fuel sources

or contingency plans to

account for limited

generator supply

• A patient movement

cell to coordinate the

evacuation of patients

• Coordinate patient movement,

if required (ESF #8)

• Coordinate on alternate fuel

sources (ESF #7, ESF #8)

• Implement strategies to assess

and monitor the public health,

disease surveillance, and

injury prevention (ESF #8)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Core Capability

POIA-Specific Critical

Considerations

POIA-Specific Resource

Requirements

POIA-Specific Critical Actions

(ESF with Primary

Responsibility)

• Response times for

emergency medical

services will increase

• Individuals who have

power-dependent durable

medical equipment or

implantable devices who

live in the impacted

community require

assistance with power

restoration or evacuation

• Accessibility of

medications for

people with behavior

or other mental

health needs should

be planned for,

including provisions

for access to

compound

pharmacies and/or

Situational

Assessment

• It may be difficult to obtain

situational awareness until

power is restored and

communications are up

and running

• Status of restoration

efforts to include

number of customers

without power;

percentage restored,

restoration estimates

• Coordinate with DOE, which

will provide the status of

restoration and energy sector

impacts (ESF #5)

• Coordinate with DHS/NCC,

which will provide status of

restoration and

communications sector

impacts (ESF #2)

Economic

Recovery

• Consideration to prioritize

key resources to access

bank assets (e.g., cash,

monetary notes) and/or

transportation and security

assets to move currency

into or near the impacted

area

• Appropriate authorities and

financial resources are

identified and

communicated to

state/local officials

• Clear instructions/

guidance from the

Federal Government

regarding financial

resources available

• Situational awareness

on affected populations

to determine potential

economic impacts and

assistance needed

• Develop a multi-dimensional

strategy capable of supporting

economic recovery and

enhancing whole community

resiliency in absence of power

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Core Capability

POIA-Specific Critical

Considerations

POIA-Specific Resource

Requirements

POIA-Specific Critical Actions

(ESF with Primary

Responsibility)

Health and

Social Services

• Consideration to prioritize

services for relocated

households, to include

access to transportation,

schools, postal services,

fire/police, grocery stores,

and educational services

for relocated students

• Consideration to prioritize

health care infrastructure

in a timely manner

• Due to lack of access, it

may be difficult getting

inspectors in to the

affected areas

• Health care providers may

not be able to get to their

places of work

• Critical dependence on

water purification and

wastewater treatment

• Greater amounts of

specifically trained

personnel

• Tracking clients and/or

affected populations

needing assistance

• None identified

Housing

• Identify and provide timely,

appropriate and accessible

temporary housing

assistance that can

support the volume of

disaster survivors and their

needs following a long-

term outage

• Housing demand for

responders (both public

and private) may exceed

capacity of impacted area

• Consider funding

mechanisms are in place

for housing costs for the

“host” states in receiving

evacuees

• Large multi-family

properties may be

habitable if elevators and

emergency lighting were

operational; this might

reduce the impact to mass

care and emergency

assistance facilities,

particularly for housing for

the elderly

• Visibility of available

accessible housing

options

• Difficulty obtaining

alternate housing in the

affected areas if power

is not available

• Implement the Housing Annex

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Core Capability

POIA-Specific Critical

Considerations

POIA-Specific

Resource

Requirements

POIA-Specific Critical Actions

(ESF with Primary

Responsibility)

Recovery Core Capabilities

Housing

•

Identify and provide timely,

appropriate and accessible

temporary housing

assistance that can

support the volume of

disaster survivors and their

needs following a long-

term outage

• Housing demand for

responders (both public

and private) may exceed

capacity of impacted area

• Consider funding

mechanisms are in place

for housing costs for the

“host” states in receiving

evacuees

• Large multi-family

properties may be

habitable if elevators and

emergency lighting were

operational; this might

reduce the impact to mass

care and emergency

assistance facilities,

particularly for housing for

the elderly

•

Visibility of available

accessible housing

options

• Difficulty obtaining

alternate housing in the

affected areas if power

is not available

•

Implement the Housing Annex

Executive Decisions

Throughout a long-term power outage, key strategic and operational decisions will be required.

This may include decisions about prioritizing resources and implementing waivers, among other

issues.

The following table identifies some of the key decisions, identified by Core Capabilities, that

either the senior-level policy coordination committee or the NRCC may require. This does not

include all of the decisions identified by core capability or CI sector that may be made at an

agency level.

Table 4: Executive Decisions

Decision Essential Elements of Information

Core Capability

with Primary

Responsibility

Application of the Power Outage Incident

Annex: Upon notification from DOE that the

power outage is likely to continue for an

extended period of time, the FEMA

Administrator, in collaboration with the

Secretary of DOE, may decide to implement

the constructs in this annex.

•

The battle-rhythm of the policy

coordination committee and when it

requires decision support

• A need to coordinate response and

recovery actions beyond traditional

coordination mechanisms

• What functions/issues require policy

decisions that need to be elevated

Planning

Stafford Act support to private sector entities.

Under the Stafford Act, the Federal Government

• A governor’s request for support for life-

saving or life-sustaining missions

Planning

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Decision Essential Elements of Information

Core Capability

with Primary

Responsibility

does not provide support to investor-owned, for-

profit utilities. In rare instances and on a case-

by-case basis, the Federal Government may

provide certain support for an exceptionally

limited period to for-profit utilities for lifesaving

or life- sustaining missions. The Federal

Government may consider regulatory relief for

private institutions and should synchronize its

operations to enable, support, and otherwise

not contradict private sector restoration

operations.

• Clarification of the duration and level of

support required, needed to receive FEMA

General Counsel and Administrator

approval

Core Capability Prioritization: Resources

to support restoration efforts are likely to be

quite limited. Decisions will need to be made

in order to prioritize federal operations to

support the most optimal restoration of the

16 CI sectors based upon interdependencies

and cascading impacts.

• Analyses of interdependencies and

risk assessments

• Infrastructure of Concern List

• Status of restoration provided by DOE

• Status of private sector businesses provided

by the NBEOC, SSAs, ISACs, ESFs, and

DHS NPPD IP.

Planning

Resource Prioritization: Resources to

support all of the people impacted by the

power outage will be limited. Therefore,

decisions will need to occur concerning how

to employ those resources in areas to

achieve the most positive impact for the

largest number of people. The course of

action in

Concept of Operations will be

reviewed and refined by leadership to

prioritize resources based on the specifics of

the incident.

• Areas in which power will be restored

within two weeks

• Understanding of the core capabilities

required to restore power in those areas

(e.g., debris removal, port openings,

public security, and other public

assistance)

• Areas with the projected shortest duration

of power outage

• Whether states have decided to

encourage or enforce evacuations

• Areas with the densest populations

and survivors that cannot self-

evacuate

• Similar resource requirements across

jurisdictions

Planning

Suspension of highway regulations to

allow rapid delivery of restoration

capabilities: To expedite the delivery of

critical resources, either for restoration or to

support survivors, certain regulations

governing emergency transportation may

need to be waived by applicable federal

authorities. Other regulations governing

emergency transportation may need to be

waived by applicable state and local

authorities.

• Whether delays exist in transporting

critical resources in a timely manner

• Whether responders are

encountering challenges in the

existing framework for transportation

permitting

• The quantifiable benefits of waiving

highway regulations (e.g., can increase

response time by X hours)

• Impacts to other sectors or ongoing

activities

Critical

Transportation

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Decision

Essential Elements of Information

Core Capability

with Primary

Responsibility

•

Evacuation: Local, state, and federal

officials will evaluate whether or not an

evacuation is necessary depending on the

scope of the incident, status of the grid and

CI sector restoration efforts and immediate

health and safety concerns. Local, state,

tribal, territorial, or insular area

governments may require federal support

for coordination of evacuations (e.g.,

general population; patient). Immediate

support for emergency backup power or

restoration prioritization may depend on

evacuation decisions

• Areas in which power will be restored within

two weeks

• Which, if any, states have decided to

encourage or enforce evacuations

• Trigger points for evacuation for each state

• Areas with the densest populations and

survivors who need assistance evacuating

• What states are available to accept

evacuees

• Available transportation resources

• Which states have implemented contraflow

traffic operations to facilitate evacuation

• Availability and

locations to implement refueling

of evacuation vehicles

• Number of patients requiring evacuation and

medical transport assets

Critical

Transportation

Mass Care

Services

Public Health,

Healthcare, and

Emergency

Medical Services

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Appendix 2: Critical Infrastructure Sector

Interdependencies

The NIPP denotes 16 CI sectors, and the reliance of virtually all industries on electric power and

fuels means that all sectors have some dependence on the energy sector. It is critical to

understand the impacts of a long-term power outage on the other 15 sectors to wisely influence

national policy and prioritize critical resource allocation.

Energy sector interdependencies are highly complex and exist at different levels, so a “system of

systems” approach is required to address linkages within and among the following:

• Facilities and assets

• Networks (physical, cyber)

• End-to-end systems

• Communities, regions, and states

• States and multi-state groups

• Connections across national borders or global

These linkages may be physical, cyber, or virtual and can cause cascading and escalating failures

(or in the case of co-located infrastructure assets, can result in common cause failures).

Disruptions within a single infrastructure can generate disturbances within other infrastructures

and over long distances, and the array of interconnections can extend or amplify the effects of

that disruption, resulting in impacts to the whole community.

Lifeline Functions

The NIPP identifies certain lifeline functions that are essential to the operation of most CI

sectors. The term “lifeline functions” generally refers to a sector that provides indispensable

services that enable the continuous operation of critical business and government functions, and

that would risk human health and safety or national and economic security if compromised or not

promptly restored. These lifeline functions include communications, energy, transportation, and

water. These sectors provide the most essential services that underlie a regional economy. Figure

12 describes basic interdependencies between the lifeline functions.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Figure 12: Lifeline Functions

C! Sector Impacts

Table 5 is a snapshot of the impacts to the other 15 CI Sectors that a long-term loss of power has

on its mission, the critical information requirements, and potential decisions and coordination

points. The information in this table will assist in identifying initial impacts to the other CI

sectors that may result in additional actions during the response. This data will be validated as

part of the crisis action planning for the particular long-term power outage.

Graphic is from the 2015 Energy Sector Specific Plan.

Interdependency between nuclear and electricity on base power for nuclear generation.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

ble 5: Sector Impacts, Critical Information Requirements, and Decision Points in a Power Outage

Sector/SSA

Sector Overview

Impacts on Sector

During a Power

Outage

Critical Information

Requirements

Potential Decision

Points and ESF/RSF

Coordination Points

Lifeline Sectors

Communications

SSA:

• DHS CS&C

NCCIC

• Communication

networks

(wireline, wireless,

cable, satellite,

broadcast)

• Communications

facilities

• Cyber

infrastructure

• System operators

may not be able to

maintain telephone,

cellular, email or

dedicated

broadband networks

for communications

• Ability to monitor,

generate, and

control the delivery

of electricity may be

affected

• Backup

communications

systems in the

impacted area

• Ability to route

communications

through other

areas/regions

• Communications

priorities/needs for

Mass Care and

Emergency

Assistance,

evacuations and re-

entry

• Fuel distribution

plans

• Federal

communications

resource priorities to

support continuity of

government, federal

command and

control, and public

alerts and warning

(ESF #2)

• Highway regulation

suspensions to allow

rapid delivery of

commercial

communication

restoration

capabilities (ESF #1)

• Fuel distribution

priorities (ESF #12)

• Security for critical

facilities (ES F#13)

• Access to sites and

impact areas (ESF

#13)

• Surface

transportation

regulatory relief to

allow rapid delivery

of commercial

communication

restoration

capabilities (ESF #1

• ) Power industry

restoration plans

and priorities (ESF

#12)

Transportation

Systems

SSAs:

• DHS (TSA office

of Security Policy

and Industry

Engagement and

USCG Office of

Port and Facility

Compliance)

• DOT (Office of

the Secretary S-

60 Office of

Intelligence,

Security and

Emergency

Response)

• Aviation

• Highway and

motor carrier

• Maritime

transportation

system

• Mass transit and

passenger rail

• Pipeline systems

• Freight rail

• Postal and

shipping

• Limited or no power

for overhead transit

lines

• Limited or no power

for railroads

switching and

signals

• Limited or no ability

to move/pump fuel

at gas stations

• Limited generator

capacity of public

transit/ SCADA,

traffic signal control,

tracking and routing

(supply chain

functioning)

• Transportation

infrastructure status

• Community support

needs and transport

requirements

• Available

transportation

resources

• Determined staging

areas for relief

operations

• Need for evacuation

transport, if required

(ESF #1, ESF #5)

• Fuel delivery

priorities (ESF #7)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector/SSA

Sector Overview

Impacts on Sector

During a Power

Outage

Critical Information

Requirements

Potential Decision

Points and ESF/RSF

Coordination Points

• Loss of ticketing and

check-in at airports

and ticketing

vending machines

for public transit

• Loss of badge

detectors for secure

identification display

areas or other

controlled access

areas

• Loss of closed

caption television,

low-light television,

motion detectors,

and other electronic

surveillance tools

• Loss of

communications

such as security

alert functions and

public address

systems

• Loss of lighting in

tunnels and

underground

stations

• Loss of

fire/life/safety

systems and alarms

Water and

Wastewater

SSA:

• EPA Water

Security Division

•

153,000 public

drinking water

systems

• More than 16,000

publicly owned

wastewater

treatment systems

•

Drinking water

utilities may have

limited backup

power and may

have to reduce

operations, with

potential impacts on

water pressure and

quality; some

drinking water

utilities may cease

operations

• Wastewater utilities

may have limited

backup power and

may have to reduce

operations, leading

to discharges of

partially treated or

untreated sewage;

some wastewater

utilities may cease

operations

•

Drinking water and

wastewater utilities’

supply of emergency

generators, fuel, and

treatment chemicals

•

Prioritizing

generators, fuel, and

chemicals to sustain

drinking water and

wastewater services

at impacted utilities

(ESF #3, ESF #10)

Other CI Sectors

Chemical

SSA:

• Basic chemicals

• Specialty

chemicals

• Directly affect all

chemical facilities

• Status of chemical

facilities in impacted

region

• Decisions on the

chemical sector’s

resource sharing

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector/SSA

Sector Overview

Impacts on Sector

During a Power

Outage

Critical Information

Requirements

Potential Decision

Points and ESF/RSF

Coordination Points

• DHS NPPD IP

• Agricultural

chemicals

• Pharmaceuticals

• Consumer

products

located in the

impacted region

• Limited or no ability

to extract coal or

perforate gas and oil

wells

• Cascading effects

on other chemical

facilities that are

dependent on goods

or materials

provided by the

affected facilities

methodology (ESF

#5; Infrastructure

Systems RSF)

Commercial

Facilities

SSA:

• DHSNPPD IP

• Entertainment and

media

• Gaming

• Lodging

• Outdoor events

• Public assembly

• Real estate

• Retail

• Sports leagues

• Impact to facilities in

a region

• Ability to house

responders if hotels

are not available

• Ability to provide

goods and services

• Status of

commercial facilities

in impacted region

• Which facilities have

backup generators

and how long they

will last

• Trigger point for

reallocation of

national critical

resources (ESF #5)

• Prioritizing energy

restoration to

commercial facilities

(ESF #5, ESF #12)

• Coordinating status

of backup

communications,

and public alerts and

warning (ESF #2)

Critical

Manufacturing

SSA:

• DHS NPPD IP

• Primary metals

manufacturing

• Machinery

manufacturing

• Electrical

equipment,

appliance, and

component

manufacturing

• Transportation

equipment

manufacturing

• Ability to

manufacture power

generators and

other equipment for

energy restoration

• Which

manufacturers have

backup generators

• What manufacturing

facilities have been

impacted in the

incident area

• Local, state, and/or

federal governments

require assets to be

manufactured/

provided to assist in

the energy

restoration process

(ESF #7)

Dams

SSA:

• DHS NPPD IP

• Water storage

and irrigation

• Sediment and

flood control

• Electricity

generation

• “Black start”

capabilities

• Peaking power

• Disruptions to

hydroelectric

operations could

create serious

supply deficits and

hinder the

movement of key

commodities if

navigation locks do

not work

• Impacted locks are

crucial to shipping

coal or fuel and no

alternative

transportation

modes are available

to transport needed

commodities

• Status of dams/locks

in impacted region

• Which facilities have

backup generators

and how long they

will provide power

• Which facilities have

“black start”

capabilities

• Whether impacted

locks affect the

shipment of coal or

fuel needed to

produce electricity or

fuel generators

• Facilities need to

initiate “black start”

capabilities (ESF #3,

ESF #12)

Defense

Industrial

Base

(DIB)

SSA:

•

Weapon system

platforms

• Military

components

• Military

expendables

•

Ability to produce

goods and services

required for weapon

systems

•

Expected restoration

timelines for affected

DIB facilities

•

Whether DOD will

change expectations

of DIB deliverables

given a long-term

disruption (ESF #5,

ESF #7)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector/SSA

Sector Overview

Impacts on Sector

During a Power

Outage

Critical Information

Requirements

Potential Decision

Points and ESF/RSF

Coordination Points

• DOD Office of

the Secretary of

Defense, Policy

Emergency

Services

SSA:

• DHS NPPD IP

• Law enforcement

• Fire and rescue

services

• Emergency

management

• Emergency

medical services

• Public works

• Ability to maintain

critical emergency

services sector

operations during

disasters

• Ability to fuel its

service vehicle fleet

• Maintain redundant

emergency

communications

• Emergency

managers

controlling access to

damaged/impacted

areas will require

personally

identifiable

information and/or

equipment

information from

utility workers to

give them access to

begin restoration

activities

• Knowledge of

restoration timing

estimates to

maintain response

capabilities (ESF

#12)

