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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONCERT SPECIALS, INC., a corporation, and
STEVEN EBRANI, individually and as an officer of
Concert Specials, Inc.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
21-CV-214
COMPLAINT FOR
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
AND OTHER EQUITABLE
RELIEF
Plaintiff, the United States of America, by its undersigned attorneys, acting upon
notification and authorization to the Attorney General by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
pursuant to Section 16(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §
56(a)(1), for its Complaint alleges:
1. Plaintiff brings this action under Sections 5(m)(1)(A), 13(b), 16(a), and 19 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), 53(b), 56(a), and 57b and
Section 2 of the Better Online Ticket Sales Act (“the BOTS Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 45c, to obtain
monetary civil penalties, permanent injunctive relief, and other relief for Defendants’ acts or
practices in violation of Section 2(a) of the BOTS Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45c(a) and Section 5 of the
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
2. Between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Defendants have used ticket bots
and other technology to gain access to tens of thousands of tickets for performances and events,
including concerts and sporting events. Defendants’ purchases exceeded posted ticket limits to
many popular events, like Elton John concerts. Defendants also have used hundreds of fictitious
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Ticketmaster accounts, multiple credit cards (including some in the names of fictitious
individuals), and proxy or spoofed IP addresses to bypass, trick, or otherwise avoid security
measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures on Ticketmaster’s
websites, that would have otherwise blocked or prevented them from obtaining so many tickets.
Defendants then have resold or have attempted to resell the tickets on secondary ticketing websites.
Defendants have made more than $13.7 million in revenue selling the tickets they obtained from
Ticketmaster on secondary markets—often at a significant price markup. Their actions prejudiced
consumers, who otherwise may have been able to purchase those tickets directly from
Ticketmaster at a lower price. By their actions, Defendants have violated the BOTS Act and the
FTC Act.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a),
1345.
4. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(1),
(c)(2), (c)(3) and (d), and 1395(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
DEFENDANTS
5. Defendant Concert Specials, Inc. (“Concert Specials”) is a New York corporation
with its principal place of business at 747 Middle Neck Road, Great Neck, NY 11024. Concert
Specials transacts or has transacted business in this District and throughout the United States.
6. Defendant Steven Ebrani (“Steven Ebrani”) is the owner and president of Concert
Specials. At all times material to this Complaint, acting alone or in concert with others, he has
formulated, directed, controlled, or had the authority to control or participated in the acts and
practices of Concert Specials, including the acts and practices set forth in this Complaint. Steven
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Ebrani resides in New York, and, in connection with the matters alleged herein, transacts or has
transacted business in this district.
7. On July 26, 2016, Defendants signed an Assurance of Discontinuance with the New
York Attorney General relating to, among other things, their use of ticket bots. The New York
Attorney General alleged, among other things, that Defendants violated New York state law by
using automated ticket purchasing software, or any machine, device, or computer program that
navigates or runs automated tasks on retail ticket purchasing websites in order to bypass security
measures to purchase tickets. Under the Assurance of Discontinuance, Defendants agreed “not to
utilize automated ticket purchasing software, including Bots, in order to bypass security measures
to purchase tickets to events in New York, or to maintain an interest in or maintain control over
the operation of automated ticket purchasing software to bypass security measures to purchase
tickets.”
COMMERCE
8. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendants have maintained a substantial
course of trade in or affecting commerce, as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act,
15 U.S.C. § 44.
THE BOTS ACT
9. Under the BOTS Act, it is unlawful for any person to “circumvent a security
measure, access control system, or other technological control or measure on an Internet website
or online service that is used by the ticket issuer to enforce posted event ticket limits or to maintain
the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.” 15 U.S.C. § 45c(a)(1).
10. The BOTS Act defines an “event” to mean “any concert, theatrical performance,
sporting event, show, or similarly scheduled activity, taking place in a venue with a seating or
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attendance capacity exceeding 200 persons that— (A) is open to the general public; and (B) is
promoted, advertised, or marketed in interstate commerce or for which event tickets are generally
sold or distributed in interstate commerce.”
