History of Modern Philosophy Kant’s Critique of Judgment—1
Critique of judgment
Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) generally regarded as foundational treatise in modern
philosophical aesthetics
no integration of aesthetic theory into a complete philosophical system predates Kant’s third
Critique
until 1780's Kant did not consider what we now know as aesthetics to be a legitimate subject for
philosophy
he denied the principles of taste
holding that our judgments about beauty are based simply on pleasure
and thus entirely subjective
a fit study for empirical studies only (anthropology or history)
did not regard aesthetic perception as related to cognitive judgment, understanding, and ideas
but his drive for philosophical systemmaticity led him to reconsider
would a critical examination of our faculty of feeling pleasure lead to a third branch of
philosophy?
that would join theoretical philosophy (metaphysics) and practical philosophy (ethics)?
he hoped to provide a theory of the aesthetic judgment that would justify its apparent claim to
intersubjective validity, and escape the temptations of skepticism and relativism
believed this could be accomplished only by giving a deeper interpretation of art and its values
and by establishing for it a more intimate connection with the basic cognitive faculties of the
mind
Critique of Pure Reason uncovered a priori conditions [mind software] for making objective,
universally valid empirical judgments, both ordinary and scientific [the mind imposes space,
time, and causality on experience]
space and time are the a priori conditions of our being affected by things (Sensibility)
the categories are the a priori conditions of making judgments (Understanding)
Critique of Practical Reason discovered a priori conditions of making objective, universally
valid moral judgments
Critique of Judgment: are there a priori conditions for making judgments based on pleasure?
Kant takes as his paradigm the type of judgment everyone believes is based on feeling
pleasure—the judgment that something is beautiful
his epistemology and metaphysics based on division between
Sensibility—the ability to be affected by things by receiving sensations; this is not yet at the
level of thought, or even experience in any meaningful sense
Understanding—the faculty of producing thoughts; it is non-sensible, discursive, works with
general concepts, not individual intuitions
History of Modern Philosophy Kant’s Critique of Judgment—2
Ordinary experience comes about through the synthesis of these two powers
the Understanding takes the material of sensation and organizes it into a concept
resulting in a thought or judgment
by ‘judgment’ Kant simply means experience that results in a claim or assertion about something
the judgment that something is beautiful he calls a ‘judgment of taste’
The Analytic of the Beautiful
an analysis of “what is required in order to call an object beautiful”
The Four Moments
is divided into four “Moments” corresponding to heading of the table of judgments in the first
Critique: quantity, quality, relation, modality
FIRST MOMENT (QUALITY)
Disinterested Pleasure
concludes that in order to call an object beautiful one must judge it to be
“the object of an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction”
aesthetic pleasure comes only to those who attend to the object disinterestedly
how does Kant reach this conclusion:
begins with the observation that the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment
thus not a cognitive judgment
in a cognitive judgment I use a concept to connect my experience to an object
in an aesthetic judgment, I don’t use a concept, but my own subjective state (sentiment)
when judging something to be beautiful, one is relating the object (one’s awareness of the object)
“back to the subject and to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or
displeasure”
judgments of taste are thus subjective rather than objective
then Kant differentiates pleasure in the beautiful from other pleasures
what is unique about pleasure in the beautiful is that it is
“a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, either of sense or of reason, here forces
our assent”
the pleasure in the beautiful is not in an object’s gratifying our senses: like sweetness of candy
nor is it based on finding some practical use (the mediately good or the useful)
nor based on fulfilling moral requirements (the morally good)
the pleasure in the beautiful ismerely contemplative
a kind of free contemplation and reflection
this disinterestedness is what is unique about the judgment of taste
for contemplation and reflection are absent in what pleases through sensation
and contemplation and reflection in the practical concerns (the useful or moral) are not free but
constrained by definite concepts
History of Modern Philosophy Kant’s Critique of Judgment—3
SECOND MOMENT (QUANTITY)
Universal Pleasure
concludes that “the beautiful is that which pleases universally without [requiring] a concept”
this conclusion is badly put since it is plainly false: a beautiful thing does not please everyone
what he means is better put earlier
“the beautiful is that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal
satisfaction”
aesthetic judgments thus behave universally
they involve an expectation or claim upon the agreement of others
we make the judgment that something is beautiful ‘as if’ beauty where a real property of the
object—in this sense the pleasure in the beautiful is not wholly subjective
we think that others should find the object beautiful as well, while fully recognizing that not
everyone will in fact agree
“the judgment of taste itself does not postulate the agreement of everyone”
we tend to see disagreements over judgment of the beautiful as involving error
an agreement as more than coincidence
Kant calls this feature of judgments of taste theirsubjective universality”
argues for this in two ways
1) through the concept of disinterestedness
if the pleasure in finding something beautiful does not lie in any interest
then one can conclude that it doesn’t depend on private conditions
“must be regarded as grounded on what he can presuppose in every other person . . .