• Emergency

communications and

infrastructure

restoration to

maintain response

capabilities (ESF #2)

•

Financial

Services

SSA:

• TREAS Office of

Critical

Infrastructure

Protection and

Compliance

Policy

• Deposit,

consumer credit,

and payment

systems products

• Credit and

liquidity products

• Investment

products

• Risk transfer

products

• All major exchanges

can be serviced by

backup power

however, the

duration of all

backup power

generation is limited

by availability of fuel

and other factors;

Moreover, this is

inconsequential if all

trading institutions

are similarly

affected, as most

institutions would

not conduct

business

• Inability of major

exchanges and

financial functions to

rely on robust

communication

networks

• Offline ATM

networks would

result in a critical

cash shortage, with

individuals unable to

access checking

and savings

accounts through

normal means

• As card transactions

become more

prevalent for

everyday purchases,

the impact of an

outage impacting

point of sale

payments systems

would be significant

• Status of major

equities exchanges

and fixed income

markets

• Access to financial

institutions’

contingency plans to

understand how

they would mitigate

the effects in an

impacted region

• Access to support

backup capabilities

(such as fuel for

generators) (ESF

#3, ESF #7)

• Rationing available

resources across

other critical sectors

communities (ESF

#5, Economic

Recovery RSF)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector/SSA

Sector Overview

Impacts on Sector

During a Power

Outage

Critical Information

Requirements

Potential Decision

Points and ESF/RSF

Coordination Points

Food

and

Agriculture

SSAs:

• USDA Office of

Homeland

Security and

Emergency

Coordination

• Food and Drug

Administration,

Center for Food

Safety and

Applied Nutrition,

Office of

Analytics and

Outreach

• Food supply

• Processing,

packaging, and

production

• Agricultural and

food product

processing,

storage,

transportation and

distribution

• Agricultural and

food supporting

facilities

• Regulatory,

oversight, and

industry

organizations

• Other agriculture

and food

• Ability to provide

and store food

• Ability to ensure

safety of food

products

• Health and well-

being of livestock

and crops

• Which facilities have

been impacted and

resultant disruptions

or loss of capacity

• Amount of time until

operations can

resume following

restoration of power

• Amount of time until

operations can

resume following

restoration of

interdependent

sector(s) services

(e.g., water,

transportation,

communication)

• Cascading effects in

the supply and

distribution chain

• Authorize the

Disaster

Supplemental

Nutrition Assistance

Program (ESF #11)

Government

Facilities

SSAs:

• DHS (Federal

Protective

Service)

• General Services

Administration

Office of Mission

Assurance

Security and

Special

Programs

• Buildings owned

by governments

• National

monuments and

icons

• Educational

facilities

(kindergarten

through college)

• Public facilities

• Offices and office

building

complexes

• Housing for

government

employees

• Correctional

facilities

• Embassies,

consulates, and

border facilities

• Courthouses

• Maintenance and

repair shops

• Libraries and

archives

• Non-public

facilities

• Research and

development

facilities

• Military

installations

• Records centers

• Space exploration

facilities

• Ability to operate

government facilities

• Ability to operate

educational facilities,

labs, and research

facilities

• Security of federal

facilities

• Disruption of critical

information

technology (IT)

systems

• Cascading effects

on government

facilities that support

national and primary

mission essential

functions

• Status of backup

communications

systems in the

impacted area

• Status and duration

of backup

generators in

government CI

facilities

• Expected restoration

timelines for affected

facilities

• Identification of

threat actors,

intrusion methods,

and network

vulnerabilities for a

manmade incident

• Prioritizing federal

resources to support

continuity of

government and

continuity of

operations, federal

command and

control, and public

alerts and warning

(ESF #5)

• Prioritizing the

interruption and

restoration of

government services

such as issuance of

entitlement benefits

• Coordinating on

status of backup

communications,

and public alerts and

warning (ESF #2)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector/SSA

Sector Overview

Impacts on Sector

During a Power

Outage

Critical Information

Requirements

Potential Decision

Points and ESF/RSF

Coordination Points

• Storage facilities

for weapons and

ammunition,

precious metals,

currency, and

special nuclear

materials and

waste

• Warehouses to

store property and

equipment

Healthcare and

Public

Health

SSA:

• HHS ASPR

•

Direct patient care

• Healthcare

information

technology

• Health plans and

payers

• Mass fatality

management

services

• Medical materials

• Laboratories,

blood, and

pharmaceuticals

•

Acute care hospitals

with emergency

service provision

have generator

power for only a few

days

Hospitals in Affected

Area:

• Patient counts and

bed availability

• Generator and fuel

status to keep

facilities running

• Which departments

are offline or

hampered

• Status of blood

supply

• Status of

medications and

medical supply

• Staff availability

and/or relocation

• Status of health

clinics in affected

areas

• Which hospitals are

open for what

services

• Emergency

communications and

infrastructure

restoration to

maintain response

capabilities (ESF #2

Access and

Functional Needs

Accommodations:

• Whether at-risk

populations with

medical, behavioral

health and social

service needs are

fulfilled

• Whether jails and

prisons are capable

of providing

necessary medical

care

• Status of

Emergency Medical

Services in the area,

•

Whether to initiate

mass patient

movement plans

(ESF #8)

• Coordinating fuel

and generator

support for

healthcare facilities

(ESF #7)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector/SSA

Sector Overview

Impacts on Sector

During a Power

Outage

Critical Information

Requirements

Potential Decision

Points and ESF/RSF

Coordination Points

including response

and transport times

of patients

• Fuel status

• Response and

transport times of

patients

• Availability of mental

health resources

• Drug and alcohol

dependent related

arrests and

disturbances

• Morgue availability

Information

Technology

SSA:

• DHS CS&C

• IT products and

services

• Incident

management

capabilities

• Domain name

resolution

services

• Identity

management and

associated trust

support services

• Internet-based

content,

information, and

communications

services

• Internet routing,

access, and

connection

services

• Major power outage

through

sophisticated cyber-

attack could result in

possible breakdown

of a single

interoperable

internet, and

resulting failure of

governance policy

• Identifying threat

actors, intrusion

methods, and

network

vulnerabilities are

critical to mitigation

and long-term

defensive strategies

• Changes to

cybersecurity

resiliency protocols

(ESF #2)

Reactors,

Materials, and

Waste

SSA:

• DHS

• NPPD IP

• Commercial

nuclear power

plants

• Non-power

reactors used for

research, training,

and radioisotope

production

• Fuel-cycle

facilities

• Nuclear and

radioactive

materials used in

medical,

industrial, and

academic settings

• Directly affect offsite

power to all nuclear

plants located in the

impacted region

• Status of nuclear

power plants in the

impacted area

• Status of the grid, to

ascertain if nuclear

power plants can

continue to generate

power or go into a

controlled shutdown

• NRC regulations

trigger controlled

shutdown using

onsite power (ESF

#5, ESF #12)

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

DHS NPPD Infrastructure of Concern List

DHS NPPD produces an IOC List during incidents that serves as a decision support tool to

inform resource allocation and prioritization decisions. The IOC List prioritizes the physical

infrastructure facilities that are most likely to be impacted by a power outage or its cascading

effects. Disruption of IOC could result in loss of life or degrade the essential government, public

health, safety, or economic functions of the impacted area, region, or the Nation.

Incident-specific analyses of the threat to, vulnerabilities of, and potential consequences from the

disruption of CI in the impacted area are the basis of the IOC List. Infrastructure assets on the

IOC List are selected based on their criticality, the potential impacts the infrastructure may have

on the restoration and recovery activities in the area, and the consequence of disruption. Each

asset on the IOC is assigned a priority level based on the overall impacts to its operations based

on the power outage.

• Priority 1 (High Consequence of Loss) – Includes infrastructure which may have

regional or national impacts or is critical for immediate response operations.

• Priority 2 (Moderate to High Consequence of Loss) – Includes infrastructure where the

consequence of loss may cascade beyond just the local/regional area. This infrastructure

may support incident response operations.

• Priority 3 (Low to Moderate Consequence of Loss) – Includes infrastructure with a low

to moderate consequence, but which is provided for situational awareness for response

activities.

Infrastructure analysts update the IOC List as required to reflect evolving changes based on

restoration and response activities.

C1 Sector Coordination and Information

Management

Certain information is required to help facilitate decision support and operations for a long-term

power outage. Information may be required from federal partners, states, electric companies, or

other partners. General categories of CIR are noted the Critical Information Requirements

section; however, supplemental information will likely be required depending on the specifics of

the incident. This information will be used to inform the key executive decisions.

The categories for the RFI process may include but are not limited to—

• Incident impacts on CI sector (cascading effects);

• Sector priorities and federal support requirements (e.g. route clearance, public

safety/security, regulatory relief);

• National security issues;

• Requirements to synchronize sector and federal response/recovery concept of operations

(e.g. responder housing, deployment phasing); and

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

• Restoration operations status.

The NRCC, as the national center through which federal response and recovery activities are

coordinated, supports the incident response informational needs of the CI sectors and initiates

RFIs based on needs of senior decision makers at the White House or cabinet members with

authority for aspects of the response.

For information specific to an ongoing request for federal assistance, the NRCC distributes the

RFI to the appropriate ESF or RSF. This will involve the appropriate ESF Coordinator within the

NRCC coordinating with ESF representatives in the various JFO/RRCCs. The NRCC will also

coordinate with the NICC for sector-specific information other than energy. Figure 13 illustrates

a high-level overview of the process flow for RFIs.

Figure 13: RFI Basic Process Flow for Power Outages

Many of the ESFs have a direct relationship with certain SSAs. Coordination between

ESFs/RSFs and SSAs of the CI sectors ensures that the information provided is accurate. RFIs

are generated and received by both ESFs and SSAs, and the flow of information shown in Figure

13 is bi-directional.

In cases where RFIs originate with industry partners, those are usually managed first by the SSA,

which coordinates with its ESF counterpart. NBEOC and sector coordination calls that are

conducted during incident response activities coordinate and align RFI requirements and status

among the private sector. For RFIs pertaining to the impacts and status of CI sectors that are not

directly aligned to an ESF, the NRCC coordinates with the NICC to obtain information from the

appropriate SSA. The SSAs coordinate with their sector-specific partners to obtain the

information. Figure 14 provides a relationship diagram between the ESFs and SSAs.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Fig

ure 14: CI Sector and ESF Relationship

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

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POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Attachment 1 to Appendix 2: Critical Infrastructure

Sector

Partners

The community involved in managing risks and restoration of CI is composed of partnerships

among owners and operators; local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal

governments; regional entities; not-for-profit organizations; and academia. Sector and cross-

sector partnership council structures are the key mechanisms for managing CI security and

resiliency.

GCCs consist of representatives across various levels of government, as appropriate to the

operating landscape of each individual sector. The councils enable interagency,

intergovernmental, and cross-jurisdictional coordination within and across sectors, and they

partner with SCCs on public-private efforts.

SCCs are self-organized and self-governed councils whose members are CI owners and operators

and their representatives. SCCs serve as principal collaboration points between the government

and private sector CI owners and operators for sector-specific planning and collaboration.

Table 6 identifies the various government and private sector partners who are key to the

resiliency of the 16 CI Sectors.

Table 6: CI Sector Partnerships29

Sector

GCC Membership

SCC Membership

Chemical

•

DOC

• DHS

• U.S. Department of

Justice (DOJ)

• DOT

• EPA

•

Agricultural Retailers Association

• American Chemistry Council

• American Coatings Association

• American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers

• American Petroleum Institute

• BASF Corporation

• Chlorine Institute, The

• Compressed Gas Association

• Council of Producers & Distributors of Agrotechnology

• CropLife America

• Dow Chemical Company

• Fertilizer Institute, The

• Institute of Makers of Explosives

• International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration

• International Liquid Terminals Association

• Louisiana Chemical Association

• LSB Chemical LLC

• National Association of Chemical Distributor

• Praxair, Inc.

• Society of Chemical Manufacturers & Affiliates

Commercial

Facilities

• DHS

•

DOJ

• American Hotel and Lodging Association

•

Analytic Risk Solutions, LLC

NIPP 2013, pg 12.

Information was obtained from the DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council Charters and

Membership webpage (https://www.dhs.gov/cipac-charters-and-membership), dated December 29, 2016. Refer to

the website for the most up-to-date membership rosters.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• GSA

• HHS

• USDA

• Beacon Capital Partners

• Boyd Gaming Corporation

• Contemporary Services Corporation

• Fort Hall Casino

• International Association of Amusement Parks & Attractions

• Mall of America

• Marriott International

• National Football League

• National Retail Federation

• Peppermill Resort Spa Casino

• Real Estate Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)

• Retail Industry Leaders Association

• Sea World

• Simon Property Group

• Stadium Managers Association

• Target

• Tishman Speyer Properties

• U.S. Tennis Association

• Viacom

Communications

• DHS

• DOC

• DOD

• DOE

• DOI

• DOJ

• Federal Communications

Commission (FCC)

• Federal Reserve Board

(FRB)

• GSA

• National Association of

State Chief Information

Officers

• National Institute of

Standards and

Technology (NIST)

• NRC

• United States Postal

Service (USPS)

• 3U Technologies

• Alcatel-Lucent

• Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions

• AT&T

• Century Link

• Cincinnati Bell

• Cisco Systems, Inc.

• Clearwire

• Computer Sciences Corporation

• Computing Technology Industry Association

• Consolidated Communications

• Cox Communication

• Fairpoint Communications, Inc.

• Frontier

• Harris Corporation

• Hubbard Radio

• Hughes Network Systems

• Independent Telephone and Telecommunications Alliance

• Internet Security Alliance

• Intrado

• Iridium

• Juniper Networks

• Level 3 Communications

• Motorola

• National Association of Broadcasters

• National Cable & Telecommunications Association

• National Telephone Cooperative Associations

• NeuStar

• Research in Motion

• Satellite Industry Association

• Sprint

• Telcordia

• Telecommunications Industry Association

• Telephone and Data Systems, Inc.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• Time Warner Cable

• U.S. Internet Services Provider Association

• U.S. Telecom Association

• Verizon

•

Windstream

Critical

Manufacturing

•

DHS

• DOC

• DOD

• DOE

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOS

• DOT

• SBA

•

Aerojet, a GenCorp Inc.

• Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

• ArcelorMittal USA

• Armstrong Marine Inc.

• Boeing Company, The

• Bridgestone Americas, Inc.

• Briggs & Stratton

• Carpenter Technology Corporation

• Caterpillar, Inc.

• Chrysler Group, LLC

• Cisco Systems, Inc.

• Cliffs Natural Resources, Inc.

• Crane Aerospace & Electronics

• Deere & Company

• Delbia Do Company

• Delphi Corporation

• Ellanef Manufacturing

• Emerson Electric, Co.

• Fairchild SemiConductor

• FarSounder, Inc.

• Ford Motor Company

• General Electric Company

• General Motors Company

• Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company

• GrayGlass

• Hercules Heat Treating Corporation

• Intel Corporation

• ITT Corporation

• Johnson Controls, Inc.

• Kohler Company

• Lee Spring, Co.

• Michelin North America

• Mi-Jack Systems & Technologies

• Mini Circuits

• Navistar International Corporation

• Nichols Brothers Boat Builders

• Novelis, Inc.

• Oregon Iron Works

• Oshkosh Corporation

• PACCAR, Inc.

• Pelco by Schneider Electric

• Penske Corporation

• Raytheon Company

• Remy International, Inc.

• Ro

ck Ventures, LLC

• Rosco Vision Systems

• S&L Aerospace Metals, LLC

• Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• Smith & Wesson Holding Company

• Steeler, Inc.

• Summit Appliances, Inc.

• TE Connectivity, Ltd.

• ThyssenKrupp Stainless USA, LLC

• United States Steel Corporation

• United Technologies Corporation

• Whirlpool Corporation

• Zero International

Dams

• DHS

• DOD

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOL

• DOS

• FERC

• Lower Colorado River

Authority

• State of Arkansas

• State of California

• State of Florida

• State of New Hampshire

• State of New Jersey

• State of North Carolina

• State of Pennsylvania

• TVA

• USDA

• Ameren Services Company

• American Electric Power

• Association of State Dam Safety Officials

• Association of State Flood Plain Managers

• Avista Utilities

• Brookfield Renewable Energy

• CMS Energy

• Colorado River Energy Distribution Association

• Dominion Resources

• Duke Energy Corporation

• Dynegy, Inc.

• Exelon

• Grant County Public Utility District, Washington

• National Association of Flood & Stormwater Management

Agencies

• National Hydropower Association

• National Water Resources Association

• New York Power Authority

• Northwestern Energy

• Ontario Power Generation

• Pacific Gas & Electric Company

• Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power

District

• SCANA Corporation

• Seattle City Light

• Southern California Edison

• Southern Company

• State of South Carolina, Public Service Authority

• U.S. Society of Dams

• Xcel Energy Corporation

Defense

Industrial Base

• DOC

• DOD

• DOE

• DHS

• DOJ

• DOS

• TREAS

• Aerojet Rocketdyne

• Aerospace Industries Association

• Alliant Techsystems

• American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) International

• American System

• BAE Systems

• Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corporation

• Boeing Company, The

• Booz Allen Hamilton

• Computer Sciences Corporation

• DRS Technologies, Inc.

• Espy Corporation, The

• General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.

• General Dynamics

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• General Electric Company

• Honeywell International

• HP White Laboratory, Inc.