11. A violation of the BOTS Act is “a violation of a rule defining an unfair or a
deceptive act or practice under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).” 15 U.S.C. § 45c(b)(1). Thus, pursuant to Section 18(d)(3) of the FTC Act,
15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(3), a violation of the BOTS Act is an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or
affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
DEFENDANTS CIRCUMVENTED SECURITY MEASURES,
ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS, OR TECHNOLOGICAL CONTROLS
OR MEASURES ON TICKETMASTER’S WEBSITES
12. Concert Specials is a ticket reseller. Its primary business involves purchasing
tickets from primary ticket issuers, and then reselling the tickets to consumers on secondary
ticketing websites.
13. Steven Ebrani, as the President of Concert Specials, was involved in selecting the
tickets for purchase and arranging for their resale.
14. Between January 1, 2017 and the current date, Defendants have made more than
34,513 Ticketmaster ticket purchases. They obtained more than 82,925 tickets from these
purchases.
15. Ticketmaster is a ticket issuer that has implemented security measures, access
control systems, or other technological controls or measures on its websites to enforce posted event
ticket purchase limits and to maintain the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.
16. In many instances, Defendants circumvented security measures, access control
systems, and other technological controls or measures on Ticketmaster’s websites by, among other
things, using ticket bots and other computer software and technologies, CAPTCHA bypass or
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solving services, fictitious names and addresses, multiple credit card accounts (including some in
the names of fictitious individuals), and IP proxies.
17. By their actions, Defendants have been able to purchase tickets far more rapidly
and in a greater volume than a consumer who was not using ticket bots or otherwise circumventing
security measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures on
Ticketmaster’s websites.
18. Defendants later resold many of the tickets on secondary ticketing websites, for a
profit.
DEFENDANTS’ USE OF TICKET BOTS TO CIRCUMVENT
SYSTEMS OR CONTROLS ON TICKETMASTER’S WEBSITES
19. Between January 1, 2017 and at least March 2017, in numerous instances,
Defendants used an automated computer program called Automatick to purchase tickets on
Ticketmaster’s websites. The Automatick ticket bot is also known as Smartick.
20. Defendants entered information into the Automatick ticket bot about the tickets that
they were interested in purchasing and the price they would pay for those tickets. The Automatick
ticket bot then would search Ticketmaster’s websites to see if the tickets were available to
purchase. The Automatick ticket bot would automatically reserve any tickets that fit Defendants’
search criteria. This reservation set aside the tickets for Defendants and blocked others from
purchasing them, at least until the reservation clock expired. Defendant Steven Ebrani would then
review the reserved tickets and select which tickets to purchase.
21. The Automatick ticket bot saved Defendants’ credit card information and
Ticketmaster account information, and automatically entered that information into Ticketmaster’s
websites. The Automatick ticket bot also would bypass any CAPTCHAs it encountered on
Ticketmaster’s websites while searching for or reserving tickets on Defendants’ behalf.
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CAPTCHA is an acronym for “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and
Humans Apart.” At times, Ticketmaster used CAPTCHAs on its websites to try to ensure that
visitors to its website were humans, and not automated computer programs or ticket bots.
22. Between approximately May 2017 and at least May 2019, in many instances,
Defendants used an automated computer program called Tixdrop to purchase tickets on
Ticketmaster’s websites. Defendants entered information into the Tixdrop ticket bot about the
tickets that they were interested in purchasing. The Tixdrop ticket bot then would repeatedly
search Ticketmaster’s websites to see if the tickets were available to purchase. The Tixdrop ticket
bot would automatically reserve any tickets that fit Defendants’ search criteria. This reservation
set aside the tickets for Defendants and blocked others from purchasing them, at least until the
reservation clock expired. Defendant Steven Ebrani would then review the reserved tickets and
select which tickets to purchase.
23. The Tixdrop ticket bot also saved Defendants’ credit card information and
Ticketmaster account information, and automatically entered that information into Ticketmaster’s
websites. In addition, the Tixdrop ticket bot would automatically complete all CAPTCHAs that
appeared on Ticketmaster’s websites while it was searching for or reserving tickets at the direction
of Defendants.
24. By using the Tixdrop and Automatick ticket bots, Defendants were able to purchase
multiple tickets across multiple Ticketmaster accounts within seconds—something that a
consumer abiding by Ticketmaster’s security, access control, and other technological measures
would be unable to do.
