2
the linguistically central phenomenon of metaphor is concerned, the widespread
tendency to reinterpret as many semantic phenomena as possible in pragmatic terms,
may have to be firmly resisted.
2. The internal question
A speaker speaks literally, according to Searle, just in case what he means by uttering a
sentence is identical with what the sentence he utters itself means. (Thus, a speaker who,
in saying, “There are prime numbers”, means that there are prime numbers is a speaker
who speaks literally, since what he means is identical with what the sentence he utters—
namely, the sentence “There are prime numbers”—itself means.) Cases where what a
speaker means by uttering a sentence is not identical with what the sentence he utters
itself means come, according to Searle, in two varieties. On the one hand, a speaker who,
in uttering a sentence, means not only what the sentence he utters itself means but, in
addition, something else as well is a speaker who speaks indirectly. (For example, a speaker
who, in saying to his hearer, “Can you tell me the time?”, means both that he would like
to know whether the hearer can tell him the time and that he would like to know what
the time is, is a speaker who speaks indirectly, since, although he does mean what the
sentence he utters itself means—namely, that he would like to know whether the hearer
has the ability to tell him the time—means, in addition, something else that is not meant
by the sentence he utters—namely, that he would like to know what the time actually is.)
On the other hand, a speaker who, in uttering a sentence, does not mean at all what the
sentence he utters itself means but something different altogether is a speaker who
speaks figuratively. (For example, a speaker who, in saying, “Sally is a block of ice”, means
that Sally is unemotional, or a speaker who, in saying, “Sally was very kind to me”, means
that Sally was very rude to him, are speakers who speak figuratively, since they do not
mean at all what the sentences they utter themselves mean—namely, that Sally is a block
of ice or that Sally was very kind, respectively—but something else altogether—namely,
that Sally is unemotional and that Sally was very rude, respectively.) Finally, a speaker
who speaks figuratively—that is to say, a speaker who does not mean at all what the
sentence he utters means, but something different altogether—can, according to Searle,
be doing the one or the other of two different kinds of things. He may be speaking
ironically, in which case not only does he not mean at all what the sentence he utters
means but means the opposite of what the sentence he utters means; or he may be
speaking metaphorically, in which case he does not mean at all what the sentence he utters
means, but neither does he mean the opposite of what the sentence he utters means.
(Thus, a speaker who, in saying, “You have been very kind to me, Sally”, means that Sally
has been very rude to him is a speaker who speaks ironically, because not only does he
not mean what the sentence he utters means, but means the opposite of what that
sentence means—given that a person’s being rude is the opposite of that person’s being
kind; whereas a speaker who, in saying “Sally is a block of ice”, means that Sally is
unemotional, is a speaker who speaks metaphorically, because, though he does not mean
at all what the sentence he utters means, neither does he mean the opposite of what that