• Huntington Ingalls Industries

• InCadence Strategic Solutions

• L-3 Communications

• Leidos

• Lockheed Martin Corporation

• MetiSpace Technology

• National Classification Management Society

• National Defense Industrial Association

• Northrop Grumman Corporation

• Orbital Science Corporation

• Oshkosh Defense Corporation

• Pratt & Whitney

• Raytheon Company

• Rockwell Collins

• Rolls-Royce North America

• Science Applications International Corporation

• TASC, Inc.

Emergency

Services

• DHS

• DOD

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOT

• HHS

• Interagency Board

• USDA

• American Ambulance Association

• American Public Works Association

• Central Station Alarm Association

• Electronic Security Association

• Emergency Preparedness Resource Group

• International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)

• International Association of Emergency Managers

• International Association of Fire Chiefs

• International Public Safety Association

• National Association of Security Companies

• National Association of State Emergency Medical Services

Officials

• National Emergency Management Association

• National Fire Protection Association

• National Fusion Center Association

• National Native American Law Enforcement Association

• National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA)

• Securitas Security Services

• Security Industry Association

Energy

• BPA

• DHS

• DOD

• DOE

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOS

• DOT

• EPA

• FERC

• HHS

• National Association of

Regulatory Utility

Commissioners (NARUC)

Electricity Subsector:

• American Electric Power

• APPA

• Arkansas Electric Cooperative

• Avangrid

• Canadian Electricity Association

• Center for Strategic and International Studies

• City Utilities of Springfield

• Consolidated Edison

• Dominion

• Duke Energy

• EEI

• Edison International

• Electric Power Supply Association

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• National Association of

State Energy Officials

• Natural Resources

Canada

• Public Safety Canada

• SEPA

• SWPA

• TREAS

• TVA

• USDA

• WAPA

• ENMAX Corporation

• Exelon Corporation

• Georgia System Operations Corporation

• Great River Energy

• Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.

• Lincoln Electric System

• MidAmerican Energy Co.

• NERC

• Norwich Public Utilities

• NRECA

• Nuclear Energy Institute

• Old Dominion Electric Cooperative

• PG&E Corporation

• PJM

• PPL Corporation

• Santee Cooper

• Southern Company

• Xcel Energy

Oil and Natural Gas Subsector:

• American Exploration & Production Council

• American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers

• American Gas Association

• American Petroleum Institute

• American Public Gas Association

• Association of Oil Pipe Lines

• Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers

• Canadian Energy Pipeline Association

• Energy Security Council

• Gas Processors Association

• Independent Petroleum Association of America

• International Association of Drilling Contractors

• International Liquid Terminals Association

• Interstate Natural Gas Association of America

• National Association of Convenience Stores

• National Ocean Industries Association

• National Propane Gas Association

• Offshore Marine Service Association

• Offshore Operators Committee

• Society of Independent Gas Marketers Association

• Texas Oil & Gas Association

• U.S. Oil & Gas Association

Financial

Services

•

American Council of

State Savings

Supervisors

• Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve

System

• Conference of State

Bank Supervisors

• Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau

• DHS

• DOD

•

Aetna

• AIG

• American Bankers Association

• American Council of Life Insurers

• American Express

• American Insurance Association

• American Society for Industrial Security International

• Bank Administration Institute

• Bank of America

• Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, The

• BATS Exchange

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• Farm Credit

Administration

• Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation

• Federal Housing Finance

Agency

• FRB

• FRB of Chicago

• FRB of New York

• National Association of

Insurance

Commissioners

• National Association of

State Credit Union

Supervisors

• National Credit Union

Administration

• North American

Securities Administration

Association

• Securities Investor

Protection Corporation

• TREAS

• United States Commodity

Futures Trading

Commission

• United States Securities

and Exchange

Commission (SEC)

• BB&T

• BCG Partners

• BITS

• Capital One

• Charles Schwab Bank

• ChicagoFIRST

• Citigroup

• Clearing House, The

• CLS Group

• Comerica

• CME Group

• Consumer Bankers Association

• Convergex

• Credit Union National Association

• Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, The

• Equifax

• Fannie Mae

• Fidelity Investments

• Financial Information Forum

• Financial Services ISAC

• First Data

• FIS

• Freddie Mac

• Futures Industry Association

• GE Capital Retail Bank

• Goldman Sachs

• Independent Community Bankers of America

• Institute of International Bankers

• Intercontinental Exchange, NYSE

• International Securities Exchange

• Investment Company Institute

• John Hancock/Manulife

• JP Morgan Chase

• LCH Clearnet

• Managed Funds Association

• MasterCard

• Money Market Institute

• Morgan Stanley

• NACHA - The Electronic Payments Association

• NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc

• National Armored Car Association

• National Association of Federal Credit Unions

• National Futures Association

• National Stock Exchange

• Navient

• Navy Federal Credit Union

• Northern Trust

• Omgeo

• Options Clearing Corporation

• PNC

• Property Casualty Insurers Association of America

• RBS

• Securities Industry Financial Markets Association

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• State Farm

• State Street Corporation

• Sun Trust

• Synchrony Financial

• U.S. Bank

• Visa U-S-A Inc.

•

Wells Fargo

Food and

Agriculture

• Alaska Government

• American Association of

Veterinary Laboratory

Diagnosticians

• Association of Food and

Drug Officials

• Association of State and

Territorial Health Officials

• Clemson University,

South Carolina

Department of Plant

Industry

• Commonwealth of

Virginia, Department of

Agriculture

• DHS

• DOC

• DOD

• DOE

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOS

• EPA

• HHS

• Iowa Department of

Inspection and Appeals

• Multistate Partnership for

Security in Agriculture

• National Assembly of

State Animal Health

Officials

• National Association of

County and City Health

Officials (NACCHO)

• National Association of

State Departments of

Agriculture

• National Center for

Foreign Animal and

Zoonotic Disease

Defense

• National Environmental

Health Association

• Navajo Nation, The

• Sandia National

Laboratories

• Southern Agriculture &

Animal Disaster

Response Alliance

• Ahold USA, Inc.

• American Bakers Association

• American Feed Industry Association

• American Frozen Food Institute

• American Meat Institute

• American Veterinary Medical Association

• Archer Daniels Midland Corporation

• Association of Food Industries

• Cargill

• Coca-Cola Company, The

• ConAgra Foods, Inc.

• Consumer Specialty Products Association

• CropLife America

• Dairy Institute of California

• Dean Foods Company

• Deloitte & Touche LLP

• Food Marketing Institute

• General Mills

• Giant Food, LLC

• Grocery Manufacturers Association

• Ingredion, Inc.

• International Bottled Water Association

• International Dairy Foods Association

• International Food Service Distributors Association

• Juice Products Association

• Kellogg Company

• Kraft Foods Global, Inc.

• Kroger Company, The

• Land O’ Lakes, Inc.

• Marriott International

• McCormick & Company, Inc.

• National Association of Manufacturers

• National Cattlemen’s Beef Association

• National Chicken Council

• National Corn Growers Association

• National Fisheries Institute

• National Grain and Feed Association

• National Grocers Association

• National Milk Producers Federation

• National Oilseed Processors Association

• National Pork Board

• National Pork Producers Association

• National Renderers Association

• National Restaurant Association

• North American Millers’ Association

• PepsiCo, Inc.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• State of California,

Department of Food and

Agriculture

• State of Florida,

Department of Agriculture

and Consumer Services

• State of Kansas,

Department of Agriculture

• State of Michigan,

Department of Agriculture

• State of Minnesota,

Department of Agriculture

• State of New Mexico,

Department of Agriculture

• State of Oklahoma,

Department of Public

Health

• State of Texas, Animal

Health Commission

• State of Texas,

Department of Agriculture

• State of West Virginia,

Department of Agriculture

• University of Kentucky,

College of Agriculture,

Cooperative Extension

Service

• University of Minnesota,

Food Protection and

Defense Institute

•

USDA

• Publix Super Markets, Inc.

• SES, Inc.

• Starbucks Coffee Company

• Sugar Association, The

• Super Store Industries

• Texas Cattle Feeder’s Association

• United Fresh Produce Association

• USA Rice Federation

Government

Facilities

• Administrative Office of

the United States Courts

• Architect of the Capitol

• City of Fort Worth, Texas

• Department of Veterans

Affairs

• DHS

• DOD

• DOE

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOL

• DOS

• DOT

• EPA

• FCC

• Federal Trade

Commission

• FRB

• GAO

• GSA

• HHS

• U.S. Department of

Housing and Urban

Development

• N/A

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

• National Archives and

Records Administration

• National Capital Planning

Commission

• National

Counterterrorism Center

(NCTC)

• NIST

• NRC

• Office of the Director of

National Intelligence

(ODNI)

• Office of Personnel

Management (OPM)

• SEC

• Smithsonian Institute

• Social Security

Administration

• State of Maryland

• State of Massachusetts

• State of Michigan

• State of Texas

• TREAS

• United States Capitol

Police

• United States Commodity

Futures Trading

Commission

• United States

Department of Education

(DoED)

• United States Trade

Representative

• USDA

• USPS

Healthcare and

Public Health

• American Association of

Poison Control Centers

• American Public Gas

Association

• Association of Public

Health Laboratories

• Association of State and

Territorial Health Officials

• Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention

• Commonwealth of

Virginia, Department of

General Services

• Commonwealth of

Virginia, Department of

Veterans Affairs and

Homeland Security

• Abbott Laboratories

• Advanced Medical Technology Association

• Adventist Health System

• Aetna, Inc.

• Alexian Brothers Health System

• Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

• American Academy of Nurse Practitioners

• American Academy of Pediatrics

• American Academy of Physicians Assistants

• American Association of Blood Banks

• American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy

• American Association of Tissue Banks

• American College of Emergency Physicians

• American College of Occupational and Environmental

Medicine

• American Health Care Association

• American Hospital Association

• American Medical Depot

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• County of Hennepin

(Minnesota), Public

Health

• County of Nassau (New

York), Department of

Health

• Department of Veterans

Affairs

• DHS

• DOD

• DOE

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOS

• DOT

• HHS

• NACCHO

• National Indian Health

Board

• Sandia National

Laboratories

• Southern Nevada, Health

District

• State of Connecticut,

Department of Public

Health

• State of Maryland,

Department of Health

• State of Michigan,

Department of Health

• State of New Jersey,

Office of Homeland

Security and

Preparedness

• State of Oregon, Office of

Emergency Management

• State of Texas,

Department of Health

Services

• USDA

• American Nurses Association

• American Osteopathic Association

• American Red Cross

• America's Health Insurance Plans

• Amgen, Inc.

• Antelope Valley Healthcare District

• Archdiocese of Washington

• Association of Healthcare Resource & Materials

Management Professionals

• Association of State Floodplain Managers

• Atlantic Health Systems

• Baxter Healthcare, Inc.

• Baylor Health Care System

• Biotechnology Industry Organization

• Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association

• Blue Shield California

• Brooklawn Memorial Park/Johnson Memorial Medical Center

• Business Continuity Consulting

• Caliber Security Partners

• Cardinal Health

• Carolinas Regional Healthcare System

• Casket and Funeral Supply Association of America

• Catholic Cemetery Conference

• Chicago Veterinary Medical Association

• Children's Medical Center of Dallas

• Cisco Systems, Inc.

• Compass Rose LLC

• Condition Zebra

• Cook Children's Northeast Hospital

• Corporate Safety, Security, and Building Services

• Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center

• DaVita Healthcare Partners

• Dayton Fire Department (Ohio)

• Divergent Group, LLC

• Dodge Company

• Emergent BioSolutions

• Excela Health System

• Flattery Touch Healthcare Consulting

• Gamxing, Inc.

• Generic Pharmaceutical Association

• George Washington University Medical Center

• Global Institute for Cybersecurity and Research

• Greater New York Hospital Association

• Group Health Cooperative

• Health Industry Distributors Association

• Health Promotion Consultants

• Healthcare Distribution Management Association

• Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society

• Healthcare Quality Management AETNA

• Healthcare Ready

• Henry Ford Health System

• Henry Schein

• Highmark Health Services

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• HITRUST

• Hofstra North Shore-LIJ School of Medicine

• Horan & McConaty Funeral Services

• Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey

• Hospital Association of Southern California

• Hospital Corporation of America

• HSS Inc.

• Humana

• Infragard EMP SIG

• Inova Health System

• Institute for CI Technology

• International Association for Healthcare Security and Safety

• International Cemetery, Cremation and Funeral Association

• IP Services

• James B. Haggin Memorial Hospital

• Johns Hopkins University

• Joint Commission, The

• Kaiser Permanente

• Kaleida Health

• Kidney Community Emergency Response Coalition

• Knowledge Center Enterprises, LLC

• Laboratory Corporation

• LaFayette General Medical Center

• Mary Washington Healthcare

• Matthews Cremation

• Mayo Clinic

• McAfee

• Medco Health Solutions, Inc.

• Medline Industries, Inc

• Medtronic

• Medxcel

• Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center

• Merck & Co., Inc.

• Monmouth Ocean Hospital Service Corporation

• Mount Sinai & Schwab Rehabilitation Hospitals

• Nashville Supply Chain Services

• National Association of Chain Drug Stores

• National Association of Psychiatric Health Systems

• National Funeral Directors Association

• National Funeral Directors & Morticians Association

• National Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center

• Nemours Foundation, The

• Nevada Hospital Association

• New Jersey Hospital Association

• Nova Southeastern University

• Orlando Health

• Palmetto Health Tuomey

• Pfizer

• Purdue Pharma Technologies

• Reclamere, Inc.

• Roswell Park Cancer Institute

• Saint Louis University Hospital

• Samaritan Health Services

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• Sempermed USA, Inc.

• Siemens Healthcare USA

• SMA Technology Group

• Southern California Orthopedic Institute

• Spectrum Healthcare Resources

• St. Luke's Health System

• Stanford Health Care/Stanford Children's Health

• Stanley Funeral Homes

• Strategic Marketplace Initiative

• Tauri Group

• Technology Partners, Inc.

• Tenet Healthcare Corporation

• Texas A&M Health Science Center

• Texas A&M University

• Texas Biomedical Research Institute

• Tronex International Incorporated

• UAB Health Systems

• United Healthcare

• UnitedHealth Group

• University of California Los Angeles Medical Center

Occupational Health Facility

• University of Medicine and Dentistry, New Jersey

• University of South Alabama

• University of Texas, MD Anderson Cancer Center

• University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston

• University of Washington Medicine

• Valley Health System

• Van Scoyoc Associates

• Verizon

• Virginia Commonwealth University Health System

• Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association

• Walgreens

• Washington Occupational Health Associates, Inc.

• WellPoint, Inc.

• Zenith American Solutions

Information

Technology

•

DHS

• DOC

• DOD

• DOE

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOS

• GSA

• Office of Management

and Budget

•

ACT-The App Association

• Adobe Systems

• Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)

• Afilias USA, Inc.

• Araxid

• Arbor Networks

• Aveshka

• Bell Canada

• Biofarma

• Bivio Networks

• Blackberry

• Business Software Alliance

• CA Technologies

• Center for Internet Security

• Certichron, Inc.

• Cisco Systems, Inc.

• Coalfire Systems, Inc.

• Computer and Communications Industry Association

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• Computer Sciences Corporation

• Computing Technology Industry Association

• Core Security Technologies

• Cyber Pack Ventures, Inc.

• Dell Inc.

• Deloitte & Touche LLP

• Dunrath Capital

• Dynetics, Inc.

• eBay, Inc.

• Echelon One

• e-Management

• EMC Corporation

• Entrust, Inc.

• Equifax, Inc.

• EWA Information & Infrastructure Technologies, Inc.

• Exelis, Inc.

• FireEye, Inc.

• Google

• Green Hills Software

• Hatha Systems

• Hewlett Packard

• IBM Corporation

• Information Technology Industry Council

• Information Technology - Information Sharing & Analysis

Center

• Intel Corporation

• Internet Security Alliance

• (ISC)2

• ITT Corporation

• iWire365, Inc.

• Juniper Networks

• KPMG LLP

• Kwictech Interactive Inc.

• L-3 Communications

• Lancope, Inc.

• LGS Innovations

• Litmus Logic, LLC

• Lockheed Martin

• Lumeta Corporation

• Lunarline, Inc

• Microsoft Corporation

• Motorola

• Netstar-1 Government Consulting, Inc.

• NeuStar

• Northrop Grumman

• NTT Communications Corporation

• One Enterprise Consulting Group, LLC

• Palo Alto Networks

• Pragmatics

• Rackspace, Inc.

• Raytheon Company

• Reclamere

• Renesys Corporation

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• SAFE-BioPharma Association

• SafeNet Gemalto, Inc.

• SAIC

• Seagate Technology

• SecureState, LLC

• Sentar, Inc.

• Serco, Inc.

• SI Organization, The

• Siemens Healthcare, USA

• Sony

• Symantec Corporation

• System 1, Inc.

• TASC, Inc.

• Team Cymru

• TechAmerica

• Telecommunications Industry Association

• TeleContinuity, Inc.

• Terremark Worldwide, Inc.

• TestPros, Inc.