25. Defendants’ use of the Tixdrop and Automatick ticket bots, along with other
technologies, allowed them to circumvent security measures, access control systems, or other
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technological controls or measures on Ticketmaster’s websites that were used by Ticketmaster to
enforce posted event ticket purchase limits, or to maintain the integrity of posted online ticket
purchasing order rules.
DEFENDANTS HID THEIR IP ADDRESSES TO CIRCUMVENT
SYSTEMS OR CONTROLS ON TICKETMASTER’S WEBSITES
26. Between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Ticketmaster has had security
measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures on its websites that
were designed to prevent or block ticket purchasers from making multiple purchases on the same
day from the same IP address. An IP address is a unique string of numbers separated by periods
that Ticketmaster uses to identify a computer or affiliated computers making purchases.
Ticketmaster uses this technological system to enforce posted event ticket purchase limits and to
maintain the integrity of its posted online ticket purchasing order rules.
27. In many instances, between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Defendants have
taken steps to conceal their IP address when making ticket purchases. For example, at times,
Defendants used rotating proxy services and IP address blocks. These services allowed
Defendants to hide their actual IP address from Ticketmaster and instead use a proxy IP address
or the IP address of a computer or network that belongs to someone else.
28. Between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Defendants have used over 19,000
different IP addresses while making purchases on Ticketmaster’s websites.
29. Defendants hid their true IP addresses from Ticketmaster because they believed it
would allow them to circumvent technological controls on Ticketmaster’s websites.
30. By hiding their true IP addresses from Ticketmaster, Defendants have
circumvented security measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or
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measures on Ticketmaster’s websites that were used by Ticketmaster to enforce posted event ticket
purchase limits, or to maintain the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.
DEFENDANTS’ USE OF FICTITIOUS NAMES, MULITIPLE TICKETMASTER
ACCOUNTS, PROXY IP ADDRESES, AND MULTIIPLE CREDIT CARDS TO
CIRCUMVENT SYSTEMS OR CONTROLS
31. Between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Ticketmaster also has had security
measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures in place on its
websites that were designed to prevent individuals from purchasing more tickets than is otherwise
allowed under its posted event ticket limits. Among other things, these technological measures
monitor the following information to verify whether the purchase fell within posted purchase
limits: (a) the individual’s name, (b) billing address, (c) Ticketmaster accounts, and (d) the IP
address and cookies associated with the computer that made the purchase. From January 1, 2017
until or around October 2018, Ticketmaster also monitored the credit card number used by the
purchaser.
32. In many instances, between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Defendants have
bypassed these security measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or
measures by using sham identities and addresses, multiple credit cards, multiple Ticketmaster
accounts, and IP proxy services.
33. Defendants have used more than 700 Ticketmaster accounts to purchase tickets
during the relevant period. Each Ticketmaster account had a unique email address.
34. Defendants typically did not open Ticketmaster accounts in their own names.
Instead, Defendants have used more than 650 different names to open the accounts. The names
were either fictitious or the names of Defendant Ebrani’s friends and family members.
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35. In many instances, Defendants also did not use their address as the primary address,
shipping address, or billing address for their Ticketmaster accounts. Instead, they used over 550
addresses that were either fake or unrelated to their business.
36. Defendants have used more than 450 different credit cards to make purchases
through their Ticketmaster accounts. In numerous instances, Defendants’ Ticketmaster accounts
included credit cards in the names of fictitious individuals or the names of friends and family.
Defendants opened at least 150 corporate credit cards in the names of friends, family members,
and fictitious individuals. Defendants have used many of these credit cards to purchase tickets.
37. As discussed above, Defendants also hid from Ticketmaster the true IP addresses
of the computers used by Defendants to make purchases.
38. Defendants knew that if they purchased tickets using their true names, addresses,
and IP addresses, then Ticketmaster could prevent them from making all of the purchases they
wished to make, or their purchases could be cancelled.
39. Defendants’ use of multiple names, addresses, IP addresses, credit cards, and
Ticketmaster accounts circumvented Ticketmaster’s a security measures, access control systems,
or other technological controls or measures that were designed to prevent ticket purchasers from
exceeding posted event ticket purchase limits.