Consequently the judgment of taste, accompanied with the consciousness of separation from
all interest, must claim validity for everyone”
2) to say that something is beautiful is (linguistically) to claim universality for one’s judgment
Judgments of taste are not objective but only subjectively universal
they cannot be proved
“there can be no rule according to which anyone is to be forced to recognize anything as
beautiful”
At this point Kant’s explication of the judgment of taste seems to lead to an insoluble problem:
the judgment of taste is based on feeling of pleasure but also claims universal validity
yet judgments of taste cannot be proved since they do not rest on concepts or rules
the crucial question, which Kant says “is the key to the critique of taste”
How is it that the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is universally communicable?
History of Modern Philosophy Kant’s Critique of Judgment—4
The answer is that the pleasure is universally communicable only if it is based not one mere
sensation but on a state of mind that is universally communicable
since the only universally communicable states of mind are cognitive states
somehow the pleasure in the beautiful must be based on cognition
but he has already determined that a judgment of taste is not cognitive in that there is no referring
to a concept but rather to a feeling
thus his answer is that the pleasure underlying the judgment of taste is not based on a particular
cognitive state of mind, but only on “cognition in general
judgment of taste is based on the free play of the cognitive faculties
imagination: that which gathers together the stuff of our experience into definite images or
representations
understanding: forms definite concepts from these representations
in aesthetic experience the same two faculties operate together
however the end result is not a definite concept
instead the two faculties interact in free play:
the imagination forms a representation of the object
but unlike the case of cognition
the understanding does not form a definite concept
for in aesthetic experience no definite concept could adequately capture what we observe
in aesthetic experience the two faculties do not come to a definite conclusion but they work
back and forth in a free play between imagination and understanding
take the case of the experience of a flower
in the case of cognition, the imagination presents to the understanding a representation of the
flower
the understanding then determines the appropriate concept (e.g., a petunia) completing the
process of cognition
but in aesthetic experience this process does not come to a completion but works back and
forth
the understanding still seeks understanding
but the imagination is continually reworking its representations
thus in aesthetic experience there is more than understanding can grasp
the understanding also stimulates the imagination into further reformulations
the aesthetic experience thus enhances our experience of the object’s particularity
while cognition seeks generically classifiable features
THIRD MOMENT (RELATION)
The Form of Purposiveness
purports to explain what is being related to in the judgment that something is beautiful
the content of the judgment of taste
History of Modern Philosophy Kant’s Critique of Judgment—5
Kant concludes it is the form of the purposiveness or finality of an object, insofar as this is
perceived without any representation of a purpose
“purposiveness without purpose”
the straightfoward (easier) part of the third moment is that the pleasure in the beautiful is based
on the perceived form of the object
Kant argues that a pure judgment of taste cannot be based on pleasures of charm or emotion
nor simply on empirical sensations such as charming colors
nor on a definite concept
but only on formal properties
these formal properties are essentially spatial and temporal relations
manifested in the spatial delineation or design of figures
temporal composition of tones
ornamentation or elements of charm or emotion may attract us to beautiful objects
but in order to make an aesthetic judgment we must abstract from these elements
reflect only on the form
the harder part of the third moment concerns the concept of “purposiveness without purpose”
to say that an object (say a knife) has a purpose is to say that the concept of its being the way it is,
having the form it has, came first and is the cause of its existence
the knife’s form makes sense because we know its purpose
to appreciate the beauty of the knife
to attend to the knife aesthetically
is to recognize the object to be purposiveness in its form
without conceptualizing a definite purpose
FOURTH MOMENT (MODALITY)
Necessary Pleasure