• Themis Computer

• Triumfant

• Tyco International

• U.S. Internet Service Provider Association

• Unisys Corporation

• Vanguard Defense Industries

• Vencore

• VeriSign Authentication Services

• Verizon

• Vostrom

• Xerox

Nuclear

Reactors,

Materials, and

Waste Sector

• Conference of Radiation

Control Program

Directors

• DHS

• DOD

• DOE

• DOJ

• DOS

• DOT

• EPA

• HHS

• NRC

• Organization of

Agreement States

• Dominion Generation

• Exelon Generation Company, LLC

• Harvard University / Boston Children's Hospital

• Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals

• Nuclear Energy Institute

• Oregon State University

• Reed College

• Rutgers University

• Security Engineering Associates

• University of Missouri

Transportation

Systems

•

American Association of

State Highway and

Transportation Officials

• DHS

• DOC

• DOD

• DOE

• DoED

• DOJ

Aviation Mode Subsector:

• Aerospace Industries Association

• Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

• Airlines for America

• Airports Consultants Council

• Airports Council International-North America

• American Association of Airport Executives

• Boeing Company, The

• Cargo Airline Association

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• DOS

• DOT

• GSA

• HHS

• IACP

• National Association of

State Directors of Pupil

Transportation

• NRC

• NSA

• National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB)

• State of Florida,

Department of Energy

• USDA

Aviation Mode

Subsector:

• DHS

• DOC

• DOD

• DOJ

• DOS

• DOT

• NCTC

• NTSB

• ODNI

• USPS

Freight Rail Mode

Subsector:

• DHS

• DOD

• DOT

Highway and Motor

Carrier Mode Subsector:

• American Association of

State Highway and

Transportation Officials

• DHS

• DOC

• DOD

• DOE

• DoED

• DOJ

• DOT

• GSA

• HHS

• IACP

• National Association of

State Directors of Pupil

Transportation

• NRC

• NSA

• National Air Carrier Association

• National Air Transportation Association

• National Business Aviation Association, Inc.

• Regional Airline Association

Freight Rail Mode Subsector:

• Alaska Railroad Corporation

• American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association

• Amtrak

• Anacostia and Pacific Company, Inc.

• Association of American Railroads

• Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway

• Canadian National Railway Company

• Canadian Pacific Railway

• Capital Metro Transit

• Conrail

• CSX Transportation

• Florida East Coast Railway

• Genesee & Wyoming, Inc.

• Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad

• Iowa Interstate Railroad Ltd.

• Kansas City Southern Railway Company

• Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

• Metra – Metropolitan Rail

• Metropolitan Transportation Authority (New York)

• New Jersey Transit

• Norfolk Southern

• Pan Am Railway

• Union Pacific Railroad Company

• Veolia Transportation

• Virginia Railway Express

• Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway

Highway and Motor Carrier Mode Subsector:

• American Bus Association

• American Chemistry Council

• American Logistics Aid Network

• American Petroleum Institute

• American Trucking Association

• BusBank, The

• CAT Eyes

• Con-Way, Inc.

• Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry

• First Student, Inc.

• Greyhound

• Inoventures, LLC

• Institute of Makers of Explosives

• Intermodal Association of North America

• Kenan Advantage Group

• Mid-States Express, Inc.

• National Association of Pupil Transportation

• National Association of Small Trucking Companies

• National Association of State Directors of Pupil

Transportation Services

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• State of Florida,

Department of Energy

• USDA

Maritime Mode

Subsector:

• DHS

• DOC

• DOD

• DOE

• DOJ

• DOT

Mass Transit and

Passenger Rail Mode

Subsector:

• DHS

• DOD

• DOJ

Pipeline Mode Subsector:

• DHS

• DOD

• DOE

• DOJ

• DOT

Postal and Shipping

Mode Subsector:

• DHS

• DOD

• DOT

• HHS

• USPS

• National School Transportation Association

• National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.

• Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association

• PITT Ohio Express

• Schneider National

• Seaton & Husk, LP

• Sentinel Transportation

• SLT Express

• Taxicab, Limousine and Paratransit Association

• Transportation Research Board

• Tri-State Motor Transit Company

• Truck Rental and Leasing Association

• United Motorcoach Association

Maritime Mode Subsector:

• N/A

Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Mode Subsector :

• American Public Transportation Association

• Amtrak

• Bay Area Rapid Transit

• Chicago Police Department

• Chicago Transit Authority

• Dallas Area Rapid Transit / Trinity Railway Express

• Denver Regional Transportation District

• Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, The

• King County Department of Transportation

• Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

• Los Angeles Sheriff's Department

• Maryland Transit Administration

• Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

• Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

• Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County

• Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New York

• Minneapolis Metro Transit

• New Jersey Transit

• New York Police Department

• Northeast Illinois Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra)

• Portland Police Department, Oregon

• Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

• Utah Transit Authority

• Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Pipeline Mode Subsector:

• American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers

• American Gas Association

• American Petroleum Institute

• Association of Oil Pipe Lines

• Canadian Energy Pipeline Association

• Interstate National Gas Association of America

• National Fuel

Postal and Shipping Mode Subsector:

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Sector GCC Membership SCC Membership

• DHL International

• FedEx Corporation

•

United Parcel Service of America

Water and

Wastewater

•

Association of State

Drinking Water

Administrators

• DHS

• DOD

• DOI

• DOJ

• DOS

• Environmental Council of

the States

• EPA

• HHS

• Montana Department of

Environmental Quality

• NACCHO

• NARUC

• State of New Hampshire,

Department of

Environmental Services

• USDA

•

Alexandria Renew Enterprises

• American Water

• American Water Works Association

• Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies

• Boston Water and Sewer Commission

• Breezy Hill Water and Sewer Company

• Conway County Regional W.D.D.

• Davidson Water, Inc.

• District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority

• National Association of Clean Water Agencies

• National Association of Water Companies

• National Rural Water Association

• New York City Department of Environmental Protection

• Onondaga County Water Authority

• Orlando Utilities Commission

• Prince William County Service Authority

• San Jose Water Company

• Spartanburg Water

• Trinity River Authority of Texas

• Water Environment Federation

• Water Environment Research Foundation

• Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center

• Water Research Foundation

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Appendix 3: Communications

This appendix describes how emergency communications systems and protocols will support

public messaging in a long-duration power outage. While some unique messaging

systems/processes for a power outage are described below as a part of the information sharing

methods, the majority of actions are consistent with Response and Recovery FIOPs, ESF #2 –

Communications and ESF #15 – External Affairs annexes to the NRF.

Situation

Since communications systems rely on electricity, any incident that causes long-term power

outages will create a challenging environment for telecommunications and public messaging.

Situational awareness will be difficult to obtain and information may change frequently before

an incident stabilizes. This will complicate efforts to deploy and employ resources effectively.

Local impacts will vary widely based on direct and cascading impacts to CI, the level and quality

of local preparedness efforts, and the availability and capabilities of local, state, tribal, territorial,

and insular area resources.

Impacts that result from a long-duration power outage will vary depending on the incident. An

incident that results in physical damage to electric power infrastructure (e.g., catastrophic

earthquake) will also likely damage or destroy telecommunications infrastructure and require

extended federal communications support. Incidents that may not result in physical damage to

communications infrastructure (e.g., some space weather) may require non-traditional response

and recovery strategies that mitigate telecommunications systems degradation and public

messaging when an outage lasts for a significant period.

Additionally, resources that would otherwise be available through mutual aid agreements, the

Emergency Management Assistance Compact, and private-sector contracts (e.g., fuel, food, and

water) may not be available due to widespread impact and finite capacity. This could adversely

affect communications restoration efforts and extend the need for federal support. In the event of

a major communication outage resulting from power loss, the applicable state emergency

communications annexes to the regional emergency communications plans developed by the

FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications Division will be used to outline state capabilities,

state restoration priorities, and pre-identified communications risk and interdependencies.

Finally, the loss of power will affect every other CI sector, and all of them rely on

communications for response and restoration operations. Therefore, the operational

communications community will actively engage non-traditional stakeholders throughout every

phase of response and recovery, as well as develop and coordinate continuity of operations plans

to avoid prolonging or producing more extensive, deeper, and longer term losses post-disaster.

Concept of Support

Federal operational communications objectives are consistent with the operational

communications critical tasks from the Response FIOP:

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

• Ensure the capacity to communicate with both the emergency response community and

the affected populations and establish interoperable voice and data communications

between local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal first responders.

• Reestablish sufficient communications infrastructure within the affected areas to support

ongoing life-sustaining activities, meet basic human needs, and transition to recovery.

Except where a pre-negotiated agreement exists, departments and agencies support their own

personnel with organic communications assets to the greatest extent possible. National stockpiles

of communications assets (e.g., radios, repeaters, smart devices) that might be available on

smaller-scale disasters will likely not be available or will not be sufficient. Due to projected lack

of sufficient stockpile tactical gear, prioritization should be given to recovering public networks,

so that all escorts have a means of coordinating federal departments and agencies and should also

be prepared to deploy knowledgeable communications personnel to support their organic

equipment. Incident-area technical expertise may not be available, especially in the immediate

response phase.

Federal resources will be prioritized to support continuity of government and continuity of

operations at all levels—required to effectively coordinate response and recovery operations—

and to provide command and control connectivity to federal response teams. Continuity of

government and continuity of operations support may require that federal assets be employed at

local or state government leadership offices (e.g., governor’s office) and EOCs when the

capabilities of state or local entities are damaged, destroyed, or otherwise unusable to support

this function. Federal teams engaged in incident management, lifesaving, and life-sustaining

operations shall be connected into a command and control network(s) that enables such teams to

communicate with higher, lower, and adjacent command elements.

Public Messaging

During a long-term power outage, public messaging informs all affected segments of society by

providing credible messaging to expedite the delivery of emergency services and aid the public

in taking protective actions.

A long-term power outage brings unique challenges for communications between government

officials and the public, since traditional public information and warning mechanisms rely on

electricity. Communication through television, radio, email, and social media may not be

possible for the majority of the public if no electricity is available to power the apparatuses used

to transmit and receive this information.

In an incident that does not result in significant infrastructure damage, some methods of

communications will work immediately following an incident and then degrade over time. In

these cases, it is estimated that following a power loss, there will be a four- to eight-hour window

in which dissemination of information through the Emergency Alert System and the Integrated

Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) will be most effective. After that window,

communication abilities are expected to degrade, due to loss of battery power on devices such as

radios and mobile phone. A typical smart device may hold a battery charge for five to eight

hours, though methods of recharging may be available (e.g., car battery, solar charger, and hand

crank device). The rate of failure will depend heavily on local preparedness; cellular towers, for

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

example, may have backup batteries or a generator backup system that could maintain power for

hours to a few days.

In an incident where infrastructure damage does occur, communications may be lost immediately

due to downed lines and damaged equipment. However, as the extent of damage will not be

immediately clear, all available means of accessible, linguistically appropriate, and timely

communications with the public should be employed.

Operational communications personnel

will have to work closely with External Affairs, Disability Integration Advisors; system owners;

ESF #2 and ESF #15 departments and agencies; and local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular

area emergency communications officers and public information officers to develop the best

technical strategies to communicate with the public.

The National Public Warning System (NPWS), operated by IPAWS, provides a nationwide all-

hazards warning capability for the President in the event of a national catastrophic disaster. The

core of the NPWS is comprised of privately owned commercial and non-commercial radio

broadcast stations that cooperatively participate with FEMA to provide a resilient information

broadcasting capability. As denoted in Figure 15 and Table 7, 77 stations participate in the

program. Known as FEMA Primary Entry Point (PEP) stations, they collectively provide

coverage for approximately 90 percent of the Nation’s population. FEMA installed power and

other resiliency features at these PEP stations and sustains the capability to support the NPWS

mission. Stations outside the NPWS (more than 20,000) will need to request any resources

through their state emergency management channels for local broadcasting needs.

FEMA has worked with USACE to harden these stations against some threats, such as

electromagnetic pulse, and equip them with backup transmitters, power generation, and fuel

systems enabling broadcasting to continue for an extended period in the event of loss of a

commercial power source. As fuel runs out, FEMA may also re-supply fuel to these stations to

enable broadcast capabilities during a long-term power outage. State and local public safety

officials can leverage the FEMA PEP station capabilities in coordination with FEMA and the

owner and operators of the private sector facilities.

Accessible communication means and methods for employees must be identified, planned for and practiced to not only ensure

continuity for them but for the important programs and functions they manage.

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

igure 15: Footprint of Radio Stations Supplied with Additional Fuel and Resiliency Resources

Table 7: Primary Entry Point Radio Stations by FEMA Regions

Station City State

FEMA

Region

WTIC

Hartford

WBZ

Boston

WGAN

Portland

WROW

Albany

WBNW

Endicott

WABC

New York

WHAM

Rochester

WHEN

Syracuse

WKAQ

San Juan

WSTA

Charlotte Amalie

Washington

III

NPR

Washington

III

WBAL

Baltimore

III

WFED

Wheaton

III

WTEL

Philadelphia

III

KDKA

Pittsburgh

III

WTAR

Norfolk

III

WRXL

Richmond

III

WVBE

Roanoke

III

WCHS

Charleston

III

WJOX

Birmingham

WOKV

Jacksonville

WAQI

Miami

WFLF

Pine Hills

WSRV

Gainesville

WMAC

Macon

WMSI

Jackson

Station City State

FEMA

Region

WLW

Cincinnati

WTAM

Cleveland

WTMJ

Milwaukee

KAAY

Little Rock

WWL

New Orleans

KWKH

Shreveport

KKOB

Albuquerque

KRMG

Tulsa

KLBJ

Austin

KROD

El Paso

WBAP

Fort Worth

KTRH

Houston

PREMIERE

San Antonio

WHO

Des Moines

VII

WHB

Kansas City

VII

KMOX

St Louis

VII

KRVN

Lexington

VII

KOA

Denver

VIII

KERR

Polson

VIII

KFYR

Bismarck

VIII

KSL

Salt Lake City

VIII

KTWO

Casper

VIII

WVUV

Fagaitua

KFLT

Tucson

KMJ

Fresno

KFI

Los Angeles

PREMIERE

Los Angeles

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

JUNE 2017

Station City State

FEMA

Region

KOGO

San Diego

KCBS

San Francisco

KTWG

Agana

KDWN

Las Vegas

KKOH

Reno

KFQD

Anchorage

HEOC

Honolulu

KBOI

Boise

KPNW

Eugene

KOPB

Portland

KIRO

Seattle

Some legacy stations do not include EMP protection.

FEMA plans to modernize all stations with EMP protection by 2026.

Operational Coordination

Communications Working Group

A large-scale/long-duration power outage will likely exceed the capabilities of operational

communications incident management and support as described in the Response FIOP. A

Communications Working Group (CWG) may be established in the NRCC. The CWG will

coordinate with resource support to help manage the national response and to recommend

resource priorities. At a minimum, the CWG shall consist of representatives from the following:

• ESF #2 – Communications

• ESF #7 – Logistics

• ESF #15 – External Affairs

• FEMA Office of National Continuity Programs

• FEMA Office of the Chief Information Officer

• FEMA Office of Chief Counsel

• FEMA Disability Integration and Coordination Advisor

• American Red Cross

• American Radio Relay League

• Communications ISAC.

The membership of the CWG will be flexible and scalable to involve additional stakeholders as

necessary. As such, relevant non-ISAC private sector companies may be asked to participate.

The CWG is responsible for:

• Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating communications situational awareness;

Station City State

FEMA

Region

WBT

Charlotte

WSFL

New Bern

WQDR

Raleigh

WCOS

Columbia

WGTK

Greenville

WJCW

Johnson City

WJXB

Knoxville

WREC

Memphis

WSM

Nashville

WLS

Chicago

WJR

Detroit

WCCO

Minneapolis

POWER OUTAGE INCIDENT ANNEX

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• Prioritizing limited resources based on national guidance;

• Identifying and addressing requirements that cannot be solved at a lower level; and

• Developing solutions to unique stakeholder problems as they arise.

National Joint Information Center

Due to the severity of this scenario and need for coordinated national messaging, a National Joint

Information Center (JIC) will be established to provide unified, accessible messaging. The JIC

serves as the federal incident communications coordination center and is staffed by incident

communications response personnel that rapidly mobilize to coordinate the federal external

communications effort. It leverages a variety of conference call mechanisms to coordinate across

state, tribal, federal, and private sector entities, assuming telephone lines are operational. The

Private Sector Incident Communications Conference Line (PICCL) is a standing line and

distribution list, comprised of private sector, CI sector, and major national association corporate

communicators. The PICCL, maintained by NPPD Office of External Affairs, is provided to

component offices to ensure private sector communicators receive timely public information

during an incident requiring a coordinated federal response. During a response in which FEMA

stands up the NBEOC, NBEOC coordination calls may be initiated with private sector partners

across various sectors.

An ESF #15 – External Affairs Operations Director may be delegated to lead the federal

interagency team. On the other hand, since DOE is the SSA for the energy sector, DOE and DHS

may co-lead the National JIC.

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Appendix 4: Roles and Responsibilities

Given that the roles and responsibilities for restoring power, maintaining infrastructure

operations, and delivering critical support resides across public, private, and community

organizations, it is paramount to synchronize response and recovery concepts across public,

private, and other non-governmental sector operations at the local, state, tribal, territorial, insular

area, and federal levels.

This section provides an overview of the power-specific roles and responsibilities of the key

public and private stakeholders who are involved in the implementation of the POIA. General

emergency response or recovery roles and responsibilities are captured in the NRF, NDRF, and

Response and Recovery FIOPs.

Table 8: Private Sector Association Roles in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

Organization

Roles in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

American Public Power

Association (APPA)

• Coordinates the restoration of power throughout the public power community.

• Facilitates two-way communications with the applicable federal agencies or other

trade associations.

•

Participates in ESCC and DOE SSA and ESF #12 – Energy efforts.

Edison Electric Institute

(EEI)

•

Represents all United States investor-owned electric companies and coordinates

with federal agencies as necessary.

• For regional outage incidents, supports its members' mutual assistance efforts

through Regional Mutual Assistance Groups.

• Upon activation of a NRE, serves as the industry liaison to the chief executive

officers of its member companies and coordinates with senior government officials

and with national organizations representing state and local interests.

• Serves as an industry liaison to state regulatory agencies when requested by a

member.

• Convenes periodic conference calls with the member company chief executive

officers and with senior government officials.