PLAINTIFF HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANTS ARE VIOLATING
AND WILL CONTINUE TO VIOLATE THE BOTS ACT AND THE FTC ACT
40. Based on the facts and violations of law alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiff has
reason to believe that Defendants are violating or are about to violate laws enforced by the
Commission, because among other things, (a) Defendants have been aware of the BOTS Act since
early 2017, but continued to violate the Act; (b) Defendants continue to circumvent security
measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures on Ticketmaster’s
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websites; and (c) Defendants are recidivists who continued to engage in unlawful conduct after
prior enforcement action.
COUNT I - VIOLATIONS OF THE BOTS ACT AND THE FTC ACT
41. As alleged in paragraphs 1 through 40, in numerous instances, Defendants have
circumvented a security measure, access control system, or other technological control or measure
on Ticketmaster’s websites that is used by Ticketmaster to enforce posted event ticket limits or to
maintain the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.
42. Therefore, Defendants’ acts or practices as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 40
violate the BOTS Act and the FTC Act.
CONSUMER INJURY
43. Consumers have suffered and will continue to suffer substantial injury as a result
of Defendants’ violations of the BOTS Act and the FTC Act. In addition, Defendants have been
unjustly enriched as a result of their unlawful acts or practices. Absent injunctive relief by this
Court, Defendants are likely to continue to injure consumers and harm the public interest.
THIS COURT’S POWER TO GRANT RELIEF
44. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), empowers this Court to grant
injunctive and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate to halt and redress violations
of any provision of law enforced by the FTC. The Court, in the exercise of its equitable
jurisdiction, may award ancillary relief, including rescission or reformation of contracts,
restitution, the refund of monies paid, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten monies, to prevent and
remedy any violation of any provision of law enforced by the FTC.
45. Section 19 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b, and the BOTS Act authorizes this
Court to grant such relief as the Court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers resulting
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from Defendants’ violations of the BOTS Act, including the rescission or reformation of contracts,
and the refund of money.
46. Section 5(m)(1)(A) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A), as modified by
Section 4 of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461, as
amended, and as implemented by 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d), authorizes this Court to award monetary
civil penalties. From August 1, 2016 to January 21, 2018, the Court was authorized to award a
penalty of up to $40,000 for each violation of the BOTS Act. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d) (2016).
From January 22, 2018 to February 13, 2019, the maximum penalty amount was $41,484 per
violation, and effective February 14, 2019, the maximum penalty amount was adjusted to $42,530
per violation, pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act
of 2015. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d) (2018); 84 Fed. Reg. 3980 (Feb. 13, 2019). Defendants’
violations of the BOTS Act were committed with the knowledge required by Section 5(m)(1)(A)
of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).
47. This Court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, may award ancillary relief,
including disgorgement, to prevent and remedy any violation of the BOTS Act and the FTC Act.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Plaintiff, pursuant to Sections 5(a), 5(m)(1)(A), and 13(b) and 19 of the FTC
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 45(m)(1)(A), and 53(b), Section 2(a) of the BOTS Act, 15 U.S.C. §
45c(a)(1), and the Court’s own equitable powers, requests that this Court:
A. Enter judgment against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff for each violation
alleged in this Complaint;
B. Enter a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of the BOTS Act by
Defendants;
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C. Award Plaintiff monetary civil penalties from each Defendant for every violation
of the BOTS Act;
D. Award such relief as the Court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers
resulting from Defendants’ violations of the FTC Act, including rescission or reformation of
contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten monies;
E. Award Plaintiff the costs of bringing this action, as well as such other and additional
relief, including disgorgement, as the Court may determine to be just and proper.
Date: January 14, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SETH D. DUCHARME
Acting United States Attorney
E
astern District of New York
/s/ Bonni J. Perlin
BONNI J. PERLIN
KEVIN YIM
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
JENNIFER B. DICKEY
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division
DANIEL J. FEITH
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
GUSTAV W. EYLER
Director, Consumer Protection Branch
Tel: (718) 254-6254
Tel: (718) 254-6186
/s/ Benjamin A. Cornfeld [email protected]
BENJAMIN A. CORNFELD [email protected]
Trial Attorney
Consumer Protection Branch
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 386
Washington, D.C. 20004
Tel: 202-598-7276
Fax: 202-514-8742
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