“the beautiful is that which without any concept is cognized as the object of a necessary
satisfaction”
when we find something beautiful we think that everyone ought to give their approval and also
describe it as beautiful
as we cannot prove that everyone will find the same object beautiful
this necessity is not theoretical, objective
nor can it be a practical necessity
Kant calls the necessity
exemplary”
“subjective”
“conditioned”
based on a “ground that is common to all”
History of Modern Philosophy Kant’s Critique of Judgment—6
describes this as “common sense”
“A subjective principle which determines what pleases or displeases only by feeling and not
by concepts, but yet with universal validity”
it is a common sense that is exemplary—an ideal or norm—but is presupposed by all aesthetic
judgment
The Deduction of the Judgments of Taste
strictly speaking the “Analytic of the Beautiful” was only supposed to show what is required to
call an object beautiful—to give an explanation of what a judgment of taste means
but Kant also begins to discuss the problem of whether one can ‘provide a deduction’ (show the
legitimacy) of a class of judgment “which imputes the same satisfaction necessarily to everyone”
this is what he thinks subsumes the Critique of Judgment under transcendental philosophy
the key question of philosophical aesthetics:
is it legitimate to make a judgment based merely on the pleasure experienced in perceptually
apprehending something, while implying that everyone ought to agree?
Kant believes he has established a link tothe general problem of transcendental philosophy:
how are synthetical a priori judgments possible?”
His answer:
claims that the pleasure in the beautiful must be based on “cognition in general,” which is
described as the harmony of the cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding) in free play
that is, not determined by concepts
harmony is characterized as the representation of the mere form of purposiveness by which an
object is given to us
determining ground of the judgment is the feeling of that harmony in the play of the mental
powers
the judgment of taste presupposes the universal capacity to experience this feeling, which Kant
refers to as a “common sense”
how to justify the implied universality and necessity of the judgment of taste?
The conclusion of the Deduction:
it is legitimate to impute to everyone the pleasure we experience in the beautiful because
1) we are claiming it rests on the subjective element that we rightly presuppose in everyone to be
necessary for cognition
for otherwise we would not be able to communicate with one another at all
2) we are assuming that our judgment of taste is pure—not affected by charm, emotion, the mere
History of Modern Philosophy Kant’s Critique of Judgment—7
pleasantness of sensation, or even concepts
experiencing beauty is thus a doubly reflective process:
1) we reflect on the spatial and temporal form of the object
by exercising our powers of judgment (imagination & understanding)
2) we judge the beauty of an object when we come to be aware
through the feeling of pleasure we get
of this harmony that is the free play between imagination & understanding
which we become aware of by reflecting upon our own mental states
The Sublime
the experience of the sublime seems to directly contradict the principle of the purposiveness of
the nature of our judgment
solution: the real object of the sublime is not storm, the chasm, the building, etc
what is properly sublime are the ideas of reason
Fine Art and Artistic Genius
turns from main argument to more discursive reflection on a number of topics
art and nature, the classification of the arts, genius, humor
through genius “Nature gives the rule to art”
Genius is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to art”
genius has a talent for producing that for which no rule can be given
genius does not imitate
originality is his essential property
argues that art can be tasteful (that is, agree with aesthetic judgment)
and yet also be ‘soulless’
lacking that certain something
what provides soul in fine art is an aesthetic idea
and it is the talent of genius to generate aesthetic ideas
influence of Kant’s theory of genius:
radical separation of the aesthetic genius from the scientific mind (129)
emphasis on the near miraculous expression of the ineffable, excited states of mind (132)
the link of fine art to a ‘metaphysical’ content (133)
the requirement of radical originality (128)
the raising of poetry to the head of all arts
all of these were a commonplace for well over a century after Kant
when modernists protested against the concept of the artist by using ‘automatic writing’ or ‘found
objects’ it is, for the most part, this concept of the artist-genius that they are reacting against