• Serves as the investor-owned electric company industry’s primary national

information resource, and provides a broad, national perspective on the event

through media and public relations activities and national stakeholder outreach,

including relevant federal agencies, social media support, and industry-wide

communication and coordination to relevant stakeholders.

• Participates in ESCC coordination among senior government and industry

executives to ensure effective response, appropriate prioritization and allocation of

resources, and support for deviation from standard procedures during an incident.

National Association of

Regulatory Utility

Commissioners

(NARUC)

• During a major power outage, links the necessary agencies together for situational

awareness and response coordination.

• Represents electric cooperatives, and coordinates with federal agencies during an

outage.

• Supports cooperative mutual assistance program activation and coordinates with

other member trade associations of the electric utility industry.

National Association of

State Energy Officials

(NASEO)

• Supports the EEAC program that provides state and territorial energy emergency

points of contact.

• Assists DOE in facilitating communications and information sharing among

impacted states when energy supply disruptions occur and with coordination calls

and situational reporting by states.

• Provides technical support to state agencies that have a role in energy response or

restoration.

• Advises states and the Federal Government on energy issues in general and

energy emergencies.

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Organization Roles in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

North American Electric

Reliability Corporation

(NERC)

• Serves as the ERO for North America, subject to oversight by the FERC and

governmental authorities in Canada. NERC’s jurisdiction includes users, owners,

and operators of the BPS, which serves more than 334 million people.

• Coordinates the E-ISAC and oversees the Bulk Power System Awareness

program.

E-ISAC:

• Provides threat information, mitigation advice, and alert products to its members.

• Supports the ESCC in fulfilling its role.

NERC Bulk Power System Awareness:

• Collects and analyzes information on system disturbances and other incidents that

have an impact on the North American BPS, and disseminates this information to

internal departments, registered entities, regional organizations, and governmental

agencies as necessary.

• Monitors ongoing storms, natural disasters, and geopolitical events that may

potentially affect or are currently affecting the BPS.

National Rural Electric

Cooperative

Association (NRECA)

•

If a disaster necessitates the activation of the ESCC, NRECA and the cooperative

sector closely coordinate with the ESCC and local, state, and federal authorities.

Multi-State Fleet

Response Working

Group

• Identifies existing protocols, policies, procedures, systems, organizations, and

technologies that are already in place within government and the private sector that

impact fleet movement.

• Catalogs and disseminates information related to state entrance and pass-through

requirements.

• Conducts annual meetings and exercises between private sector and state/local

government participants.

• Identifies common operational impediments and gaps and provides

recommendations for solutions.

• Coordinates with state and local government planning and operational activities

and regulatory requirements.

• Promotes awareness, education, and integrated planning.

• Develops products and services.

• Develops recommendations to public and private sector operational leadership.

• Enhances communication between public and private sector participants.

• Leverages the efforts and activities of the Federal Government and its agencies

who may play a role in this effort.

Table 9: Local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Insular Area Government

Roles in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

Table 10: Fed

eral Government Roles in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

Agency

Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

Department of

Agriculture (USDA)

• Provides technical support and access to damage assessments, impacts, needs,

and restoration efforts for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution

in Rural Development Utilities Program-financed systems.

• Provides nutrition assistance to affected people through Supplemental Nutrition

Assistance Program (SNAP), Disaster-SNAP, and the Women Infants and Children

program.

• Produces economic impact information and research on food and agriculture.

• Identify what may be exceptions to the normal utility prioritization process when the situation requires utilities to

reprioritize based on significant consequences or cascading interdependencies resulting from some unique

aspect of the event that might not have been foreseen.

• Coordinate with utilities on prioritizing the restoration of power to CI and the public.

Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

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Agency Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

• Ensures the health and well-being of livestock, wildlife, and crops.

• Ensures the safety and defense of the Nation’s supply of meat, poultry, and

processed egg products.

Department of Defense

(DOD)

• DOD supports federal actions related to power outage incidents requiring temporary

power restoration assistance.

Defense Logistics Agency Energy Office:

• Provides high-end generators through a memorandum of agreement between DLA

and FEMA.

• Bulk Petroleum Services—Provides contract support for the bulk petroleum supply

chain, including worldwide acquisition of fuel-related services such as government-

owned, contractor-operated defense fuel support points and contractor-owned

and -operated defense fuel support points, alongside aircraft fuel delivery, lab

testing and environmental compliance, assessment, and remediation.

• Direct Delivery Fuels/Commercial Specification Fuels – Provides worldwide

acquisition and integrated material management of commercial fuels delivered

directly to military and federal civilian customers.

United States Army Corps of Engineers:

• Responsible for providing temporary power to designated critical facilities.

• Maintains temporary emergency power restoration resources such as USACE

Emergency Power Planning and Response Teams, Advance Contracting Initiative

contractors, 249th Engineer Battalion, SMEs, and the USACE Deployable Tactical

Operations System for communications.

• Assesses critical facilities to determine generator and other requirements for

temporary emergency power.

• Initiates long-term recovery efforts by assessing and coordinating the CI restoration.

• Prepares, delivers, installs, and de-installs generators.

• Provides operations, fueling, service, and maintenance of installed generators.

• Services, maintains, and repairs generators prior to their return to long-term storage

to ensure they are fully mission capable.

Department of Energy

(DO)

• Serves as the SSA for the energy sector; the primary federal agency responsible for

collaborating with the energy sector on emergency preparedness requirements.

• During Stafford Act emergencies, which require coordinated federal support, directs

ESF #12 activities for the energy sector.

• Addresses significant disruptions in energy supplies for any reason, whether

caused by physical disruption of energy transmission and distribution systems,

unexpected operational failure of such systems, acts of terrorism or sabotage, or

unusual economic, international, or political events.

• Assesses the impact that damage to an energy system in one geographic region

may have on energy supplies, systems, and components in other regions relying on

the same system.

• Provides information, in cooperation with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area,

and federal governments and energy industry officials, on energy supply and

demand conditions and the requirements for and availability of materials and

services critical to energy supply systems (e.g., outages, restoration status, energy

infrastructure status).

• Serves as a federal point of contact with the energy industry for information sharing

and requests for assistance from private and public sector owners and operators.

• Provides technical and subject matter expertise regarding energy supplies and

systems to energy asset owners and operators, other federal agencies, and local,

state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments, and conducts field

assments as needed.

• E

xchanges information with the states during a power outage, including the scope,

outages and potential duration by county, and response and recovery efforts

through the EEACs.

• Coordinates and shares information with the Electricity and the Oil and Natural Gas

SCCs, the ERO, and various associations that represent portions of the energy

sector.

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Agency Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

• Serves as a source for reporting of critical energy infrastructure damage and

operating status for the energy systems within an impacted area, as well as the

impacts on regional and national energy systems.

• Applies DOE’s technical expertise to help ensure the security, resiliency, and

survivability of key energy assets and critical energy infrastructure.

Bonneville Power Administration:

• Operates and maintains about three-fourths of the high-voltage transmission within

Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western Montana, and small parts of eastern Montana,

California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.

Southeastern Power Administration:

• Through 23 USACE water projects, markets power to more than 491 wholesale

customers in 10 southeastern states—Alabama, Florida, Georgia, southern Illinois,

Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—

serving over 12 million consumers.

• Schedules hydropower generation at the USACE facilities within its marketing area

to ensure and maintain continuity of electric service to its customers.

Southwestern Power Administration:

• Markets hydroelectric power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma,

and Texas from 24 USACE multipurpose hydroelectric facilities/dams, serving over

eight million end-use customers.

• Operates and maintains 1,380 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, and owns

numerous substations and switching stations, as well as a communications system

to monitor and control the transmission of electricity that includes microwave, very

high frequency radio, and state-of-the-art fiber optics.

Western Area Power Administration:

• Operates and maintains an extensive, integrated, and complex high-voltage power

transmission system to deliver power.

• Using this over-17,000-circuit-mile federal transmission system, sells and delivers

reliable electric power to most of the western half of the United States BPS.

Department of

Homeland Security

(DHS)

• The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic

incident management and is responsible for coordinating federal operations

within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

Federal Emergency Management Agency:

• The FEMA Administrator serves as the principal advisor to the President, the

Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council regarding

emergency management.

• Obtains the latest information on the status of the power outage from DOE,

disseminates CI risk assessments to all authorized government agencies, and

responds to requests for such information.

• Directs power outage questions, issues, and concerns from emergency

management officials to DOE.

• Deploys and provides resources as appropriate to collect data for information

analysis and situational awareness to support operational decisions during a

power outage incident.

• Acquires material and resources to support local, state, tribal, territorial, and

insular area response and recovery operations through existing contracts, and

activates contracts that provide personnel, equipment, and supplies to support

life-sustaining services (e.g., shelter, hydration, meals/food, emergency supplies,

reunification services, durable medical equipment) resulting from a power

outage.

• Coordinates overall staffing of federal emergency management activities at

multiagency coordination centers, including which ESFs/RSFs are activated, the

size and composition of the organizational structure, the level of staffing at

multiagency coordination centers, and identification of required key positions.

• Provides strategic leadership to coordinate and prioritize federal resources and

capabilities to areas affected by the power outage.

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Agency Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

• Develop and promulgate continuity guidance across the whole community to

increase the resiliency of the nation for all threats and hazards.

National Protection and Programs Directorate:

• Leads the national effort to coordinate the overall federal effort to promote the

security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure.

• Office of Cyber Security & Communications:

– Serves as the SSA for the Communications and Information Technology sectors

and provides national-level incident situation reporting for those sectors.

– Serves as the national coordinator for ESF #2 – Communications.

• Office of Emergency Communications:

– Coordinates planning for national security and emergency preparedness

communications for the Federal Government.

– Helps emergency responders and government officials continue to communicate

in the event of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other incidents.

• National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center:

– The operational component of CS&C and the national cyber CI center

designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security; serves as a centralized

location to coordinate and integrate operational elements involved in

cybersecurity and communications reliance, including incident response.

– Engages Cyber Incident Response Teams to assist in identification of security

vulnerabilities, develop mitigation strategies, and support incident response.

• Office of Infrastructure Protection:

– Serves as the national coordinator for the security and resilience of the Nation’s

CI in accordance with the Homeland Security Act and Presidential Policy

Directive (PPD)-21.

– Maintains the NICC, the watch center for DHS NPPD IP, and the CI element of

the National Operations Center.

– Serves as the national physical infrastructure center, designated by the

Secretary of Homeland Security; gathers incident information on the impact to

those sectors for which DHS NPPD IP serves as SSA to provide input for

national CI situation reporting.

– Serves as the SSA for six of the critical sectors designated under PPD 21,

providing guidance and support to other SSAs, and supporting CI incident

response and recovery. DHS NPPD IP may be utilized to facilitate public-private

coordination on a sector-by-sector basis in coordination with the SSA for that

sector.

– Assigns Protective Security Advisors and Regional Directors to serve as liaisons

between local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal government

officials and owners and operators and as infrastructure liaisons at RRCCs and

local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area EOCs.

– Assigns an Infrastructure Liaison as the principal DHS NPPD IP representative

and advisor to the Unified Coordination Staff when a JFO is established.

– Assesses dependencies, interdependencies, and cascading effects to

recommend priorities to local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area officials, to

minimize cascading effects and to support recovery and restoration efforts.

– Gathers incident information on the impact to those sectors for which it serves as

SSA to provide input for national CI situation reporting.

• Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA):

– Coordinates with the NICC and the NCCIC to provide infrastructure

consequence analysis, decision support, and modeling capabilities to public and

private sector partners.

– Develops an IOC List which prioritizes CI that may need support to maximize

recovery and restoration efforts.

– Identifies dependencies on, interdependencies between, and cascading effects

of an incident on CI.

• National Coordination Center for Communications:

– Joint governmental and communications industry partnership assisting in

coordination, restoration and reconstruction of National Security and Emergency

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Agency Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

Preparedness (NS/EP) communications supporting federal, SLTT, and industry

needs

– Serves as the operational focal point of the Communications Information Sharing

and Analysis Center (COMM-ISAC)

– Identifies and Assists in resolving addresses cross-sector dependencies where

communications is a limiting factor or communications requires support

– Deploys ESF#2 communications expertise to NRCC, RRCC, field offices, and

EOCs as appropriate.

Department of Health

and Human Services

(HHS)

• Provides federal assets and capabilities to support time-sensitive, life-saving, and

life-sustaining public health and medical infrastructure as well as stabilization

missions to supplement local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area response and

recovery capabilities.

• Provides augmentation support for mass care and emergency assistance services.

• Provides technical assistance in the form of impact analyses and recovery planning

support of public health and medical services, as well as healthcare service delivery

infrastructure, where appropriate.

• Provides strategic leadership in coordinating care and movement of patients

requiring evacuation.

• Provides situational awareness regarding health and medical issues.

• Provides support for long-term recovery, including collaborating with local, state,

tribal, territorial, and insular area officials on prioritizing restoration of the public

health and private medical and healthcare infrastructures to accelerate overall

community recovery.

• Coordinates linking HHS benefits programs with affected populations.

• Through ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services, works toward mitigating

issues pertaining to healthcare and public health CI, and protects the

wholesomeness of food and food sources through increased monitoring.

Department of the

Interior (DOI)

Bureau of Land Management:

• Provides information on energy production and supply on federal lands.

• Assesses damage to energy-related infrastructure.

• Provides engineering and technical support as necessary.

• Develops and maintains information on critical energy-related infrastructure on

federal and tribal lands.

Bureau of Reclamation:

• Provides technical assistance for the assessment of hydroelectric facilities and

reservoir water operations actions as they affect energy production.

• Uses Bureau of Reclamation personnel to assist in the repair of damaged

hydropower generation facilities.

• Modifies operations at Bureau of Reclamation facilities to increase electrical

generation to supplement losses in areas affected by the incident.

•

Uses hydroelectric plant internal restart.

Department of Justice

(DOJ)

• Leads the law enforcement response to all terrorist and cyber or threats within

federal criminal jurisdiction; supplements state and local law enforcement resources

in certain circumstances.

• Provides public safety and security assistance to support preparedness and

response priorities when needed.

• Provide law enforcement support to local, state, tribal, and territorial authorities to

address public safety and security concerns if requested and with the requisite

authority.

Department of State

(DOS)

•

Acts as the formal diplomatic mechanism for the majority of communications

between the United States Government and other nations regarding the response

to a domestic crisis.

• Maintains the International Coordination Support Annex with United States

interagency coordination to provide support and guidance to the United States

Government on international coordination during the incident.

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Agency Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

• Coordinates and consults with foreign governments and international organizations

during the power outage to determine what, if any, international and diplomatic

impacts and implications exist.

• Notifies foreign governments of travel restrictions and advises American citizens,

businesses, and other United States social/economic entities abroad of the nature

and extent of the power outage in the United States and any direct effect that it

might have on their safety and security.

• Works with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, federal, and NGO officials to

support and facilitate liaison between foreign missions and nationals.

• Coordinates non-energy federal assistance to cross-border communities impacted

by the power outage.

• Coordinates international offers of assistance based on needs conveyed by DHS or

other federal departments and agencies, as stated in the International Assistance

System, while managing and leveraging applicable bilateral and multilateral

agreements and relations.

Department of

Transportation (DOT)

• Actively posts information related to transportation permits, waivers, and other

regulations and authorities that are applicable to a power outage on its contingency

operations website.

• Serves as one of four primary agencies that support USACE in the Infrastructure

Systems RSF structure.

• Supports communication and coordination needs relative to the overall mission of

the Infrastructure Systems RSF.

• Supports the Community Planning and Capacity Building and the Health and Social

Services RSFs.

Environmental

Protection Agency

(EPA)

• Serves as the designated SSA lead for the water sector under HSPD-7 and the

NIPP.

• Works with the water sector in a preparedness role to encourage water utilities to

coordinate with their power utilities on a prioritization list for power restoration after

an outage.

• Coordinates with the water sector (drinking water and wastewater facilities),

including local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal government partners

and the private sector, in support of ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering.

• Coordinates with DOE and state officials to approve and issue motor vehicle fuel

supply waivers under the Clean Air Act and in support of ESF #12.

• Exercises enforcement discretion, where appropriate, where EPA’s environmental

requirements could impede emergency operations of first responders or CI.

• As the coordinating agency for ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response,

addresses the cleanup of any oil and hazardous materials releases under an ESF

#10 mission assignment or under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances

Pollution Contingency Plan. It may decontaminate CI that is contaminated by oil or

hazardous materials, including chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear

substances.

Commission (FERC)

•

Monitors and investigates significant power outages to identify causes and needed

reliability improvements and to determine if reliability standards were violated.

• Through emergency authority under section 1(15) of the Interstate Commerce Act,

gives directions for preference or priority in transportation, embargoes, or

movement of traffic whenever the Commission is of the opinion that an emergency

requiring immediate action exists in any section of the country.

• Acts on requests to waive tariff provisions during an emergency.

• Shares timely actionable information regarding grid security with appropriate key

personnel of owners, operators, and users of the critical electric infrastructure.

• Share with, or receives from, any non-federal entity or the Federal Government a

cyber threat indicator or defensive measure.

• Receives prior notification of sector-specific alerts developed by the NERC-

Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) in the event of a

significant incident or threat that affects the BPS.

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Agency Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

General Services

Administration (GSA)

• Provides contract support for generators and related items; also transportation

services and leasing for space, as requested.

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC)

• Serves as the primary agency for federal response to radiological incidents at a

facility or incidents caused by material that is licensed by the NRC or an NRC

Agreement State. These facilities include, but are not limited to, commercial nuclear

power plants, fuel cycle facilities, DOE-owned gaseous diffusion facilities operating

under NRC regulatory oversight, independent spent fuel storage installations,

radiopharmaceutical manufacturers, and research reactors.

• Performs an independent assessment of the incident and potential off-site

consequences from FEMA disaster-initiated review and, as appropriate, provides

recommendations concerning any protective measures.

• Performs oversight of the licensee, to include monitoring, evaluation of protective

action recommendations, advice, assistance, and, as appropriate, direction.

• Dispatches, if appropriate, an NRC site team of technical experts to the licensee’s

facility.

Tennessee Valley

Authority (TVA)

•

Provides electricity for business customers and local power distributors serving nine

million people in parts of seven southeastern states, Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky,

Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.

• Assesses supply, system damage, and repair requirements within TVA.

• Supplies surplus power as required to the power grid.

• Supplies critical replacement parts and equipment as requested.

•

Supplies technical expertise as requested.

Table 11: Non-Governmental Organization Roles in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

Organization

Roles and Responsibilities in a Long-Term Power Outage Incident

American Red Cross

(ARC)

•

Roles and responsibilities for the ARC are included in the ESF and RSF annexes

and the Response and Recovery FIOPs.

National Voluntary

Organizations Active in

Disasters (NVOAD)

• Roles and responsibilities for NVOAD are included in the ESF and RSF annexes

and the Response and Recovery FIOPs.

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Appendix 5: Power Outage Modeling Capabilities

and Tools

A variety of modeling and situational awareness tools and capabilities exist that can provide

situational awareness on energy-specific functions. Some of these tools are owned and operated

by SMEs in dedicated modeling centers while others are available to end users to operate on their

own devices (e.g., computers, smartphones, and tablets). This appendix includes an explanation

of the tools, tool management, and tool access; however, it should be noted that DOE is the

source for all status and official reporting for the Federal Government for the energy sector.

Modeling Tools

EAGLE-I

The Environment for Analysis of Geo-Located Energy Information (EAGLE-I), which was

developed by staff at DOE Headquarters, is a web-based visualization and situational awareness

system comprised of numerous applications. Use of EAGLE-I is limited to Federal Government

personnel only, and while there are currently over 600 users across the federal community, some

EAGLE-I data and applications can only be accessed by DOE personnel. The National Outage

Map component of EAGLE-I provides federal users with accurate, timely coverage of electric

customer outage information, aggregated and visualized at the county level, sourced directly

from utility company websites, and refreshed every 15 minutes. (https://eagle-

i.doe.gov/default.aspx)

Figure 16 shows a screenshot from EAGLE-I.

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Figure 16: Screenshot from EAGLE-I

EAR S S

The Energy Assurance and Resiliency Standardized Services (EARSS) system was developed by

Oak Ridge National Laboratory to disseminate the analysis of impacts of technological, man-

made, and extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, wild fires, and ice storms, on energy hubs

and energy delivery infrastructures. The system provides predictive and post-event impact

analysis on energy infrastructure nodes and links, as well as population at risk.

The data and analyses are available both in a visualization platform called the EARSS

CONNECTOR and/or as inputs into other models or overlays for additional analyses by the user

communities through a geoserver platform called the EARSS Geo Server.

(https://earss.extranet.ornl.gov/geoserver/web/).

Figure 17 shows a screenshot from EARSS.

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Figure 17: Screenshot from EARSS

HHS empower Mapping Tool

The HHS emPOWER Map Tool, owned by HHS, is an interactive online mapping tool that is

helping community health and emergency management officials to better anticipate, plan for, and

respond to the needs of at risk individuals that rely on electricity-dependent medical and assistive

equipment and devices to live independently in their homes. The map provides a monthly total of

Medicare beneficiary claims for electricity-dependent equipment and devices at the national,

state, territory, county and zip code levels. The tools also provide near real-time National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) severe weather and other natural hazard

tracking services to help identify impacted areas and estimate the number of electricity-

dependent individuals that may rapidly seek assistance from first responders, hospitals and

emergency shelters and their equipment and batteries fail.

The integrated data accessible through the HHS emPOWER Map can help community

organizations, including hospitals, first responders, and electric company officials, work with

health officials to minimize health impacts of prolonged power outages due to storms and other

disasters on vulnerable residents.

Emergency planners, using emPOWER, can participate and plan for emergency shelters that may

experience greater electricity-dependent Medicare beneficiaries nearby. First responders and

hospitals can better anticipate and plan for a surge in assistance calls and care demands. Local

officials can also more accurately estimate transportation and evacuation assistance needs and

identify areas that may require recharging stations or be prioritize for power restoration.

(https://empowermap.hhs.gov)

Figure 18 shows a screenshot from emPOWER.

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Figure 18: Screenshot from emPOWER

EPFAT

Following disasters that disrupt the commercial power service, generators are often required at

critical public facilities such as water treatment plants, hospitals, wastewater treatment plants and

shelters. USACE assists FEMA in providing temporary emergency power at critical public

facilities identified by state officials. Facility assessment data is required before a generator can

be sourced and installed.

The Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT) is a secure web-based tool used by

critical public facility owners/operators or emergency response agencies to input, store, update

and/or provide temporary emergency power under Stafford Act Declaration events and for local

responders to provide emergency power assessment data under non-Stafford events. Having pre-

installation assessment data in advance expedites USACE’s abilities to provide temporary power.

(http://epfat.swf.usace.army.mil)

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EPRAM (National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center

The Evolutionary Prototyping with Risk Analysis and Mitigation (EPRAM) electric restoration

analysis model is a National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) tool

developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. It determines the impact of network-level

damage on electric power restoration by analyzing work rates and substation priorities, critical

path activities, and time to restore. Model characteristics include national-scale data coverage,

cellular automata technique, and simulation of work management practices used by electric

companies during a variety of natural and manmade events.

EPRAM’s cellular automata approach builds on geo-spatial representations of electric substation

service areas. Service areas are initially modeled as contiguous polygons at “normal” status.

During a damage event, service areas progress from “outage” to “partially restored” to “fully

restored.” The model incorporates constraints such as priority scheduling of field crews,

availability of spares, line switching, generator black-start options, travel time across damaged

areas, and the extent of debris. EPRAM provides a variety of outputs such as charts of aggregate

event (time to restoration), geo-spatial restoration sequences, tabular lists of critical facility

impacts, and work crew assignments.

EPRAM (USACE)

The Emergency Power Readiness Assessment Model (EPRAM) is a modeling tool in the

USACE SimSuite web-based series of planning tools. It allows USACE to identify a specific

geographical incident impact area and then query critical facilities within that area to help

determine potential requirements for temporary emergency power generators. This web site can

only be accessed by a user who is operating on an “army.mil” IT network.

(http://simsuite.usace.army.mil/simsuite/index.html#/portal)

Figure shows a screenshot from USACE EPRAM.

Figure19: USACE EPRAM Screenshot

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HAZUS-MH

Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard (HAZUS-MH) is a nationally applicable standardized methodology

that estimates potential losses from earthquakes, hurricane winds, and floods. FEMA developed

HAZUS-MH under contract with the National Institute of Building Sciences.

HAZUS-MH uses state-of-the-art Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software to map and

display hazard data and the results of damage and economic loss estimates for buildings and

infrastructure. It also allows users to estimate the impacts of earthquakes, hurricane winds, and

floods on populations. (https://www.fema.gov/hazus)

MoDI

The Model and Data Inventory (MoDI) is an interactive, web-based tool that provides an

inventory of the datasets and models used across the federal interagency community to support

operational decision making. The MoDI is a product of the ESF Leadership Group (ESFLG)

Modeling and Data Working Group (MDWG). The Director of FEMA’s Planning and Exercise

Division, Response Directorate, chairs the MDWG. The ESFLG selects the members, who

include subject matter experts, program managers, and program directors representing each of

the federal ESFs.

The ESFLG MoDI contains information about individual models and datasets, including quick

summaries and detailed technical information to support both end users and technical specialists.

Access and point of contact information are provided for each dataset and model, and each entry

is tagged with key information about when the dataset or model is useful during emergency

response and to which hazard(s), core capabilities, and support functions it applies. An

interactive analysis tool allows users to explore the connections between models and datasets and

how information flows between them. (http://gis.fema.gov/Model-and-Data-Inventory/)

Figure 19 shows a screenshot from MoDI.

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Figure 19: Screenshot from MoDI

Table 12 provides an at-a-glance summary of the modeling tools and their owners, availability,

and method of access.

Table 12: Modeling Tools to Assist in a Power Outage Incident

Modeling

Tool

Proprietary Owner/Source Availability Access

EAGLE-I

DOE/Sourced directly from utility

companies as well as DOE,

federal and private data sources

Federal employees

only

Controlled by DOE: https://eagle-

i.doe.gov/default.aspx

EARSS

Oakridge National Laboratory

Access from Oakridge

National Laboratory

required

Controlled by Oakridge National

Laboratory:

https://earss.extranet.ornl.gov/geoserver

/web/

emPOWER

HHS

Publicly available for

emergency planners

Controlled by HHS:

http://empowermap.phe.gov”

EPFAT

USACE

Critical Public Facility

Owners/Operators

Controlled by USACE:

http://epfat.swf.usace.army.mil/

EPRAM

NISAC

Federal employees

only

Controlled by Los Alamos National

Laboratory

EPRAM

USACE

Limited to army.mil

users

Controlled by USACE:

http://simsuite.usace.army.mil/simsuite/i

ndex.html#/portal

HAZUS

FEMA

Publicly available

through web portal

Controlled by FEMA:

https://www.fema.gov/hazus

MoDI

FEMA

Analysis available for

response phases

(recovery underway)

Controlled by FEMA:

http://gis.fema.gov/Model-and-Data-

Inventory/

Figure 20 shows a mapping of optimal tool usage against the incident response phases.

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Figure 20: Power Outage Modeling Tools in the Response and Recovery Phases

Situational Awareness Reporting

EAD

The Energy Assurance Daily (EAD), produced by DOE, provides a summary of public

information concerning current energy issues. Published Monday through Friday to inform

stakeholders of developments affecting energy systems, flows, and markets, it provides

highlights of energy issues rather than comprehensive coverage.

The EAD addresses:

• Major energy developments

• Electricity, petroleum, and natural gas industries

• Other relevant news

• Energy prices

The EAD is available to the public online (http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/ead.aspx) and is posted on

HSIN.

EARSS

In addition to its modeling, EARSS also provides situational awareness of various data sets

required to respond to a long-term power outage.

• Monitoring capability:

o Situational awareness of distribution outages

o Real-time weather overlays

o Real-time detection and notification of naturally occurring extreme events

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• Energy infrastructure situational awareness:

o Coal delivery and rail lines

o Refinery and oil wells

o Natural gas pipelines

o Transportation and evacuation routes

o Population impacts

FCC DIRS

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Disaster Information Reposting System

(DIRS) is a voluntary, web-based system that communications companies, including wireless,

wireline, broadcast, and cable providers, can use to report communications infrastructure status

and situational awareness information during times of crisis. In the event of a major disaster, the

FCC and DHS NPPD National Coordination Center for Communications (NCC) need accurate

information regarding the status of communications services in the disaster area, particularly

during restoration efforts. (http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/cip/dirs/dirs.html)

When jointly activated by DHS and FCC, DIRS collects information concerning the following:

(https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/cip/dirs/dirs.html)

Form OE-417

Through the Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report (Form OE-417), information is

collected on major electric system incidents and emergencies to inform DOE. Electric companies

that operate as Control Area Operators and/or Reliability Authorities, as well as other electric

companies as appropriate, are required to file the form whenever an electrical incident or

disturbance is sufficiently large enough to cross the reporting thresholds. Reporting coverage for

the Form OE-417 includes all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States

Virgin Islands, and the United States Trust Territories. DOE uses the information to fulfill its

overall national security and other energy emergency management responsibilities as well as for

analytical purposes. While Form OE-417 Annual Summaries are available on the DOE website,

the actual reports are protected, to the extent possible, consistent with federal law.

GeoHEALTH

GeoHEALTH (formerly MedMap) is a secure, GIS-based, electronic, interactive mapping

application. This application incorporates information from numerous sources both internal and

external to HHS. It includes other federal and public agencies such as NOAA and the United

States Geological Survey, as well as other NGOs, into a single visual environment for enhanced

situational awareness, assessment, and management of resources for planning and response to

natural or manmade incidents.

This system supports functions such as policy analysis, planning, course of action comparison,

incident management, and training. It supports the needs of decision makers at various levels

within HHS and other federal agencies to provide enhanced situational awareness at a level of

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granularity needed for all responders, including regional emergency coordinators and teams in

the field. It also displays and provides details on medical care sites, resources, and mobilization

points and provides analytical tools for planning and preparedness efforts. During a large event

such as an improvised explosive device or hurricane, there is the need to immediately determine

medical care sites, resources and mobilization points and modify information as it becomes

available and changes. (http://geohealth.hhs.gov)

Outage Control

Outage Central is a portal that provides emergency response personnel with comprehensive

outage links, severe weather alerts, and outage news. Operated by an independent company, it is

accessible to the public, responders, and utilities. Information on outages is organized by states

and regional mutual aid groups.

U.S. Electric System Operating Data Tool

Through Form EIA-930, the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects hourly

forecast and actual demand data from all 66 U.S. balancing authorities operating in the lower 48

states. This data is collected 24/7/365 and made publicly available within an hour and a half of

the end of the operating hour on EIA’s website through the Electric System Operating Data Tool

webpages.

Significant disruptions of balancing authority demand due to weather events or facility outages

appear promptly in the tool. It allows users to track system recovery hourly by comparing current

actual system demand with demand forecasts and historical actual demand for previous

comparable periods.

Table 13 provides an at-a-glance summary of the situational awareness tools and their owners,

availability, and method of access.

Table 13: Situational Awareness Tools to Assist in a Power Outage Incident

Situational

Awareness Tool

Proprietary

Owner/Source

Availability Access

DIRS

FCC

Voluntary Access

http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/

cip/dirs/dirs.html

EAD

DOE

Available to the public,

published M–F

http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/ead.aspx

EARSS

Oakridge National

Laboratory

Access from Oakridge

National Laboratory required

Controlled by Oakridge National

Laboratory:

https://earss.extranet.ornl.gov/geoser

ver/web/

Form OE-417

DOE

Schedule 1 information may

be publicly released, Schedule

2 information is protected in

accordance with applicable

laws

The form is available on DOE public

website by date and time group;

however, report information is

controlled by DOE. Annual report

summaries are available on DOE's

public Web site.

GeoHEALTH

HHS

Some available to the public,

restricted access for others

http://geohealth.hhs.gov

Outage Central

Macrosoft

Available to the public

http://www.outagecentral.com/

U.S. Electric

System

U.S. Department of

Energy/Energy

U.S. Electric System

Operating Data Tool/Form

EIA-930

http://www.eia.gov/beta/realtime_grid

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Situational

Awareness Tool

Proprietary

Owner/Source

Availability Access

Operating Data

Tool

Information

Administration (EIA)

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Appendix 6: Authorities and References

The tables in this appendix summarize specific authorities relevant to a long-term power outage.

The NRF, NDRF, and the Response and Recovery FIOPs provide a list of overarching incident

management authorities.

Nothing in this annex alters or impedes the ability of federal agencies to carry out their

respective authorities and associated responsibilities under law. This annex does not create new

authorities nor change existing ones.

Table 14: Applicable Statutes

Title

Date

Applicability to a Power Outage

Clean Air Act

(42 U.S.C., Chapter 85)

1970

Section 211 (c)(4)(C) provision allows EPA (upon request from a

governor) to issue waivers to motor vehicle fuel requirements to

address short-term fuel supply shortages. Such waivers may also

benefit first responders and emergency response equipment.

Clean Water Act

(33 U.S.C.)

1972

Employs a variety of regulatory and non-regulatory tools to reduce

direct pollutant discharges into the Nation’s waterways, finance

wastewater treatment facilities, and manage polluted runoff. It also

gives the EPA authority to implement pollution control programs and

to set wastewater standards for industry and limitations on

contaminants in surface waters. Its broader goal is to help restore

and maintain the chemical, biological, and physical integrity of the

Nation’s waters.

ritical Infrastructure

Information Act of 2002

(P.L. 107-296)

2002

Establishes the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)

Program. It creates a framework that enables members of the

private sector to voluntarily submit sensitive information regarding

the Nation’s CI to DHS with assurance that the government will not

expose sensitive or proprietary data. It also establishes the PCII

Program Office within DHS NPPD IP.

Cybersecurity Information

Sharing Act of 2015

(P.L. 114-113)

2015

Enhances the ability of federal and non-federal entities to share

information about cybersecurity threats.

Defense Production Act

(DPA)

(50 U.S.C.)

1950

Authority to require acceptance and priority performance of

contracts and orders to promote national defense, which includes

emergency preparedness activities conducted pursuant to Title VI of

the Stafford Act and CI protection and restoration, or to maximize

domestic energy supplies. The Federal Priorities and Allocations

System administers the placement of DPA priority ratings in

contracts involving industrial, agricultural, health, energy, and

transportation resources and services. The President delegated

authority to require acceptance and priority performance of contracts

or orders for these categories of resources and services to DOC,

USDA, HHS, DOE, and DOT, respectively. Through the placement

of priority ratings in contracts, private sector contractors,

subcontractors, vendors, and suppliers are required to give

preferential treatment for contracts and orders. This authority can

ensure timely delivery of materials and services from private

businesses to restore power disruptions. Priority ratings can be

placed on either government (local, state, federal) or private sector

contracts. Additionally, the installation of government-owned

equipment authority may expedite and prioritize restoration of both

public and private power infrastructure disrupted by either natural or

human-caused hazards. Voluntary agreements under DPA may

facilitate cooperation among business competitors to protect or

restore power systems in connection with natural disasters or acts of

terrorism. Participants in a voluntary agreement are granted relief

from antitrust laws.

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Title Date Applicability to a Power Outage

DOE Organization Act

(P.L. 95-91)

1977

Established DOE. DOE has the authority to obtain current

information regarding emergencies in the electric supply systems in

the United States as provided by other statutes such as the Federal

Energy Administration Act of 1974. DOE has established mandatory

reporting requirements for electric power system incidents or

possible incidents to meet DOE’s national security requirements and

other responsibilities.

Emergency

Reconstruction of

Interstate Natural

Gas Facilities Under the

Natural Gas Act

(18 CFR, Parts 153, 157,

and 375)

2003

FERC regulations enable interstate natural gas pipeline companies,

under emergency conditions, to replace mainline facilities using—if

necessary—a route other than the existing right-of-way, and to

waive the 45-day prior notice requirement and cost constraints.

Energy Policy and

Conservation Act (EPCA)

(P.L. 94-133)

1975

EPCA’s goals are to increase energy production and supply, reduce

energy demand, provide energy efficiency, and give the Executive

Branch additional powers to respond to disruptions in energy supply.

• Sections 151–191 authorize DOE to establish and operate the

SPR, including the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve.

• Section 161(h) empowers the President to draw down the SPR in

circumstances other than a “severe energy supply interruption” or

a need to meet United States obligations under international

energy program.

• Pursuant to section 181, the Secretary establishes and maintains

the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve.

Energy Policy Act of 2005

(P.L. 109-58)

2005

Title XII, Electricity, Subtitle A: Reliability Standards, Section 1211:

Electric Reliability Standards; Electricity Modernization Act of 2005

provides for federal jurisdiction over certain activities that are

required to support reliability of the United States BPS. Title XII

authorizes FERC to certify a national ERO to enforce mandatory

reliability standards for the BPS. FERC oversee the ERO and

approves all ERO standards. The ERO can impose penalties on a

user, owner, or operator of the BPS for violations of any FERC-

approved reliability standard, but such penalties are subject to

FERC review and potential change.

Fixing America’s Surface

Transportation (FAST) Act

(P.L. 114-94)

2015

• Amends Part II of the Federal Power Act by adding a new section

215(A) which authorizes the Secretary of Energy to order

emergency measures to protect or restore the reliability of critical

electric infrastructure or of defense critical electric infrastructure

upon a presidential finding of a Grid Security Emergency.

• Requires DOE, FERC, and other appropriate federal agencies, to

the extent practicable and consistent with their obligations, to

protect classified and critical electric infrastructure information and

share timely actionable information regarding grid security with

appropriate key personnel of owners, operators, and users of the

critical electric infrastructure.

Federal Power Act

(16 U.S.C, Chapter 12)

1920

• Created the Federal Power Commission as the licensing authority

for hydroelectric plants; its authority was subsequently transferred

to FERC upon its creation.

• The Secretary of Energy, under Section 202(c), has authority in

time of war or other emergency to order temporary

interconnections of facilities and generation, delivery, interchange,

or transmission of electric energy that the Secretary deems

necessary to meet an emergency.

• Establishes the Critical Electric Infrastructure Information (CEII)

program. It authorizes DOE and FERC to designate certain

sensitive information provided to the Federal Government as CEII

and protect the information from disclosure under the Freedom of

Information Act.

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Title Date Applicability to a Power Outage

Foreign Assistance Act

(P.L. 87–195)

1961

Reorganizes the structure of United States foreign assistance

programs, separated military from non-military aid, and creates a

new agency within DOS, the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) to coordinate the United States

Government’s response to disasters overseas.

Natural Gas Act

(15 U.S.C., Chapter 15b)

1938

•

Gives the President authority to declare a natural gas supply

emergency.

• Allows DOE to authorize imports and exports of natural gas.

Provides FERC the authority to approve the siting of and

abandonment of interstate natural gas facilities, including

pipelines, storage, and liquefied natural gas facilities.

• Delegates authority over the construction, operation, and siting of

particular facilities to the FERC.

• Provides DOE with the authority to order any interstate pipeline or

local distribution company served by an interstate pipeline to

allocate natural gas to help meet the needs of high-priority

consumers during a natural gas emergency.

Power Plant and Industrial

Fuel Use Act (FUA)

(42 U.S.C.)

1978

• Under section 404(a), gives the President authority to allocate coal

(and require the transportation of coal) for use by any power plant

or major fuel-burning installation during a declared severe energy

supply interruption as defined by section 3(8) of EPCA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6202(8).

• Section 404(b) authorizes the President to prohibit the use by any

power plant or major fuel-burning installation of petroleum or

natural gas, or both, as a primary energy source.

Safe Drinking Water Act

(42 U.S.C., Section 300f et

seq.)

1974,

amended

1986 and

1996

Protects the quality of public drinking water supplies in the United

States. Under the SDWA, EPA sets standards and treatment

requirements for public water supplies. Regulations are in place for

constituents that my pose health risks and that are likely to be

present in public water supplies (microorganisms, disinfectants,

disinfection byproducts, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals and

radionuclides.) After a power outage, water pressure fluctuation in

the distribution system and/or loss of power at the treatment plant

may increase contaminant intrusion or risk of compromised water

quality. SDWA requirements require compliance monitoring to

assure water quality meets safe drinking water standards.

Table 15: Applicable FERC Orders

Title

Date

Applicability to a Power Outage

Certifying NERC as the

ERO (Docket No. RR06-1-

000)

July 20,

2006

Pursuant to Energy Policy Act of 2005, FERC conditionally certified

the NERC as the Nation’s ERO.

• NERC must make specified changes and file them with FERC to

continue as the ERO.

• Develops and enforces mandatory electric reliability standards

under FERC’s oversight. The standards will apply to all users,

owners, and operators of the BPS.

Order on Application for

Blanket Authorization for

Transfers of Jurisdictional

Facilities and Petition for

Declaratory Order

(Docket Nos. EC06-140-

000, EL06-86-000)

September

22, 2006

The FERC Commission approved EEI to expand membership of the

Spare Transformer Sharing Agreement that provides a blanket

authorization for any jurisdictional public utility party to the

Agreement to engage in future transfers of transformers pursuant to

the Agreement, including transfers of transformers by public utilities

to their affiliates.

Mandatory Reliability

Standards for Critical

Infrastructure Protection

(CIP)

(Docket No. RM06-22-000)

January 18,

2008

Pursuant to Section 215 of the Federal Power Act, FERC approved

eight CIP Reliability Standards submitted by NERC. The standards

require certain users, owners, and operators of the BPS to comply

with specific requirements to safeguard critical cyber assets.

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Title Date Applicability to a Power Outage

Approving Revised

Reliability Standards for

CIP and Requiring

Compliance Filing

(Docket No. RD09-7-000)

September

30, 2009

The FERC Commission approved the CIP Reliability Standards in

Order No. 706 and directed NERC to develop modifications to the

CIP Reliability Standards to address specific concerns. The order in

Docket No. RD09-7-000 approves version 2 of the CIP standards

by: (1) removing the “reasonable business judgment” language from

each of the Standards; (2) removing the “acceptance of risk”

exceptions from each of the Standards; (3) adding specific

conditions that a Responsible Entity must satisfy to invoke the

technical feasibility exception; and (4) adding review and oversight

regarding creating a risk-based assessment methodology for critical

cyber asset identification in CIP-002-1.

Order No. 761, Final Rule

Approving Version 4

Critical Infrastructure

Protection Reliability

Standards

(Docket No. RM11-11-000)

April 19,

2012

FERC approved eight modified CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-002-4

through CIP-009-4, developed and submitted by NERC.

• The CIP Reliability Standards provide a cybersecurity framework

to identify and protect “Critical Cyber Assets” to support the

reliable operation of the BPS.

• Reliability Standard CIP-002-4 requires the identification and

documentation of Critical Cyber Assets associated with “Critical

Assets” that support the reliable operation of the BPS and

introduces “bright line” criteria for the identification of Critical

Assets.

Order No. 791, Final Rule

Approving Version 5

Critical Infrastructure

Protection Reliability

Standards

(Docket No. RM13-5-000)

November

22, 2013

FERC approved the Version 5 CIP Reliability Standards, CIP-002-5

through CIP-011-1, submitted by NERC.

• The CIP version 5 Standards adopt new cyber security controls

and extend the scope of the systems that are protected by the CIP

Reliability Standards.

Order No. 802, Final Rule

Approving Physical

Security Reliability

Standard

(Docket No. RM14-15-000)

November

20, 2014

FERC directed NERC to submit one or more Reliability Standards

that require certain registered entities to take steps, or demonstrate

that they have taken steps, to address physical security risks and

vulnerabilities related to the reliable operation of the BPS. These

steps require owners or operators of the BPS, as appropriate, to

identify facilities on the BPS that are critical to its reliable operation.

The owners or operators of those critical facilities should develop,

validate, and implement plans to protect against physical attacks

that may compromise the operability or recovery of such facilities.

Order No. 822, Final Rule

Approving Revised

Critical Infrastructure

Protection Reliability

Standards

(Docket No. RM15-14-000)

January 21,

2016

FERC approved seven CIP Reliability Standards: CIP-003-6

(Security Management Controls), CIP-004-6 (Personnel and

Training), CIP-006-6 (Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems),

CIP-007-6 (Systems Security Management), CIP-009-6 (Recovery

Plans for BES Cyber Systems), CIP-010-2 (Configuration Change

Management and Vulnerability Assessments), and CIP-011-2

(Information Protection).

Order No. 829, Order

Directing NERC to

Develop Revised Critical

Infrastructure Protection

Reliability Standard that

Addresses Supply Chain

Risk Management

(Docket No. RM15-14-002)

July 21,

2016

FERC directed NERC to develop a new or modified reliability

standard to address supply chain risk management for industrial

control system hardware, software, and computing and networking

services associated with bulk electric system operations. The new or

modified reliability standard is intended to mitigate the risk of a

cybersecurity incident affecting the reliable operation of the BPS.

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ble 16: Executive Orders and Presidential Directives

Title

Date

Description

Executive Order (E.O.)

12038, Relating to

Certain Functions

Transferred to the

Secretary of Energy by

the DOE Organization

Act

February 3,

1978

Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to issue Presidential permits for

the construction, operation, maintenance, and connection of electric

transmission facilities at U.S. international borders, if it determines that

the issuance of such a permit is in the public interest.

E.O. 13636, Improving

Critical Infrastructure

Cybersecurity

February 12,

2013

Directs the Executive Branch to––

• Develop a technology-neutral voluntary cybersecurity framework;

• Promote and incentivize the adoption of cybersecurity practices;

• Increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat

information sharing;

• Incorporate strong privacy and civil liberties protections into every

initiative to secure our CI; and

• Explore the use of existing regulation to promote cyber security.

PPD-21, Critical

Infrastructure Security

and Resilience

February 12,

2013

Addresses the roles and responsibilities across the Federal

Government and establishes a more effective partnership with CI

owners and operators and local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular

area entities to enhance CI’s security and resilience. Replaces HSPD-

7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.

PPD-41, United States

Cyber Incident

Coordination

July 26, 2016

Sets forth principles governing the Federal Government’s response to

any cyber incident, whether involving government or private sector

entities. For significant cyber incidents, this PPD also establishes lead

federal agencies and an architecture for coordinating the broader

Federal Government response.

Table 17: Waivers and Other Regulatory Relief

Core Capability(s)

Lead Agency and Description

Economic Recovery

FERC:

• During an emergency, FERC may consider waiving tariff provisions that may

interfere with restoration efforts.

Environmental

Response Health and

Safety

EPA:

• The Clean Air Act, Section 211 (c)(4)(C) allows EPA (upon request from a

governor), to issue waivers to motor vehicle fuel requirements to address short-term

fuel supply shortages. Such waivers may also benefit first responders and

emergency response equipment.

• In an extraordinary situation during an emergency, EPA could potentially issue a No

Action Assurance that allows fuel loading and unloading without the use of vapor

recovery or vapor combustion devices at bulk gasoline and marine loading terminals

and associated truck racks, as otherwise required under the Clean Air Act.

Planning/ Operational

Coordination

FEMA:

• During an emergency, waivers can be offered on reporting requirements, enabling

responders to focus more fully on the restoration efforts.

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Core Capability(s)

Lead Agency and Description

Critical Transportation

DOT:

• The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Emergency Relief Docket (ERD) is a

special provision regulation that provides expedited review and approval of waiver

requests from railroads related to a specific emergency. The Administrator of the

FRA can designate specific events, such as emergencies to trigger the opening of

the ERD.

• Exemptions (“waivers”) from many of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

(FMCSRs) occur “automatically” in accordance with 49 CFR 390.23 when the

President, a governor, or a local government official issues a declaration of

emergency (as defined in 49 CFR 390.5). Presidential and state declarations are

effective for up to 30 days, and local declarations are effective for up to five days.

Only a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Field Administrator or

Regional Field Administrator has authority to extend the waivers beyond the initial

30 days and to place additional restrictions on the waivers. The waivers apply to any

commercial motor vehicle responding from anywhere in the United States to provide

direct relief to the emergency.

• The Hours of Service limitations do not apply to a driver of a utility service vehicle as

defined in 49 CFR § 395.2.

• The Federal Government does not issue permits for oversize or overweight vehicles.

State DOTs may grant these permits. To obtain state permits, travelers need to

contact the state(s) in which they need to travel. For more information see the

following link:

http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/sw/permit_report/index.h

tm.

• The Federal Government does not issue toll waivers. Toll waivers may be issued on

a case-by-case basis by the state, local authority, or private entity that owns the

specific piece of tolled infrastructure.

Mass Care

FEMA:

• Issues waivers of the GSA lodging rate used to determine allowable room night

charges for survivors in the TSA program.

Table 18: Source Documents and References (Federal)

Department

or Agency

Document or Reference Year

DOE

Energy: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the

National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/Energy_SSP_Public.pdf

2007

DOE

Energy Infrastructure Risk Framework, United States DOE Office of Electricity Delivery

and Energy Reliability, Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration Division,

Identifying Dependencies and Interdependencies, 2011.

2011

DOE

NERC: Severe Impact Resilience: Considerations and Recommendations.

http://www.nerc.com/docs/oc/sirtf/SIRTF_Final_May_9_2012-Board_Accepted.pdf

2012

DHS

National Infrastructure Protection Plan. https://www.dhs.gov/publication/nipp-2013-

partnering-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience

2013

DOE & DHS

2015 Energy Sector Specific Plan.

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-energy-2015-508.pdf

2015

FEMA

FEMA: ESF #12 Data Requirements for Emergency Management

2015

DOE

United States Electricity Industry Primer, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy

Reliability, United States DOE, DOE/OE-0017, August 2016 Revised Edition.

2015

FEMA

International Assistance Systems Concept of Operationshttp://www.fema.gov/media-

library-data/1444411200092-

5b09869d53801ceb5640c00b2f337e64/2015_IAS_CONOPS_Public_Version_Accessib

le.pdf

2016

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Table 19: Source Documents and References (Industry)

Industry Stakeholders (Private and Public Sector)

Year

EEI: “How the National Response Event Framework Is Different From the Current Mutual Assistance

Program.” http://www.eei.org

2014

EEI: “Responding with the Strength of an Industry: Understanding The Investor-Owned Electric Utility

Industry’s National Response Event Plan.” http://www.eei.org

2014

American Public Power Association: “Public Power Mutual Aid Playbook.”

http://www.publicpower.org

2014

ESCC Playbook: “A Crisis Management Framework for the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council

(ESCC).”

2015

EEI: “Understanding the Electric Power Industry’s Response and Restoration Process.”

http://ww.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/electricreliability/mutualassistance/Documents/MA_101FINAL.pdf

2016

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Appendix 7: Glossary

Access and functional needs. Individual circumstances requiring assistance, accommodation, or

modification for mobility, communication, transportation, safety, health maintenance, etc., due to

any temporary or permanent situation that limits an individual’s ability to take action during an

incident.

American Public Power Association. The national service organization representing the

interests of not-for-profit, state, municipal, and other locally owned electric companies in the

United States. More than 2,000 public power utilities, doing business in every state but Hawaii,

account for over 15 percent of all electric energy (kilowatt-hours) sales to ultimate consumers in

the Nation and collectively serve over 48 million people. APPA utility members’ primary goal is

providing customers in the communities they serve with reliable electric power and energy at the

lowest reasonable cost, consistent with good environmental stewardship.

American Public Power Association Mutual Aid Working Group. A mutual aid network for

the Nation’s public power utilities. Each of the ten regions has appointed a Public Power

Network Coordinator who works with the public power utilities in the applicable regions on

coordinating any federal/state support needed to APPA.

Assessment. The process of acquiring, collecting, processing, examining, analyzing, evaluating,

monitoring, and interpreting the data, information, evidence, objects, measurements, images, and

sound, among others, whether tangible or intangible, to provide a basis for decision making.

Black start resources. Generating units that have the ability to be started without support from

the rest of the bulk power system, or are designed to remain energized without connection to the

remainder of the bulk power system, and can be used to restart other generating units as part of

the process of re-energizing the system.

Bulk Electric System. The electrical generation resources, transmission lines, interconnections

with neighboring systems, and associated equipment, generally operated at voltages of 100

kilovolts or higher.

Bulk Power System. A large interconnected electrical system made up of generation and

transmission facilities and their control systems. A BPS does not include facilities used in the

local distribution of electric energy. If a bulk power system is disrupted, the effects are felt in

more than one location. In the United States, the NERC oversees the BPS.

Collaborate. The process of working together to achieve shared goals.

Core Capabilities. Distinct critical elements necessary to achieve the National Preparedness

Goal.

Critical Infrastructure. Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United

States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating

impact on security, national economic security, national public health or medical, or safety, or

any combination of those matters. (Source: NIPP)

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Cybersecurity. The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of, and, if

needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems and the

information contained therein to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Includes

protection and restoration, when needed, of information networks and wireline, wireless,

satellite, public safety answering points, and 9-1-1 communications systems and control systems.

(Source: NIPP)

Defense Production Act. The Defense Production Act

(DPA) is the primary source of

presidential authority to expedite and expand the supply of critical resources from the U.S.

industrial base to support the national defense and homeland security. In addition to military,

energy, and space activities, the DPA definition of “national defense” includes emergency

preparedness activities conducted pursuant to Title VI of the Stafford Act, protection and

restoration of critical infrastructure, and efforts so prevent, reduce vulnerability to, minimize

damage from, and recover from acts of terrorism within the United States. The President’s DPA

authorities are delegated to the head of various federal departments in Executive Order 13603.

DPA, however does not necessarily increase the production of critical resources if those

production lines are already operating at a maximum capacity and the demand for such resources

are high resulting in significant national shortages.

Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The E-ISAC gathers and analyzes

security information, coordinates incident management, and communicates mitigation strategies

with stakeholders within the electricity subsector, across interdependent sectors, and with

government partners. The E-ISAC, in collaboration with DOE and the ESCC, serves as the

primary security communications channel for the electricity subsector and enhances the

subsector’s ability to prepare for and respond to cyber and physical threats, vulnerabilities, and

incidents. The NERC operates the E-ISAC on behalf of the electricity subsector.

Electric grid. Layout of the electrical transmission system; a network of transmission lines and

the associated substations and other equipment required to move power.

Emergency communications. The means and methods for exchanging communications and

information necessary for successful incident management. (Source: National Emergency

Communications Plan)

Emergency Management Assistance Compact. A congressionally ratified mutual aid compact

that legally establishes a national system to facilitate resources across state lines during an

emergency or disaster.

Emergency response providers. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines emergency

response providers as local, state, and federal governmental and nongovernmental emergency

public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital

emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities.

Emergency Support Functions. Used by the Federal Government and many state governments

as the primary mechanism at the operational level to organize and provide assistance, ESFs align

categories of resources and provide strategic objectives for their use. ESFs utilize standardized

Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq.).

Executive Order 13603 of March 16, 2012: National Defense Resources Preparedness.

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resource management concepts such as typing, inventorying, and tracking to facilitate the

dispatch, deployment, and recovery of resources before, during, and after an incident.

Energy sector. The energy sector supplies fuels to the transportation industry, electricity to

households and businesses, and other sources of energy that are integral to growth and

production across the Nation. It is divided into three interrelated segments or subsectors—

electricity, oil, and natural gas—to include the production, refining, storage, and distribution of

oil, gas, and electric power, except for hydroelectric and commercial nuclear power facilities and

pipelines. (Source: Energy Sector Specific Plan)

Energy Subsector Coordinating Council. The ESCC is the principal liaison between leadership

in the Federal Government and in the electric power sector, with the mission of coordinating

efforts to prepare for national-level incidents or threats to CI. The ESCC includes utility CEOs

and trade association leaders representing all segments of the industry.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: An independent agency that regulates the interstate

transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil. FERC regulates the wholesale sale of electric

energy in interstate commerce. FERC also reviews proposals to build liquefied natural gas

terminals and interstate natural gas pipelines as well as licensing hydropower projects.

Federal Power Program. A government program that includes the TVA, BPA, SEPA, SWPA,

and WAPA. These wholesale-only entities were created to provide their electric company and

industrial customers with access to federally owned and operated hydroelectric dams for

distribution to end users. TVA is an independent, government-owned corporation that provides

electricity for business customers and local power distributors in parts of seven southeastern

states and owns both generation and transmission facilities. BPA, SEPA, SWPA, and WAPA are

Power Marketing Administrations or PMAs, which are federal agencies housed within the DOE

(see Power Marketing Administration).

First responders. (also see Emergency response providers). The Implementing the 9/11

Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 states that the term “first responder” shall have the

same meaning as the term “emergency response provider,” which is defined in the Homeland

Security Act of 2002.

Generator. Machine that converts one form of energy into another, especially mechanical

energy into electrical energy.

Government Coordinating Council. The government counterpart to the SCC for each sector,

established to enable interagency coordination. The GCC comprises representatives across

various levels of government (local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal) as

appropriate to the security and operational landscape of each individual sector. (Source: 2013

NIPP)

Independent power producers. Sometimes called non-utility generators, these are privately

held businesses that own and operate their own generation assets and sell power to other utilities

or directly to end users.

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers. Operational entities formed by CI owners and

operators to gather, analyze, appropriately sanitize, and disseminate intelligence and information

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related to CI. ISACs provide 24/7 threat warning and incident reporting capabilities and have the

ability to reach and share information within their sectors, between sectors, and among

government and private sector stakeholders. (Source: Presidential Decision Directive [PDD]-63)

Interdependency. Mutually reliant relationship between entities (objects, individuals, or

groups); the degree of interdependency does not need to be equal in both directions.

Investor-owned utilities. For-profit companies owned by their shareholders. These utilities may

have service territories in one or more states. State commissions will grant IOUs the license to

operate in specific areas of the state under certain terms and conditions. Their interstate

generation, transmission, and power sales are regulated by FERC, and state commissions

regulate their distribution system and retail sales.

Jurisdiction. A range or sphere of authority. Public safety agencies have jurisdiction at an

incident related to their legal responsibilities and authority. Jurisdictional authority at an incident

can be political or geographical (e.g., local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal

boundary lines) or functional (e.g., law enforcement, public health, medical).

Large power transformer. The term LPT is broadly used to describe a power transformer with

a maximum nameplate rating of 100 megavolt-amperes or higher. (Source: Large Power

Transformers and the Electric Grid, DOE, April 2014 Update)

Lifeline function. Per the NIPP, a lifeline function is a sector that provides indispensable

services to enable the continuous operation of critical business and government functions that

would risk human health and safety or national and economic security if compromised or not

promptly restored. These sectors provide the most essential services that underlie a regional

economy. Lifeline functions include communications, energy, transportation, and water.

Mutual Aid Agreement or Assistance Agreement: Written or oral agreement between and

among agencies, organizations, or jurisdictions that provides a mechanism to quickly obtain

emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, and other associated

services. The primary objective is to facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of emergency

support prior to, during, or after an incident.

National Disaster Recovery Framework. Defines how the whole community, including

emergency managers, community development professionals, recovery practitioners, government

agencies, private sector, NGO leaders, and the public, will collaborate and coordinate to more

effectively utilize existing resources to promote resilience and support the recovery of those

affected by an incident. (Source: NDRF)

National Incident Management System. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is

a comprehensive, national approach to incident management that applies at all jurisdictional

levels and across functional disciplines.

National Preparedness Goal. The cornerstone for the implementation of PPD-8, it establishes

the capabilities and outcomes for the Nation to accomplish across five mission areas (Prevention,

Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery) to be secure and resilient. The Goal establishes

distinct core capabilities and corresponding target elements for each mission area.

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National Response Coordination Center. When activated, the NRCC is a multiagency

coordination center located at FEMA Headquarters. Its staff coordinates the overall federal

support for major disasters and emergencies, including catastrophic incidents and emergency

management program implementation. FEMA maintains the NRCC as a functional component of

the National Operations Center for incident support operations. (Source: NRF)

National Response Event. A classification used by Edison Electric Institute to describe a natural

or manmade event that is forecasted to cause or that causes long-term power outages affecting a

significant population or several regions across the United States and requires resources from its

multiple regional mutual aid groups. [Note: this term is not necessarily used by other

components of the electric industry.]

National Response Framework. A guide to how the Nation responds to all types of disasters

and emergencies. It describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that

range from the serious but purely local to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural

disasters.

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. The national service organization for the

Nation’s 900-plus member owned not-for-profit electric utilities who keep the lights on for 42

million people across 47 states. Electric cooperatives bring power to 75 percent of the United

States landmass and 12 percent of the U.S. population.

Network. Per the NIPP, a network is a group of components that share information or interact

with each other to perform a function.

Nongovernmental organization. Voluntary, racial, ethnic, faith-based, veteran-based, and not-

for-profit organizations that provide sheltering, emergency food supplies, and other essential

support services. NGOs are inherently independent and committed to specific interests and

values.

North American Electric Reliability Corporation. A not-for-profit international regulatory

authority whose mission is to assure the reliability of the BPS in North America. NERC’s area of

responsibility spans the continental United States, Canada, and the northern portion of Baja

California, Mexico. NERC is the electric reliability organization for North America, subject to

oversight by the FERC and governmental authorities in Canada.

Outage. Removal of generating capacity from service, either forced or scheduled.

Power grid. Layout of the electrical transmission system; a network of transmission lines and

the associated substations and other equipment required to move power.

Power Marketing Administrations. PMAs provide public power and rural electric cooperative

customers with cost-based hydroelectric power produced at federal dams operated primarily by

USACE and the Bureau of Reclamation.

Private sector entity. Per the NRF, private sector entities include large, medium, and small

businesses; commerce, private cultural and educational institutions; and industry, as well as

public-private partnerships that have been established specifically for emergency management

purposes.

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Protective Security Advisors. Security SMEs who engage with local, state, tribal, territorial,

and insular area governmental partners and members of the private sector stakeholder

community to protect the Nation’s CI. During incidents, PSAs provide infrastructure security and

resilience expertise at the JFOs, RRCCs, and state and county EOCs to assist with response and

recovery efforts.

Public power utilities. Not-for-profit utilities owned and operated by state or local governments

or by agencies, authorities, or instrumentalities of such governments. City-owned utilities are

also known as municipal utilities (munis). Public power utilities are regulated and governed by

locally elected or appointed officials and are directly accountable to the communities they serve.

Within the United States, there are more than 2,000 community-owned electric companies,

serving more than 48 million people or about 14 percent of the Nation’s electricity consumers.

Recovery Support Functions. Coordinating structures for key functional areas of assistance

during recovery operations, RSFs support local governments by facilitating problem solving,

improving access to resources, and fostering coordination among state and federal agencies,

nongovernmental partners, and stakeholders. (Source: NDRF)

Regional Mutual Assistance Groups. Voluntary partnerships of investor-owned electric

companies across the country, RMAGs are the mechanisms through which investor-owned

electric companies request support for restoring power. These entities facilitate the process of

identifying available restoration workers and help utilities coordinate the logistics and personnel

involved in restoration efforts.

Regional Response Coordination Center. When activated, RRCCs are multi-agency

coordination centers generally staffed by ESFs in anticipation of or immediately following an

incident. Operating under the direction of the FEMA Regional Administrator, the staff within an

RRCC coordinates federal regional response efforts and maintains connectivity with FEMA

Headquarters and with state EOCs and state and major urban area fusion centers.

Resources. Personnel and major items of equipment, supplies, and facilities available or

potentially available for assignment to incident operations and for which status is maintained.

Resources are described by kind and type and may be used in operational support or supervisory

capacities at an incident or at an EOC.

Rural Electric Cooperatives. Also known as co-ops, they are not-for-profit entities owned by

their members and tend to serve in rural areas that are not traditionally served by other utilities.

They must have democratic governance and operate at cost. Any revenue generated in excess of

operating costs must be returned to the members. Members vote for representatives to the

co-op’s board of directors, which oversees operations.

Sector Coordinating Council. The private sector counterpart to the GCC, these councils are

self-organized, self-run, and self-governed organizations that represent a spectrum of key

stakeholders within a sector. They serve as principal entry points for the government to

collaborate with each sector for developing and coordinating a wide range of CI security and

resilience activities and issues. (Source: NIPP)

Sector Specific Agency. A federal department or agency designated by PPD-21 with

responsibility for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise, as well as leading,

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facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its

designated CI sector in the all-hazards environment. (Source: PPD-21)

Sector Specific Plans. Planning documents that complement and tailor application of the

National Plan to the specific characteristics and risk landscape of each CI sector. SSAs develop

them in close collaboration with the SCCs and other sector partners. (Source: NIPP)

SpareConnect Program. A program that establishes a confidential, unified platform for the

entire electric industry to communicate equipment needs in the event of an emergency or other

non-routine failure.

Spare Transformer Equipment Program. An electric industry program that requires each

participating electric company to maintain a specific number of transformers and to sell its spare

transformers to any other participating utility that suffers a “triggering event” (an act of terrorism

that destroys or disables one or more substations and results in the declared state of emergency

by the President of the United States).

Substations. Equipment that switches, steps down, or regulates voltage of electricity. Also

serves as a control and transfer point on a transmission system.

Transformer. Electrical device that changes the voltage in alternating current circuits.

Whole Community. Per the National Preparedness Goal, the term “whole community” applies

to the focus on enabling the participation in national preparedness activities of a wider range of

players from the private and nonprofit sectors, including NGOs and the general public, in

conjunction with the participation of local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal

governmental partners to foster better coordination and working relationships.

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Appendix 8: Acronyms

To promote readability, this annex utilizes acronyms only after the first occurrence of the proper

name of a Federal Executive Branch department or agency or of a commonly used term. The

exception to this rule applies to acronyms that only appear within tables and figures in the

document, where space considerations and readability render the use of acronyms optimal.

APPA American Public Power Association

ARC American Red Cross

ASPR

DHS Office of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response

BPA

Bonneville Power Administration

BES

Bulk Electrical System

BPS Bulk Power System

CAT Crisis Action Team

CEII Critical Electric Infrastructure Information

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CI Critical Infrastructure

CI-CAT

Critical Infrastructure–Crisis Action Team

CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection

CIR Critical Information Requirement

Co-ops Cooperatives

CS&C Office of Cybersecurity and Communications

CWG Communications Working Group

DCISE Defense Inclusive Base Collaborative Information Sharing Environment

DHS NPPD IP Department of Homeland Security National Protection and Programs

Directorate Infrastructure Protection

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DIB Defense Industrial Base

DIRS Disaster Information Reposting System

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOC Department of Commerce

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DoED Department of Education

DOI Department of the Interior

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DOJ Department of Justice

DOL Department of Labor

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

DPA Defense Production Act

DRF Disaster Relief Fund

E-ISAC Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center

EAD

Energy Assurance Daily

EAGLE-I

Environment for Analysis of Geo-Located Energy Information

EEAC

Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators

EARSS

Energy Awareness and Resiliency Standardized Services

EEI

Edison Electric Institute

EIA Energy Information Administration

EIDL Economic Injury Disaster Loans

EMP Electromagnetic pulse

EOC

Emergency Operations Center

EPA

Environmental Protection Agency

EPCA

Energy Policy and Conservation Act

EPFAT

Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool

EPRAM (Los Alamos) Evolutionary Prototyping with Risk Analysis and Mitigation

ERD Emergency Relief Docket

EPRAM (USACE) Emergency Power Readiness Assessment Model

ERO Electric Reliability Organization

ESCC

Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council

ESF

Emergency Support Function

ESFLG

Emergency Support Function Leadership Group

FAST Fixing America’s Surface Transportation

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERC

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FIOP Federal Interagency Operational Plan

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

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FRA Federal Railroad Administration

FRB Federal Reserve Board

FRCC Florida Reliability Coordinating Council

FUA Fuel Use Act

GCC Government Coordinating Council

GIS Geographic Information Systems

GSA General Services Administration

HAZUS Hazards U.S.

HAZUS-MH

Hazards U.S. Multi-hazards

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police

IOC Infrastructure of Concern

IOU Investor-Owned Utilities

IP Office of Infrastructure Protection (DHS)

IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System

ISAC Information Sharing Analysis Center

Information Technology

JFO Joint Field Office

JIC Joint Information Center

JOC Joint Operations Center

LPT

Large Power Transformer

MAWG Mutual Aid Working Group

MDWG Modeling and Data Working Group

MoDI Modeling and Data Inventory

MRO Midwest Reliability Organization

NACCHO National Association of County and City Health Officials

NBEOC

National Business Emergency Operations Center

NASEO National Association of State Energy Officials

NARUC National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

NCC National Coordination Center

NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center

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NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NDRF

National Disaster Recovery Framework

NEF

National Essential Functions

NERC

North American Electric Reliability Corporation

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NICC National Infrastructure Coordinating Center

NIMS National Incident Management System

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan

NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NMART

Edison Electrical Institute’s National Mutual Assistance Resource Team

NPPD National Protection and Programs Directorate

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPWS National Public Warning System

NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRCC National Response Coordination Center

NRCS

National Response Coordination Staff

NRE National Response Event

NRECA National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

NRF National Response Framework

NSA National Sheriffs’ Association

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

NVOAD National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OCIA Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis

OPM Office of Personnel Management

PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information

PEP

Primary Entry Point

PICCL

Private Sector Incident Communications Conference Line

PMA Power Marketing Administration

POD Point of Distribution

POIA Power Outage Incident Annex

PPD Presidential Policy Directive

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PSA Protective Security Advisor

RFI Request for Information

RMAG Regional Mutual Assistance Group

RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center

RSF Recovery Support Function

SBA Small Business Administration

SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition systems

SCC Sector Coordinating Council

SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act

SEC

Securities and Exchange Commission

SEPA

Southeastern Power Administration

SERC

SERC Reliability Corporation

SME Subject matter expert

SNAP Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve

SSA Sector Specific Agency

STEP

Spare Transformer Equipment Program

SWPA Southwestern Power Administration

TREAS

Department of the Treasury

TSA

Transportation Security Administration

TVA

Tennessee Valley Authority

UCG Unified Coordination Group

USACE

United States Army Corps of Engineers

USCG United States Coast Guard

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

USPS

United States Postal Service

WAPA

Western Area Power Administration

WECC Western Electricity Coordinating Council